Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality
Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in María Lugones's essay “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy.
Wright, Charles. "Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality." Hypatia 19, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 49-76. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2004.tb00148.x.