Germany's Boundaries 1818-1819 A Study of British French Differences at the Paris Peace Conference

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GERMANY'S BOUNDARIES 1918-1919

A Study of British-French Differences at

the Paris Peace Conference

BY

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PREFACE

According to most historians, a definitive work on the Paris Peace Conference does not exist. This last of the great peace congresses presents such a massive amount of material that only in selected areas are any monographic and factual accounts found. This is an unfortunate circumstance for topics such as reparations, territorial settlements, the League of Nations, and many others necessarily overlap. Few studies on national views relating to various questions are available. Hence I have attempted such a study of French and British views at Versailles toward Germany's territorial settlement.

The student of the Peace Conference is also beset with the difficulty of obtaining documentary material. The British archives concerning the main period of the Peace Conference, that is, prior to June 28, 1919, are still closed. The French have printed the most complete set of documents covering the Conference (Conference de la Paix 1919-1920, Recueil des actes de la conference. 36 vols.), however, the only complete set easily available to scholars is at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California.

The majority of the material obtained for this work came from the St. John's University Library, the
University of Minnesota Library, and the Library of Congress. I should like to thank Ronald W. Roloff, O.S.B., who patiently obtained books through the Inter-Library Loan for my studies. And I am vastly indebted to my advisor, Professor Joseph F. Heininger, who with untiring patience and understanding read the manuscript and improved it greatly stylistically and in numerous other ways. His cooperation was immensely valuable and I wish to thank him for his kindness.
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Only for a time do wars destroy the strength of the vanquished to the advantage of the victor. And yet the progress of murder machines goes faster than that of organization for peace.\footnote{Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, trans. F. M. Atkinson (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930), p. 146.}
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The outbreak of the European war in the early days of August, 1914, brought to a climax the preceding years of diplomatic intrigue. This diplomacy had resulted in a system of alliances which must ultimately lead to war. Great Britain, following its traditional policy, had been confronted at the turn of the century by the rising might of German naval power. Failing to reach an understanding with Germany, Great Britain negotiated an entente with France in 1904, followed by an agreement with Russia in 1907. Between 1891 and 1894, France, militarily humiliated in 1870, isolated from European military alliances for two decades by Bismarck's foreign policy, succeeded in negotiating a series of agreements with Russia. When Germany then declared war on Russia on August 2, 1914, and on France the following day, Great Britain was honor-bound to protect French sovereignty. The German invasion of Belgium removed any British reluctance to enter the war, and since traditional British policy had always sought to prevent control of the low countries by a single continental
power, Great Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914.

World War I lasted four years, and unleashed upon the European continent the first great conflict of our century. Britain and France, historic rivals, drew together in the face of a common danger, for expediency proved more valuable than past policies. Compromises were reached, relations were cemented, and plans were made for the destruction of the Central Powers. Historic sentiment, however, was not easily displaced, and relations were sometimes seriously strained. Regarding the question of the Allied High Command, Georges Clemenceau later pointed out that "there was a long way to go. We had too many wars with British for them readily to fall in with the idea of placing their soldiers under the command of a Frenchman."¹ British-French intimacy was sometimes overtaxed, even when confronted by a common danger threatening their very existence. However, when the time came to make a lasting peace in honor of those who had shed their blood, even though the common threat was now past, they should have, as each had saved the other, worked together. Yet to say this was easy, but to achieve it required something more. For the rulers of states would show that they were "only guided

¹Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p. 57. Clemenceau denounced the British for suppressing nine divisions and claimed that while French losses were infinitely more serious than the British, they refused to make use of their enormous home reserves at the very moment it was essential to augment them.
in the present by the historical débris of feelings past and gone."\(^2\) In the absence of a foreign threat British-French relations declined enough to bring about a compromised peace. Perhaps only the threat of a future resurgent Germany saved a total rupture of relations.

Whatever their difficulties, the British-French Alliance continued during the war. With the help of American support after April, 1917, the Allied powers forced Germany to sign a truce on November 11, 1918. With the Armistice and relief from the devastating war, Allied Plenipotentiaries expressed general joy and satisfaction and hoped for an understanding of ideals in the great task that faced them.\(^3\)

With the work of the warrior completed, the diplomats and foreign ministries turned to reconstruction. Hopes for the coming peace were high; ideals were even higher. President Wilson, formulator of the Fourteen Points that were to be the basis of the Peace Conference, imagined himself as a symbol of the new Europe. Those crowds that acclaimed him at "Victoria Station" and "on the Corso," however, hailed him as the symbol of their victory; the man who would deliver Germany up

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for spoils. Wilson arrived in Europe aboard the George Washington, promising justice and peace to the European peoples, and because of the political necessity of keeping America from concluding a separate peace, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau presented similar appearances. Calling victory based on territorial conquests fruitless, since it would require battle to face German retaliatory attempts for French revenge, Clemenceau asked for a victor capable of controlling himself so as to replace armed might by right. Lloyd George and the British delegation also took up the word of the "Prophet," the British delegation's derogative for President Wilson. Lloyd George spoke for the delegation when he wrote, "We must not allow any sense of revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping desire to overrule the fundamental principles of righteousness."

Indeed, the assembly of notable world figures that gathered in Paris for the opening of the Peace Conference on January 18, 1919, promised hopes of satisfying the demands for a just and lasting peace. Nevertheless, these high ideals were seldom reached, and historians generally and many Conference delegates feel that the

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5Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, pp. 197-198.

Allied Plenipotentiaries fell considerably short of their goal. One, Harold Nicolson, pointed out in *Peacemaking 1919* that the Versailles Peace Treaty signed on June 28, 1919, flagrantly violated nineteen of President Wilson's twenty-three terms of peace. American idealism, running counter to European national interests, had succumbed to traditional diplomatic methods when the cause for unity was removed. British and French relations rapidly dissolved, and expediency, undermining the possibility of securing a good peace, dictated a policy favoring individual interests. Lloyd George had promised a return to normal trade relations within the Empire and reparations for war damages and costs. France under Clemenceau sought security, frontier extension, and punishment of Germany. The result was a compromise between idealism and traditional diplomacy, justice and might, and trade and security that promised few people satisfaction.

Conflicting interests which erupted at the Paris Peace Conference between Britain and France prompted these two countries to follow separate policies in the ensuing years. The importance of this divergence in relations was only realized when the time came to curtail a revived Germany, but then *rapprochement* between their

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8 P. 13.
policies came too late. These interests of Britain and France which came to light in Paris were not hastily constructed norms of national foreign policy, but were impregnated with tradition. British foreign policy was controlled by the Foreign Office and the Civil Service which represented tradition rather than the men in the governmental assemblies who represented the will of the people. Similarly, French foreign policy had descended from the tradition of royal absolutism into the hands of exclusive executive control and had persisted in this department even into the period of bourgeois democracy. Schuman has written that:

The foreign minister can usually pursue a personal policy within the limits imposed by the traditions of his office, the pressure of the permanent staff, and the 'national interests' of France.

The conclusion must be that these British and French interests existed throughout the war, however, these interests, prevalent at the beginning of the war and embodied in the Allied war aims and the terms of the Armistice, were necessarily overshadowed by the necessity of gaining victory. During the preliminary preparations for the Peace Conference, traditional diplomacy was further restrained by Wilsonian idealism only to emerge in


11 Ibid., p. 29.
the actual transformation of ideals to reality.

The growing impasse of British-French relations at Paris can be traced and analyzed by a study of the German territorial settlement as it was formulated in the Allied war aims, stated in the Armistice, discussed in the preparations for the Conference, and finally confirmed in the Versailles Peace Treaty. The dignitaries placed much emphasis upon the outcome of this settlement. This importance was stated firmly by the Allied ministers, when on January 5, 1919, they presented their plan formed at the preliminary sittings to discuss the Peace Conference. They then declared that the German territorial settlement "is the paramount problem which dominates all others, while the terms of its settlement will react on the whole Peace settlement."^{12}

^{12}Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 391.
CHAPTER II

BRITISH-FRENCH WAR AIMS

Officially, Germany had declared war on France, and, as a consequence, the total guilt of aggression was placed upon the Kaiser's regime during the Peace Conference. Yet, to understand the British-French position and their war aims, it must be pointed out that there has been speculation about the willingness of France and England to avoid war. Some authors refer specifically to the upper middle classes in France and England and mention their obstinacy and secret activities. Their conservative control of the bureaucracy and opposition to lower middle class reforms are sometimes given as possible causes for the conflict. Having large holdings in capital, industry, and newspapers, this class greatly increased its profits because of the war. However, while it cannot be stated that they wanted war, they perhaps did not want peace enough to ward off the catastrophe.¹ Even among the common soldiers in August, 1914,

the war had a thrilling sensation, however momentary. And, as the French crossed the frontier on August 14, 1914, in the face of trifling opposition, the soil of Alsace-Lorraine stretched before them. Wrenched from France in 1870, the provinces had become a symbol of the days of Napoleon. The French revanche, so long a dream, was to become reality.

The war aims of the British Empire, given in Dublin on September 25, 1914, by Hubert H. Asquith, Prime Minister until December, 1916, touched upon the ideal of public right as a governing idea of European policy and repudiated militarism in the relations of states. The moulding of a future Europe must make room for small states to exist free and independent while developing alongside their more powerful neighbors. Using slightly stronger language, Asquith moved closer to French interests in a speech given at Guildhall on November 9, 1914, when he said:

We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly destroyed.

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4 Ibid., I, 24.
On December 22, 1914, René Viviani, French Foreign Minister from June 13, 1914, to October 29, 1915, delivered a speech on French war aims. Stating that "France will lay down her arms only . . . when the provinces torn from her have been rejoined to her forever," Viviani, at this stage of the war, understandably associated French interests with English war aims.⁵ A comparison was not totally unjustified. These statements of notable intentions and righteous resolutions are cloaked in vague and ambiguous terminology, and hence their interpretation by a victorious nation could be as wide as its imagination. France had definite intentions of regaining Alsace-Lorraine, but how far beyond this acquisition of territory would the French desire for revenge and security carry her? Britain had little desire for territorial aggrandisement on the continent, but undoubtedly she wished the destruction of German naval power, a return to undisputed mastery of the high seas, and enlargement of the Empire. Still British entrance into the war was directly related to the violation of Belgium neutrality. Clemenceau's statement that "we must have the courage to say that our programme, when we entered the war, was not one of liberation!" could not readily be applied to Great Britain.⁶

⁵Ibid., I, 24-25. See Appendix A for Lloyd George's summary of the Allied war aims at the commencement of the war.

⁶Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p. 190.
During the autumn of 1916, Asquith, soon to be replaced by Lloyd George, issued instructions to the Foreign Office to prepare a memorandum to suggest a basis for a territorial settlement in Europe. This memorandum was prepared on two assumptions, one being an Allied victory, the other being a stalemate. The memorandum re-emphasized the right of large and small states and declared that the principle of nationality must be one of the governing factors in the consideration of territorial arrangements after the war. However, regarding this principle of nationality, the British Foreign Office made reservations when areas of British interest were concerned. It announced:

We are limited in the first place by the pledges already given to our Allies which may be, as for instance in the case of Italy, too difficult to reconcile with the claims of nationalities. We must realize further that our Allies, apart from any promises which we have made to them, may put forward claims conflicting with the principles of nationalities. In such an event our attitude should be guided by circumstances generally and British interests in particular. Lastly we should not push the principle of nationality so far as to unduly strengthen any state which is likely to be a cause of danger to European peace in the future.\footnote{Ibid., I, 32.}

The vital British interest continued to be Belgium and the withholding from Germany of access to Belgian coasts after the war. Since neutrality had proved to be ineffective, Belgian neutrality was to be safeguarded by

\footnote{Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 31.}
an alliance between France, Belgium, and Britain. Although this was objectionable from the British standpoint, because it entailed continental alliances and an increase in military obligations, there appeared to be no alternative as long as Belgium remained incapable of undertaking its own defense. In regard to Luxemburg, the British Foreign Office declared in favor of annexing that small principality to Belgium which had lost it in 1839.9

The British decision on a territorial settlement for Alsace-Lorraine left the matter in French hands, but favored a further rectification of the frontier on strategic grounds, provided the wishes of the people concurred and were consulted. Nevertheless, any attempt on the part of France to incorporate considerable amounts of German territory on the plea of strategical exigencies would be met with disapproval.10

When considering the status of Poland and the Eastern German boundaries, the Foreign Office made three suggestions before finally declaring in favor of the "creation of a Polish kingdom under a Russian Grand Duke."11 This was in accordance with the tsar's statement on November 15, 1916, when Nicholas II announced his rather paradoxical intention of establishing Poland

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9Ibid., I, 33.
10Ibid., I, 33-34.
11Ibid.
as an autonomous entity, but within the boundaries of the Russian Empire. The British felt that the only link to Russia should be a personal one. They expected Poland to be given economic stability by an outlet to the Baltic Sea. Poland was to be one of the most powerful units among the independent countries expected to come into existence after the war, and plans were discussed to make Poland a buffer state between Russia and Germany. Not only would Poland insure against Russian preponderance in Europe, but she would also be an effective barrier against German extension in the East. The Foreign Office felt that if Russia would remain faithful to Poland, the latter would not join in a league against the tsar. Although the British realized opposition to this proposal might occur in Petrograd, they believed the military situation would force the Russians to require British-French help in forcing the enemy from Russian territory. Using this diplomatic blackmail, the British felt they could compel the Russians to accept the proposals on Poland. Furthermore, the creation of a free Poland would seriously weaken Germany, since it would result in the loss of a very capable and prosperous population and the

12 Ibid., II, 970. Nicholas announced again on December 25, 1916, that he was striving to create a free Poland from all three of the until-now separated territories under the control of Germany, Austria, and Russia herself. These pronouncements came after the Central Power’s declaration on November 5, 1916, of creating an independent Poland. See Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 8.
loss of the coalfields of Silesia. A map showing the frontiers which the new Polish state might fairly claim was annexed to the memorandum. Based on ethnological lines, the figures for the population were taken from a German census. It was also decided to link the predominantly Czech populated area of Bohemia to Poland rather than have it made independent or linked to a Southern Slav state. The Czechs would, as the memorandum stated, fully appreciate the superior culture and civilization of the Poles.

However, while the British government was defining England's war aims, there were, during the latter part of 1916, several attempts to establish a peace settlement, one of which came from Germany herself. Following Germany's proposal to negotiate, President Wilson, in the middle of December, 1916, sought a rapprochement between the Allied and Central Powers. A note from the United States Ambassador in London on December 20, 1916, to the British Secretary of State, A. J. Balfour, contained peace proposals from Wilson. Five days later the chief ministers of Britain, France, and Italy met to consider the war conditions and to prepare methods for bringing

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13 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 34-36.

14 Ibid., I, 44.

the devastating conflict to a victorious end. Their conclusions, stated in general and vague terms, were communicated to Wilson on January 10, 1917. The Allied governments had stoutly agreed to continue with the war sacrifices until final victory was achieved on their terms. The British Foreign Office sent a succeeding note respecting the message of January 10 to the British Ambassador in Washington on January 13. This note stated the British concern for a durable peace, which would depend on its character, and that the peace could not have essentially and hopelessly defective foundations. The German desire for domination must be destroyed and machinery made available to enforce a peace and prevent any recurring outbreaks. The evil would be greatly mitigated when and if the Allies secured the changes in the map of Europe outlined in their joint note.

Meanwhile, the French desire for territorial acquisition had grown stronger. The French approached the British government about the Western German boundaries. Premier Aristide Briand despatched a note to Ambassador Paul Cambon in London on January 12, 1917, stating

\[^{16}\] Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, I, 57.

\[^{17}\] *State Papers*, CXI, 603-606.

\[^{18}\] Ibid., CXI, 606-610. These changes included the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, evacuation from France and Rumania, Poland to be dealt with according to the proclamation made by the tsar, Alsace-Lorraine was to be returned to France, and the Irredenta was to be given to Italy.
that Alsace-Lorraine must be restored not in the mutilated condition of 1815, but with frontiers as they had existed before 1790. The geographic and mineral basin of the Saar was demanded, and the Rhine was to serve as "a rampart for France." According to Lloyd George, Cambon, "with his sapient understanding of the British mind," did not communicate the message to the British government until six months had passed. Cambon then informed the Foreign Minister, Balfour, that the French "desired to see the territory to the west of the Rhine separated from the German Empire and erected into something in the nature of a buffer state." Lloyd George implied the Foreign Minister attached no importance to the French proposal for neither the War Cabinet nor the Imperial Cabinet were ever informed, perhaps because the French Ambassador never pressed the issue, preferring instead to accept Balfour's silence as a condonement.

19 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 384-385.

20 The British War Cabinet defined the war aims and policies of England, however, during the spring (March) of 1917, a meeting of the Dominion Premiers and the British War Cabinet resulted in the formation of the Imperial War Cabinet. Between March 20, 1917, and December 31, 1918, it held forty-eight meetings and played a decisive part in shaping the terms of the Peace. See Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 60-66, 94.

21 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 384-385. Wandyecz states that the French had made an overture to Britain and were turned down thus causing the French to turn to the Russians. See France and Her Eastern Allies, pp. 8-9.
One month after Briand's note to Cambon, the French approached the Russians about future postwar German borders. A message from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pokrovsky, to his Ambassador in Paris on February 12, 1917, stated that in an audience with the tsar, French Ambassador Doumergue had submitted French territorial aims in Western Europe. In reaching an agreement Russia would receive a free hand in arranging the Eastern borders of Germany. A later note from Pokrovsky to Doumergue on February 14 declared that the Russian government was contemplating the French terms. In March, 1917, Briand gave instructions to Doumergue to secure a definite pledge from the tsar giving personal assurance of support for French claims. This assurance was satisfactorily achieved in the French-Russian agreement on March 11, 1917, giving Russia complete control of Poland and France the Saar Valley, Alsace-Lorraine, and an independent Rhineland garrisoned by a French army. Lloyd George stated that the British government was not informed nor aware of this "clandestine transaction" until the Bolsheviks published the despatches sent from the Russian Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Paris.

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23Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 139.

24Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 385. Although Lloyd George declared that "it was my first experience of the underhanded diplomacy," Balfour
After France had given Russia complete control in Polish affairs, the tsar's government fell in March, 1917, and a provisional government was established. On March 28 the "Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies proclaimed that Poland 'had a right to free existence,"25 and on the following day the provisional government established an independent Poland on the principle of nationality. Albert Thomas, French Minister of Armament, declared the tsarist shadow over Polish-French relations had been lifted and Paris was totally in favor of a united and independent Poland. Fearing both Russian withdrawal from the war and Bolshevism, French statesmen now realized the need for a large pro-French Poland. Hence, on June 4, 1917, France provided for a Polish army on French soil, and on August 15, 1917, established the Polish National Committee presided over by Roman Dmowski at Lausanne. Yet Paris was slow to grant the Committee control over the Polish army and the French Assembly defeated suggestions for a Polish state restored to its 1772 borders which definitely would have alarmed the Russians.26

The French decision on Poland was expedient and

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25Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, p. 11.

26Ibid., pp. 11-13.
conformed with American and British policies. President Wilson had declared in favor of a united and independent Poland on January 22, 1917. On June 8, 1917, Great Britain, in a reply to the Russian note regarding the Allied war aims, happily agreed with the Provisional government's decision to liberate Poland, "not only the Poland ruled by the old Russian autocracy, but equally that within the dominion of the Germanic Empires." Britain also strongly hinted her desire to establish solid British-American relations for she agreed favorably with the aims of Wilson by which the war policy of Britain would be guided. The French understandably desired to change position in the event their agreement with the tsarist regime was made known, which occurred in November, 1917.

In the early spring of 1917, British war aims were restated when the Dominion Premiers formed the Imperial War Cabinet. The Imperial Cabinet's conclusions were similar to those pronounced in the Foreign Office Memorandum in 1916. In its meetings dealing with the British and Allied war aims, however, the Cabinet played an important part in shaping terms for the peace.

In 1918, French certainty that Russia would quit

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28 State Papers, CXI, 547.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., I, 94.
the war furthered efforts to secure an Allied declaration on Poland. Previously, on December 27, 1917, Pichon, French Foreign Minister, had clearly stated in the Chamber of Deputies that France wanted a Poland 'united, independent, indivisible, and with all guarantees of free political, economic, and military development.' Pichon went on to eulogize France's role in the struggle for Polish independence. However, Dmowski's and Committee's efforts to bring about a joint declaration had proved fruitless. Then, stunned by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the French urged an Allied protest against the partition of Poland. On June 3, 1918, French initiative helped instigate and bring about a joint Allied decision declaring as an Allied war aim that Poland was to be a free state with access to the sea. 31

British war aims were again made known on January 5, 1918, when Lloyd George spoke to the Trade Union Congress in London. This speech, considered before delivery by the Cabinet, had received the assent of the Liberal leaders in Britain, the approval of President Wilson, and the consent of the French Foreign Minister, Stephen Pichon. It was the most comprehensive and detailed statement made up to this time, but was merely an elucidation of previous declarations. 32

31 Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, pp. 13-14.

On January 8, 1918, President Wilson presented his famous Fourteen Points. His announcement was followed closely by Lloyd George with another speech in February. Claiming to be speaking for the whole British Empire, Lloyd George stated that Great Britain was not fighting a war of aggression against Germany, and had no intention of destroying her position in the future, but merely wished to turn aside her hopes of military domination. The settlement of a new Europe would be based on reason and justice, and the consent of the governed was to be the basis of any territorial settlement. Again the primary British interest was the complete restoration of the political, territorial, and economic rights of Belgium, and such reparation as could be secured for its towns and provinces. Poland was to be comprised of all those parts genuinely Polish which desired to form a part of the new state. France was to receive primary consideration in the "reconsideration (italics mine) of the great wrong of 1871."33

Thus as the war was drawing to a close, British and French war aims, seemingly compatible in broad and general terms at the beginning of the war, had begun to diverge if ever so slightly. Britain, like France, was interested in the complete restoration of Belgium; both were concerned with the creation of a new Poland. But

the French search for security from Germany would push territorial demands for the new Poland further than the British wished to comply. Britain had been willing to give France complete control of Alsace-Lorraine, but Lloyd George had talked in February, 1918, of a reconsideration of the problem. The British hostility toward Germany had likewise appreciably declined from a complete destruction of Prussia to a turning aside of her tendency toward military expansion. French plans for the acquisition of the Saar Valley and the separation of the Rhineland from Germany had not met with British approval. American entrance into the war on April 6, 1917, had presented France with another major problem. The presence of two predominant English-speaking countries could present a block to French designs on the continent after the war.
CHAPTER III

THE ARMISTICE

During the summer of 1918, specifically from July 18, the Allied armies were victorious and plans had been made to increase the power and scope of their offensive. By the beginning of October, the Belgian army had crossed the marshy ground of the Yser, putting the Allies in a position to continue attacks, and was to fall on the Moselle and in the Vosges in the general direction of the main body of the German army whose base was in Northern Germany. By destroying the enemy's military power, the Allied forces hoped to dictate terms to the German government. However, if the Germans continued the struggle, a serious obstacle would present itself to the Allied forces. Fortifications along the banks of the Rhine could easily halt Allied progress. However, once the Rhine was breached the German nation would lay at the mercy of the Allies, and Germany realized this.¹

On October 5, 1918, the Chancellor of Germany, Prince Maximilian of Baden, sent a note through the intermediary of the German Minister at Berne and the

Swiss government requesting that President Wilson take in hand the restoration of the peace. Wilson was asked to inform all belligerent nations of this action and to ask them to send plenipotentiaries to begin negotiations. Germany had declared her willingness to negotiate on the basis of Wilson's speech to Congress on January 18, 1918, and his subsequent utterances, particularly that of September 27, 1918.

President Wilson's reply to the German note on October 8, 1918, declared that the preliminary conditions to any armistice would be the evacuation of all German troops from the invaded countries, acceptance of the Fourteen Points as the basis for the desired peace, and an assurance that the present and future government of Germany would be placed on a democratic foundation. The same day, Marshal Foch sent to Clemenceau a résumé of obligations considered essential if the hostilities ceased, however temporary. These obligations were based upon three leading principles: the liberation of the invaded countries, the assurance of a suitable military base of departure in case fighting should resume, and

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4Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 11.
full security as a guarantee for reparations.\textsuperscript{5}

Foch's proposals were considerably more stringent than President Wilson's condition of evacuating invaded territories. Foch, however, felt that Wilson was merely fixing a minimum condition and not excluding other stipulations, which Foch assembled before October 9, 1918, when the representatives of the Allied governments met in Paris at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the communications between Washington and Berlin.\textsuperscript{6} These men, House, Clemenceau, Orlando, and Lloyd George had met in conference before, during the darkest hour of war in the American headquarters at 78 Rue de l'Universite and in the quarters of the Supreme War Council at Versailles.\textsuperscript{7}

Simultaneously with Wilson's and Foch's proposals for an armistice, William Graves Sharp, the United States

\textsuperscript{5}Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, pp. 451-452. The liberation of the invaded countries included Alsace-Lorraine. This was to be effective within fifteen days of the signing of a truce. The military base of departure included three bridgeheads on the Rhine, Rastadt, Strasbourg, and Neu-Brisach. These bridgeheads were to have the shape of a semi-circle with a radius of 18 3/4 miles, the edge of the right bank of the Rhine being the center. Security for reparations specifically meant the evacuation of the left bank of the Rhine and occupation by Allied troops within thirty days. This area was to be administered by the Allies in concert with the local authorities. During the first two weeks of October the Allied armies were not near enough the Northern Rhine to occupy it, however, they could occupy the Southern Rhine which was much nearer. By demanding the three bridgeheads the Allied armies could turn the German defenses on the upper Rhine if the conflict resumed.

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 453.

\textsuperscript{7}House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 11.
Ambassador to France, found the French press very vague in setting or advocating any definite course of action. In a talk with Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, Sharp found him very cautious in stating what France wished to have stipulated. Public opinion was generally in favor of the fullest reparation backed by the strongest guarantees. On October 12, Marshal Foch sent Sharp a communication of the conditions to be proposed for the Armistice. Nothing was said concerning the Rhineland occupation or even Alsace-Lorraine, but the evacuation of the proposed territories was to be to a line determined by the military. Expressing concern over Germany's condition, Foch exclaimed "we must hope that Germany's collapse will be so complete that she will have to comply with whatever we demand." 8

The same day Prince Maximilian of Baden informed Washington that Germany was ready to conclude the Armistice and conform with the proposals set down by Wilson; however, while Clemenceau preferred not to mix in the Armistice discussions between Washington and Berlin, Lloyd George convinced his colleagues to send Wilson a message calling to his attention the inadequacy of the proposed Armistice conditions. Possessing doubts about giving the Germans any chance to recuperate, Lloyd George believed that the military advisors should be consulted.

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before the Armistice negotiations began.\textsuperscript{9} President Poincaré of France expressed the same fears and was in complete disagreement with the signing or negotiation of an armistice. Believing that the German army was maneuvering for a final smashing blow, he was opposed to Clemenceau and Foch who favored a peace settlement.\textsuperscript{10} Marshal Joffre stated on October 13, 1918, that the Germans would not be able to reinforce themselves during the truce. Even if this was possible, the Allies themselves would have been able to bolster and improve their own armies much more than the Germans, so any advantage would be lost.\textsuperscript{11} Generally it was agreed that it would be better to have Germany sign than to reject and keep on fighting. Foch believed they had struggled for certain results ("on ne fait la guerre que pour ses résultats") and that they had obtained them. Further fighting was useless. "This being achieved, no man has the right to cause another drop of blood to be shed."\textsuperscript{12}

President Wilson, warned by the Allies of the shortcomings of his armistice conditions, informed Prince Maximilian of Baden on October 14, that the terms must be

\textsuperscript{9}Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, pp. 453-454.

\textsuperscript{10}Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, pp. 112-113.


left to the judgement and advice of the military counselors of the United States and the Allied governments. Germany proceeded to ignore the message, desiring to leave the task of drawing up the Armistice conditions to President Wilson. The Allies, however, realizing that any situation in which Wilson acted as an arbiter between the Entente governments and Germany would lead to confusion and gain nothing for themselves, decided that negotiations between Washington and Berlin should cease.

Marshal Foch firmly believed that the Allied governments should seek advice from the Commanders of the army as they, better than anyone, realized the German troop conditions. Foch, bringing this out in a letter to Clemenceau on October 16, again stated the conditions he thought necessary for any type of peace and collection of reparations. Considering the fate of the Rhineland after the reparations had been paid, Foch mentioned the possibilities of continuing the occupation, annexing the provinces, or the creation of an independent or neutral autonomous state forming a buffer. No consideration of returning it to Germany was included in the letter. Because he felt that only those sacrifices of territory agreed to by the enemy at the Armistice would remain final, the French necessarily had to make their frontier

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13 The Supreme War Council in 1917 created and had at its disposal as technical advisors, military representatives. In this capacity as counsellors these advisors were called upon on October 8, 1918, to draw up a project for an armistice with Germany.

demands before the signing of the Armistice. Foch requested that he be allowed to remain in continuous touch with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through an aid, but his request was denied on October 23.\textsuperscript{15}

The Armistice conditions were to be established by the Allied governments since Wilson had referred the German government to the Committee established on October 9. Following Lloyd George's proposal to consult the military, the Allied Committee asked for a detailed statement from the military standpoint concerning the terms to be placed upon Germany. Clemenceau arranged for an appointment with Foch and Pétain on October 24, at Paris, at which time their suggestions were to be heard. Foch then called a meeting at his headquarters in Senlis to hear the British and American military views. Sir Douglas Haig's proposals were lenient, including evacuation of only Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Metz, and Strasbourg. General Pershing's conditions were more severe and agreed with Pétain's proposal to occupy the left bank of the Rhine and the Rhine bridges. The conclusions reached by the Allied commanders agreed with the French position and were as follows:

1. The immediate evacuation of lands unlawfully invaded: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, and Luxemburg, and the immediate repatriation of their inhabitants.
2. Surrender by the enemy of 5,000 cannon, 30,000 machine guns, and 3,000 minenwerfer [German muzzle-loading rifled trench gun].

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 458.
(3) Evacuation by the German army of all territory on the left bank of the Rhine; occupation by the Allies of bridgeheads on the right bank, drawn with a radius of 18 3/4 miles, at Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne, and Strasbourg, and the creation on the right bank of a neutral zone 25 miles wide running east of the river.

(4) Prohibition of any destruction or damage by the enemy in the area evacuated.
(5) Delivery of 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 railway cars in good condition.
(6) Delivery of 150 submarines, withdrawal of the surface fleet to Baltic ports, occupation by the Allied fleets of Cuxhaven and Heligoland.
(7) Maintenance of the blockade during the period fixed for the fulfillment of the above conditions.

On October 26, 1918, Foch presented these conditions to Poincaré and Clemenceau.\textsuperscript{16}

As the Allied governments firmly believed that the terms of the Armistice should be settled at a conference represented by all of the Allied and Associated Powers, such a conference was called at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris on October 29. The principal participants, Lloyd George and Balfour of Great Britain, Colonel House of the United States, Pichon and Clemenceau of France, and Baron Sonnino of Italy, met to determine whether the Fourteen Points on which the Germans had been negotiating truce talks would be the basis of the peace. Clemenceau pointed out that neither he nor the British had been consulted, and that they both wished to make clear the meaning of the Fourteen Points before committing themselves to the terms of the Armistice and the proposed peace. The

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 458-461.
British particularly opposed point two dealing with "freedom of the seas." Balfour and Lloyd George would not give any type of concession on this point. Clemenceau supported the British on this issue even to the point of having the United States make a separate peace with Germany. The French withheld their support until the promise of reparations was inserted. Colonel House, Wilson's representative, implied during the discussions that the United States was not committed totally to the Fourteen Points, but that they must be included. House thus opened the way for a broad interpretation of the Fourteen Points.

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17Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 74-78. The British position on "freedom of the seas" was officially set down on October 17, 1918, when Admiral Wemyss submitted a memorandum to the War Cabinet. In reply to Wilson's second point Wemyss argued that the British position was unique and that it could not be committed to any international body. The British maintained their right to capture belligerent merchant ships and the right to search neutral ships since the geographical position of Britain put her at a disadvantage. According to R. H. Beadon, Quartermaster General for the British Peace Delegation, "It seems evident then that our ancient doctrine of the balance of power must still hold the field in spite of all desire to disclaim it. 'Splendid isolation' must remain our idle dream." The British doctrine was not only to expect sympathy from her European Allies, infinitely inferior to her at sea. Britain had recognized the dangers of submarine warfare to her naval position, and since the German success had weakened the Allied cause, it would have been an advantage to guard against this naval arm in the future. Strangely enough the French government opposed any limitation with regard to submarine building, apparently realizing its potential in the hands of a weaker fleet. R. H. Beadon, Some Memories of the Peace Conference (London: Lincoln Williams, 1933), pp. 55-63. See also, A. J. Balfour, Essays Speculative and Political (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., n.d.).

18Ibid., I, 78-81. Harold Nicolson implies that Colonel House's presentation of the Fourteen Points led to a misconception of their meaning by the Allies. The
On October 30, 1918, Marshal Joffre informed Ambassador Sharp that definite information had been received concerning efforts by Germany to fortify the Rhine. Germany apparently was continuing to strengthen her original pre-war frontiers. Joffre believed the German army was to blame and did not hold the German government responsible. Nevertheless, the fear that Germany would only use the Armistice as a preparation for further fighting did not diminish. The war still continued, and the sinking of the Irish mail steamer, Leinster, off Kingston on October 16, only eleven days after Germany's first request for mediation, heightened the Allies' conservatism. This fear encouraged the French to fulfill their desires to extend their borders eastward. Undeniably the Rhine was the safest frontier for France, but there was some doubt as to whether an annexation of the left bank would be popular among the Rhenish people. Joffre, suggesting that the left bank be neutralized for a number of years as a buffer state, would then hold a plebiscite to settle the problem.

Germans had made the Armistice believing that the Fourteen Points would be the basis of the peace. The Allies, however, believed they could be modified extensively. See Peacemaking 1919, pp. 13-16.


On the morning of October 31, the Allied representatives held their first meeting at the Paris residence of Colonel House to discuss the military situation. The following day a detailed examination of the terms to be imposed upon Germany commenced at the Ministry of War in Paris. Discussions concerning Foch's proposal to occupy the left bank and Sir Douglas Haig's views of October 25, were held. Haig's views were essentially the same as before, and the French reflected that the entire British delegation was of this opinion. Marshal Foch's views were, however, accepted and the French moved closer to fulfilling their deeply felt need for security.

During the discussions on November 2, 1918, the French Foreign Secretary, Pichon, raised the question of Poland's restoration which had been declared an Allied war aim. It was decided the matter lay outside the scope of the Armistice and Germany was to withdraw to her Eastern borders as they existed in 1914.

Finally on November 4, the definite text of the Armistice was agreed to by the heads of the Allied governments and cabled to President Wilson. At the special request of the British all due reservations were

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22Haig proposed to halt the Allied armies at the frontiers of Belgium, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine, some distance from the Rhine.

23Foch, Memoirs of Marshal Foch, p. 463.

24Ibid., p. 465.

25See Appendix C.
made as to the principle of "freedom of the seas." President Wilson was careful to point this out to the Germans in his message of November 5, which asked them to communicate all future messages to the Allied headquarters through Marshal Foch. Foch received a notice on the night of November 6-7, giving the names of the German plenipotentiaries designated by Berlin. On the morning of the 7th, Foch was informed that the German dignitaries would leave Spa at noon and arrive at the French lines between four and five o'clock in the afternoon. Discussions continued between the Germans and the Allies until 5 A.M. Monday morning, November 11, 1918, when the Armistice was signed at Compiegne Forest aboard Marshal Foch's train.

The "Great War" was over, but amid the general happiness and rejoicing there remained a fear, not only of the German nation, but also of the portentous task of reconstruction and the signing of the peace. France for the moment had partially achieved her goals. Alsace-Lorraine was most certainly in her possession. The Allied troops would be in occupation of the Rhine, and France was seeking an extension of her frontier to that river. While nothing had been said of the Saar Valley in the Armistice conditions, France looked at it as the "victor's spoils." In the East, Germany was required to

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26 The German delegates were: Secretary of State Erzberger, Major General von Winterfeldt, Minister Plenipotentiary Count Oberndorff, Naval Captain Vanselow, Staff Captain Geyer, and Cavalry Captain von Helldorff.
fall back to her frontiers of 1914, and the restoration of Poland as an Allied war aim would clear the path for a resurgent Poland, an ally to France and a buffer against Bolshevism. French security would remain the number one concern of France at the Peace Conference.

During the war, Great Britain had been understandably afraid of Germany's military might. This fear was still prevalent during and shortly after the Armistice. Because of this fear, Great Britain had not hesitated to support France in strong demands. Public opinion among the British people also demanded that Germany should suffer for the war. Yet as Great Britain became aware of the German military and civilian conditions, this fear evaporated and Great Britain again realized the need for a traditional balance of power on the continent. During the preparation for the coming Peace Conference, France recognized this change and the two nations drifted farther apart in their views on the German borders and the means to secure a lasting peace.
CHAPTER IV

PUBLIC OPINION, PEACE POLICY,
AND PREPARATION

Germany had been defeated by the Allied coalition, and for the Allies the reality of victory brought a sudden feeling of relief and joy, but there remained countless sober reminders of the devastating destruction caused by the fighting. The temporary postwar artificial period of prosperity quickly dissolved as the war-torn countries of Europe quickly adjusted to peaceful conditions. Europe soon faced a food and fuel shortage, demobilized servicemen sought employment, and the physical destruction itself was seemingly unbelievable. France especially had suffered great losses.\(^1\) Great Britain’s manpower losses were not as large as

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\(^1\)During the war France lost 1,364,000 men; 740,000 men were permanently disabled, and 3,000,000 men were wounded. Of the men under thirty who went into the front line only 50% ever returned. The Northern provinces were almost totally ruined as 4,022 villages, 20,000 factories, and millions of acres of land were destroyed. Coal production was down from 40 to 25 million tons. There was a crisis in transportation and the internal and external indebtedness of France was 34 milliard gold francs or 8.5 billion dollars. See Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, 1, 86-87. See also Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, p. 3.
France, but the German submarine had seriously injured the British merchant fleet.\textsuperscript{2} Amidst the paradoxical suffering of victory there came from the conquering nations the idea of German war guilt. Clemenceau had stated that "War and Peace, with their strong contrasts, alternate against a common background. For the catastrophe of 1914 the Germans are responsible, only a professional liar would deny this."\textsuperscript{3} Understandably, the feeling that Germany should pay for the war was heard everywhere. Simultaneously with this desire, people in England, France, and Italy were hailing Wilson as a benefactor, not yet realizing that his ideas to build a new Europe opposed their wishes to see Germany drained of economic resources and divided as the "spoils of war." The Allied governments thus had a distinct dilemma. They could not offend American idealism, relatively untouched by the war, into concluding a separate peace with Germany, and yet they had to fulfill the wants of their people and the needs of their states. As peace preparations progressed, this was clearly easier for Britain than for France, since England's policy gradually returned to the traditional balance of power concept which meant a more lenient attitude toward Germany.

\textsuperscript{2}Britain lost 900,000 men and had another 2,000,000 wounded. The German submarines sank 8,000,000 tons of British shipping at a cost to Great Britain of 10,000,000 pounds. See Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 86-87.

\textsuperscript{3}Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p. 105.
Since Britain and France had made war to preserve their common interests, so also the peace should have preserved the common interests of these nations. However, the Allies soon began to differ on the principles, which, during the war because of the threat of a common enemy, they had held in common. Lloyd George had stated, that while the Peace Conference would take time to define boundaries, the principles upon which the map of Europe was to be redrawn had been repeatedly laid down by the Allies.\(^4\) Clemenceau, however, pointed out that each had considered the problem from his own point of view "in hours of deadly peril or even simple anxiety, but not so much as might be supposed, since the problem was first and foremost to keep alive . . . ."\(^5\) The common concern of Britain and France had been undermined by victory. If any mutual ground remained it was their wish to establish a lasting peace, but Britain and France each had different methods of attaining this goal.

The attitude and aims of the French government immediately following the Armistice were not noticeable for their avidity. France naturally needed and wanted reparations for war damages, but her attempts to sub-

\(^4\) Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, I, 89. According to Lloyd George, no new conditions were imposed upon Germany once the Armistice had been signed except one: "The demand for punishment of those who were responsible for the war or for atrocious offences against the laws of war." I, 93.

\(^5\) Clemenceau, *Grandeur and Misery of Victory*, pp. 188-189.
jugate the German state by reducing its territory was a solution brought on by her deep-seated anxiety of the lack of security, not by greed.\textsuperscript{6} Clemenceau stated:

We were left, as our supreme conquest, the right of nations to govern themselves, which is the basis of all civilizations . . . . Since victory proclaimed the abolition of violence, liberation must not be translated by the annexation of a conquered territory.\textsuperscript{7}

For France there were two types of peace to contemplate, the maintaining of military domination or the grouping of states, banded together to represent abstract justice, capable of maintaining an impassable barrier to unruly outbursts of the spirit of conquest. France felt the latter would subject her to repetitions of the same experience suffered in 1914. But if the victorious alliance could be preserved in some form, her security might be attained and in no way become a force for domination.\textsuperscript{8} The French, under the leadership of Clemenceau and Poincaré, believed a reconciliation between Germany and France, although wonderful to contemplate, impossible. Germany was thought too unscrupulous, France too willing to forget. Clemenceau wrote:

The fact is that there is no standing still. We must either rise or fall. If one goes forward at every moment while the other gives himself up to

\textsuperscript{6}Nicolson, Petacmaking 1919, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{7}Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, pp. 189-190.

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., p. 186.
the enervating delights of going back, no two people will ever meet full face.\(^9\)

Britain and France had waged war as Allies, they could not avoid making peace as Allies. Indeed, France had no intention of refusing cooperation with British policy, not as long as Germany remained in a preponderant position in Europe. Immediately after the Armistice, while Clemenceau was at the head of the government, he was asked what his policy would be after the war. He answered, "The same as during the war. I am not separating myself from America, I am not separating myself from England."\(^{10}\) However, the French need for security and French interpretation of British policy would prove otherwise.

Following the Armistice, British public opinion, greatly influenced by the press and led by the radical Lord Northcliffe, called for German blood and drastically criticized any moderation in policy introduced by Lloyd George's coalition government.\(^{11}\) Contrary to public opinion, however, weakening Germany to the condition of almost a second rate power, considered justified by the French, was against that centuries-old principle of British policy to maintain an equilibrium of power on the

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\(^9\)Ibid., p. 145.


\(^{11}\)Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 60-63.
continent.12 Security of the French frontier against German attack was of vast importance, but England felt the purchase of this security could not be bought at a cost of prolonging war animosities. In British minds there was the added danger that Germany might be driven to seek closer relations with Russia.13 With no Emperor, Germany seemed less dangerous, and there developed a disposition in England and the United States to deal gently with a Germany that professed democracy and repentance. England, then, was very careful to act sparingly in restricting Germany's borders.14

In regard to Anglo-American cooperation, there developed, upon the entrance of the United States into the war, a slow but marked tendency of the British government to look more and more toward the United States for support of British policies. Following the Armistice this tendency grew noticeably. A telegram from Lloyd George to President Wilson on November 19, 1918, expressed certainty that the two countries' ideals were fundamentally similar and that cooperation at the Peace Conference would promote the "reign of peace with liberty


and true democracy throughout the world." Lloyd George definitely wished to create a better atmosphere between American and British views, especially so they might be able to cooperate on subjects where they might have to take a more liberal view of the Treaty than Clemenceau was likely to adopt. Whenever those policies of the British Empire permitted, they would follow those of the United States. On November 27, the British government informed the American Embassy of an outline of British policy which had not been communicated to France because England wished to consult America first, and in a telegram on December 4, 1918, D. H. Miller, legal advisor for the American delegation, informed Colonel House that Sir William Tyrell, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State, had indicated that British claims for indemnity would not be very large, because Britain and America were more alike than any two other powers, and mentioned the necessity for both countries to see that claims were just. During the Peace Conference, the British delegates were expected to keep in close contact with the Americans and their policy, but not openly. According to Harold Nicolson, any ostensible identity of view between the Anglo-

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16 *Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, I, 183.

17 *Foreign Relations, 1919*, I, 408.

Saxons would be resented. He astutely "aimed only at secret covenants secretly arrived at." Mr. Balfour's statement aptly summed up British feeling toward the United States when he stated:

But surely, even now it is fairly clear that if substantial progress is to be made toward securing the peace of the world and a free development of its constituent nations the United States and the British Empire should explicitly recognize what all instinctively know, that on these subjects they share a common ideal.

The British in various guises had returned to their old policy of balance of power on the continent. Nevertheless, such a turn about could not and did not go unnoticed by France, and prompted Clemenceau to remark some years later that,

Our humanitarian countries, bound to unite willy-nilly against all excesses of violence, and finding themselves no longer linked by the immediate fear of a common enemy, have returned, to quote Mr. Lloyd George, to the traditional policy of enmity.

Specific peace problems and peace preparations had begun long before the signing of the Armistice. The French established the Comité d'études in 1917 presided over by Professor Ernest Lavisse. However, there was no close contact with the Quai d'Orsay which limited the committee's effectiveness. The Polish questions were worked out by Ernest Denis, a Slav scholar, who strongly

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19 Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 106.
20 Balfour, Essays Political and Speculative, p. 240.
21 Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p. 165.
pointed out that historically, France could not have security unless she had good alliances east of Germany. The problem was to make an Eastern front in which Poland could play a role as well as Czechoslovakia. Senator Jean Morel, a former minister and president of the tariff committee, had control of economic questions and also helped Andre Tardieu, Commissioner General for Franco-American Affairs of War, to coordinate the preparation work. Tardieu, however, failed to collaborate the sections effectively, and according to Nicolson's experiences at the Conference, the French delegation fell below the level of American and British technical preparation. Nevertheless, they compensated for this lack by intelligence and rapidity of assimilation.\textsuperscript{22}

British preparation had also begun in 1917. Under the direction of Alwyn Parker, Librarian of the Foreign Office, a special organization was created for the collection of material and the training of a peace staff. Due to Parker's guidance the War Office, Admiralty, War Trade Intelligence Office, and the Foreign Office were able to prepare material which did not, at any essential point overlap. The Historical section, under the direction of Dr. G. W. Prothero, prepared the \textit{Peace Handbooks} which provided the delegates with detailed information concerning the territorial development of countries.

\textsuperscript{22}Nicolson, \textit{Peacemaking 1919}, p. 28. See also Wandycz, \textit{France and Her Eastern Allies}, p. 21.
However, the delegation machinery created by Parker and controlled by Sir Maurice Hanky, while effective, succumbed to the weakness of human nature. Rivalry between the various sections and haphazard conditions in coordination between the Plenipotentiaries and the delegation resulted in various parts of the Treaty subject matter being poorly assigned.\textsuperscript{23} The French contributed to the British preparations when librarian Camile Bloch of the Bibliothèque de la Guerre opened the way for free access to French documents.\textsuperscript{24}

The problems of concluding a peace with Germany were many and varied, and their effect on the outcome of the peace differed. One, however, was very important in view of the conflicts that broke out during the Conference, that is whether the Conference had a workable basis of negotiations. Lloyd George stated that the Allied governments had developed their principles but that they did not pertain to the specific problems of the peace. President Wilson's Fourteen Points had been accepted by the Allied and Central Powers as a basis for negotiations, but only on the general terms which the Points expressed.\textsuperscript{25} However, politically, none of the

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., pp. 26-27. See also Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 211.

\textsuperscript{24}Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{25}House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 21.
Allied European powers did or could strictly afford to adhere to them. Clemenceau and the French government had reservations on security and reparations. Lloyd George and the English were especially sensitive to any policy making even slight reference to "freedom of the seas."

Although this was partly rectified, British public opinion remained such a powerful factor during the Conference as to cause Lloyd George to refrain from a strict interpretation of Wilson's points.26

The selection of a city for the Peace Conference also brought some confusion and dismay among the Allied governments. Neither Great Britain nor the United States favored holding the Conference at Paris or at Versailles. Colonel House had apparently secured Lloyd George's consent on November 5, 1918, to meet in Switzerland. Clemenceau wished for Versailles, but he did not openly urge the matter.27 Wilson's reversal on November 7, in favor of Versailles, however, seemed to pull the British government along, and on November 11, they sent representatives to the French government to request the use of the Hotel Majestic and the Hotel Astoria.28

26Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 83. See also Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 413. Nicolson believed that there was no pre-determined basis nor a definite and rigid program. Andre Tardieu shared this opinion in The Truth About the Treaty.

27Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 120. Lloyd George claimed that Clemenceau insisted on Paris because of French suffering. See The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 147.

28Ibid., I, 121-122. The British delegation was composed of 207 persons. For a breakdown of the delegation see Peacemaking 1919, p. 45.
The decision to accept Paris as the site of the Conference undoubtedly gave the French a definite advantage during the negotiations for they received control of the Presidency, the Secrétariat Général, and the Central Bureau. Lloyd George felt the selection of Paris for negotiations was the lesser of two evils. It had been agreed to hold the Conference at the earliest possible date although this was contrary to the view which had been previously expressed by the British government. However, because of the serious economic conditions in Europe and conscripts wishing to return home, an early peace was imperative. While the British were apprehensive about the atmosphere of Paris because of recent grave riots, the City had offered her services for the negotiations and every week of delay brought added danger from the troops. Although Lloyd George claimed the

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29 Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 119.

30 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 148-151. London itself had been threatened by a contingent of mutineers and Sir William Robertson, Commander of the Army in England, had contemplated firing upon them. Nevertheless, while it was thus agreed to hold the Conference at as early a date as possible, there was a delay of approximately two months from the signing of the Armistice to the official opening of the Conference. The reasons given for the delay are many: the Allied governments had to wait for the reorganization of governments, especially Germany; there was the historical argument that past peace conferences were even more dilatory; the passions of the victorious and the defeated must be allowed to subside; the Christmas Holidays presupposed a vacation; the inclusion of President Wilson's Covenant caused more delay; and perhaps most important, there was the absence of a unified cause. See Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 48-56. Lloyd George himself thought that the Allies should meet before the Conference, but
Parisian influence upon the Conference caused no serious impressions, he still stated that:

The bitterness and ferocity of the attacks, when it is considered that we were special envoys of foreign powers at the French Capital, were quite without precedent . . . . This conduct could not have occurred and would not have been permitted in any other capital in the world.31

On November 15, 1918, in a telegram from Clemenceau to Lloyd George, the French Premier suggested that plans for the Peace Conference should be discussed at a meeting of the Heads of State and that it was pertinent that President Wilson be present at the discussions. Still neither Great Britain nor France wanted Wilson at the Peace Conference itself.32 The same day the French Foreign Office published a memorandum containing remarks pertaining to a scheme of procedure. Essentially, France wished to have an unofficial examination by the Great Powers (Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy) of the questions to be discussed. This examination was to lead to the preliminaries of the peace and the whole mechanism of the final Congress. The French proposal was based upon three principles: (1) the right of peoples to decide their own destinies by free and secret vote, but in certain regions sectionings would

that this would not last longer than three or four weeks. The final peace could then be concluded within a week, a most optimistic and unrealistic view. See Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 407.

31Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 579.

32Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 130-132.
have to be carried out "in view of the discordance between the administrative frontiers and the limits of the peoples which they divide," such would be the case for the Polish people in Prussia; (2) the release from all treaties concluded during the war would be a prerequisite for any nation who wished to be admitted to the Congress; and (3) and most important was the need for a basis of negotiations.

The French recognized the Allied war aims as stated on January 10, 1917, as a single base, but considered them more as a program than a basis of discussion. The questions proposed by the French memorandum to be discussed fell into two main groups, the settlement of the war and the elaboration of the League of Nations. Pertaining to the German borders, France wished to discuss under the settlement of the war, new states already recognized (such as Poland), territorial restitution (Alsace-Lorraine), and neutral territories for the purpose of protection. Although no specific mention was made of the Rhineland, it was hinted at in a statement concerning the future frontiers of France.  

On November 21, 1918, the French Foreign Office made changes concerning its memorandum of November 15, of which the most significant dealt with Wilson's Fourteen Points. It stated:

33 Ibid., I, 350.
34 Ibid., I, 350-351.
Nor can the fourteen propositions of President Wilson be taken as a point of departure because they are the principles of public right which may inspire the negotiations, but which do not possess the concrete character indispensable for approaching the precise regulations of concrete stipulations. 35

D. H. Miller, a legal advisor of the United States delegation, pointed out, however, in a memorandum on the same day that the Allied war aims had received no sanction from the United States, but that the Allied powers had agreed to the Fourteen Points on November 5, 1918. 36

Meanwhile, activities of the British Red Cross in Poland had aroused the suspicion of the French government. A Red Cross delegate, Abrahamson, had discussed the conditions of the Armistice and its effect upon Germany with Erzberger, the German Secretary of State, much to the discomfort of the French who maintained that all negotiations must be carried on through Marshal Foch. The French were beginning to make their influence in Polish affairs felt, while simultaneously exhibiting a desire to control information concerning Germany. 37

In Britain there was a serious lack of confidence in the coalition government and Lloyd George's postwar methods and aims. The Daily Mail, a strenuous supporter

35Ibid., I, 353.
36Ibid., I, 359. See Appendix D for the text of the Allied memorandum agreeing to the Fourteen Points.
37Ibid., II, 30-31. In respect to a German last stand before the Armistice, Abrahamson reported there were 120,000 Russian prisoners waiting to be removed from Germany. Their function had been preparing fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine.
of Lloyd George, threatened to forsake him, while the
backers of Lord Northcliffe continued to call for German
money and punishment for German guilt. 38

On November 29, 1918, the French Ambassador, Jus-
serand, presented to President Wilson a definite French
program for peace. The provisions again emphasized the
importance of a preliminary peace and would have cancel-
led the secret treaties during the war. It further con-
tained a plan for a future German government, a federal-
ization of states based upon universal suffrage, and also
provided a Congress for the victorious, defeated, and
neutral states. The French plan was, however, rejected
by Wilson. 39

During the first few days of December, Clemenceau
and Marshal Foch visited London to talk over points con-
cerning the Peace Conference. A warm and welcome recep-
tion was extended to them as Foch proceeded to Buckingham
Palace and Clemenceau went to the French Embassy. 40
Although the British government desired to improve the
Entente relationship, the Conference in London indicated
a separation of British and French policies. Clemenceau,
on his way to Oxford to receive an honorary degree, spoke

38 Ibid., I, 409.

39 Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 102.

40 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties,
I, 131-132. Lloyd George states the French arrived on
November 30, but Nicolson sets the date as December 2.
See Peacemaking 1919, p. 82.
to Lloyd George at the House of Commons, "I have to tell you that from the very day after the Armistice I found you an enemy to France." To which Lloyd George retorted, "Well, was it not always our traditional policy?" 41

The first meeting was held on the night of November 30, in Downing Street, and discussion was confined to arrangements relating to occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads. Clemenceau was absent, but the French were represented by Foch and General Weygand, while the British were represented by Sir Henry Wilson (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), Balfour, and Lloyd George. Lloyd George believed the absence of Clemenceau was planned because of the English partiality for Foch, leaving him to introduce French ideas on the future of the Rhineland. 42

When considering the Rhineland area, Foch mentioned only the military necessities, for he pointed out that even if Germany were limited to the right bank of the river, she would still have a population of 60 to 70,000,000 Germans who might wish to repeat 1914. Claiming that to make the left bank a neutral state was not sufficient, he demanded an armed state ready to repel any attack. A coalition of France, Belgium, and Luxem-

41 Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p. 121.
42 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 132. Lloyd George claimed that this was the first intimation given to the British that France intended to secure control over the Rhine.
burg would give 49,000,000 people, and by adding the Rhenish provinces on the left bank, the coalition would have approximately 55,000,000 against the Germans' 60 to 70,000,000. Whether the Rhineland would be an autonomous organization was a "question he did not wish to discuss."\textsuperscript{43} Control of the organization would be left to Britain, France, and Belgium. Foch maintained his objective was not to "annex or conquer." He only insisted that the Rhineland provinces belonged in an economic and military system. The feelings of the inhabitants, if unfavorable, were to be brought to the Allied side by the attractions of their economic organization and because they were the victors. Lloyd George pointed out the possibility of a second Alsace-Lorraine, but Foch said he realized this and that precautions would be taken to conciliate the feelings of the people.\textsuperscript{44}

During the French visit to Great Britain, the British public was nearly hysterical, owing to the long strain of the war, its relief, and the excitement of a general election coming at the same time.\textsuperscript{45} The fear of

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Ibid.}, I, 133.

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid.}, I, 133-135. Because the Rhineland topic was the first mentioned at the first meeting before the Peace Conference, Lloyd George reasoned that the French attached a great deal of importance to it.

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Foreign Relations}, 1919, I, 337. The "Khaki Election" of December, 1918, was an apparent evil necessity. Lloyd George had to stand off the Northcliffe Press, the opinion for immediate demobilization, and the interests of France. See Nicolson, \textit{Peacemaking 1919}, pp. 19-20. Lloyd George asked for a mandate to conclude
letting the Germans off too easily was still prevalent although Lloyd George had hinted at the difficulties of forcing Germany to pay her debts. He further assured them that Germany would not be allowed to dump cheap goods on Britain to the prejudice of British trade. Lloyd George's flagrant promises during the election would nevertheless continue to haunt him at Paris.  

On December 9, 1918, an advance copy of President Poincaré's speech to be delivered in honor of President Wilson's arrival in Paris on December 14, was published, stating that in France there was a distinct desire to suppress Germany and crush her ability to make war. Resentment against German war actions was very high and the feeling was that if Germany went unpunished, the victory would be useless.  

Max Lazard, a member of one of France's richest banking families and a "first class

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a "just, but not a vindicative peace." See Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 162. According to Nicolson, Lloyd George's statement of bleeding Germany "'til the pip squeaks" is not a true picture. See Peace-making 1919, p. 21. Parliament had long exceeded its natural life. Seven years was the legal, and six the traditional term and accepted life of a Parliament. In 1917 this limit was cut down to five years. The House of Commons had been elected in 1910, thus exceeding the statutory span by three years. Its life had twice been extended by Parliament during the war. According to Lloyd George, "It would have been an outrage to decide vast issues which affected the lives of over 40,000,000 men and women, three-fourths of whom had no voice in the election of the existing Parliament." The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 157-158.

46 Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 410. See also Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference, p. 51.

47 Ibid., I, 145.
witness for liberal French opinion," stated that he could not conceive of a League of Nations with Germany. The war had destroyed all confidence in Germany's good faith, even in liberal French circles.  

The French, however, did indeed savor their victory, and left no doubt about whom the victors were. When Shotwell, the United States technical expert concerning historical questions, arrived in Paris on December 14, 1919, for the opening of the pre-conference discussions, he marveled at what he saw and related:

Place de la Concorde! You cannot [sic] imagine what a sight it was. Every part of the square not needed for street was packed with captured German cannon. We caught a glimpse in passing of the Champs Elysees with miles of cannon on each side of the drive way. France's trophies.  

French aims for the Peace Conference were again set forth on December 10, 1918, in a proposal entitled "Project de Préliminaries de Paix avec l'Allemagne." Although this memorandum was supposedly drawn up by Monsieur de Fleuriau, Counsellor of the French Embassy, and Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to Great Britain, it undoubtedly had the approval of the Foreign Office. There were three essential problems stipulated by the articles, the guarantee on the left bank of the Rhine, the complete restoration of Poland, and the future admin-

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istration of Germany.  

Since the Armistice signed on November 11, 1918, was to last only for thirty-six days, the pre-Conference meeting was troubled with the renewal of the Truce. The Armistice extended until December 16, so on the 13th a prolongation of the Armistice was signed extending it for another thirty days or until January 17, 1919. This Armistice at Trèves, however, added another clause giving the French, under Marshal Foch, more control of the left bank. It stated:

From now onwards the generalissimo reserves to himself the right of occupying (when he deems it advisable), as an additional guarantee, the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine, north of the bridgehead of Cologne, and as far as the Dutch frontier.

Six days notice will be given by the generalissimo before the occupation comes into effect.  

Foch continued to demand the occupation of the Rhineland provinces as a guarantee after the signing of the peace. Estimating that between fifty and sixty German divisions remained under arms, Foch urged the Allies to be prepared to meet sixty to seventy, and thus he recommended that the Allies retain 140 divisions.  

On December 30, 1918, Clemenceau delivered a speech in the Chamber of Deputies in which he declared himself in favor of maintaining the strict doctrine of

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51 Ibid., I, 371-373. See Appendix E for the territorial clauses of the December 10 memorandum.

52 Ibid., II, 11.

53 Ibid., II, 57.
the balance of power and supporting it by the concert of Great Powers. He said:

This system of alliances, which I do not renounce, will be my guiding thought at the Conference, if your confidence sends me to it, so that there will be no separation in Peace of the four Powers which have battled side by side.\textsuperscript{54}

The French definitely did not want to split the unity of the Allies, but at the same time they were preparing a decisive campaign to reduce Germany and fulfill French Security.

Another small incident that added to French suspicion of British policy came on January 7, 1919, when definite evidence was received that the British had seized and released a German ship in the Baltic after it had been allowed to unload its cargo of coal in Copenhagen. The German ship then received fifty tons of British bunkers (receptacles for coal) for the return trip to Germany. Shipping between Germany and Denmark appeared to have been constant, with British ships returning German salutes. There was also a rumor that a British admiral just arrived from England had been instructed to disregard the blockade.\textsuperscript{55} This heightened the French fury towards the British, especially as a long, cold winter and influenza had swept over France, and she was obliged to import coal from England due to


\textsuperscript{55}Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 56.
the wrecked mines suffered in the war.\textsuperscript{56}

On January 9, 1919, the French Foreign Office published the peace plans of the preliminary sittings of the Allied Ministers which had been conducted and drawn up on January 5, 1919. The plans first called for a preparatory meeting of the members of the Supreme War Council at Versailles in order to settle questions of form and substance.\textsuperscript{57} Lloyd George and the Dominion Ministers arrived in Paris on January 11, and the following day the first unofficial meeting between the Plenipotentiaries took place at the Quai d'Orsay for the purpose of organizing the Preliminary Peace Conference. It began its meeting as the Supreme War Council and transformed itself into the Peace Conference Organization by simply having the military advisers withdraw. On January 13, 1919, the British Empire delegation met for a reunion and the Plenipotentiaries met again for the second renewal of the Armistice. The same day the British delegation received the French program of procedure drafted by Berthelot, Minister Plenipotentiary and Acting Director of Political and Commercial Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which the delegation thought

\textsuperscript{56} Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference, pp. 100-101. The British coal industry under government control made a net gain to the British Exchequer of 60,000,000 pounds.

\textsuperscript{57} Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 385. See Appendix F for the territorial plans of the preliminary sittings.
was not very enlightening. 58

Thus as the Paris Peace Conference officially opened on January 18, 1919, there were definite indications that British and French policies concerning the German borders were not in agreement. Although both countries wanted to secure a good and lasting peace, their methods were divergent. The French desired to overpower Germany physically and dominate her by alliances and military force. England, leaning more towards the United States, felt that any drastic reduction in German territory might produce countless Alsace-Lorraine, sources of trouble in the future. Britain also lived on trade and a revived and friendly Germany might again become the heart of a flourishing Europe. Traditionally Britain would then follow the doctrine of balance of power on the continent. This set the scene for future disputes during the Conference, especially over the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.

58Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 47. The Armistice was renewed on January 17, 1919. See Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 14.
CHAPTER V

BRITISH-FRENCH POSITIONS

JANUARY 18, 1919

The primary concern of Europe in 1919, at the start of the Peace Conference, was Germany. For France this was doubly true, since she recognized in Germany a people more numerous than any of her neighbors, more warlike than any, and more aggressive than chastened France herself. Germany for numerous reasons was more than a match for any one of her European neighbors, indeed, for more than several of them combined.¹ And, although France emerged a victor from the war, her actions following 1918 seemed derived from a hypnotic fear of the German menace. The keynote of French foreign policy was sécurité and its "desire for garanties de sécurité contre une agression de l'Allemagne."² To find France concerning herself to

¹At the outset of the war Germany possessed the largest population in Europe with the exception of Russia, she had internal lines of communication and a railway system to exploit them, her growing industrial might and naval force caused concern for all Europe, and her military prowess had been revealed at Sadowa and in the Franco-Prussian war. And though Germany was defeated in the war, the basic structure of her power remained. D. W. Brogan, France Under the Republic, the Development of Modern France 1870-1939 (New York: Harper and Brothers, n.d.), p. 544.

²France desired security guarantees against German aggression. Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between
such an extent when Germany was seemingly prostrate, exhausted, and internally disrupted seems astonishing, yet France was not considering the near future but the years that lay distantly removed. France had gained a temporary advantage, and although her view was not totally pessimistic, she would feel secure only if two conditions were fulfilled—an alliance to hold Germany permanently inferior, and sufficient military superiority to ward off a German attack until the Allies could come to her defense.³

Thus French policy at the Armistice and during the preparation of proposals and programs for the Peace Conference sought a speedy settlement of the German border problem. Great Britain, however, being more conservative and sympathetic toward a rapprochement with the defeated states, found French policy unacceptable.⁴ Realization of a change in the British attitude toward the subjugation of Germany had intensified French activities to obtain satisfaction at the Peace Conference. French maneuvering had begun even before the signing of the Armistice, and France undoubtedly had plans to present at the Peace Conference a number of fait accomplis concerning territorial changes. France by any means,

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⁴Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, p. 23.
did not intend to join the British policy on British
terms. Clemenceau had declared:

Were we to remain with Mr. Lloyd George under
the domination of the 'traditional British Policy,'
which consists in keeping the continent of Europe
divided for the benefit of the islander, which had
led to the present condition of anarchy, and threat-
ened to engulf us in them?\^5

Among French designs, the annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine was perhaps the most gratifying. These prov-
inces were symbols of the days of French glory, and they
represented at the very least partial fulfillment of
French revanche for 1870. France had little doubt that
she would not be allowed to annex the provinces for such
a stipulation was included in the Allied war aims. But
French thoroughness precluded chance, and a telegram on
September 14, 1918, from Paul Cambon, French Ambassador
in London, to Jules Cambon, French Ambassador to Berlin
in 1914 and a French Plenipotentiary delegate at the
Peace Conference, referred to a decreed project which
would place a barricade around Alsace-Lorraine to prevent
"respirant."\^6 And, although nothing specific was men-
tioned, it appeared that French officials wished to sep-
erate Alsace-Lorraine from any Allied contact.

The French claim to Alsace-Lorraine was based on

\^5Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory,
p. 198.

\^6Paul Cambon, Correspondance 1870-1924 (Paris:
literally means "breathing." Undoubtedly the French
meant to prevent any type of communication between
Alsace-Lorraine and the Allies in case of any reaction
from the inhabitants hostile to the French annexation.
the fact that these territories had been acquired and assimilated peacefully, and that in 1871, the seizure by Germany was against the desire of the inhabitants. France would not hear of a plebiscite, however, due to some 2,000,000 German immigrants which made a vote implausible.\(^7\) Germany, nevertheless, demanded a plebiscite, claiming that the annexation in 1871 only corrected a wrong existing since Louis XIV took Alsace by force. Refutation of this claim was somewhat dramatic as Clemenceau published a letter written from Versailles in French on October 25, 1870, by the Empress Eugénie, a virtual prisoner in Paris, showing that the German intent was to furnish a military barrier to remove still further any future French invasions.\(^8\)

On December 7, 1918, President Poincaré, accompanied by colleagues of the diplomatic corps, left Paris and arrived in Metz on the following day, resulting in the official entry of the French into Alsace-Lorraine.\(^9\) That day Poincaré was met by the military (Foch, Pershing, and Haig) and the citizens of Metz with flowers

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\(^7\)Beadon, *Some Memories of the Peace Conference*, pp. 147-149.

\(^8\)Sharp, *The War Memoirs of William Graves Sharp*, p. 374. According to Sharp the telegram to Eugénie was dated October 25, 1870, but Michael Howard relates that the Empress was smuggled out of Paris on September 4, 1870, sixteen days before Paris was cut off from the outside world. *The Franco-Prussian War* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), pp. 225, 230.

and French flags in every window. Strasbourg proved even more festive, and in Sharp's words it was a "veritable fete day!" The local officials shouted "Vive la France! Vive Poincaré! Vive Clemenceau!" Poincaré stated in his speech that 'the Plebiscite is an accomplished fact,' a truth amply demonstrated by the rousing reception.¹⁰ Sharp stated:

This enthusiasm was so genuine . . . that no doubt could exist as to the sentiment which there prevailed for France. I could like [n] the scene [g] to nothing better perhaps than to say that they resembled family reunions of members long separated.¹¹

The Alsace-Lorraine problem was solved by the Allied victory, the evacuation of German troops required by the Armistice, and the enthusiastic reception of the French troops. There remained only the legal technicalities of the Peace Conference to recognize it as reality.¹²

The French claim to the Saar Valley went back to 1814. Upon Napoleon's overthrow, the Powers (Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia) had determined the Northeastern boundaries of France in such a way as to give France a part of the Saar Valley. Clemenceau was thus asking for a restoration of a frontier thus

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 364-366.
¹¹Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 378.
¹²House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, pp. 46-47. On January 30, 1919, a French decree applying the French customs tariff and taxation to Alsace-Lorraine was signed by Clemenceau, to be effective February 1, 1919. On March 15, 1919, a French decree applied the protection of patents to the provinces. See British State Papers, CXII, 1031-1032.
accorded France. On November 12, 1918, Paul Cambon had tried to interest Lloyd George in the recognition of French claims in the Saar. Stating that the inhabitants desired to belong to France, Cambon mentioned how necessary it was not to relax the intimate relationship which had been built up during the war. However, according to Lloyd George the French claimed not only that portion of the Saar given to them in 1814, which the Allies recognized should be restored, but all of the Saar Valley because the richest mines were outside the 1814 frontiers. Historically their claim was inadequate, but the French supplied their own argument by bringing in the question of reparation for war damages to French mines. France argued too, that this coal was now essential to the industry of Alsace-Lorraine, which would make France the sole customer of the Saar's coal. The French claimed ownership of this coal as compensation and then went a step further and argued the impracticality of severing the surface of the soil from coal underneath. However, considering the indisputable German population, the British and Americans opposed the French plan since

13Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 224.

14Cambon, Correspondance, III, 282-283. Lloyd George had posed questions concerning the territory to which Cambon had made reference, causing Cambon to comment "il connaissait mal s'il la connaissait, l'histoire du traité de 1815, je la lui ai racontée."

15Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 399-400.
they wished no future Alsace-Lorraines. A compromise was reached whereby France received the coal, but not sovereignty.\textsuperscript{16}

The restoration of Belgium was perhaps one of the most important Allied war aims, at least for the British. Recognition of Belgian neutrality and compensation for war damages could be expected to be awarded at the Peace Conference. Part of this compensation, to be in the form of territorial aggrandisement, concerned the territory of Moresnet and Luxemburg.\textsuperscript{17} Little trouble was expected, but after the signing of the Armistice, France expressed an extremely stubborn attitude toward relinquishing any kind of control to Belgium in the Luxemburg area. Adding to the difficulty was the telegram from the Grand Duchess, Marie Adelaide, on November 11, 1918, to President Wilson which expressed the Duchess's desire to protect the Luxemburgers' free and independent status at the Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{18} On November 13, the Belgian Minister, Cartier, gave reasons why the independence of the Grand Duchy should not be maintained.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16}Beadon, \textit{Some Memories of the Peace Conference}, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{17}Germany and Belgium had ruled Moresnet jointly until the Germans annexed the territory in 1914. See \textit{Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 435-436}.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 436}.

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, II, 436-440. Luxembourg had been separated from Belgium in 1839 and fell under the influence of Prussia. Because of the wishes of the peoples of Belgium and Luxembourg this was not to be allowed to happen again.
following day Cartier received word that the Duchess had decided to take no active part in the affairs of state until the wishes of the people had been determined.\textsuperscript{20} On November 28, 1918, the United States Minister in Belgium, Whitlock, learned of the suspension of the powers of the Grand Duchess by the Luxemburg Chamber. The liberal element in Luxemburg feared an effort from France to annex the country.\textsuperscript{21} The activities of France indicated that these fears were not unfounded for the French Minister to Belgium, De France, conducted himself in such a manner as to augment French influence, and French troops conducted daily parades through the streets. The British, however, were opposed to any French attempt for supremacy in Luxemburg. Whitlock, the American Minister in Belgium, wrote:

\begin{quote}
England will oppose the desire of the French government to annex Luxemburg and she will not consent to Belgium's securing the left bank of the Scheldt.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, French activity continued and on December 15, 1918, Marshal Foch took military measures to prevent the movement of Belgian troops into Luxemburg which was not in the French zone. Under the pretense of military difficulties not specifically mentioned, Foch visited Luxemburg accompanied by a regiment.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., II, 441.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., II, 442.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.
of French infantry as a personal Honor Guard. Since Foch had not had an Honor Guard at his own headquarters, the Belgians interpreted the move as a French attempt to annex the principality. Reminded by the French Foreign Secretary, Pichon, of the agreement by which Belgian troops were to participate in the occupation, Foch replied he would examine the question later and then proceeded to ignore Colonel Menshaert of the Belgian Army. Belgium feared ulterior political motives by the French, an impression given by French propaganda. Whitlock reported that "Foch's delegate at the Inter-Allied Conference stated the other day that Luxemburg must be treated as a French department . . . ."23 The Marshal's delegate announced the intention to name a territorial commander in the Grand Duchy and the Belgian government then demanded at Paris that this commander be a Belgian officer.24 Thus, while the Belgium and Luxemburg problems had been expected to develop little friction, another breach grew in the relations of Britain and France. These problems would, however, be overshadowed at the Peace Conference by the Rhineland and Polish questions.

Since the restoration of Poland concerned the German and Russian borders, interest, especially French, was very great. Britain and France clashed most violently

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23 Ibid., II, 444.
24 Ibid.
over the Polish problem, and the Pilsudski-Dmowski internal feud caused the Allies difficulties in recognizing who actually controlled the Polish government. The French Foreign Office desired a strong Poland for four main reasons: Germany would not really be defeated until she had lost her Polish provinces; French security on the Rhine required a strong power to the east of Germany; aggrandisement at Germany's expense would keep Poland and Germany enemies; and Poland provided a barrier between Russian Bolshevism and a German revolution. A Quai d'Orsay memorandum recommended that the Polish western borders should include Silesia, Poznania, Western and Eastern Prussia, and parts of Pomerania, however, the 1772 borders were not yet mentioned. While the British government generally recognized that Poland was a French sphere, Britain, nevertheless, interfered when she believed the severity of the French and Polish claims imposed too great a strain on Germany.25

At the Allied Supreme War Council on November 2, 1918, Foch proposed, with Pichon's support, evacuation of all German troops from the area constituting Poland before the first partition in 1772. However, Balfour seriously objected and the proposal was dropped. Dmowski, head of the Polish National Committee, backed by France, then urged evacuation of Poland by German troops and its occupation by Allied forces (presumably

25Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, pp. 22-25.
French troops), but again Great Britain withheld her support and the idea was rejected.26

Between November 11, and November 14, 1918, Pil- 
sudski assumed control of Poland with the sanction of 
the Regency Council in Warsaw and obtained the dissolu-
tion of the radical government in Lublin. The French, 
however, still recognized the National Committee led by 
Dmowski and supported it as Poland's representative at 
the Peace Conference. A compromise solution was finally 
found by the Poles themselves and Pichon welcomed the new 
state commenting, "the creation of a Polish state in its 
historical boundaries . . . is, one of the first condi-
tions of a just and lasting peace."27

On November 13, 1918, the Polish National Com-
mittee informed the Allied governments of German-led 
Ukrainians obstructing the annexation of Galicia to 
Poland.28 Polish troops left Cracow for Eastern Galicia 
on the following day, but Great Britain informed the Com-
mittee on November 15, that any attempt in East Galicia 
to pre Judge or forestall the decisions of the Peace Con-

26Ibid., pp. 17-18. Article 12 of the Supreme War 
Council's memorandum of November 2, 1918, moved the Ger-
man troops back to the 1914 border. However, it was 
later changed by the Council and the German troops 
remained until Pilsudski and the Poles drove them out. 
Pilsudski's fait accompli succeeded where French diplo-
macy failed. Article 16 of the memorandum gave the 
Allies access through Danzig, but it remained a dead 
letter.

27Ibid., p. 20.

28Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 411.
ference would be viewed with serious displeasure. 29

As the Peace Conference neared, conditions in Poland became more and more tenuous. Until the compromise had been worked out no one actually knew who governed Poland. Bolshevism increased worries, and Polish cries for aid became more frequent. On January 1, 1919, Colonel H. H. Wade, the British Military Attache in Copenhagen, conducted Paderewski, who became premier and foreign minister on January 19, to Posen and came under attack by German soldiers. Later Wade reported Paderewski's proposals for a Polish territorial settlement were exaggerated. 30 The fact that the Polish government sent Dmowski to Paris as her Peace Conference representative did not improve the Polish position. Lloyd George especially disliked Dmowski because of his anti-semitism, and the British Prime Minister through Dmowski unrepresentative of democratic opinion in Poland. 31

In the West the left bank of the Rhine proved to be the major issue at the Paris Peace Conference concerning the German borders, and here British-French relations were most seriously threatened. France demanded that the left bank of the Rhine be constituted an autonomous buffer state, but neither the British nor the Americans would contemplate such propositions. 32 The French had

29 Ibid., II, 408.
30 Ibid., II, 422-424.
31 Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, p. 25.
32 Beadon, Some Memories of the Peace Conference, p. 151.
gained control of the Rhineland settlement in 1917 in an agreement with Russia. And although the agreement was stillborn, French interest in the Rhineland remained. Nearly every French statesman and military leader sought the extension of France's frontiers to the Rhine as protection against Germany. Joffre stated, "I must say here, however, that only the Rhine as a frontier can offer to France absolute security against future aggressions."33 At the insistence of his fellow Frenchmen, Clemenceau fought hard to obtain agreement on an autonomous Rhineland state, but he must have known from the beginning that this struggle was hopeless, not only due to British-American opposition, but also from that in the Rhineland.34 He admitted: "Our childishness lies in the fact that we are too ready to believe that their incomplete Prussianization inclines them to become French."35

Thus British-French relations at the start of the Peace Conference were definitely strained. Nevertheless, Britain and France realized the importance of maintaining agreement respecting Germany. Britain now generally knew French intentions toward Germany while France realized she could expect no support from Britain

33Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 383.
34Beadon, Some Memories of the Peace Conference, p. 152.
35Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, pp. 205-206.
in these policies. However, Clemenceau did not know how far Britain would oppose France's ambitions. France would push as far as she dared, but she would back down from a complete disruption of the Allied Alliance.
CHAPTER VI

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

On January 18, 1919, at 3 P.M. in the Peace Room at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Peace Conference was officially opened by the French President Raymond Poincaré. Claiming that the victory was complete, Poincaré, in the interests of justice and peace, asked the delegates "to reap from this victory its full fruits," to punish the guilty, and to provide guarantees against a recurrence of 1914. ¹ Clemenceau then accepted the Presidency of the Conference and distributed the rules of procedure, mentioning that the program had been based upon the ideas of President Wilson. The Powers and all represented peoples were then invited to make their claims known, whether concerning themselves or of a general nature. ²

From the British standpoint the outlook was not promising since members of the British staff were afraid of French high finance influencing French officials to

¹Foreign Relations, 1919, III, 159-163.

²Ibid., III, 168-169. See Appendix G for the rules of the Conference.
adopt a more severe policy toward Germany. Furthermore, Phillippe Berthelot, Minister Plenipotentiary, a man the British highly respected, was placed in an advisory capacity and could only work through the obstinate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pichon. There was some concern whether the French might not control the Conference since Clemenceau was President; Monsieur P. Dutasta, another Frenchman was appointed as Secretary General; and the French therefore had a convenient method of controlling the Council of Ten. Furthermore, the official agenda was prepared by Dutasta in consultation with officials of the French Foreign Office. They could thus include subjects they wished to discuss, and, since the agenda reached the delegates only shortly before each meeting, there was little time to study it in detail. Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, felt that this could be averted by the early appointment of committees to thrash out details. The British also believed the choice of Dutasta as Secretary General reflected a fault (but more likely an intention) of Clemenceau since the British delegates favored the selection of Berthelot. During the Conference, Sir Maurice Hanky, Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet and Secretary General of the British delega-

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5Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, p. 245.
tion, rescued Dutasta countless times, and, as the Conference progressed, Clemenceau relied more and more upon the British delegate. 6

In the Conference itself, the organization was established by the informal negotiations of the Powers, termed the Council of Ten, and set up as a model of the Supreme War Council. However, the Council which held seventy-two meetings appeared ineffective, slow, and superficial in its decisions, even though it was recognized as the supreme authority of the Conference from January 13, 1919, until March 25, 1919. 7 Nicolson estimated that 20% of its total energy was spent on making peace, some 30% was taken up by executive functions, 10% was wasted on unnecessary detail, and 40% was devoted to the task of preventing a breach among one or another of the Allies. 8 Just as the Supreme War Council left decisions of la guerre open to Foch or the Germans, so the Council of Ten thought that the peace agenda would be imposed on them in much the same manner. 9

The work of the Conference of Paris was accom-


7 House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, pp. 17-20. Clemenceau had reminded the smaller delegations at the second Plenary Meeting on January 25, 1919, that it had been the Great Powers who had invited them and in view of the twelve million men they had in the field, they would run the Conference. See Foreign Relations, 1919, III, 196.

8 Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 139.

9 Ibid., p. 114.
plished by fifty-eight committees that sat for some six months and held 1,646 meetings. Their conclusions were verified by twenty-six local investigations and discussed at seventy-two meetings of the Council of Ten, at thirty-nine meetings of the Council of Five, and at 145 meetings of the Council of Four. These committees were delegated the smaller detailed problems and even though theoretically they had no proper authority except recommendation, their influence was great. The committees did not necessarily determine only facts, but also decided questions of policy, and European delegates were generally instructed to work for a particular solution.

Committee work, however, could not decide the major questions, and the Council of Ten therefore became more aware of its weakness as it began dealing with the Polish problems and French claims to the Rhineland provinces. Gradually the Council of Ten was set aside in an informal manner, when during the second month of the Conference Lloyd George was in England, Wilson was in the United States, and Clemenceau was shot and wounded on February 19, 1919. The Council became completely helpless. The British Secretary of State, Balfour, then became chairman and urged the reports of the com-

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10 Ibid., p. 125.
12 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
mittees investigating the German frontiers to be ready by March 8, 1919. His proposal to separate military clauses from the political clauses was rejected and thus a preliminary peace which would have given time to work on the frontier questions was avoided. Lloyd George returned to Paris on March 8, Wilson returned on March 14, and on March 24, the Council of Ten split into the Council of Four and the Council of Five (composed of the foreign ministers). 13

On the eve of the Conference, the French-Polish coalition was united on the Eastern territorial problem, but there was no general French plan for a settlement there. France, despite her long tradition of friendship with Poland, regarded her chiefly as a potential ally against Germany. 14 From the British view there was genuine sympathy for Poland, although not perhaps as deep as might have been expected in view of her tragic history. Lloyd George wanted a purely ethnic state, and although a "pure" Poland was impossible, surprisingly enough a reasonable ethnographical Poland was considered easier to define than a geographical Poland due to the lack of natural frontiers on the East and West. The British thought of Poland as a special problem, and as the British Quartermaster General, R. H. Beadon, later


wrote:

Poland had become a memory rather than a country. Her cause seemed no longer a one of practical politics because it was not a question of freeing her from one oppression but from three.\textsuperscript{15}

On January 18, 1919, the Conference formally summoned the representative of Poland, Dmowski, thus officially recognizing the reconstituted state. Dmowski then presented Poland's claims to the Council of Ten on January 29, 1919. According to Lloyd George's statement, Dmowski made no secret of Polish rejection of the application of the principle of self-determination to some of their claims. Presenting the Polish case on the basis of the borders of 1772, Dmowski further demanded additional territory in the West, reasoning that East Germany was not German, but Germanized. Dmowski believed there were 40% Poles living there, but that these people were afraid to register their nationality in a German census. East Prussia was to be abolished, and Dmowski suggested the country be made an independent German state with the Capital at Königsberg.\textsuperscript{16}

Meanwhile, armed conflicts or little wars were going on during the Peace Conference between peoples determined to gain a better bargaining position. The Council of Ten attempted to pacify these actions, and

\textsuperscript{15}Beadon, \textit{Some Memories of the Peace Conference}, pp. 155-158.

\textsuperscript{16}Lloyd George, \textit{The Truth About the Peace Treaties}, II, 972-974.
on January 24, 1919, President Wilson sternly warned against using force to gain possession of territory.\textsuperscript{17} Poland perhaps gave the Council the most trouble as Lloyd George wrote later:

Drunk with the new wine of liberty supplied to her by the Allies, she fancied herself once more the resistless mistress of Central Europe. Self-determination did not suit her ambitions. \ldots Poland flourished the sword of her warrior kings which had rusted in their tombs for centuries.\textsuperscript{18}

Lloyd George also stated that Pilsudski, head of the Polish government, "from the moment he attained supreme power . \ldots devoted the whole of his mind and character to a policy of territorial expansion by force."\textsuperscript{19} Two circumstances encouraged this aggression: (1) a greater Poland suited French policy, and (2) French policy had the paramount aim of weakening Germany and strengthening her opponents. France felt that by carving out a large Poland she could reduce the population of Germany, and consequently she tried to create as many new provinces out of German territory as she could find an excuse for establishing.\textsuperscript{20}

The cynicism of French diplomacy was never more apparent than in dealing with Polish aggression which ran counter to the principle of self-determination. On the plea of a Bolshevik invasion, the Allied powers sent

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, I, 306-307.
\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, I, 308-309.
\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, I, 309.
\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, I, 309-311.
arms and men to Poland upon the insistence of the French. The troops, dispatched under General Haller, were, immediately upon arrival, sent by the Poles to annex Galicia where, according to Lloyd George, the population was only one-fourth Polish. A note from the Allied Powers was sent Haller ordering him to withdraw, but it was either never delivered or else Haller disregarded it.  

Moreover, Polish enthusiasm had carried her aggression into Germany, and as a result, Foch was given permission on February 13, 1919, to settle a line of demarcation between the Germans and the Poles without prejudice to future settlement by the Conference. On February 16, 1919, a telegram from Paderewski to Clemenceau claimed that German troops in a large offensive occupied Babimost and Kargowa using asphyxiating gas. Foch, ordered to restrain the fighting, reported on February 17, that he had dispatched a telegram to Warsaw granting the Inter-Allied Commission there power to deal with questions that could only be handled on the spot.  

The telegram included the text of Article One of the Armistice Convention signed on February 16, 1919, which stated:

I. The Germans are to cease all hostilities against the Poles at once, whether in the district of Posen or any other district. With this end in view, they are forbidden to allow their troops to cross the following line: The old frontier between East and West Prussia and Russia as far as Louisenfelde, from thence the line west of Louisenfelde,

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21 Ibid., I, 312.  
22 Ibid., II, 976-978.
west of Gr. Neudorff, south of Brzoza, north of Schubin, north of Exin, south of Samotschin, south of Chodziesen, north of Czarnikau, west of Miala, west of Birnbaum, west of Bentschen, west of Wollstein, north of Lissa, north of Rawitsch, south of Krotoschin, west of Adelau, west of Schildberg, north of Doruchow, to the Silesian frontier.23

Discussion proceeded on Polish problems, and on February 26, 1919, at a meeting of the Council of Five, the British Foreign Minister, Balfour, suggested that a committee be appointed to deal with the territorial questions between Poland and Germany and added that Jules Cambon would be the President of the committee. Balfour's proposal was agreed to by the Foreign Ministers, Pichon, Sonnino, and Lansing, and it was urged that the committee's work be completed sometime in March, preferably by March 8.24

On March 18, 1919, Marshal Foch asked permission before the Council of Ten to draw the attention of the Conference to the grave situation in Poland. Referring to the agreement of the Powers on January 2, to send a mission to Poland to report on the conditions, Foch pointed out that Mr. Noulens, in despatches dated March 5, 8, 11, and 12 had, in the name of the Mission, drawn attention to the gravity of the situation in Poland. Foch proposed an Allied intervention to bolster and assist the Polish government. Lloyd George, however, would not accede to Foch's proposals for he

23Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 15.

24Ibid., IV, 139-140.
thought it would merely mean giving support to the perme-
ination of a greater mischief—by which he meant the
 eventual invasion of Russia.  

Finally, on March 19, 1919, the Commission on
Poland reported to the Council indicating an almost
insuperable difficulty in drawing a frontier on a purely
ethnological basis. However, on all points except one
(the region of the River Bartsch, due to a military
nature) the Commission gave the Poles less than they
had asked. A corridor was given to Poland connecting
the port of Danzig and also two railways through Thorn
and Mlawa. The Commission's report was signed unani-
mously, but Lloyd George stated that the terms were
imposed on the British member, and that he opposed some
aspects of the report because Poland received German
populated areas. He then wanted to know if the Com-
mission defined the frontiers on ex parte evidence alone,
and receiving a positive answer, demanded a hearing for
the German side. Jules Cambon, President of the Com-
mission, and Tardieu tried to persuade the British Prime
Minister to withdraw his stubborn disapproval, but it
was finally agreed to refer the report back to the Com-
mission for reconsideration.  

Jules Cambon presented the new report to the Coun-
cil on March 22, with unanimous backing of the Commission

26 Ibid., IV, 413-419.
including the British expert, Sir William Tyrrell. The Commission reaffirmed its previous position and maintained that the importance of granting to Poland certain German populated areas overrode the historical and ethnographical arguments in favor of Germany. Nevertheless, Lloyd George refused to change his opinion and the report of the Commission was postponed.\textsuperscript{27}

The British Prime Minister's criticism of the Commission's reports was directed primarily against including 2,000,000 Germans in Poland since she had not a high reputation as an administrator. Furthermore, the proposed borders would make it hard for the German government to sign the Treaty and might lead to its collapse.\textsuperscript{28} However, it seemed obvious that the large issue at stake was not strict adherence to ethnic principles, but the much greater problem of French security and Germany's place in Europe. Lloyd George undoubtedly had the intention to prevent France from too far-reaching commitments in Eastern Europe.

Weakening Poland in turn by depriving her of sound strategic borders would also weaken France, because Lloyd George considered Poland an instrument of the French policy of dominating the Continent.\textsuperscript{29}

Clemenceau again defended Polish rights in the meeting of March 27, and stressed that strategic con-

\textsuperscript{27}Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., p. 37.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 39.
siderations could not be ignored. On April 1, the question of Danzig was considered and various arrangements (autonomy, free city, and direct incorporation into Poland) were discussed. Clemenceau and the French desired to give Danzig to Poland, but Lloyd George objected. The pleading of Paderewski, a note from the Commission on April 12, and the report of the Noulens Mission on April 17, recommended giving Danzig to the Poles, but the British Prime Minister refused. The Council then appointed a small committee to draft new recommendations on Danzig and on the district of Marienwerder (district through which the railways were to run) in accord with Lloyd George's wishes. The final text was adopted on April 18, and provided for a plebiscite in Marienwerder (which in this case was tantamount to leaving it to Germany) and made Danzig a Free City.

Nevertheless, while the Polish question served to widen the breach between Britain and France, in French eyes the Rhineland was the most important settlement concerning the German frontiers, and the one which caused the most difficulty. The British had first received a

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30 On January 29, 1919, the Council of Ten decided to send an inter-Allied mission to Poland presided over by Joseph Noulens, former French ambassador to Russia. The task of the mission was to put an end to German-Polish hostilities, and to report on the general state of affairs in Poland.

31 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
hint of French desires to occupy the Rhineland at the London Conference in early December, 1918, at which Clemenceau was conspicuously absent. According to Lloyd George, it was still more significant that Clemenceau seldom raised the Rhineland question at any of the subsequent official meetings of the Peace Conference. Apparently Clemenceau wished to avoid any rebuff which would be recorded in the minutes of the meetings. Clemenceau thus confined his activity about the Rhine to sounding out delegates at personal interviews. He urged the insistence of the Rhine frontier as an essential part of the peace settlement. 32

On January 10, 1919, a memorandum from Marshal Foch was presented to the Plenipotentiaries stating that the problem of the Western frontiers was not being examined as special to Belgium and France, but as a European and international guarantee necessary for all the states from a military standpoint. Foch claimed that history had proven German aggressiveness and he warned that any future Germany, whether a republic or not, would retain the same principles and despotic authority. 33 Foch pointed out that his remedy was "not to make friends with a new republic . . . but to make the Rhine a mil-

32 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 386.

33 Ibid., I, 386-389.
tary barrier against any hostile action..."  
Germany was to be deprived any entrance or assembling point for an invasion of France, that is, all territorial sovereignty on the left bank of the Rhine.

Foch followed his January 10th memorandum with a second on February 18, 1919. At this time, Foch asked that the Council conclude an immediate preliminary peace with Germany, for no German army could resist the coalition. Once again with the Rhine as his primary concern, Foch based his arguments on strategic grounds. Germany was to relinquish all sovereign and proprietary rights over the Rhine provinces, whose status would then be determined by the Peace Conference. Foch proposed that an immediate demand be sent to Germany, believing that the Allies could now establish any condition they wished. To sum up, he added that an immediate and summary settlement with Germany "will allow us to consider how we shall deal with Eastern Europe, which we now propose to do at once."  

Foch's memorandum was followed by Andre Tardieu's proposals on February 25, 1919. The French Plenipotentiary delegate maintained that France did not desire to annex the left bank of the Rhine, but that she merely wished to keep it from being an invasion jump-off point. The left bank would remain under the joint control of

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34 Ibid., I, 389.
the Allies. Following Foch's argument very closely, Tardieu further stated that the League of Nations and the limitations on German forces were not enough—France demanded a "physical guarantee." 36

There can be little doubt that Foch and Tardieu expressed their views to the Council with the full approval of Clemenceau, Poincaré, Briand, and Barthou, to mention a few of the French statesmen. To France the left bank of the Rhine was the "only fruit worth snatching from the tree of victory." To the British it was a "definite and dishonorable betrayal of one of the fundamental principles for which the Allies had professed to fight." 37 Britain believed any attempt to divide Germany would fail and ultimately cause friction, possibly another war.

Upon recovering from his wound, Clemenceau approached Lloyd George on the Rhine subject, both being still anxious to avoid a head-on conflict. The problem was sent to a committee made up of Tardieu, Philip Kerr (Lloyd George's personal secretary), and Dr. Mazes of the United States, but no resolutions or conclusions were reached. Great Britain had even objected to contributing to a part of the occupation forces, and a real danger of an estrangement arose between Britain and France


37 Ibid., I, 396.
for Britain had opposed the quartering of troops, not only on the right bank, but on the left bank as well. Thus the issue remained undecided with no side satisfied.38

On March 7, 1919, at 10:30 A.M. a meeting between Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Colonel House was held outside the Council Chamber at the Ministry of War, during which the Eastern and Western frontiers were discussed. In reply to Lloyd George's complaint that Foch did not fully explain his plan, Clemenceau explained that Foch himself had not thought it out and did not understand it.39 British disapproval of Foch's plan resulted from the proposal placing the Polish frontier on a line drawn from Danzig to Thorn. It meant incorporating the whole of Eastern Prussia, overwhelmingly German, in the new Republic of Poland. Colonel House said it might be possible to create an internationalized or independent East Prussia and Clemenceau approved. However, due to British opposition it was decided to wait for the Commission's report.40

38Ibid., I, 396-399.

39Ibid., I, 283-287. Clemenceau was possibly hiding his real feelings toward Foch's plan which the British opposed or perhaps it was an indication of the internal dissention among the French over the Rhineland question.

40The Commission's report on March 19, 1919, stated that "East Prussia was doubtless the most Prussian part of Germany, and its capital, Königsberg, was a holy place of Prussianism." The southern part of the Province (the district of Allenstein) contained many Poles, but these, unlike the majority of their countrymen, were
Clemenceau objected to the application of the principle of self-determination to the Western frontiers, because it was the principle "which allowed a man to clutch at your throat the first time it was convenient to him." He further disagreed to any time limitations being placed upon the separation of the Rhineland provinces. The British were mostly alarmed with Foch's plan for an army of occupation to hold the Rhine from the Dutch to the Swiss frontier which they estimated would take 300,000 men. Clemenceau argued that it would take 100,000 men and that they would hold only a few bridgeheads. When Britain stated it would not make a permanent contribution to the occupation forces, Clemenceau replied that France would undertake two-thirds of it.

On March 18, 1919, Balfour indicated that the French fear of German aggression was indeed real, but pointed out that it was all one-sided. Even if Germany rearmed, the granting to France of the Rhineland would still leave her a second rate power. In Balfour's opinion, only a change in the world system could secure peace, and France and her statesmen were not promoting

Protestants, and had been very largely Germanized. It was concluded that a plebiscite be held there. See Foreign Relations, 1919, IV, 414.

41 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 286.

42 Ibid., I, 286-288.
this. As Lloyd George stated:

It looked as if we had arrived at a point where it was impossible to reach any agreement with our French colleagues unless we were prepared to throw over all the declarations which we had made during the war with regard to the Peace Settlement.

Since the British-French cooperation was becoming more estranged, the British delegation decided to make it clear in writing exactly where it stood. Lloyd George and his advisors (General Smuts, Sir Henry Wilson, Sir Maurice Hankey, and Philip Kerr) retired to the secluded Forest of Fontainebleau and prepared the memorandum of March 25, 1919, titled "Some Considerations for the Peace Conference before They Finally Draft Their Terms." This document informed Clemenceau that the British would not consent to an occupation of the left bank except a short occupation as a provisional guarantee for payment of the German debt. It further stated that:

From every point of view, therefore, it seems to me that we ought to endeavor to draw up a peace settlement as if we were impartial arbiters forgetful of the passions of war. This settlement ought to have three ends in view. First of all it must do justice to the Allies by taking into account Germany's responsibility for the origin of the war . . . . Secondly it must be a settlement which a responsible German government can sign in the belief that it can fulfill the obligations it incurs. Thirdly, it must be a settlement which will contain no provocations for future wars and which will constitute an alternative to Bolshevism, because it will commend itself to all reasonable opinion as a fair settlement of the European problem.


44 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 402.
To my mind it is idle to endeavour to impose a permanent limitation of armaments upon Germany unless we are prepared similarly to impose limitations upon ourselves.\textsuperscript{45}

The March 25th memorandum also contained British policy concerning Poland and stated that the Polish claims were ridiculous and would not be upheld by the British delegation. The British proposed that Poland receive a corridor to Danzig, drawn irrespective of transportation considerations so as to embrace the smallest number of Germans. In the West, there was to be no separation of the Rhineland provinces, but they would be demilitarized. The provinces would be controlled by France, Britain, and the United States until the League of Nations was able to provide for French security. France would receive Alsace-Lorraine, and in the Saar, France would receive the 1814 frontiers or as an alternative the present frontiers with the use of the Saar mines for ten years.\textsuperscript{46}

Understandably, the British memorandum was accepted with hostility in French circles, and caused Clemenceau to reply with a memorandum on March 26, 1919. Clemenceau's repartie suggested that the British and the French were in accord on a just and durable peace, but that justice must be obvious, and according to the British plan only the maritime nations would receive any,

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., I, 408-409.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., I, 412-414.
leaving the continental nations no better off than before the war. Depriving Germany of territory would not sow the seed of future discontent for Germany had already been dealt the worst blow. Besides, justice, as conceived by the Allies, did not mean the same thing to the Germans. Therefore, Clemenceau reported that the French could not accept the British proposal, and most important, Clemenceau pointed out the threat of bad relations when he stated:

Here we have a condition of inequality which might risk leaving a bad impression upon the after-war relations between the Allies, more important than the after-war relations between Germany and the Allies.\textsuperscript{47}

Lloyd George's reply to Clemenceau rejected the Premier's arguments since the British Prime Minister suggested that France attached slight importance to an indemnity, German ships, Alsace-Lorraine, disarmament, and American and British friendship. He said she seemed willing to forego all for the Polish claims and the inviolability of French soil.\textsuperscript{48}

However, on March 27, 1919, some agreement was reached as Clemenceau accepted the Rhine terms of the British proposal if aggression was defined as entry into a fifty kilometer zone on the right bank of the Rhine ("l'agression est défini par l'entrée des forces allemandes dans la zone de kilomètres au delà du Rhin.").

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., I, 419.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., I, 420-422.
To which Tardieu added that in such a case France would have the right to transport troops to a line along the Rhine ("en cas d'agression, nous devons avoir le droit de porter nos troupes sur la ligne du Rhine qui est notre ligne de défense."). Nevertheless, Clemenceau still insisted that the absence of all military installations on the left bank of the Rhine and in a fifty kilometer zone on the right bank, plus military guarantees were not enough, stating they were only temporary guarantees ("mais ce que je ne pourrais pas accepter, ce serait une garantie temporaire.").

On March 31, 1919, the French brought Marshal Foch before the Council of Four, and he again repeated his arguments, but received no support. On April 4, 1919, King Albert of Belgium gave his opinion, and despite heavy pressure from the French, he rejected their view. The strain between the French and the British became quite noticeable and prompted Harold Nicolson to record the following statement in his diary.

I gather that there has been a great crisis all this week as between Lloyd George and Clemenceau. The French want the Rhine frontier as their bulwark against Germany. We refuse to give it to them. There is a marked atmosphere of strain and tension.


50Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 422-424.

51Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 291.
Clemenceau, deeply concerned about the failure of Rhineland negotiations, and to a lesser degree the Saar situation, stated that France could not bear the prospect of facing 65,000,000 Germans, and thus he asked for a counter proposal upon the Rhine question. In answer, Lloyd George "conceived the idea of a joint military guarantee by America and Britain to France against any aggression by Germany in the future."\(^52\) The French, said Clemenceau, agreed to this and he would accept the Fontainebleau plan if Great Britain cooperated in the temporary occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads.\(^53\) However, Lloyd George and Wilson objected, and according to Harold Nicolson the French then changed their tactics and secured the services of Lord Northcliffe's press in England to stir up the House of Commons against Lloyd George on the ground that he was pro-German. On April 9, 1919, Nicolson wrote that:

> The French have got a bad attack of nerves. 'Shellshock' as Smuts says. The result is that Lloyd George (who is indignant at the attacks made upon him in the French Press—which can hardly be made without official encouragement) is becoming irritable and in conjunction with P. W. [President Wilson] is beginning to ride a high horse. The whole situation, in fact, is full of menace, uncertainty, tension, sorrow, and discontent.\(^54\)

\(^{52}\)Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, I, 424.

\(^{53}\)Ibid. France proposed to occupy Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Coblenz, Wiesbaden, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, and near enough Frankfurt to dominate the town.

These press attacks and finally a petition of 230 members of the House of Commons forced Lloyd George to leave Paris for England on April 16, 1919, so that he might answer charges brought against him.55

In Lloyd George's absence from Paris, French pressure on Wilson obtained his agreement to an occupation of the Rhineland for fifteen years by the Allied troops. Colonel House attributed this to the harsh attacks of the Parisian newspapers, noticing that the minute Wilson agreed to the French terms the attacks diminished, and as Lloyd George later stated: "The effect was magical. All the Parisian papers appeared on the Morning of the 16th with the most enthusiastic praise of President Wilson."56

The compromise was approved by Lloyd George on April 22, 1919, but it was apparent that some days prior to this date the crisis had passed; however, the situation was not at all satisfactory to the radical French element.57 England had promised a military alliance, and although she had no army, she possessed a large navy, but, nevertheless, "when guardian of the German fleet, she had allowed it to destroy itself at Scapa Flow."58 While Clemenceau had accepted the compromise,

55Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 558-564.
56Ibid., I, 425-426.
57Ibid., I, 427.
58Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, pp. 236-237.
President Poincaré and Foch had not. On April 28, Poincaré instructed Clemenceau to again press for a Rhineland occupation for an undetermined period. Clemenceau, however reluctant, remained loyal to his acceptance of the compromise proposals and later wrote:

The only question that arose in the beginning of the discussion on the Rhine frontier was the breaking off of the Alliance, and that, I emphatically declare, I would not consent to. 59

The French radicals and military never forgave him for it, and until the signing of the Peace on June 28, 1919, Clemenceau was under continuous pressure. 60

Despite the difficulties of the Peace Conference, by May 6, 1919, a compromise had been reached on most points and on that day at the Sixth Plenary session of the Conference, the agenda paper called for the discussion of the conditions of the Peace to be presented to Germany. Clemenceau requested Tardieu to make the explanatory statement, after which Marshal Foch again pointed out the inadequacies of the present condition concerning the occupation of the Rhineland. 61 Nevertheless, the following day these conditions were presented to the German delegation at Trianon Place, Versailles, where the camouflage used to mislead German war planes

59 Ibid., p. 239.

60 See Grandeur and Misery of Victory, pp. 214-230, for an account of Poincaré's and Foch's activities to maintain the French claim to the Rhine.

61 Foreign Relations, 1919, III, 334.
still hung over the lakes in the adjoining parks. 62

Although the differences had apparently been settled, on May 29, 1919, Lloyd George again returned to the question of the Rhine occupation and thought that the whole issue would have to be reconsidered. Outwardly his action stemmed from the belief that occupation by foreign troops would create an atmosphere favorable for the development of Bolshevism. The British Prime Minister thus felt that perhaps fifteen years was too great a time for the occupation period and that the size of the occupation force (at which time he maintained he had not the slightest idea of what it was to consist) must be kept as small as possible. Clemenceau refused, but Lloyd George insisted on the right to reconsider the problem as one of the Powers which had inflicted defeat upon Germany. After further discussion it was agreed that a Commission be appointed to rewrite the draft Convention relating to the occupation of the Rhine provinces on the skeleton plan suggested in the letter from Mr. Noyes, the American delegate on the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission. 63

The same day (May 29) the German delegation sent the Council of Four a memorandum denouncing the harsh conditions of the Peace, and explained what Germany was willing and able to do. German complaints were most

62 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 675-676.

63 Foreign Relations, 1919, VI, 108-110.
bitter concerning the Eastern territorial settlement, and Germany insisted it had departed from Wilson's Fourteen Points. Germany especially would be unable to cede Upper Silesia and still pay her debts. Lloyd George felt that such a readjustment in Eastern Germany was imperative and agreed with the principles established during the war. The real question was whether the Peace Conference had departed from its principles.

With the German grievances in mind, a meeting of the British delegation and the Dominion Premiers occurred in Lloyd George's flat in Rue Nitot on Sunday, June 1, 1919. A review of the peace terms relating to the Eastern settlement indicated that each member desired to make some concession to Germany and that plebiscites should be granted in some areas. General Smuts was quite severe in his criticism. Lloyd George later remarked about the General that:

He was glad to know that it was generally agreed that the Eastern provisions must be modified. Poland was an historic failure and always would be a failure, and in this treaty we were trying to reverse the verdict of history.

It was thus agreed that certain concessions in the form of plebiscites be given to Germany and that further discussion was needed on the Rhineland occupation. Because

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64 Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 682-687.
65 Ibid., I, 687.
66 Ibid., I, 693.
of the strong opposition expected from the French, the Dominion Premiers delegated Lloyd George full power to deal with France as he saw fit, and to obtain the British view "even if it were necessary to withhold our signature from the treaty."\footnote{Ibid., I, 700-720. See Appendix I for a summary of the British position on June 1, 1919.}

On June 2, 1919, at Lloyd George's residence, the British Prime Minister presented the new British position to the Council of Four. Regarding the Eastern frontiers, Upper Silesia, Guhrau, Militsch, Schneidemühl-Konitz, Memel, and a small district in northern Pomerania, Lloyd George and his colleagues insisted that these areas be reconsidered and plebiscites established. The Saar, compensation, and the League of Nations were also brought up, but again Lloyd George pointed out that these were minor points and that the British delegation was mainly concerned with the Rhine problem.\footnote{Foreign Relations, 1919, VI, 140-141.} Clemenceau was visibly disturbed and remarked that the situation was very grave, however, he thanked the British Prime Minister for his candid opinion. Lloyd George then presented to Clemenceau the alternative of choosing between the Rhine and the British guarantee. Clemenceau retaliated by threatening to hand in his resignation and warned that with his removal the United States and Great Britain
could expect much firmer opposition from his replacement. It was decided not to meet the following morning so the Heads of State could consult their own delegations. Later Clemenceau wrote that "without the stalwart support of Mr. Wilson, the treaty on that day would have been a mangled corpse." In the face of these problems the Council of Four again turned to discussing the issues in the hope of finding a solution.

On the following afternoon, June 3, 1919, at President Wilson's house in the Place des Etats-Unis, the Council discussed the Eastern problems. The major point of contention revolved around Upper Silesia. Lloyd George maintained that this region had not been Polish for 800 years and that it was ridiculous that Poland should receive it unreservedly. President Wilson suggested that his proposal be accepted, which was the alteration of the frontier giving Germany Guhrau-Militsch, Schneidemühl-Konitz, northern Pomerania, and a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. Strangely enough Clemenceau remained almost silent throughout much of the discussion and Wilson's proposal was accepted.

The Commission which had been appointed to reconsider the Rhineland occupation on May 29, 1919, sent its

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69Ibid., VI, 142-146.
70Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p. 234.
71Foreign Relations, 1919, VI, 154-155. See Appendix J for a map of the final boundary.
first report to the Council of Four on June 11, however, Clemenceau reported that he had only received a French copy. The English translation was not yet ready and he himself had not had time to study his own.\textsuperscript{72} By the June 12th meeting, however, the Council had before them the report of the Commission on the Left Bank of Rhine. Lloyd George, however, still had not obtained a copy and therefore the report was not discussed in detail. Nevertheless, the British Prime Minister stated that a prolonged occupation of the territory was not really necessary for the protection of France. Indeed, it would be a great peril to France and the peace of Europe. Clemenceau replied that it was necessary that the German people see a foreign army on German soil. The discussion was then adjourned on this subject until some later date.\textsuperscript{73}

On June 13, the report of the Rhineland Commission was again placed before the Council of Four. The report, the draft convention, and the memorandum were considered and after some discussion the Commission's work was slightly amended and then approved by the Four Powers.\textsuperscript{74} Surprisingly there was little opposition from the French. They had acquiesced in the face of British demands.

On June 16, 1919, a declaration by Great Britain,

\textsuperscript{72}\textit{Ibid.}, VI, 294.

\textsuperscript{73}\textit{Ibid.}, VI, 327-328.

\textsuperscript{74}\textit{Ibid.}, VI, 389. See Appendix K for approved text on the Rhineland.
France, and the United States was signed stating that the period of occupation was not necessarily to last until the reparation clauses were completely executed. This assumed that Germany would be obliged to give proof of her good will before the end of fifteen years time. France was slightly consoled for her concessions regarding Germany by the signing of the Triple Alliance Pact negotiated by the three Allied powers which promised aid to France if attacked by Germany. On June 28, 1919, the Peace was signed and the same day the Triple Alliance Pact was signed in the Place des Etats-Unis by Clemenceau, Pichon, Wilson, Lansing, Balfour, and Lloyd George.

75British Foreign and State Papers, CXII, 978.
76Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, p. 182.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

On June 28, 1919, the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed, and that same day the United States and Britain pledged their support to a military pact granting aid to France in the case of German aggression. However, the Guarantee Pact which had been read before the members of the House of Commons on June 22, 1919, and subsequently unanimously accepted, had been defeated by six votes in the Senate of the United States.\(^1\) Thus, France, struggling to maintain a position of military dominance on the continent, fighting for an independent Rhineland, desiring to create a large and powerful Poland out of Germany, and submitting to the opposition of Great Britain in return for a military pact, found herself in much the same position as she had been in 1914. While Germany was momentarily incapable of attacking France, the French wondered how long she would remain in this condition.

The pure and simple reign of might had been surrendered to introduce into international life new con-

\(^1\) Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, pp. 240-241.
cepts of right, and Clemenceau later expressed the French attitude when he said that "this was not enough for the inaugurators of a retrograde Peace, who had nothing better, but to abandon what our splendid soldiers had won;"\textsuperscript{2} or again by saying, "Self inflicted defeat as the sequel to supreme victory—that was what made out of all that lavishing of the blood of France."\textsuperscript{3}

Nevertheless, the British and French delegates had entered into the Peace negotiations with the hopes of securing a peace not only for themselves, but for the world. However, both delegations had realized by January 18, 1919, that their policies would in some areas be opposed to one another, and that the task which they faced was beset with serious difficulties. The night before the British Foreign Minister (Balfour) left for the Conference, he stated, "It is not so much the war as the Peace that I have always dreaded." It was certain that he went to negotiate with few hopes.\textsuperscript{4} Beadon, the British Quartermaster General, later wrote that:

I was not alone in fearing that, as has so frequently happened on other occasions when Allies set out to divide the spoils of victory, the Conference might ultimately break up in recrimination and disorder.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 185.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 107.

\textsuperscript{4}Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour, p. 263.

\textsuperscript{5}Beadon, Some Memories of the Peace Conference, p. 21.
Clemenceau, the French "tiger" had wondered how much of the past could be forgotten in favor of the new conceptions of Wilsonian state relations, and whether the unchanging realities of international problems could be solved by the "respectable hotch-potch" that was proposed. According to Clemenceau man finds himself swayed by ardent passions born of national interest, which sometimes masters him completely. "A man's country comes before his own private philosophy."  

Both countries had become aware of the new situation that had slowly emerged since the signing of the Armistice. As the condition of Germany gradually became known, the British fear that had prevailed during the war subsided, the French fear did not. And as the Conference progressed British policy rapidly adopted a more lenient attitude toward the defeated nation. This attitude prompted Clemenceau to state later that:

There was no serious opposition to the harshest clauses of the Armistice except among our British Allies, who were applying themselves heartily to the task of sparing Germany. Fearing nothing so much as that the balance of power might too markedly swing over to the advantage of her Ally France.  

The height of British leniency came in June, 1919, after the Empire and British delegation had studied the German replies to the Peace conditions. Lloyd George had stated on June 6, 1919, that "France was afraid of

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6 Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p. 184.

7 Ibid., p. 120.
the Teuton, but . . . the Teuton was largely done for." Great Britain then demanded more concessions for Germany or threatened to walk out on the Peace Conference.

At Versailles, France had wavered between two methods by which Germany could have been kept in check. Either she could make herself superior in power and less dependent on outside help, or she could put her faith primarily in the military assistance which she could obtain from others. France had tried to obtain both, but Great Britain would not accede to her demands concerning the German frontiers. Nevertheless, at no stage of the negotiations was the French government ready to drop the demand for what she called "la solidarite des allies." Hence, the British were able to achieve revisions in the terms of the Treaty favorable to Germany.

However, the Paris Peace Conference was not only a meeting of governments, for the negotiations were conducted by men who perhaps more than any other factor contributed to the final terms. Lloyd George later wrote that:

If the lofty ideals prevalent before the Peace Conference have not been attained, it is not the fault of the treaty but of the statesmanship that possessed neither the faith nor the courage to stand by all that was highest and best in its provisions.10

8Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, VI, 212.
9Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars, p. 16.
10Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 62.
Clemenceau, who as mayor of Montmartre had seen the Germans invade France in 1870, fought stubbornly to gain for France a preponderant position in Europe. His policy and philosophy of peace were that to have peace one "has had to make war; that peace is bought by power, by strength of arms and not otherwise."\(^{11}\) Clemenceau some years later again stated that:

I am no longer astonished that the military chiefs, traditionalists above everything, should have clung obstinately to a continual repetition of the same defensive dispositions, always reinforced in vain, doomed eternally to prove abortive. The idea of force is deeply rooted in man as in the whole universe. Law is controlled and ordered force.\(^{12}\)

Nevertheless, the French Premier had submitted to British policy solidly stated by Lloyd George and backed by the Dominion Premiers; and as Beadon wrote in his book:

Yet the Germans can thank the British Prime Minister that the whole of Silesia, including its capital Breslau, was not allotted to Poland in the original terms. Even President Wilson had agreed to this.\(^{13}\)

Beadon could have added the Rhineland occupation terms and the plebiscites granted to Germany for it was British insistence that tempered the severity of these terms. The granting of plebiscites to German border territories is significant for with

\(^{11}\)Clemenceau, "The Case of France," in Public Opinion and World Peace, p. 131.

\(^{12}\)Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p. 188.

\(^{13}\)Beadon, Some Memories of the Peace Conference, p. 27.
the exception of the Northern Schleswig zone, she (Germany) won every case which was put to the vote of the inhabitants. The work of Frederick and Bismarck was not to crumble so easily.\textsuperscript{14}

For this Clemenceau was never forgiven by the French and specifically Poincaré. One wonders what Poincaré would have done in a similar situation. Lloyd George placed much of the failure of the Conference and the Peace on the French President. Indeed, his personal opinion of Poincaré is completely critical. Poincaré was a Lorrainer, born in sight of the German eagle and his anti-Germanism was a passion that gave him special hold on France. For Lloyd George, "an agreement with Poincaré simply meant that he thought an open break was inconvenient at that time."\textsuperscript{15} Perhaps the strongest charge leveled against Poincaré was Lloyd George's statement:

It was a disaster to France and to Europe. Where a statesman was needed who realized that if it is to be wisely exploited victory must be utilized with clemency and restraint, Poincaré made it impossible for any French Prime Minister to exert these qualities. He would not tolerate any compromise, concession or conciliation. He was bent on keeping Germany down. He was more responsible than any other man for the refusal of France to implement the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. He stimulated and subsidized the Armaments of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia which created such a ferment of uneasiness in disarmed Germany. He encouraged insurrection in the Rhineland against the authority of the Reich. He intrigued with the anti-German elements in Britain to thwart every effort in the direction of restoring goodwill in Europe and he completely baffled Briand's endeavor in that direction. He is the true creator of modern

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 142.

\textsuperscript{15} Lloyd George, \textit{The Truth About the Peace Treaties}, I, 249-251.
Germany with its great and growing armaments, and should this end in another conflict the catastrophe will have been engineered by Poincaré. His dead hand lies heavy on Europe to-day.

Still, the opposing policies of Britain and France cannot be totally ascribed to any one man, for it is circumstances and men that make history. The French were obsessed by the fear of a new war with Germany and therefore peace to them could only be the reward of an effective preparation for war. This was not so for the British. They achieved their security. It must be admitted that Britain had not suffered as greatly as France and her geographic position itself removed her from the bodily harm of war. France had been invaded twice in forty-four years, and the possibility still remained. Thus, for the French the Peace was in reality a plan for organizing a potential war coalition, while the British were seeking cooperation for the needs of a peace-time world that would be more conducive to normal economic activity. Britain's intent was to foster prosperity and recovery, and to create a peace psychology among other nations. While Britain was therefore interested in promoting a better balance of power, France on the contrary was trying to maintain the status quo brought about by the war. Both regarded their objectives and the national interests of their respective countries as identical with those of Europe as a whole. Here was

16Ibid., I, 252.
the fundamental cause of the differences of France and Britain, allies in war, but strangers in peace.
APPENDIX A

The war aims of the Allies promulgated at the commencement of the war might therefore be thus summarized.

1. The vindication of international right against the tyranny of force used as an instrument not of righteousness but of arrogance, of greed and of national oppression.

2. The complete restoration of the national independence and integrity of Belgium and Serbia.

3. The defeat and destruction of Prussian militarism as a menace to the peace of the world.

4. The establishment of the principles of international right on such firm foundations that the smaller and weaker nations could be guaranteed protection against the ruthlessness and aggressiveness of the strong.

5. As far as France was concerned the restoration of the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine.

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1Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 25.
APPENDIX B

DOCUMENT NO. 2

Confidential Telegram from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Pokrovsky) to the Russian Ambassador at Paris.

Petrograd, February 12, 1917

Copy to London confidentially. At an audience with the Most High (the Tsar) M. Doumercq submitted to the Emperor the desire of France to secure for herself at the end of the present war the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and a special position in the valley of the River Saar, as well as to attain the political separation from Germany of her trans-Rheinish districts and their organization on a separate basis in order that in future the River Rhine might form a permanent strategical frontier against a Germanic invasion. Doumercq expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would not refuse immediately to draw up its assent to these suggestions in a formal manner.

His Imperial Majesty was pleased to agree to this in principle, in consequence of which I requested Doumercq, after communicating with his Government, to let me have the draft of an agreement, which would then be given a formal sanction by an exchange of notes between the French Ambassador and myself.

Proceeding thus to meet the wishes of our ally, I nevertheless consider it my duty to recall the standpoint put forward by the Imperial Government in the telegram of February 24, 1916, No. 948, to the effect that "while allowing France and England complete liberty in delimiting the Western frontiers of Germany, we expect that the Allies on their part will give us equal liberty in delimiting our frontiers with Germany and Austria-Hungary." Hence the impending exchange of notes on the question raised by Doumercq will justify us in asking the French Government simultaneously to confirm its assent to allowing Russia freedom of action in drawing up her future frontiers in the West. Exact data on

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the question will be supplied by us in due course to the French Cabinet.

(signed) Pokrovsky

DOCUMENT NO. 3

Copy of Note from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador at Petrograd (M. Doumercgue).

February 14, 1917

In your note of to-day's date your Excellency was good enough to inform the Imperial Government that the Government of the Republic was contemplating the inclusion in the terms of peace to be offered to Germany the following demands and guarantees of a territorial nature.

1. Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France.
2. The frontiers are to be extended at least up to the limits of the former Principality of Lorraine, and are to be drawn up at the discretion of the French Government so as to provide for the strategical needs and for the inclusion in French territory of the entire iron district of Lorraine and of the entire coal district of the Saar Valley.
3. The rest of the territories situated on the left bank of the Rhine, which now form part of the German Empire, are to be entirely separated from Germany and freed from all political and economic dependence upon her.
4. The territories of the left bank of the Rhine outside French territory are to be constituted an autonomous and neutral State, and are to be occupied by French troops until such time as the enemy States have completely satisfied all the conditions and guarantees indicated in the treaty of peace.

Your Excellency stated that the Government of the Republic would be happy to be able to rely upon the support of the Imperial Government for the carrying out of its plans. By order of his Imperial Majesty, my most august master, I have the honour, in the name of the Russian Government, to inform your excellency by the present note that the Government of the Republic may rely upon the support of the Imperial Government for the carrying out of its plans as set out above.
DOCUMENT NO. 4

Telegram from the Russian Ambassador at Paris to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

March 11, 1917

See my reply to telegram No. 167, No. 2. The Government of the French Republic, anxious to confirm the importance of the treaties concluded with the Russian Government in 1915 for the settlement on the termination of the war of the question of Constantinople and the Straits in accordance with Russia’s aspirations, anxious, on the other hand, to secure for its ally in military and industrial respects all the guarantees desirable for the safety and the economic development of the empire, recognizes Russia’s complete liberty in establishing her western frontiers.

(signed) Isvolsky
APPENDIX C

THE GERMAN ARMISTICE

Terms of the Armistice With Germany, Signed November 11, 1918.

Between Marshal Foch, commander in chief of the allied armies, acting in the name of the allied and associated powers, with Admiral Wemyss, first sea lord, on the one hand, and Herr Erzberger, secretary of state, president of the German delegation, Count von Oberndorff, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Maj. Gen. von Winterfeldt, Capt. Vanselow (German Navy), duly empowered and acting with the concurrence of the German chancellor, on the other hand.

An armistice has been concluded on the following conditions:

Conditions of the Armistice Concluded with Germany

(A) Clauses Relating to the Western Front

I. Cessation of hostilities by land and in the air six hours after the signing of the armistice.

II. Immediate evacuation of the invaded countries—Belgium, France, Luxemburg, as well as Alsace-Lorraine—so ordered as to be completed within 15 days from the signature of the armistice.

German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed shall be made prisoners of war.

Occupation by the allied and United States forces jointly shall keep pace with the evacuation in these areas.

All movements of evacuation and occupation shall be regulated in accordance with a note (annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

III. Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within 15 days, of all inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial, or condemned).

IV. Surrender in good condition by the German armies

of the following equipment: 5,000 guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 1,700 aeroplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly all D. 7's and night-bombing machines).

The above to be delivered in situ to the allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (annexe I) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

V. Evacuation by the German armies of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine. These districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the allied and United States armies of occupation.

The occupation of these territories by allied and United States troops shall be assured by garrisons holding the principal crossing of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne), together with bridgeheads at these points of a 30-kilometer (about 19 miles) radius on the right bank, and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the area.

A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the river and 10 kilometers (6½ miles) distant from them between the Dutch frontier and the Swiss frontier.

All movements of evacuation and occupation shall be regulated according to the note (annexe I) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

(B) Clauses Relating to the Eastern Frontiers of Germany

XII. All German troops at present in any territory which before the war formed part of Austria-Hungary, Roumania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany, as above defined, as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.

XIII. Evacuation of German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners and agents, civilians as well as military, now on the territory of Russia (frontiers as defined on Aug. 1, 1914), to be recalled.

XIV. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other coercive measures with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (frontiers as defined on Aug. 1, 1914).

XV. Annulment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

XVI. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, in order
to convey supplies to the populations of these territories or for the purpose of maintaining order.

(F) Duration of Armistice

XXXIV. The duration of the armistice is to be 36 days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the armistice may be repudiated by one of the contracting parties 48 hours' previous notice. It is understood that failure to execute Articles III and XVIII completely in the periods specified is not to give reason for a repudiation of the armistice, save where such failure is due to malice aforethought.

To insure the execution of the present convention under the most favorable conditions, the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is recognized. This commission shall act under the supreme authority of the high command, military and naval, of the allied armies.

The present armistice was signed on the 11th day of November, 1918, at 5 o'clock a.m. (French time).

F. Foch Erzberger
R. E. Wemyss Oberndorff
Winterfeldt Vanseelow

November 11, 1918.

ANNEX NO. 1

I. The evacuation of the invaded territories, Belgium, France, and Luxemburg, and also of Alsace-Lorraine, shall be carried out in three successive stages according to the following conditions:

First Stage.--Evacuation of the territories situated between the existing front and line no. 1 on the inclosed map, to be completed within 5 days after the signature of the armistice.

Second Stage.--Evacuation of territories situated between line no. 1 and line no. 2, to be carried out within 4 further days (9 days in all after the signing of the armistice).

Third Stage.--Evacuation of the territories situated between line no. 2 and line no. 3, to be completed within 6 further days (15 days in all after the signing of the armistice).

Allied and United States troops shall enter these various territories on the expiration of the period allowed to the German troops for the evacuation of each.
In consequence, the allied troops will cross the present German front as from the 6th day following the signing of the armistice, line no. 1 as from the 10th day, and line no. 2 as from the 16th day.

II. Evacuation of the Rhine district.

This evacuation shall also be carried out in several successive stages:
(1) Evacuation of territories situated between lines 2 and 3 and line 4, to be completed within 4 further days (19 days in all after the signing of the armistice).
(2) Evacuation of territories situated between lines 4 and 5 to be completed within 4 further days (23 days in all after the signing of the armistice).
(3) Evacuation of territories situated between lines 5 and 6 (line of the Rhine) to be completed within 4 further days (27 days in all after the signing of the armistice).
(4) Evacuation of the bridgeheads and of the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine to be completed within 4 further days (31 days in all after the signing of the armistice).

The allied and United States army of occupation shall enter these various territories after the expiration of the period allowed to the German troops for the evacuation of each; consequently the army will cross line no. 3, 20 days after the signing of the armistice.

It will cross line no. 4 as from the twenty-fourth day after the signing of the armistice; line no. 5 as from the twenty-eighth day; line no. 6 (Rhine) the thirty-second day, in order to occupy the bridgeheads.

III. Surrender by the German armies of war material specified by the armistice.

This war material shall be surrendered according to the following conditions: The first half before the tenth day, the second half before the twentieth day. This material shall be handed over to each of the allied and United States armies by each larger tactical group of the German armies in the proportions which may be fixed by the permanent International Armistic Commission.
APPENDIX D

MEMORANDUM OF THE ALLIED POWERS
November 5, 1918

The Allied Governments have given careful considerations to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress in January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress on January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored, as well as evacuated and made free. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.

1Foreign Relations, 1919, supp. 1, I, 468.
APPENDIX E

PROPOSED BASIS FOR THE PRELIMINARIES
OF PEACE WITH GERMANY

There are for us three essential problems to be solved in order to reconcile the necessary guarantees and International Law:

I.--Guarantees on the left bank of the Rhine (military neutralization, without political intervention);

II.--Complete restoration of Poland (for she is irreconcilable with the Kingdom of Prussia);

III.--Future administration of Germany (in conformity with the right of peoples to self-determination);

I. Territorial Clauses

The following stipulations will indicate the new German frontiers, in the way of restoration of the provinces which Prussia had unjustly incorporated either to its territory, or to that of the former German Empire.

(a) Restitution to France of the Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine torn from France in 1815 and 1871, with the slight rectifications of frontier indicated by Marshal Foch (along the valley of the Queich, the Rhine to Landau, extended by the ridge bounding the basin of the Sarre on the North).

(b) Surrender to the reconstituted State of Poland of the Polish districts of Prussia (see Mr. Balfour's remarks at the Versailles Conference) of Posnania and Upper Silesia, as well as access to the Baltic (Upper Silesia, which has not belonged to Poland in modern times, should be allocated to her because it is Polish but cannot be by way of restitution. For the same reason all the southern districts of Eastern Prussia which are by language and race Polish, though forming part of the historic Duchy of Prussia, the successor of the Teutonic Knights.

(c) Restitution to Denmark of the Danish territories of Slesvig.

(d) Rectification of the Belgian Frontier in the district of Malmedy.

1Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 372-373.
(e) Freedom of the economic union of Luxembourg from every tie with Germany (the provision in the Treaty of Frankfort which took from the Compagnie Francaise de l'Est the control of the railways of Luxembourg will be replaced by a clause restoring to that Company the said control).

(f) Cession by the German Government of its sovereign rights over the German possessions overseas.

(g) Recognition by Germany of the French Protectorate in Morocco in its entirety and with suppression of all rights derived for Germany from the Treaty of Algeciras and other treaties.

(h) Recognition by Germany of the British Protectorate in Egypt.

(i) Recognition by Germany of the States established out of the territories of the former Empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary in the same way and under the same conditions as the Allies.

(j) Abrogation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and of all agreements concluded with whatever authorities constituted in or in the name of territories of peoples comprised in the former Russian Empire including Finland.

(k) Abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest and of all previous agreements with Roumania (a new treaty with this country through the medium of the Allies not being necessary since Germany has no common frontier with Roumania and since a treaty concluded under Allied auspices would appear to establish a sort of protectorate over Roumania).

(l) Security given by Germany to the Allies (except the United States) of her adhesion to the clauses, which will be communicated to her of the peace treaties concluded between the Allies, the Turkish Empire and Bulgaria.

(m) Cession by Germany to the Allies by an arrangement to become to within six months of all concessions granted to German subjects in the Turkish Empire.
APPENDIX F

PLAN OF THE PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN THE ALLIED MINISTERS
January 5, 1919

A preparatory meeting of the members of the Supreme Council of Versailles is necessary in order to settle several questions of form and substance.

1. Representation of belligerent and neutral States at the different stages of negotiations.
2. Leading principles and the order in which questions should be examined.
3. Organisation of the work.

As soon as these points have been settled by the Great Powers, the States invited may be requested by the French Government to notify the names of their Delegates. It will then be possible to enter upon the study of the preliminaries.

II. Principles and Methods

The Conference is entrusted with the task of preparing, through the settlement of the war, the new organisation of international relations, in accordance with the general principles stated in President Wilson's speech of January 8, 1918, and in his speech of September 27, 1918, as well as in the Allies' reply of November 5th, 1918.

Consequently, the order of the debates might be as follows:

1. Establishment of the Leading Principles.
2. Territorial Problems.

1Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 386-389.
Establishment of frontiers between belligerents, newly-formed States, and neutral countries, determined according to—

(a) The right to self-determination of peoples.
(b) The right of nations, whether weak or strong, to be in principle on an equal footing.
(c) The right of ethnical and religious minorities.
(d) The right to guarantees against an aggressive renewal of militarism (rectification of frontiers, military neutrality of certain regions, internationalisation of certain highways, freedom of the seas, etc).
APPENDIX G

RULES OF THE CONFERENCE

I

The Conference summoned with a view to lay down the conditions of peace, in the first place by peace preliminaries and later by a definite Treaty of Peace, shall include the representatives of the Allied or Associated belligerent Powers.

The Belligerent Powers with general interests (the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan) shall attend all sessions and commissions.

The Belligerent Powers with special interests (Belgium, Brazil, the British Dominions and India, China, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Hayti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Siam, the Czecho-Slovak Republic) shall attend the sessions at which questions concerning them are discussed.

Powers having broken off diplomatic relations with the enemy Powers (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay) shall attend sessions at which questions interesting them will be discussed.

Neutral Powers and States in process of formation shall, on being summoned by the Powers with general interests, be heard, either orally or in writing, at sessions devoted especially to the examination of questions in which they are directly concerned, and in so far as those questions are concerned.

II

The Powers shall be represented by Plenipotentiary Delegates to the number of:

Five for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan;
Three for Belgium, Brazil, Serbia;
Two for China, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Siam, the Czecho-Slovak Republic;
One for Cuba, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia,

Foreign Relations, 1919, III, 172-175.
Nicaragua, Panama;
One for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay.
The British Dominions and India shall be repre-
sented as follows:
Two delegates each for Canada, Australia, South
Africa, India (including the native States);
One Delegate for New Zealand.
Each Delegation shall be entitled to set up a
panel, but the number of Plenipotentiaries shall not
exceed the figures given above.
The representatives of the Dominions (including
Newfoundland) and of India can, moreover, be included
in the representation of the British Empire by means of
the panel system.
Montenegro shall be represented by one Delegate,
but the manner of his appointment shall not be decided
until the present political situation of that country
becomes clear.
The conditions governing the representation of
Russia shall be settled by the Conference when Russian
affairs come up for discussion.

III

Each Delegation of Plenipotentiaries may be accom-
panied by duly accredited Technical Delegates and by two
shorthand writers.
The Technical Delegates may attend sessions in
order to supply information when called upon. They may
be asked to speak in order to give necessary explanations.

IV

The order of precedence shall follow the alpha-
betical order of the Powers in French.

V

The Conference shall be opened by the President
of the French Republic. The President of the French
Council of Ministers shall thereupon provisionally take
the chair.
The credentials of members present shall at once
be examined by a Committee composed of one Plenipoten-
tiary for each of the Allied or Associated Powers.

VI

At the first meeting the permanent President and
four Vice-Presidents shall be elected from among the
Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers in alphabetical order.

VII

A Secretariat chosen outside the ranks of the Plenipotentiaries, consisting of one representative each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, shall be submitted for the approval of the Conference by the President, who shall be in control of and responsible for it.

The Secretariat shall draw up the protocols of the sessions, classify the archives, provide for the administrative organization of the Conference and, generally, ensure the regular and punctual working of the services entrusted to us.

The head of the Secretariat shall be responsible for the sole custody of the protocols and archives.

The archives shall be accessible at all times to members of the Conference.

VIII

Publicity shall be given to the proceedings by means of official communiques prepared by the Secretariat and made public.

In case of disagreement as to the wording of such communiques, the matter shall be referred to the chief Plenipotentiaries of their representatives.

IX

All documents to be incorporated in the protocols must be supplied in writing by the Plenipotentiaries originally responsible for them.

No document or proposal may be so supplied except by a Plenipotentiary or in his name.

X

With a view to facilitate discussion, any Plenipotentiary wishing to propose a resolution must give the President twenty-four hours' notice thereof, except in the case of proposals connected with the order of the day and arising from the actual discussion.

Exceptions may, however, be made to this rule in the case of amendments of secondary questions which do not constitute actual proposals.
XI

All petitions, memoranda, observations and documents addressed to the Conference by any persons other than the Plenipotentiaries must be received and classified by the Secretariat.

Such of these communications as are of any political interest shall be briefly summarized in a list circulated to all the Plenipotentiaries. Supplementary editions of this list shall be issued as such communications are received.

All these documents shall be deposited in the archives.

XII

All questions to be decided shall be discussed at a first and second reading; the former shall afford occasion for a general discussion for the purpose of arriving at an agreement on points of principle; the second reading shall provide an opportunity of discussing details.

XIII

The Plenipotentiaries shall be entitled, subject to the approval of the Conference, to authorize their Technical Delegates to submit direct any technical explanations considered desirable regarding any particular question.

If the Conference shall think fit, the study of any particular question from the technical point of view may be entrusted to a Committee composed of Technical Delegates, who shall be instructed to present a report and suggest solutions.

XIV

The Protocols drawn up by the Secretariat shall be printed and circulated in proof to the Delegates with the least possible delay.

To save time, this circulation of the protocols in advance shall take the place of reading them at the beginning of the sessions. Should no alterations be demanded by the Plenipotentiaries, the text shall be considered as approved and deposited in the archives. Should any alteration be called for, it shall be read aloud by the President at the beginning of the following session.

The whole of the protocol shall, however, be read if one of the Plenipotentiary members shall so request.
A committee shall be formed to draft the motions adopted.

This committee shall deal only with questions which have been decided; its sole task shall be to draw up the text of the decisions adopted and to present them to the Conference for approval.

It shall consist of five members who shall not be Plenipotentiary Delegates and shall comprise one representative each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan.
APPENDIX H

PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE, PROTOCOL NO. 6, PLENARY SESSION OF MAY 6, 1919

PART II.—Boundaries of Germany

(A.)—Boundaries of Germany except Eastern Russia (East Prussia)

1. With Belgium:
   The north-eastern boundary of the territory of Moresnet, east of the Kreis of Eupen, west of the Kreis of Montjoie (former frontier), north-east and east of the Kreis of Malmedy as far as Luxemburg.
2. With Luxemburg:
   The frontier of 1914.
3. With France:
   The frontier of July, 1870, from Luxemburg to Switzerland (the Customs frontier being that of the territory of the Saar Basin).
4. With Switzerland:
   The present frontier.
5. With Austria:
   The frontier of 1914, up to Czecho-Slovakia.
6. With Czecho-Slovakia:
   The frontier of 1914, with Bohemia and Silesia, so far as the salient to the east of Neustadt.
7. With Poland:
   From the point defined above; east of Falkenberg, the boundary between Upper and Middle Silesia, west of Posnania, the course of the Bartsch, the boundary between (the Kreis of) Guhrau and Glogau, the boundary between Lissa and Fraustadt, southwest of Kopnitz, west of Bentschen, the northern point of Lake Chlop, the boundary between Schwerin and Birnbaum, the boundary between Filehne and Czarnkau, west and north of Schneidemuhl, a line 8 kilometers to the west of the railway Schneidemuhl-Konitz, west-north-west of Konitz, the boundary between Konitz and Schlochau, the boundary of West Prussia south-east of Lauenburg, east of Hohenfelde and of Chottschow, the coast of the Baltic Sea to the north-north-west of Chottschow.

1Foreign Relations, 1919, III, 335-345.
8. With Denmark:
   The frontier as fixed by special Articles.

   (B.)--Boundaries With East Prussia

   The coast of the Baltic Sea to the north of Proebbernau, the bend of the Elbinger Channel, the course of the
   Nogat, of the Vistula the southern boundary (of the Kreis) or Marienwerder, of Rosenberg, the boundary
   between West Prussia and East Prussia, the Skottau, boundary between Osterode and Neidenburg, the course of
   the Neide, north of Bialutten, the former Russian frontier up the east of Schmalleningken, the course of the
   Niemen, the Skierwieth arm of the delta to the Kurische Haff; the frontier cuts the Kurische Nehrung 4
   kilometers to the south-west of Nidden.

PART III.--Political Clauses for Europe

Section I.--BELGIUM

The Treaties of 1839 will be abrogated and may be
replaced by Conventions between Belgium, the Netherlands
and the Allied and Associated Powers; Germany binds her-
self to recognize these conventions.

Germany recognizes the sovereignty of Belgium
over the contested territory of Moresnet. She renounces
Prussian Moresnet. She renounces Prussian Moresnet to
the west of the road from Liège to Aix-la-Chapelle. She
cedes to Belgium the Kreise of Eupen and Malmedy. Under
the Belgian authorities, the inhabitants will have six
months within which to express their desire to remain,
wholly or in part, under German sovereignty. Belgium
will thereupon accept the decision of the League of
Nations.

Section II.--LUXEMBURG

Germany renounces the benefit of all the treaties
relating to Luxembourg, recognizes that the Grand Duchy
has ceased to form part of the German Zollverein,
renounces all rights to the exploitation of the rail-
ways, adheres to the termination of the neutrality of
the Grand Duchy, and accepts in advance all international
arrangements which may be concluded in regard to that
country by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Section III.--LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

Germany will neither maintain nor construct any
fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or
at a distance of less than 50 kilometers from the east
bank of the Rhine. In the area thus defined, Germany
will not maintain any armed force, will undertake no military maneuvers and will preserve no material facilities for mobilization.

Section IV.--SAAR BASIN

The Section relating to the Saar Basin:

1. Fixes the boundaries of the territory to which the stipulations of the Treaty apply;
2. Records the cession to France of the complete and absolute ownership, unencumbered and free from all debts or charges (with exclusive rights of exploitation) of the coal mines of the Saar Basin, as compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France, and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany;
3. Assures to France, as owner of the mines, all the economic and juridical guarantees requisite for their exploitation;
4. Determines the rights of the population and the status of workmen;
5. Fixes for a period of 15 years the political and administrative regime of the territory of the Saar Basin, as Germany renounces in favor of the League of Nations the government of the said territory during that period;
6. Determines the rules of voting, whereby, at the expiration of the period of 15 years, the population of the territory of the Saar Basin will freely make known under which sovereignty it desires to be placed.

BOUNDARIES

The territory of the Saar Basin comprises the Kreise of Sarrelouis, Sarrebruck, Ottweiler, Saint-Ingbert, part of the Kreise of Mersig, of Saint-Wendel, of Homburg and of Deux-Ponts.

It is bounded:
To the south and west by the new frontier of France.
To the north by the administrative boundaries of the Kreise or cantons incorporated in the said territory, following a general line leaving the Saar at 5 kilometres to the north of Mettlack and rejoining to the south-east of Mettnich the southern frontier of the Principality of Birkenfeld.
To the east by a line passing about 4 kilometres north-east of Saint-Wendel, leaving Breitenbach and Waldmohr outside the territory of the Saar, encircling Homburg, following the line of the crest of the east bank of the Blies and rejoining the French frontier to the south of Hornbach.
This area comprises 161,000 hectares. Its population is 647,000 inhabitants.

CESSION OF MINES

The complete and absolute cession applies to all deposits of coal, whether concessions have been granted for them or not, to all their accessories and plant both on and below the surface, especially their electric power stations, stocks, employee's and workmen's dwellings, etc., and in general to everything of which those who own or exploit the mines have the possession or enjoyment.

Section V.--ALSACE-LORRAINE RESTORATION

The High Contracting Parties recognize the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871, both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their country in spite of the solemn protest of their representatives at the assembly of Bordeaux.

Therefore:

The territories seized from France in 1871 are restored to French sovereignty as from the 11th November, 1918.

Germany shall hand over to France all the administrative documents, archives, etc., relating to these territories.

Section VIII.--POLAND

Germany renounces in favor of Poland the territories bounded by the Baltic, the western frontier of Poland, the former frontiers between Austria and Germany, and Russia and Germany, as far as the Niemen (this does not apply to East Prussia and the Free City of Danzig), those boundaries being defined in Part II.

A Commission, consisting of seven members (five being nominated by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, one by Germany and one by Poland) shall delimit on the spot the frontier line between Poland and Germany.

Poland will grant to persons and to means of transport coming from or destined for East Prussia the same rights as she gives to her own nationals.

German nationals habitually resident on Polish territory will acquire Polish nationality. A special authorization from the Polish State will be necessary for those who became resident subsequently to April 26th, 1886.
Within a period of two years these German nationals will be entitled to opt. The same provisions apply to Poles who are German nationals and habitually resident in Germany, or living abroad.

Poland consents to embody in a Treaty with the principal Powers:--

(i) Such provisions as those Powers may deem necessary to protect the interests of inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion.

(ii) Provisions destined to protect freedom of transit and to secure equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations.

Section IX.--EAST PRUSSIA

In a stated area along the southern frontier the inhabitants will indicate by a vote the State to which they wish to belong.

Within a period of fifteen days the German troops and authorities will be withdrawn from this area, and will abstain from making any requisitions therein. The said area will thereupon be placed under the authority of a Commission of five members appointed by the Allies. This Commission will be charged with the administration and will arrange for the vote of the inhabitants, the result of which will be determined by communes. Thereafter the Commission will propose a frontier line. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers will fix the frontier. The German and Polish authorities will then be entrusted with the administration of their respective territories, and the powers of the Commission will terminate.

Like provisions will apply to the Kreise of Stuhm and Rosenberg, and to the Kreise of Marienburg and Marienwerder to the east of the Vistula.

The Principal Powers will fix the terms of a convention between Poland, Germany, East Prussia, and Danzig in regard to facilities for railway communication on the right bank of the Vistula, between Poland and Danzig.

Section X.--MEMEL

Germany renounces the territories comprised between the Baltic, the frontier of East Prussia (defined in Part II), and the former Russo-German frontier.

Section XI.--FREE CITY OF DANZIG

Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the territory defined as follows:

From the Baltic Sea, the western frontier of East Prussia (as above defined) to the meeting of the Vistula with the Nogat; downstream, the Vistula as far as a point
6.5 kilometres to the north of Dirschau; thence, westwards, a point 8.5 kilometres to the north-east of Schoneck; then by the median lines of the Lonkener See and the Pollenziner See, to a point on the coast 1 kilometre south of Kolibken.

A Commission composed of three members, including a High Commissioner appointed by the Principal Powers, one member appointed by Germany and one member appointed by Poland, shall be constituted within 15 days of the coming into force of the present Treaty, for the purpose of delimiting the spot the frontier.

The City of Danzig, together with the territory defined above, is established as a Free City.

The constitution of the Free City shall be drawn up, in agreement with a High Commissioner of the League of Nations, by representatives of the City, and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.

The High Commissioners, resident in Danzig, shall deal in the first instance with all differences arising between Poland and the Free City.

A Convention, the terms of which shall be fixed by the Principal Powers, shall be concluded between Poland and Danzig with the following objects:

1. To place Danzig within the limits of the Polish customs frontiers, with a free area in the port;
2. To ensure to Poland the free use of all waterways, docks, basins, wharves, etc. necessary for her imports and exports;
3. To ensure to Poland the administration of the Vistula and of the railway system of Danzig (except ways of purely local interest) and of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication between Poland and Danzig;
4. To provide against any discrimination to the detriment of Poles within the Free City;
5. To provide that the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City and the protection of its citizens abroad.

German nationals ordinarily resident in Danzig will become citizens of the Free City. During two years these residents will be entitled to opt for German nationality.

All property belonging to the Empire or to any German State situated within the territory of the Free City shall pass to the Principal Powers for transfer to Danzig or to Poland according to the decision of those Powers.
APPENDIX I

JUNE 1, 1919
CONCLUSIONS OF THE BRITISH MEETING REGARDING
THE GERMAN OBSERVATIONS

It was resolved that the Prime Minister, in his negotiations at the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, should press for concessions to be made to the enemy in the Treaty of Peace in the following respects:

(a) A modification of the clauses dealing with the Eastern frontiers in the direction of-
   (i) Leaving to Germany the districts where the population was predominantly German in cases where there was no overwhelming reason for transporting such districts to Poland, and
   (ii) Providing for plebiscites being held in doubtful cases.

(b) The extension to Germany of some promise that she should enter the League of Nations at an earlier date than at present arranged in the treaty . . .

(c) A modification of the clauses dealing with the army of occupation in the direction of-
   (i) Reducing the numerical strength, having regard to the reductions made and about to be made in German forces, and
   (ii) Making the period of occupation as short as possible.

The Delegation authorised the Prime Minister, in the event of any resistance on the part of any of his colleagues on the Council, to use the full weight of the entire British Empire even to the point of refusing-

(a) The services of the British army to advance into Germany.

1Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, 718-719.
(b) The services of the British Navy to enforce the Blockade of Germany.

The Delegation agreed that in his negotiations on the four points mentioned above, the Prime Minister should not be confined to any set limits, but should be allowed a certain latitude.
APPENDIX 3

The Western Border of Poland

1Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, p. 31.

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APPENDIX K

CONVENTION REGARDING THE MILITARY OCCUPATION
OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE RHINE

Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on June 13th, 1919

(Note:--The use of the terms "Allies" and "Allied" throughout this document must be interpreted to mean "the Allied and Associated Powers.")

I. As provided by Section XIV, (Articles 428 et seq.) of the Treaty dated . . . , armed forces of the Allies will continue in occupation of German territory (as defined by Article 5 of the Armistice Convention of 11th November, 1918, as extended by Article 7 of the Convention of 16th January, 1919), as guarantee of the execution by Germany of the Treaty.

No German troops, except prisoners of war in process of repatriation, shall be admitted to the occupied territories, even in transit; but police forces of a strength to be determined by the Allied Powers may be maintained in these territories for the purpose of maintaining order.

II. There shall be constituted a civilian body styled the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, and hereinafter called "the High Commission" which, except in so far as the Treaty may otherwise provide, shall be the supreme representative of the Allies within the occupied territory. It shall consist of four members representing Belgium, France, Great Britain and the United States.

III (a). So far as may be necessary for securing the maintenance, safety and requirements of the Allied forces, the High Commission shall have the power to issue ordinances for that purpose. Such ordinances shall be published under the authority of the High Commission, and copies thereof shall be sent to each of the Allied and Associated Governments and also to the German Government. When so published they shall have the force of law and shall be recognised as such by all the Allied military authorities and by the German civil

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1 Foreign Relations, 1919, VI, 389-394.

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authorities.

(b) The members of the High Commission shall enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities.

(c) The German courts shall continue to exercise
civil and criminal jurisdiction subject to the exceptions
 contained in paragraphs (d) and (e) below.

(d) The armed forces of the Allies and the persons
accompanying them, to whom the General Officers command-
ing the Armies of Occupation shall have issued a pass
revocable at their pleasure, and any persons employed by,
or in the service of such troops, shall be exclusively
subject to the military law and jurisdiction of such
forces.

(e) Any person who commits any offence against the
persons or property of the armed forces of the Allies, may
be made amenable to the military jurisdiction of the said
forces.

IV. The German authorities, both in the occupied
and in the unoccupied territories, shall, on the demand
of any duly authorized military officer of the occupying
forces, arrest and hand over to the nearest commander
of Allied troops any person charged with an offence who
is amenable under Clause (d) or Clause (e) of Article III
above to the military jurisdiction of the Allied forces.

V. The civil administration of the provinces
(Provinzen), Government departments (Regierungsbezirke),
Urban Circles (Stadtkreise), Rural Circles (Landkreise),
and Communes (Gemeinden), shall remain in the hands of
the German authorities, and the civil administration of
these areas shall continue under German Law and under
the authority of the Central German Government except
in so far as it may be necessary for the High Commission
by Ordinance under Article III to accommodate that admin-
istration to the needs and circumstances of military
occupation. It is understood that the German authori-
ties shall be obliged, under penalty of removal, to con-
form to the ordinances issued in virtue of Article III
above.

VI. Subject to the requisition in kind and to
demand services shall be exercised by the Allied Armies
of Occupation.

The charges for the requisitions effected in the
zone of each allied army, and the estimate of damage
caused by the troops of occupations, shall be determined
by local Commissions composed in equal representation of
both German civilians appointed by the German civil
authorities and Allied military officers and presided
over by some person appointed by the High Commission.
The German Government shall also be responsible
for the cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation
under the conditions fixed by the Treaty.
The German Government shall also be responsible
for the costs and expenses of the High Commission, and
for its housing. Suitabe premises for the housing of
the High Commission shall be selected in consultation with the German Government.

VII. The Allied troops shall continue undisturbed in possession of any premises at present occupied by them, subject to the provision of Art. VIII (b) below.

VIII (a). The German Government shall undertake, moreover, to place at the disposal of the Allied troops and to maintain in good state of repair, all the necessary furniture, heating and lighting, in accordance with the regulations concerning these matters in force in the various armies concerned. These shall include accommodation for officers and men, guard-rooms, offices, administrative, regimental and staff headquarters, workshops, store-rooms, hospitals, laundries, regimental schools, riding schools, stables, training grounds, warehouses for supplies and grounds for military manoeuvres, also theatre and cinema premises, and reasonable facilities for sport and for recreation grounds for the troops.

(b) Private soldiers and non-commissioned officers shall be accommodated in barracks, and shall not be billeted on the inhabitants, except in cases of exceptional emergency.

In the event of the existing military establishments being insufficient or not being considered suitable, the Allied troops may take possession of any other public or private establishment with its personnel, suitable for these purposes, or, if there are no such suitable premises, they may require the construction of new barracks.

Civilian and military officers and their families may be billeted on the inhabitants in accordance the billeting regulations in force in each army.

IX. No German direct taxes or duties will be payable by the High Commission, the Allied armies or their personnel.

Food supplies, arms, clothing, equipment and provisions of all kinds for the use of the Allied armies, or addressed to the military authorities, or to the High Commission, or to canteens and officers' messes, shall be transported free of charge and free of all import duties of any kind.

X. The personnel employed on all means of communication (railways, railroads and tramways of all kinds, waterways (including the Rhine), roads and rivers), shall obey any orders given by, or on behalf of, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies for military purposes.

All the material and all the civil personnel necessary for the maintenance and working of all means of communication must be kept in its entirety on all such means of communication in the occupied territory.

The transport on the railways of Allied troops or individual soldiers or officers, on duty or furnished with a warrant, will be effected without payment.
XI. The Armies of Occupation may continue to use for military purposes all existing telegraphic and telephonic installations.

The Armies of Occupation shall also have the right to continue to instal and use military telegraph and telephone lines, wireless stations and all other similar means of communication which may appear to them expedient; for this purpose, subject to the approval of the High Commission, they may enter upon and occupy any land, whether public or private.

The personnel of the public telegraph and telephone services shall continue to obey the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies given for military purposes.

Allied telegrams and messages of an official nature shall be entitled to priority over all other communications and shall be despatched free of charge. The Allied military authorities shall have the right to supervise the order in which such communications are transmitted.

No wireless telegraphy installations shall be allowed to be erected by the authorities or by the inhabitants of the occupied territory without previous authorisation by the Allied military authorities.

XII. The personnel of the postal service shall obey any orders given by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies for military purposes. The public postal service shall continue to be carried out by the German authorities, but this shall not in any way affect the retention of the military postal services organised by the Armies of Occupation, who shall have the right to use all existing postal routes for military requirements.

The said armies shall have the right to run postal wagons with all necessary personnel on all existing postal routes.

The German Government shall transmit free of charge and without examination letters and parcels which may be entrusted to its post-offices by, or on behalf of the Armies of Occupation or of the High Commission; and shall be responsible for the value of any letters or parcels lost.

XIII. The High Commission shall have the power, whenever they think it necessary, to declare a state of siege in any part of the territory or in the whole of it. Upon such declaration the military authorities shall have the powers provided in the German Imperial Law of May 30th, 1892. In case of emergency, where public order is disturbed or threatened in any district, the local military authorities shall have the power to take such temporary measures as may be necessary for restoring order. In such case the military authorities shall report the facts to the High Commission.
Memorandum Defining the Relations Between the Allied Military Authorities and the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on 13th June, 1919)

1. Each High Commissioner is directly responsible to his Government, economic questions being first referred by the High Commissioner to the Supreme Economic Council as long as that body exists.

2. The ordinances of the High Commission are to be communicated to the Commanders of Armies by, or on behalf of, the Allied High Command.

3. Whenever the High Commission has occasion to publish ordinances affecting the interests of the occupying armies, in respect of which the initiative does not come from the military authorities, the High Commission shall consult the military authorities beforehand.

4. Communications between the High Commission and the various military authorities will always take place through the channel of the Allied High Command.

5. All civil commissions or officials already appointed or to be appointed by any one or more of the Allied and Associated Powers who deal with matters affecting the civil administration or the economic life of the civilian population in the occupied territory shall, if they are retained, be placed under the authority of the High Commission.

6. (a) The appointment of each High Commissioner shall be subject to the approval of all the Allied and Associated Governments represented.  
(b) The French member of the High Commission shall be president thereof.  
(c) The decisions of the High Commission shall be reached by a majority of votes.  
(d) Each High Commissioner shall have one vote. But in case of an equality of votes the President shall have the right to give a casting vote.  
(e) In either of these two cases the dissenting High Commissioner, or High Commissioners, may appeal to their governments. But such an appeal shall not, in cases of urgency, delay the putting into execution of the decisions taken, which shall then be carried out under the responsibility of the members voting for the decisions.

7. In issuing decrees and proclamations or otherwise interfering with Civil Administration under a state of siege, the Commander-in-Chief shall continue to act in consultation with, and only after approval by the High Commission. This shall of course not apply to action of a purely military nature.
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