Nietzsche and Daly: Sparks of Friendship A Study of Nietzschean Thought in Daly's Early Works

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Nietzsche and Daly: Sparks of Friendship
A Study of Nietzschean Thought in Daly's Early Works

A THESIS
The Honors Program
College of St. Benedict/ St. John's University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Distinction "All College Honors"
and the Degree Bachelor of Arts
In the Department of Philosophy

by
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PROJECT TITLE: Nietzsche and Daly: Sparks of Friendship

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1. Introduction

The idea of this thesis really started two years ago during the semester in which I first encountered Nietzsche. My study of philosophy before that point was limited, and I saw it largely as a body of abstract ideas, a body far removed from the characters and stories of literature. Enter Nietzsche—a man whose name was to me as magical, awe-inspiring and vague as a name like Picasso or the Indian Ocean. In his books, I felt as though in the presence of a giant. Here was someone who had brought literature and philosophy close together—closer than I might ever be able to understand. Here were waters into which I might look and look and never see the bottom.

But my hero-worship of Nietzsche, while perhaps not totally expelled, has died a bit. I feel less comfortable now in seeing him as my own special discovery, my Nietzsche. Why? Because I have come to realize two things: that I have difficulty knowing when Nietzsche says what he means or means what he says; and that, because of this, I find it next to impossible to admire and agree with him on a consistent basis. As a blind follower, I can follow an imagined guide very far. But I do not want to be so self-deluded when it comes to Nietzsche. Thus, I enter his work cautiously and well aware of the points of controversy—his aphorisms on women being some of the most notable.

At approximately the same time as my introduction to Nietzsche, however, I was also introduced to the works of Mary Daly, radical feminist. Shortly after hearing a talk she gave at St. Cloud State University,¹ I decided that I wanted to look at her philosophy and

¹ I remember her mentioning Nietzsche's name several times in the course of that evening, and this memory is the most concrete reason why I started trying
Nietzsche's under the same light or as part of the same journey. An interesting choice of companions, she is (at least at first glance) someone who might be more likely to push Nietzsche (and me) off a cliff than help him up a mountain. Not only that, but she mentions Nietzsche only sparingly in her works. How then could I think that her writing would provide me with a Nietzschean encounter?

The answers to that question lie within the transcript of this paper. Suffice it to say here, however, that I think Mary Daly is someone who has climbed the Nietzschean range before--perhaps many times--and that I ultimately cannot think of someone better for tracking the course of Nietzschean thought on a very challenging contemporary terrain. Looking back on the process of this thesis, there are very few people other than Daly who would have taught me more about what to look for on the way and how to return to Nietzsche's texts. This paper does not seek to make absolute claims about Nietzsche's relevance in contemporary society, but I think that anyone who now reads him must take into account the philosophical problems, challenges and new directions to which people (especially women) such as Mary Daly are now giving voice.

This paper is thus more of a hypo-thesis. And I hyphenate that word in order to suggest that it is a "slower" thesis, much as the word "hypothermia" calls to mind the slowness of a body's heating system in cold weather.\(^2\) Ultimately, this paper is a gathering together of

\(^2\) The prefix "hypo" means something like "underneath" as in the case of a hypodermic needle. If the reader insists on philological purity I can concede that this really is "beneath" the level of a doctoral thesis. A thesis which took the entire Dalyan and Nietzschean corpora into account and made a full set of conclusions based on their examinations would require a much longer study.
momentum in order to suggest that Daly is more Nietzschean than she admits in citations or endnotes and to give useful examples of how her thought often runs in parallel to or remains in dialogue with his. My main desire, however, is not to criticize Daly; rather, I am interested in attempting a partial genealogy of her work and in theorizing how she has later benefitted from even more "pirating" of the Nietzschean corpus.³

Back at the St. Cloud lecture, Daly's presentation seemed to spiral out, with talk of pirating and galaxies and stars, like what I imagined of Zarathustra's journey, but she ultimately rejected Nietzsche on the grounds that he was misogynist and a product of patriarchal tradition. That evening thus left me with questions: Did I believe Daly when she said she rejected most of Nietzsche? If not, how far did she rely on Nietzsche for her formulations of our ethical responsibilities? Was Nietzsche a misogynist? If so, could she use him to talk about liberation or transvaluation even (and perhaps especially) if she pirated his ideas out of the context of his larger œuvre?

These questions all intrigued me, and the first difficult obstacle I encountered was the task of finding a focus from which to address them. At first, I used the question of Nietzsche's misogyny as a starting point: if I could show that Daly was wrong in labelling Nietzsche a misogynist or that Nietzsche had already included the core of her "new"

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³ This word "piracy" intimates Daly's usage here. She uses "piracy" to describe the process whereby she "sorted out nuggets of partial, i.e., patriarchally distorted, knowledge and placed these in a Metapatriarchal context" (Outercourse, 157).
ideas within his work, then I could perhaps save him from slipping into
the archaic--I could give Nietzsche new relevance. But this direction
was changed by a conscientious director and more reading.

Very few people were/are convinced that Nietzsche was trying to
be consistent or a systematist or that he would care about someone
who (only arguably) was trying to pigeonhole him. I certainly did not
know enough of Nietzsche to rescue him from the misogynist label, and
ruling out Daly's uniqueness seemed to be feasible but undesirable.\(^4\)

This past fall I switched my focus to Daly; I began to see her as
someone who could (by the very fact that she mentioned and dealt
with him) help me test some of Nietzsche's boundaries in contemporary
thought. Whether I thereby coopted her into a service she would not
willingly undertake remains to be seen. But I was certain that I was
going to learn more if I tried to enlist Daly's support than I would if I
attempted the Sisyphean task of disproving Nietzsche's alleged
misogyny and subverting her.

And even as I turned solely to Nietzsche, I began to feel
something opening up. As I read through Zarathustra and Genealogy
of Morals and encountered the eternal recurrence and the will-to-
power and self-overcoming, I acquired an important perspective: it
seemed entirely possible to view these three themes as the heart of

\(^4\) I am not convinced that Nietzsche is blatantly or obviously misogynist.
However, I realize that I must take account of the obvious problems that arise
when the words "Nietzsche" and "women" are present in the same conversation.
Basically, I discuss Nietzsche's ideas as gender-free or as ideas which are able to
be used for their relevance or application in a contemporary society, forgiving,
forgetting or foregoing his passages (particularly the aphorisms) which
challenge this assumption--a Dalyan method, perhaps.

I would also like to point out that there is a wealth of scholarship which is
written specifically on this issue. One essay which is extremely useful in trying
to understand what Nietzsche may have had in mind in his passages concerning
women is R. Hinton Thomas' "Nietzsche, Women and the Whip." See also Derrida's
Spurs and the articles listed in the bibliography at the end of this paper.
Nietzsche’s works. If this proved to be true, and if I could find Daly’s heart as well, I knew that I could then begin to question whether and how one heart spoke to the other.

Thus, the journey through Dalyan and Nietzschean texts continued. I must admit that reading and processing the Nietzschean works was more difficult. Sometimes I lost sight of Daly along the way. Perhaps I had taken roads or perspectives that she disagreed with or refused to take for fear of being misinterpreted or mishandled. Perhaps I lost sight of her because these were necessary opportunities for me to explore Nietzsche without her. But I know for certain that many of these same times were those when I wished she were with me, times when I wished I could hear what she would say to Nietzsche in that particular moment of reading.

Now, as at the end of the writing process, there is a lot of mist. Just three moments ago I thought I saw Daly nearby as I approached the cave where Zarathustra was said to have breathed his last golden breath. But a moment later I was not sure. I started to enter. I heard laughter—whether Daly’s or Zarathustra’s I could not tell. Then the surroundings, the moment, changed. I was back typing. I had not crossed the threshold, had not fully verified my hypo-thesis. But even with that laugh still in my ear, I am not discouraged.

Now my justification no longer has to be a question of making a comparison/contrast of Daly and Nietzsche that would be right or wrong. No longer is it an ethical issue of enlisting Daly on this road to understanding a philosopher who she, at least in part, denounces. Nor is it an issue of coming up with an ultimate statement—a polished and perfected granule of knowledge to add to the philosophical libraries.
Instead, I use as impetus, justification, and criterion for evaluation of this paper's provisional conclusions the following questions: Does the paper prove that a reader can begin to see a real connection between Nietzsche and Daly? And does the paper spark further study? Assuming I can answer these two questions in the affirmative, I will still be able to avoid the most horrifying question—so what?5

What follows is thus an attempt to answer "yes" to those questions, to demonstrate the beginnings of a connection.6 In the first section, I summarize the concepts or experiences Nietzsche labels as the eternal recurrence, the will-to-power and self-overcoming (or

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5 There is also a personal manner in which I believe that I avoid the so-what question. Having read her, I now see Daly as someone who, at least for a time, struggles with the issues of how far an honest philosopher could also be an honest theologian and of how such a person, given her existence, can work to rectify the sexual-political situation of women. These are two areas of concern which have also become important for me. Having read Nietzsche in the milieu of a Benedictine school and a Catholic faith, what do I do now? And having discovered real sense in many of Daly's feminist presentations, what can I do with my own relationships with women, my own prejudices and traditions which may not be worth saving given the pain and suffering which they have brought and perhaps still bring about?

This paper does not answer any of these personal questions directly or definitively. Rather, my self-analysis and self-exploration lie between or behind or underneath the lines of this thesis. But they are there, providing fuel for future journeys into other galaxies, and I take some comfort in knowing what went into and what came out of this product of two years' work and thought. I have grown. I have changed my perspective. I have held apparently contradictory things in tension, and I have not been pulled apart. For this courage, I think both Daly and Nietzsche would grant me pardon for ever having started a thesis which tried to bring three very different people so close together.

6 I regret that I have been unable to read the entire Dalyan corpus. As mentioned in footnote 2 above, however, such an effort would require more time than I have had at my disposal. For now I content myself with looking primarily at Daly's earliest works because they are the ones in which she most directly cites Nietzsche and deals with specifically Nietzschean problems and terminology (the eternal recurrence in particular). In light of this limitation, then, no conclusions in the paper will be absolute, and all uses of her later works will be referred to her early works in relative terms.

From the little I have read of Daly's later works, however, I do believe it possible to chart a (relative and relevant) progression of increasingly Nietzschean ideas throughout the Dalyan corpus. This thought, however, is not proven in this thesis as it lies beyond my limitations and scope.
freedom). In the second section, I summarize the work of Mary Daly as I encountered it in her works *The Church and the Second Sex* and *Beyond God the Father*, paying special attention to her critique of the Catholic Church and her discussion of human becoming and sisterhood. And finally in the third section, I discuss what I see as evidence from her first two books for Daly's uncited uses of Nietzsche, ultimately concluding that, while in some ways the two are polar opposites, in several very important ways Daly follows Nietzsche quite closely.7

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7 The final section also points to further hypotheses in Daly's works, particularly in *Gyn-Ecology* and *Outercourse.*
II. On Nietzsche: Eternal Recurrence, Will-to-Power, Self-Overcoming

What I do or do not do now is as important for everything that is yet to come as is the greatest event of the past: in this tremendous perspective of effectiveness all actions appear equally great and small.
--Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, aphorism 233

A.) Introduction--the Eternal Recurrence

Eternal recurrence is best defined as Nietzsche's formulation of the human's most radical or fundamental relationship to time (or Becoming)--"O my soul, I gave you new names and colorful toys; I called you "destiny" and "circumference of circumferences" and "umbilical cord of time"" (Zarathustra, 222). There are other formulations of the human's time relation, the most prominent ones popularly imaged as a rage against a dying light or as an insidious trap/container into which one is born and out of which one is released in death. But to say that the human is in relationship to time is not necessarily to say that there exist two things or substances, one being time and the other being the human. Rather, we can only honestly say,

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8 Citations for Nietzsche's and Daly's works follow this pattern:
Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "Zarathustra"
The Church and the Second Sex: "The Church"
Beyond God the Father: "Beyond"

All other titles of works cited are given in full. Unless indicated all numbers given within the body of the texts are page numbers. Where indicated, the numbers refer to aphorism or note numbers in the Nietzschean texts.
for Nietzsche, that we experience time (or flux) and that we are always in a relationship to that experience.\(^9\)

To name the soul the umbilical cord of time is thus to say that the human and time have merged. It is akin to saying that the human is time or that the time-relation is a relation to oneself—or at least that the time-experience and the self are intimately connected and not two entities.\(^10\) The metaphor of the umbilical cord also evokes the human (as time-ly) as a bridge between formless and formed becoming, between chaos or the enigmatic womb and the earth.

All human discussions regarding the time experience are thus attempts to establish our relations to ourselves as the creatures for whom Becoming or time is an issue. And thus, far from trying to remove the temporal piece of the human and define human existence in atemporal or transcendental terms\(^11\), Nietzsche, in his discussion of the eternal recurrence, is meeting it as a challenge.

He describes the eternal recurrence in *Zarathustra* as the most difficult thought, as something difficult to swallow and keep down. It initially lies in the stomach of Zarathustra's spirit like nausea or acts like St. Benedict's image of the narrow road, painful at first because of its constriction. Again like Benedict seeing the narrow road, however,

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9 This might lead one to think that the experience of time is only in the mind. But time for Nietzsche is not merely a mental "reality" or construct; to name the soul the umbilical cord of time is not to engage in navel-gazing. Neither is it astronomy. Nietzsche does not want to say that time (or any-thing else) has any reality apart from the human process. And, because the human and the world is will-to-power and nothing else, there is neither realism or idealism, but perspectivism. Thus, to be human means to have an experience of time, and to be a life-affirming human means to be one who experiences time in a certain manner and with a certain direction.

10 I suggest a parallel with William Blake's *Four Zoas* in which Los cannot free Orc because fibres from Orc have grown into the rock beneath him, making it impossible for Los to pull them apart.

11 I.e., in terms of a soul which persists eternally.
Zarathustra learns to see the eternal recurrence as ultimately liberating--perhaps because of the ordered expansion which it subsequently allows the "heart." Zarathustra's task is the following: to bring up the eternal recurrence out of his depths, to make it his, to transform its pangs into those of birth. Eternal recurrence is finally for Zarathustra (and for Nietzsche) the most fundamental and powerful way of experiencing the human's time-relation.

The power of Nietzsche's formulation of the experience of eternal recurrence becomes clearer when we see how it subsumes the other temporal formulations. If we see ourselves as things within a container or a dying light, we see this precisely because we refuse to experience the eternal recurrence or because we have begun to experience it and have turned back. We can only either embrace this (initially) most horrible of "thoughts" or "experiences" as something which is ultimately liberating or run from it as something which is anathema to consciousness. We do not evade it by not "thinking" about it; nor do we supersede it by affirming it (Will-to-Power, note 1058).

When we consider what has just been said then, Nietzsche seems rather Freudian in his analysis of the eternal recurrence: with regard to its experience, there is possible integration or repression, but "what was" does not simply vaporize, as we would so often wish, to allow space for "what is." To put it another way, the human is always within or existing a time-relation or a time-interpretation. The human is now the creature which includes or structures or interprets the past, present, and future all in the moment--in every moment.

But, even given that such is the case, why begin this discussion of Nietzsche with a treatment of eternal recurrence? The eternal return
or the eternal recurrence is central to Nietzsche's thought. It includes "within" itself the will-to-power and self-overcoming, and thus its priority lies in its effectiveness in presenting these three ideas as a unity.

The eternal recurrence is not only a thought Zarathustra must call up and/or listen to; it is also a thought Zarathustra must teach. In some respects, then, it could be argued that Nietzsche himself sees the eternal recurrence as the golden thread through the labyrinth of his thought--it is this which Zarathustra is led to, which serves as a climax of his life, which he identifies as the task in/for every moment. As culminating point and eternal task, the eternal recurrence carries with it the implicit understandings of the other two "themes." An explication of eternal recurrence leads "back" to a discussion of the will-to-power and then "forward" to Zarathustra's longing: freedom or self-overcoming.

12 Joan Stambaugh in Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return: "Eternity is eternal return of the Same. The Same is not a thing or a person recurring in endless cycles of absolute time. The Same is return" (107).

The easiest way to characterize the two terms would be the following: eternal recurrence describes the Same, what recurs in every moment. And eternal return describes what I do in affirming that. So, in a very real sense, I return to the recurring of the past--this same moment and its eagle, its same spider, its same moonlight--but it is not returned to me as some given, identical, rigidified and impenetrable content. Rather, in returning (active verb) I am continuously overcoming it. I as human, as the motion and action of the eternal return am eternally returning to the phenomena in order to overcome it, in order to increase, in order to be More. I am the movement which is never finished, which can continue to increase and which can never end as long as I eternally return to what was--which happens until and unless I become forever the last people. I gather strength, I increase because each moment of overcoming, having created out of its givenness something new and greater, itself is able to be overcome, as well as all that which it overcame (but not ultimately, not once and for all). There is always more to do.

13 The will-to-power is outlined throughout Nietzsche's works, especially in the collection so entitled. Self-overcoming is not often mentioned as such, but I found the entirety of Zarathustra and Book Four of the Gay Science to be very helpful in understanding it.
It is quite possible, however, that someone could start by talking about the "goal" of freedom, move into a discussion of will-to-power and finish by talking about the eternal recurrence--which is closer to the way Nietzsche's own thought developed towards the eternal recurrence. Because it emphasizes the way the human creates, constructs, and structures time, however, the eternal recurrence seems to be a fundamental starting point, as Nietzsche recognized in the later works and in his notes in *The Will to Power*. Nietzsche's works are full of discussions on what to do with the past, with history, with what looks like rigidified or "set in stone" facts. Moreover, it is this genealogical (looking-back and charting the roots and interconnectedness of the past) project which precedes and lays the groundwork for his self-set, ultimate task to bring joyful wisdom (looking-forward out of *amor fati* 14) as an existential possibility for contemporary consciousness.

An image of a mass of string comes to mind. And the eternal recurrence--Joan Stambaugh calls it "the counterpossibility to meaninglessness and nihilism" (xii)--seems to me a way to start winding the string around itself, into a definite shape or form. Its beginning is difficult to locate--a child has trouble getting the string to work around itself. But as we continue to work with it, as our fingers become more dextrous, we can come to see how all the rest of Nietzsche's work (the will-to-power and self-overcoming, etc.) come to

14 *Amor fati* means for Nietzsche the ability of the human to move through the past or the tradition to the point of creation, of the child who is a self-propelled wheel. It means to have come to the point from which one can see that all that has been has led up to this moment in its necessity and that one does not want anything to change--not the slightest thing--of one's past. It is thus a radical embracing of the fate or the givenness of the roots of the plant, and is thus also practically identical to the eternal recurrence, the affirmation of which allows the plant to flower.
depend on this motion, how it is even inseparably connected to it. What looked like merely a tangled pile comes to have a definite form and (useful) meaning, the eternal recurrence having been both the motion which enabled the coming-to-presence of the shape and the shape itself.

Throughout my treatment of the eternal recurrence, I give special emphasis to the other two themes of will-to-power and self-overcoming, never trying to define one without the other two. And at the end, though there may remain loose, split or even dead ends, they are not due to the beginning point but to the complexity of their interrelationship. One has never said the final word on anything in Nietzsche.

B.) Is Eternal Recurrence only a thought?

Is eternal recurrence only a thought? For the most part, yes. If by the word "thought" one thinks broadly and actively as Nietzsche does. A thought for Nietzsche, if it is an honest one, realizes that it is not a mental representation of, or a reaction to, what is going on "out there" in the world. Rather, a thought is a human interpretation, a giving-form to what is, at bottom, phenomena--non-substantive. Thought, interpretation, imagination, valuation--all these practices are part of the same creative human drive: the will to create something solid for ourselves out of chaos. In this sense then, the eternal recurrence can be nothing but thought. But since there is no

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15 By non-substantive I mean that Nietzsche does not grant anything we "see" in the world a metaphysical reality--there is no substance or a thing-in-itself to be admired or looked at from a distance. Metaphysics is the wrong road for Nietzsche.
correspondence theory for Nietzsche, no *aequatio intellectus et rei*, then to say that the eternal recurrence is just a thought, as though it were the result of some mental gymnastics or mental "product" with no recourse to "experience" or "life," would be to diminish Nietzsche's text.

Given that we mean something deeper when we say that the eternal recurrence is a thought, however, what kind of thought is it?

There are generally two different "thoughts" on this. Some people have put forth the idea of the eternal recurrence as a cosmological hypothesis--one observable in the "world." This idea is surely more difficult to support as "Nietzsche's favorite."\(^{16}\)

Best demonstrated in Nietzsche's chapter of *Zarathustra* entitled "On the Vision and the Riddle," the cosmological hypothesis points out that what Nietzsche really wants to show us is the actual, infinite recurrence of all life and events--whatever can happen has already happened and will continue to happen in the future. Alexander Nehamas suggests that this is not the most potent formulation of the eternal recurrence for Nietzsche: "Could it be that Zarathustra tells the story [of the gateway and our infinite recurrence to it] only in order to

\(^{16}\) Alexander Nehamas: "Perhaps Nietzsche realized that this thought . . . is independent of the cosmology he sometimes entertained; this would explain why he never worked out in detail his attempts to prove that hypothesis. Or perhaps he did not. The evidence, though it suggests he did, is not absolutely telling . . . . But the defects of this theory have unfortunately obscured the most serious and valuable aspects of Nietzsche's writing about these issues: the psychological consequences he draws from the recurrence. . . . The eternal recurrence is not a theory of the world but a view of the self" (150). This could mean that the eternal recurrence refers to the "self" which I experience as the "same" throughout the course of my changing experiences. But I think that Nehamas has something different in mind when he says that Nietzsche presents the eternal recurrence as a view of the self. The eternal recurrence is not the eternal recurrence of my identity--a particular ego which recurs into infinity--but perhaps a perspective from which to view identity as such. Affirmation of the eternal recurrence would then be that practice which brings the self to light; without an affirmative answer to the demon's hypothetical question, my "reality" as self is not fully "realized."
frighten the dwarf, while the psychological implications Nietzsche wants to draw from it presuppose only a weaker hypothesis?" (149). What Nehamas is saying here is that Nietzsche is largely unconcerned with the idea that events or individuals (as in transmigration of souls) actually and infinitely recur. Nietzsche is at once concerned with more and less than that: he is concerned with the "psychological implications" of a hypothetical recurrence which effects a radical change in the person who thinks it, one which does not require a real and really observable set of recurring facts in order to legitimate itself.

And in fact, Nehamas believes that Nietzsche's concern is one of realizing that "the history of the whole world, or, in more modest terms, the history of each person, is totally involved in every moment" (149). The ultimate power of the eternal recurrence is thus to produce a vision--of the shepherd for Zarathustra, whom Zarathustra eventually becomes and who finally becomes "able to want to undergo again all that is cheap and detestable in the world for the sake of all that is not" (150).

The cosmological hypothesis, then, is not the only thought of the eternal recurrence. And the approach of Joan Stambaugh, Nehamas and others in thinking of the eternal recurrence as a personal or psychological thought (portrayed as a hypothetical, ethical problem in the parable of the demon in the Gay Science) seems more compelling as a way of reading Nietzsche and Zarathustra. In fact, in light of the discussions of the self and the soul in the Gay Science and Genealogy of Morals, it is almost impossible to defend the cosmological argument as the intended meaning of the eternal recurrence--precisely because,
as a cosmological interpretation, the eternal recurrence misses what
Stambaugh characterizes as Nietzsche's conception of time:

For Zarathustra, time is precisely not a circle. If no one has
ever gone to the end of these roads, it is not possible for
anyone to 'come again,' in the sense of having gone to the
end of the eternal future to the point where it meets the
eternal past, forming a circle and removing the mutual
contradiction of past and future. (Stambaugh, 38)17

Time is thus something noncyclical and nonsubstantive for Nietzsche.

Because time is not a circle and because Nietzsche concentrates on
the psychological interpretation of the eternal recurrence, however,
these facts do not mean that the cosmological interpretation loses its
ferocity—or its usefulness. Zarathustra is weighed down by this
manifestation of the eternal recurrence for a long time. Even the
possibility, the thought of actual recurrence, being trapped in a circle,
is heavy and precludes affirmation and joy. Zarathustra is tempted to
slip into nihilism, standing as he is at the abysmal gate of the moment.
Thus, it is possible to identify two "thoughts" or "phases" of the eternal
recurrence, the one having the possibility of being a means to the
other, but the second and psychological thought (described below) is
the higher one and the ultimate "goal" of one who seeks to transform
himself (Zarathustra) and his "world."

C.) The two thoughts (healthy and unhealthy) of Eternal Recurrence

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17 Stambaugh also emphasizes that Nietzsche does not see the eternal recurrence
as happening out there in the world but as something more like Kantian
categories—"no repetition, this must first be created" (Stambaugh citing Will-to-
Power, 59).
Because Zarathustra came perilously close to nihilism when his soul housed the cosmological experience of eternal recurrence, it seems possible and even appropriate to view the eternal recurrence as a set of two interconnected (or component) thoughts, one promoting sickness and denial of life and one promoting health and affirmation of life. This dual presentation has four advantages: it prevents us from having to choose between two sets of scholarship; it allows us to practice Zarathustra's "carrying into one all that is fragment and riddle"; it helps us avoid a distinction Nietzsche probably did not want to make (between recurrence in "reality" versus recurrence in the "mind"); and it helps us stay true to Nietzsche's texts. Regarding the fourth advantage, these labels of healthy and unhealthy are everywhere in Nietzsche's work. And I think that they adequately describe what Nietzsche saw in the possible responses to the eternal recurrence and may even serve to privilege the healthy over the unhealthy without trapping him in a hierarchical dualism (which he abhors).

Ultimately, Nietzsche himself realizes that the problem of the eternal recurrence is not a matter of choosing one interpretation or experience over the other--that would be a mistake similar to choosing Being over Becoming--but that both are part of the process. Zarathustra had to lie ill for seven days with the unhealthy thought before he could finally call it up to its joyful release and completion.\(^\text{18}\)

Even more, there are times when Nietzsche seriously considers the

\(^{18}\) Two formulations of the task of eternal recurrence (the dual response) come in the *Gay Science* aphorisms numbers 249 and 337: "Anyone who manages to experience the history of humanity as a whole as his own history will feel in an enormously generalized way all the grief of the invalid who thinks of health. . . . But. . . . if one could burden one's soul with all of this. . . . and crowd it into a single feeling--this would surely have to result in a happiness that humanity has not known so far: the happiness of a god full of power and love, full of tears and laughter" (p. 268).
repetition of epochs or eras—the recurrence of the age of nobility, for example. And thus recurrence may not be so easily separated for him into real and imagined (or hypothetical). Therefore, we need to keep both thoughts in mind, staying true to Nietzsche's emphases.

A presentation of eternal recurrence as a duality of thought also has its disadvantages, however. By equating the cosmological thought with the unhealthy references in Nietzsche's work, one tends to miss the point that the eternal recurrence is ultimately one process. Even with the discussion above—the necessity of the nihilistic response to Zarathustra's transformation—one may not fully understand that there is a difference between Zarathustra's thinking through the eternal recurrence to its depths and feeling the weight of the demon's hypothesis and Qoheleth's thinking through a similar experience ("All is vain. There is nothing new under the sun.").

In the case of Zarathustra, there are action and movement. He does not stagnate nor does he react by proclaiming a universal lack of meaning. Rather, he has willed this experience through to its violent and joyful conclusions—confident that his soul can clear its waters. In contrast, Qoheleth has not willed anything but the eternity of this same fragment of the thought—if there is no meaning, then there will be no meaning. Moreover, the healthy aspect of the thought rests not only in the response of Zarathustra to the dwarf or the demon's question—but in his attitude along the way. Eternal recurrence is finally less a matter of healthy reaction than healthy action.

1) The "unhealthy" or cosmological interpretation.
It does seem possible to read this cosmological approach from the text. There is evidence that Nietzsche himself considers it (weighs it, is unsure of it) in several of the notes in *Will-to-Power*. However, Nietzsche is clear that when one worries about the "reality" of dead cycles of content repeating themselves from now to eternity, one is reacting--engaging in the unhealthy, life-denying response to the eternal recurrence. And reaction is not what Nietzsche ultimately has in mind as the best of possible roads. He does consider there to be something to the observation of recurrence "in" the world, at least as a paradigm for eternal recurrence. Recurrence for him is not always merely a hypothesis.

An example of this observed physical occurrence for Nietzsche: When he speaks of the nobility in the *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche asks whether a return to the age of nobility would be possible, whether humanity could ever experience a rejuvenation of the affects, of action rather than reaction. And he leans toward a qualified "yes." It is not that the same blond beasts of prey will return and storm across

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19 *Will-to-Power*, note 1058: "Everything becomes and recurs eternally--escape is impossible!" Also notes 1062 "Thus--the world lacks the capacity for eternal novelty," and note 1064 "My consolation is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea will cast it up again."

20 Reaction for Nietzsche immediately calls to mind the *resentment* or the will-to-power turned inward of the slave class. *Ressentiment* is not a particular reactive affect but a more structural term which describes the overall posture of the slave class; its untranslatable meaning is best described as resentment. Reactive affects (as indicative of *ressentiment*) concretize themselves in expressions of pity and revenge; when someone does not have the opportunity or power to act they react (sometimes just as more cruelly). Because reaction or resistance to the nobility's unconscious acting helps to form the strength of the will, however, Nietzsche sees reaction as a necessary part of the process towards creation. He does not see reaction or *ressentiment* as the major or sole component of human--which is active--joy.

See the "Second Essay" of *Genealogy of Morals* section 11: "another group of affects . . . are of even greater biological value than those reactive affects and therefore deserve even more . . . to be esteemed" (74). See also the entirety of *Beyond Good and Evil*. 
Europe—for they are, in their historical "reality," overcome (i.e. altered and appropriated) by the slave morality and by the bad conscience—but that the direction of our overcoming and our possible joy comes from their recurrence in our present.

That the nobility has been so overcome in their historical reality is not an occasion of a negative value-judgment by Nietzsche.21 After all, they were not "great" as the humans were/are great who came after them, for the nobles lived without a conscience, without a self, without thought, without imagination. They neither needed nor felt a need for cleverness or depth. But with the advent of the bad conscience, the priests, and eventually the ascetic ideal, the human developed strength and creativity. Moreover, the human survived the terrible possibility of nihilism and suicide by inventing a world of meaning for itself, a subterranean world of self-torture and metaphysics which has never been climbed out of, not even by science which looks at first glance as though it were an antipode to all religion and religious values. How then, if history or the "world" does not lead back to them, could Nietzsche look to a recurrence of the nobility?

The answer to this question presupposes an understanding of what is meant by the words "to overcome something." Overcoming, for Nietzsche, is not negation, as the ascetics thought it was. It is not as though Abba Antony destroyed his will (although that is what Antony may have thought he did) in the desert by denying himself food.

21 Will-to-Power, note 417: "Joy in the destruction of the most noble and at the sight of its progressive ruin: in reality joy in what is coming and lies in the future, which triumphs over existing things, however good... . .To the paralyzing sense of general disintegration and incompleteness I opposed the eternal recurrence."
recourse to sexual intercourse, etc. Neither is it a surpassing of something, never to return to it. Rather, Nietzsche would say that, by his self-proclaimed fight against his "will," Antony changed it, made it more hostile to life and, ironically, strengthened it by turning it inward and against himself.

Overcoming something for Nietzsche means to incorporate it, to give it a new or an additional direction, to transform its meaning, to give it additional meanings, to change one's perspective on it. It is, again like Benedict's description of the heart, overcoming something in the sense of constricting or constructing its passage at first in order to make it stronger. In short, when I keep myself free for the innocence of Becoming--when I refuse to try to relate to myself as to an essence, a soul, a "this is Pete Costello"--I overcome again and again the past and give it to the future with a direction. An example in Nietzsche's texts: in the *Genealogy of Morals* ("Second Essay" sections 4 ff.) is the accruing of purposes for punishment, a process which keeps an "original" purpose but adds more--so much more that it becomes impossible to determine the "nature" of punishment, the character of its being or the single reason for its use. At most, we can re-member its natural history or accumulation of its meanings.

This discussion of overcoming (and punishment) is the genealogical process in which Nietzsche engages. The slave morality, the development of guilt, bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal--his tracing of all these things shows one fundamental tenet: that everything just listed arose out of a reaction to the nobility and the noble actions or instincts. Although they overcame the blond beasts of
prey and their "cruelty," the slaves, priests, scholars and now the modern humans still--at bottom--retain the activity and the cruel affects of the nobility which they can never quite throw off. In arising out of a reaction, a dialectic is preserved. Yes, Nietzsche wants to say, the nobility can recur. . . if by recurring one means the coming to presence again of more active ways of manifesting the will-to-power.

Although this discussion of the _Genealogy of Morals_ has been only a necessary side-track, it has explained the basis for a cosmological piece of the _healthy_ interpretation of the human's relation to Becoming. What is needed is still the more comprehensive description of the unhealthy interpretation which follows.

While operating from the unhealthy interpretation, we see the same motion of the phenomena which pass away and recur as we would in the healthy interpretation. But from the unhealthy perspective, we attribute a substantive character to phenomena; we structure what we see, or structure by seeing, or structurally see phenomena. The phenomena are "things" to us. Such has always been the case: nature has bred (or the human itself has bred or burned) in the human a memory; by means of memory the human has acquired the right and the will to make promise; and by means of the promise,

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22 See _Genealogy of Morals_ "Third Essay," section 12: "to deny one's own "reality"--what a triumph! not merely over one's senses, over appearance, but a much higher kind of triumph, a violation and cruelty against reason--a voluptuous pleasure that reaches its height when the ascetic self-contempt and self-mockery of reason declares: _there is_ a realm of truth and being, but reason is excluded from it!" (118).
the human has come to be able to structure the future by means of dividing what is "seen" into past and present (then future).\textsuperscript{23}

Perhaps there was a time when the human did not have this ability to structure but rather lived instinctively and without thought and reflection--perhaps as nobility. Then there would have been an eternal present into which nothing would have remained or perished. But now there is no doubt that we are interpreters in all we do. Things do not just enter and leave our eyes and ears without being held for a while, being linked to other sights and sounds that have come before and will, we believe, come in the future.\textsuperscript{24}

With this, it is possible to describe more definitely the unhealthy thought of the eternal recurrence. It is one which tends to structure the Becoming of phenomena in a nihilistic way. Instead of being able to view the present as something which carries the past, via a particular direction, into the future, the unhealthy thought sees only the dead cycles of content mentioned above. To put it briefly, when the human sees that Becoming is a "reality"--that things come to presence and pass away, and that it seems like some things recur without our being able to prevent their passing or hold onto them for as long as we would like--it is quite often the case that, in order to make sense of this motion, one takes the viewpoint of Qoheleth--all is in vain.

\textsuperscript{23} See \textit{Genealogy of Morals} "Second Essay," particularly section one.
\textsuperscript{24} See \textit{Will-to-Power}, note 511: "the spirit \textit{wants} equality, i.e., to subsume a sense impression into an existing series; in the same way as the body \textit{assimilates} inorganic matter." Here the equality which the spirit desires seems to be an equal importance for every experience, to grant eternity and co-extensiveness to all that comes within my "range" as human will-to-power. Things are assimilated, interpreted, interconnected. Overcoming is thus an incorporating and structuring of phenomena in such a way as to give them a direction and a purpose within our root systems.
And according to this viewpoint, none of our actions can delay the eternal flow (time looks linear or cyclical from this position). Worse, all that we do we can remember being done before and having had the same (or at least similar) effects. Novelty is only illusion—the attitude is that this too shall pass as all else has done. And it will pass without sufficient justification. The passing away of the past controls what appears in the present, and thus the future. One cannot will backwards, because the cause of the present is over, has passed away. And the future appears unchangeable, destined. Death destroys all our plans, it makes meaningless any initiative we might start. Thus, there must be nothing which is not already determined. Time must be a circle.

And because of this experience or interpretation, one turns away from the active, creative life—so much so that one is in danger of suicide. This unhealthy formulation seems to be Zarathustra's initial horror, what he first sees eternal recurrence to be. It is this unhealthy interpretation which the spirit of gravity, the dwarf, first drops as lead into Zarathustra's ear.

The Unhealthy Thought As It Manifests the Will-to-Power

According to the above image of the eternal recurrence as a mass of string, the will-to-power and self-overcoming (as interconnected with the time-experience) should be recognizable within the very discussion of the experience of eternal recurrence itself. With regard to the unhealthy thought in particular, its relevance to these two other main themes is still an open question. It does not remain so, and after I
attempt a definition of the term will-to-power it will be clearer why
the open question closes.

The will-to-power is basically a will-to-form or structure. It is a
drive, as Nehamas describes it, to make everything grow out of one soil,
to unify the multifarious appearance of Becoming. It is a changing of
formless instinct into formed becoming. It is, in a sense, the "reality"
or "quality" of the soul which allows it to be the umbilical cord of time.

Although not dependent on some concept of a substantive "will"
(as Schopenhauer's philosophy was) Nietzsche's use of the will-to-
power is still a metaphysical one, Heidegger says. It encompasses all
human actions—it is all human actions: We are will-to-power and
nothing else. Perhaps the easiest way to define this term initially is to
compare it to the Freudian interpretation of dreams and speech: In
most dream-texts and conversations it is possible to reveal "latent"
sexual texts. Dreaming of driving a car disguises the desire for the
sexual act. Locker-room talk reveals one's Oedipal complex or penis
envy. To see all of this cloaked meaning, many people claim that one

25 For a discussion on how Nietzsche's will-to-power does not depend on a
substantive will see Will-to-Power, note 46: "For there is no will, and
consequently neither a strong or weak will. The multitude and disgregation of
impulses and the lack of any systematic order among them result in a 'weak will';
their coordination under a single predominant impulse results in a 'strong will.'"
See also Bernd Magnus, p. 24, who talks about how Nietzsche can see the will-to-
power as wills acting upon wills without necessarily seeing the wills themselves
as substantive agents.

In terms of the metaphysical character of the will-to-power, I believe that
it comes close to the transvaluation of values—in that both eince a structural
character. The transvaluation of values is perhaps a structural character the
human "observes" when it looks directly at itself, and the will-to-power is
perhaps a structural character the human "observes" when it looks at Life more
generally. Regardless, the will-to-power is not any-thing, but it is a description
of the most fundamental character of Life. We cannot get back to any more basic
"this is Life" than the will-to-power; our life is, Nietzsche says, because the will-
to-power is. Without the structure of the will-to-power underlying all Becoming,
Life would not continue. It would cease to make an issue out of itself (in/through
the human).
only need develop one's psychoanalytic perspective. Thus, for the will-to-power, we need, similarly, the perspective that enables us to see its reading of our past, present, and future.

Once we have come to see with Nietzschean eyes, we can see that humans cannot escape the will-to-power:

Nietzsche finds will-to-power a useful explanatory hypothesis first in accounting for certain features of human behavior. It illuminates aspects of human behavior which have previously been misrepresented, which were totally opaque, or else were only imperfectly understood . . . . Thereafter, in the spirit of a thought experiment, Nietzsche inquires whether he cannot extend this one principle of explanation to all vital phenomena. And still later he extends it to the universe *simpliciter*. (Magnus, 22)

Thus, will-to-power is (as an explanatory tool) over-arching, and it is not only an issue for those who are more dominant, who "have" or can "acquire" power. Power is not a substance which one wills after. The ascetic ideal and the unhealthy thought of eternal recurrence (which we tend to see as devoid of traditional or dominating power) are also evidence of a will-to-power.

Power is form or a giving-direction. It is a motion. The nobility has a will-to-power turned outward; the saint and priest, one turned inward. As Nietzsche says in the *Genealogy of Morals*, the human, even when stripped of the possibility for the feelings of increased strength over externals, of domination and bloodlust, continues to will (to have impulses, to have drives to act)--in fact, the human would rather will nothingness than not to will at all.26 The ascetic ideal (even when stripped of its self-created theistic context) continues, in the realization of eternal recurrence, to amplify the will-to-power turned inward.

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At this point, however, I think that it is again necessary to qualify this description. As Bernd Magnus says, "We must not understand Nietzsche to be saying that some transcendent metaphysical unity lurks behind the world. The world is not some mere appearance of will-to-power" (22). Instead, Magnus states that for Nietzsche

The world is a process of becoming, conceived as a unity. It is will-to-power in the sense that will-to-power is its intelligible character. We presumably can see will-to-power expressing itself in and as everything if we modify our perspective, if we abandon traditional habits of thought and speech. Will-to-power is therefore to be understood only as existing in and through "its" manifestations. (22)

Nietzsche therefore sees the will-to-power as a human perspective and a human necessity for his goal of overgoing and joyful wisdom. Without meditating on this, the metaphysical characteristic of the human, one cannot experience joy in Becoming; without it, one will not attain a perspective from which life has meaning, from which affirmation becomes possible.

It is true that in the ascetic ideal or in the unhealthy thought of the eternal recurrence the main instinct of the person is now to nihilism, to will that there be somehow an end to Becoming, to the meaningless suffering of an ego caught in an insidious container or a dying light. And this instinct is realized in self-overcoming--but it is an unhealthy understanding of self-overcoming, one which wants everything to perish or vanish, which wants the death of consciousness and thought so as not to have to endure what has come about. If there must be cycles which recur, at least now the will wants to disappear so that it does not have to endure anything until its turn comes again.
There can be no creation because of the lock of the past on the present and the future--so let there be no creation. Do nothing but live in fear of your fate! Everything has been done already. So huddle together and pray for deliverance from this container of cyclic time.27

2) The healthy thought of the Eternal Recurrence

So much for the unhealthy thought. Thankfully, it is not Nietzsche's ultimate form of the experience of eternal recurrence. There is a healthier, more affirmative interpretation of Becoming which awaits Zarathustra. And Zarathustra must overcome (in Nietzsche's highest sense) the unhealthy drive or experience in order to reach its healthy height.

When the dwarf first speaks to him in "On the Vision and the Riddle," Zarathustra has not yet overcome the saint or the ascetic ideal. The dwarf lands a position on Zarathustra's back because of the prominence of the saint, the priest, and the last people in Zarathustra's mind and journey. Zarathustra is still weighed down by their life-denying version of the experience. To them, and to Zarathustra before his transformation, God must die in order to save humanity--which cannot save itself.

But Zarathustra's nausea ends in brightness. One does not have to say an ultimate "No" to Becoming; perhaps one must do so in the beginning or along the way or even repeatedly. But it is also possible to say "Yes." It is possible to experience time not as something within which we are trapped, not as a container without elbow room.

27 This seems to be only a few steps away from the last people, who are not consciously fleeing the eternal recurrence but in a sense are without conscience and without consciousness--they see a star and blink without even knowing what they see.
Certainly the dwarf has interpreted Zarathustra's thought in this way—time is a circle. Zarathustra realizes, however, that this thought is not healthy, that it comes out of a past which is regurgitated and not overcome, in Nietzsche's sense of that word. Zarathustra still searches to find its healthy counterpart. But if it is not an actuality of repeated, identical content what is it? Zarathustra himself says that the moment, the gate, the spider, the moonlight must recur. What can he mean?

Zarathustra looks again at the phenomena and at Becoming. He does not see dead cycles of dead content returning again and again without change. He sees—change! Change with a direction, change which carries with it the past, and everything about the past. Something recurs—but it is not a content which recurs for Zarathustra (Will-to-Power, note 1066). It is the Same in every moment.

What then is the Same? Perhaps it is easier to start out by saying what the Same is not. It is not a self or a substance which I can identify as something which stays the same despite the changes which occur around me. It is not simply the "I" which unifies my "experiences" and over against which I have a "world."

Life will have meaning, Nietzsche says, if something can be achieved in every moment and if that achievement is the same in

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28 See the discussion of the people of re ssentiment in section 13 of the "Third Essay" of Genealogy of Morals.  
29 It is important to identify here how easy it is when talking about Becoming to start to do so in linear terms. A giving of direction of change seems to say that Becoming happens in a linear way, outward to be sure, but in a straight line. For Nietzsche, Becoming does not even happen in a crooked line. It does not happen in a line at all—because of the eternal recurrence. For Becoming to be linear would be for "it" to forget or leave behind the past in its ever-outward motion. The eternal recurrence precludes a linear formulation and demands that we re-think Becoming not as opposite to static Being but as something qualitatively different.
every moment (Gay Science, aphorism 341). By this affirmation, he is trying to establish the inter-dependence of will-to-power and eternal recurrence. Out of the highest will-to-power, an active and outward willing, I can swallow the past—all of the past. And I can "keep it down." I can hold the necessary character of the moment's becoming and still give it (the moment) a direction, a perspective, a form, a structure which is creative.

The highest will-to-power is needed to become this iron stomach/furnace which transforms what appears meaningless and nihilistic (the "world" of Becoming without end, without a goal or meaning) into something authentically joyful. But the possibility for authentic joy, the character of the moment is the Same in every moment. Why? Because I am will-to-power and nothing else. The human is always structuring and giving form to the phenomena. So, as long as some people are not fully those whose only possibility is the unhealthy interpretation of the eternal recurrence, the unaffirming "No" to Becoming, the possibility of affirmation and creation (as well as the possibility of denial and negation) is always there. They arise as married to each other.

Nietzsche describes the eternal recurrence of the Same (as a task for every moment) in the Gay Science as an hypothesis put forward by a demon (Gay Science, aphorism 341). What if your life, every single part, each moment, had to be lived over and over for all eternity? Could you not only endure that thought, but also desire it with all your "heart?" To say yes to this question is the task of the overgoer in every moment. Zarathustra and the dwarf—the spider and the moonlight of their past—keep returning to the moment. Its gate is the Same
(Zarathustra, 158). And constantly Zarathustra must either speak his word ("Dwarf, it is you or I") and shatter or sink down into the rabble-consciousness. As Nehamas says, "even if we were to live again, even if we were given that possibility infinitely many times, we would only be given the same life we already had. If our life, then, is ever to be redeemed, it is to be redeemed now, and not in a distinct afterlife" (157).

Perhaps another way to describe the Same, although above I de-emphasized the sameness of "me" through "my experiences," is to think of it as my "role" in the movement of becoming itself. Becoming is not ultimately something "out there" which I am in and have to negotiate. Becoming is also not behavioristically determined by what was, but it is related to it. In short, the Same is the experience, the realization of myself as Becoming--all that I am is the infinite changing of will-to-power. And all that I can be is this--an ordered, a beautiful, an eternal Becoming.

To put it another way: "What is" always contains within itself "what was"--and the "what will be" is, for the human, structured and bounded by their "concentric" character. Because we are a human will-to-power, we are "agents" of Becoming. We are participants; through a long period of reactivity, we have learned to isolate the will, to be conscious, to gain a perspective on ourselves as will-to-power and thus to create, to shape the course of our (and our "world's") Becoming.

D.) A Concrete Example of Struggle Toward/With the Healthy Thought
Of course, I am not always immediately ascending, joyful, or creative. I can also be unaffirming, caught up in revulsion, in seeing my interpretation (common enough as it is) of time and the past as something which I cannot overcome and thus missing the eternity of the present in which all of the past can be, must be, calls out to be overcome. I can refuse to be, to give eternal return in the sense that I insist on staying in one place and looking back at what was as though across an unbridgeable river.

When I balk at the realization or experience that the past is always already in the moment--and my vision that sees the concentration camps of World War II as a stumbling block for my willing in the present--I fail to see the task which is in the moment which that same past (those same camps) present to me. It is the absurdity which lies in the fact that I see myself as rigidified in the present because I cannot go back and undo Nazi Germany. And for me, as a child with recurring nightmares about being chased by them, it is the Nazis I must first overcome in order to affirm the joy in existence. Without the effort which comes with seeing that my Becoming depends on the continual surfacing of their atrocities and the understanding that it is impossible for my actions to have borne fruit without their continued influence--without that effort, I forego the joy of being able in each and every moment to overcome (construct, find a place for, integrate) them, to let them end, and to know that they will return in acquired strength.

The eternal recurrence is thus the interconnection and interplay of the two responses put together: unhealthy nausea at the eternal character of the past and the moment, and a healthy release of these to
the perishing of the present to joyful affirmation in a creative, active "Yes." The eternal recurrence is a moving back (a beginning the journey up the mountain), a confrontation, and a giving back. What form the giving back will take is determined by the health of the person—either the will gnashes its teeth and vomits up its creative ability or it transforms itself from the vision attained and shines with creative radiance.

Everything always remains (recurs). Not just like a memory or a book that keeps getting printed or a story that is passed down through generations—for exact replicas do not remain but are interpreted and added to and directed. Someone different from my mother reminds me of her sometime after her death, but even here the same returns—I move again and again to the same mother, eagle and river and spider. But I give them back to the present, and I affirm them in the creation of more strength, more power, growth. I return them in my returning. I give back as I come back. And I always come back to More; my mother, after I see that other person, occupies new meaning, a new place in the ever-new structure of "me." I know I come back to More, to accrued meaning because of my feeling of attained power. I overcome my adolescent insecurities in that I affirm their presence in the moment and then create out of them, structure them in a way which gives them form within a "whole." As Nehamas says, I make my life literature—make it grow out of one soil and unify all of its drives or impulses or "traits" into a necessary and inevitable form—and then find meaning in that process. If I can become literature—the "place" where characters are nothing more than the sum of their effects—I will have become who I am.
As the Same process, the same movement, as self-overcoming of my past and my moonlight, I am more powerful now, but I am also not yet finished. The past and its moonlight are still to be overcome, redirected, shaped, reswallowed again and again as I allow all that was to recur, to return to my gateway of the moment in order that I may let it perish, again, through the present. I become a greater and more powerful character--from Ivan to Ariosha, as it were.

This perishing is not a hopeless giving up, not a gesture of defeat, not a failure or an eternal plunge into the abyss of warring personalities. Perishing is refusing to hold onto what is, can be only within the moment. It is a letting go in order to grasp hold of what is brought about by what is "dying." The grasping hold is as important as the letting go. Together they are a saying yes to the innocence of becoming (which is eternally the Same). They are the hindering of rigidification--I cannot say "thus was Nietzsche, thus are his texts." For his texts do not recur as identical, without interpretation, without the increased texts of others' returnings. All this, however, as is obvious from Nietzsche's fight against madness, does not point to a deliberate, unmanageable and undirected explosion of meaning, as in deconstruction, but to the inability for us ever to sum something up.

E) A Summary

This is the healthy "goal" of Zarathustra: the longing which he expresses as/for an artistic will-to-power. It is this highest freedom which has to come as a product of the two millenia of the ascetic ideal, which had to overcome (allow to perish while still realizing the presence in every moment of their influence) the nobility in order to
be more refined, deeper, stronger and therefore more specifically human. It is only at this point, at the point when the people of knowledge can question even the value of the will to truth, that freedom can be at its highest point so far, that the possibility for the greatest joy and most healthful meaning in human existence can be found.

Yes, the nobility can recur, but it is a nobility with a new direction. It is not the same nobility engaged in the same cycles because we have since redirected the completely unconscious, instinctual character of the noble through the creation of thought, consciousness, memory, and promises. He or she has become one who structures the future, who is more conscious--and out of this takes new directions in his or her activity.

When Zarathustra experiences the thought of the eternal recurrence as his own, as something more powerful than the observation of the shepherd's transformation (At that time, Zarathustra had seen the before and the after, but he had not then actually experienced the process), contained in that experience is the full weight of the realization that who I am is not yet finalized and that it never will be.

Eternal recurrence, in terms of Zarathustra's experience, is the realization that what is given as "constant" through all Becoming is only will-to-power and what is possible is only--in every moment--either joyful self-overcoming or despairing, nihilistic absurdity. Eternal recurrence is an eternal return to the moment, to the human as bound up with the moment and living in the perishing of the present.
Recurrence then for Nietzsche is a thought—perhaps two of them, the healthy and the unhealthy—but it also carries shades of "reality." There are thematics (such as the three metamorphoses) or epochs or a character of the moment (the Same) which recur, phenomena which come back. But they are not identical replications. Rather, as he intimates in the *Birth of Tragedy* and the *Gay Science* (perhaps aphorism 369), the joyful nature of the Greeks in the Dionysiac experience of life must come back—and it must do so in a changed mask, with a different configuration, and with more strength because of what has been experienced.

Certainly, eternal recurrence as nihilism comes again and again as we realize (periodically, in authentic moments) that the womb of being is empty, that there is nothing but the Apollinian veils we make in order to survive chaos and produce art from its bowels. It is a repetitive process of disillusionment and courageous projection in the face of—in spite of—absurdity. It is a repetitive process that becomes a will to meaning (out of the need to transform the life-denying thought of dead content's recurrence) which, as will-to-power, makes memory in the human.

In fact, it is only with the eternal recurrence as a crisis of nihilism that the eternal recurrence of the bared will-to-power as will-to-affirmation can take over. It is only when I am faced with destruction that I can summon the power to create. The ascetic priest becomes disillusioned in his hermitage in the forest. Zarathustra ascends the mountain. Now comes Nietzsche's hierarchy of health and strength. In these times of crisis, it is those who can command (those
who have obeyed for so long with an eye for creation of values) who will make new veils for "the human" to stand under.

It is the affirmation of the eternal recurrence, the healthy and directed constant change which keeps me from being able to be summed up--I let the present end in order to be always in the present. When I do not create, I do not become in the highest sense. I degrade, I become only rabble. And this is the highest danger and nausea for humanity--to have removed oneself from Becoming and into the "container" of nihilism.

F.) The Will-to-Power and Self-Overcoming

Given the character of the human as eternal recurrence and will-to-power, as becoming, I must continually overcome and self-overcome. Nehamas' formulation of the project of making my life literature is never completed--I never reach the perfectly completed text because there is always more to gather within my "character"--and it ultimately must be represented in every moment. And overcoming happens through the will-to-power, that contentless activity which does not collect all the events of the past and hold them as would a camel for as long as it can before its back breaks, but rather allows them to come again and pass away again gathering its strength from this affirmation of love (the child).

The movement of the eternal recurrence is thus inextricably bound to the formulation of the process of self-overcoming and affirmation of the will-to-power. In some sense, they are all synonyms for the same experience--eternal recurrence emphasizes a bit more of
the character of the infinity of the moment, self-overcoming the human
process, and will-to-power the structural motion in which all this takes
place. But none is really separate from the other. Thus, our highest
task in each moment is to become, in a quasi-Aristotelian sense, well.
With style.

Unlike the last people, we do not have to stop at the foot of the
abyss and turn back. We can plunge into it. When we see that there is
no finality, we can and must return to a more fundamental possibility
of the human, one not dominated by a lapse into illusions. We must re-
view birth and death. We must affirm process through the motion
which is our only metaphysical comfort—eternal return and the ever-
widening scope of creative power. By this affirmation, we no longer
rail against life for the meaninglessness and endless character of all
suffering—for recurrence. We rejoice precisely because there is no end.
We see even the nausea as an eternally willable part of the process, as
a recurring part of the return which we are always engaged in.  

To say it again (cf. page 25), Becoming is not arbitrary for the
human. Again and again we see that our concepts of life or our
directions that we take as absolute are undermined, revised,
reformulated; and so we think that there is no order to be found in this
chaos. There is too much variety, too much Becoming and little—no-
being. But when we look again, we see a web of change—one
characterized by our memories and structured by our promises. It is
the will-to-power that characterizes all phenomena or projections of
human experience: religion, politics, sexuality.

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30 The joy that is possible is dependent on the nausea. And we desire to
experience joy.
Though he may appear to be "objective" at times, however, Nietzsche wants to recommend the ascending and healthy type, the overgoer who can "do" the eternal recurrence which is affirmation and the will-to-power which is turned outward in the sense of allowing the drives and instincts to produce art--instead of surgery.31


1.) Is the overgoer then, following the discussion of eternal recurrence above, something which the human becomes naturally, in every moment, or something we have to work toward?

The answer is some of both. We "naturally" have the possibility to become the overgoer out of our past; we also have an incredible task to make that "possibility" a "reality." I think that Stambaugh is correct in saying that the positive affirmation of the eternal recurrence is a momentary activity. She quotes Nietzsche as saying that it must be done in every moment, that it was a moment for him when he came up with its pregnancy, that the overgoer is something to be attained for and within the moment (Stambaugh, 89 ff.).

This says to me that there is partly a task to be worked on and a phenomenon to be described in Nietzsche. Yes, the overgoer as dreamed by Nietzsche may be a higher person who is able, not just occasionally but in every moment, to affirm all of existence. And maybe that person will come. However, Stambaugh seems right in theorizing that the overgoer could be a process for Nietzsche, a

31 The heroism of the eternal recurrence: "Going out to meet at the same time one's highest suffering and one's highest hope" (Gay Science, 219).
momentary lion-like burst of courage for which we gather strength, a periodic leap out of decay or decadence into joy through eternal recurrence and will-to-power.

But eternal recurrence and affirmation of existence is not something which Nietzsche always emphasizes as an impossibility for most people:

if our soul has trembled with happiness . . . just once, all eternity was needed to produce this one event--and in this single moment of affirmation, all eternity is called good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed. (Will-to-Power, note 1032)

Thus, eternal recurrence and its height of the will-to-power are for Nietzsche a thought and a response which allow us to reflect upon what we have actually already (and necessarily) affirmed, an activity of "mind" or "soul" which allows for the symptom of the will-to-power--the increasing feeling of attained power, an impetus to life.32

What does not necessarily follow from the trembling soul mentioned above, is the possibility that each person could be an overgoer. Nevertheless, even when thought to its (conscious) depths, eternal recurrence seems attainable for more people than Nietzsche's doctrine of the overgoer might seem at first to present. Why? Because we really are able to see time's character as disparate moments, to see all of time bound together in the moment, the moment which draws after itself all that is to come.33 Yes, eternal recurrence as affirmation

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32 Nehamas, while perhaps agreeing with Stambaugh that Nietzsche would not make the process of the overgoer only for an elite group, points out that "Nietzsche tries to suggest how intense and painful a self-examination is necessary before one can even begin to answer the demon's question affirmatively" (163).

33 In fact, Stambaugh says, it is because of the "fact" of instantaneous time which we can recognize that we have the possibility of generating temporal structures (datebooks, calendars, hourglasses, etc.). Instantaneous time has no
is still an activity and a task (of integration), one which we can fail to
do consciously, from the depths, when we live our everyday lives
hunched over in the confines of illusion. But even in our everydayness
we can be affirming—it is the overgoer or the prophets of the overgoer
that must help us to see this.

2) The Overgoer—"Concrete" Task

As Nehamas and Magnus observe, Nietzsche, in the overgoer,
gives us the opportunity to see that the self itself is, at every moment,
our creation, our shaping. Magnus: "If will-to-power is form-giving,
shaping, articulation, then the Ubermensch forms and shapes the will-
to-power which he himself is. It is not a question of mastering others,
of overcoming the herd by overpowering it. The herd to be overcome
is the herd in ourselves. Mastery and overcoming are to be understood
as self-mastery and self-overcoming primarily" (34). Self-mastery
occupies a most important place with Nietzsche, and it is only out of a
mastered self that we can create with any artistic (ordered,
meaningful) competence.

Our concrete task then is to give ourselves style. It is to live with
a rule(r) but also with conflict—always being able to channel our
multifarious souls into one stream but always with many wills
combatting and struggling for dominance "within" us. Our task is to
live with conflict to the point of overflowing, to practice under the
hundred swords of Damocles. And then, even if only periodically, it is
gift and duty to dance out of the one soil, one air, one country we have
structured in order to become ever more bright and clear: "the

definite structure and thus admits of less fundamental formulations. See also "On
the Great Longing" (Zarathustra, 221).
character of each event depends on its eventual implications for the whole of one's constantly changing self" (Nehamas, 162).

Our task is, in Nietzsche's own words, "to be a human being with one elevated feeling--to be a single great mood incarnate--that has hitherto been a mere dream. . . . Nevertheless history might one day give birth to such people, too" (Gay Science, 231).34 Once we have so ordered ourselves, once we have affirmed, swallowed, danced, and given back--then we will have achieved as far as possible, in as many moments as we can, the "being" of the overgoer.

We can rest assured at any moment, however, that we not have reached the ultimate height. Nor can we dance one way all our lives. Nietzsche hates long habits--part of being the overgoer is knowing when to hold the fermata and when to let it die. Silence and stillness is always necessary to hear the beginning of the next song bubbling from underneath the floorboards.35

The process of the overgoer is itself a becoming More (continually returning to and re-opening the past to continue the expansion of meaning into the future) and as such is never regulated by a particular content. It desires to transform nihilism into artistic affirmation, a way of life which is fuller than the projections into which we too often desire to fall. It is a freeing from the guilt and reactivity of ressentiment. True, as Magnus says, while "the last man's life is shrouded in ambiguity, the life of the Ubermensch is focused" (33). But the overgoer, in being focused, is not static.

Perhaps the best articulation Nietzsche gives to the process and task of the overgoer is in the section entitled "On the Three

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34 See also Gay Science aphorism number 290.
35 See also Gay Science aphorism number 295.
Metamorphoses." In this we see the progression of the overgoer's journey to creativity in every moment. First, in the self-overcoming as it extends from the camel who must take all the "thou shalts" of the past onto its back, who must give itself its own sub regula vel abbate, and speed off into its own desert. This is the taking on of the eternal recurrence as most abysmal thought and greatest weight. Then the self-overcoming of the lion—who is a metamorphosis of domination, of tearing down, of rejecting the nihilistic implications of the circle but still tied to it, still in need of it.

In its highest form, however, the process of the overgoer is forgetfulness (in order to be the child who rolls creation out of itself) and a sacred yes to the infinity of questions, to the will to dwell among them. At its highest realization, it is freedom from rigidification of the past (it is bound up with eternal return) and nihilism. It is a setting free of the instincts to create, it is a heightened consciousness, yet it is (as structure and ground for activity and activity itself) beyond these. Thus, the child arises out of the camel and the lion, but can no longer see them in its self-propelled motion—nor does the child realize that by its motion the other two will come again.

The fact that this process of self-overcoming, from camel to child, is repeated over and over, in every moment is, however, what gives life meaning. Only in this way can Zarathustra say with honesty that he is the advocate of life, suffering, and the circle—to me, the child, the lion, and the camel respectively. Only through the metamorphoses' eternal recurrence can we come to realize that "the only way out of

36 "Under a rule and an abbot"—a quote from the prologue of the Rule of Benedict.
37 Of the need to bear and tear—the need to be camel and lion.
tradition is through it. . . . Great art does not arise ex nihilo " (Magnus, 38).

Thus, in the metaphor of the process, the overgoers are always in motion. They do not permanently settle into any of their values as a morality. Instead they are continually self-overcoming: weighing, prodding, overcoming, returning to, affirming, directing, re-directing, adding to, and perishing with their values. This constant action means that the overgoers refuse to have an ultimate goal or an ultimate summing up. To have such would mean that they would be outside the realm of honesty--the one supreme virtue, the only metaphysical counterpart, perhaps, that Nietzsche sees to the will-to-power.38
II. On Daly--Human Becoming, Reappropriation, Sisterhood.

We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind us--indeed, we have gone further and destroyed the land behind us. Now, little ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean: to be sure, it does not always roar, and at times it lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries of graciousness. But hours will come when you will realize that it is infinite and that there is nothing more awesome than infinity. Oh, the poor bird that felt free and now strikes at the walls of this cage! Woe when you feel homesick for the land as if it had offered more freedom and there is no longer any 'land.'

--Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, aphorism 124

A.) Introduction

Despite my discussion in the preface, there is still the very real possibility that I am giving priority to Nietzsche in this thesis and subverting Daly's authority. In some ways, that judgment is undeniably true and unavoidable. But I want to assert confidently that I do not find Daly to be equally dense, equally literary, equally compelling; nor do I feel obliged to change my preferences out of a sense of guilt or a need for pluralism. I do, however, find Daly to be fascinating and challenging. And I am eager to explore why most others have not even surmised that she has used or been in dialogue with Nietzsche more than the following statement by Grimshaw indicates: "Daly sees [Nietzsche] as a prophet. And the half-truth I think she saw in his work, the insight that could be gained from him, was that the Christian morality he so despised...was in fact the morality which had been thought especially appropriate to women" (155).39 It

39 See section five below on the transvaluation of values, page 82 ff. Suffice it to say here that Rosemarie Tong sees the Nietzsche/Daly connection in their similar
is obvious to me that Daly is Nietzschean to a large extent. And it is also obvious that she has insights of her own to offer Nietzsche. Outlining the extent of both of these obvious claims is the purpose of this thesis. What follows then is a preliminary attempt to summarize Daly's major issues as she talks about them in her two earliest works *Beyond God the Father* and *The Church and the Second Sex*.

B.) Initial Summary of Mary Daly's Early Corpus

1) Daly's Call to Consciousness

If I had to summarize the purpose of Daly's first two books in one phrase it would be this: to call women to realize the necessity of ending their mutilation due to patriarchal sex role socialization and the necessity of beginning women's bonding, "human becoming" and "creative action in and toward transcendence" (*Beyond*, 6). This is the heart of her work. But only giving her these phrases would be unjust. Daly has only reached the ability to call women to communal, separate transcendence through a long period of preparation. In these two books, one of her most valuable contributions has been her preparatory work, her laying out of a dual history: the general history of the effects of patriarchy within women, and the specific history of her own life.

This dual account allows Daly, in her own eyes, to do more than chronicle the past. Certainly, she mourns with de Beauvoir the fact that most women of the past "exhausted themselves in breaking through to discovery of their own humanity, with little energy left for constructing use of the transvaluation of values, but does not explore their relationship much further than that.
their own interpretation of the universe" (*Beyond*, 7). But, in putting her own story on the line, Daly does not only mourn; with her history behind her, she also sketches out new ground for the future.

Daly has a hope and a courage which she identifies as "existential." She is convinced that a feminist revolution is possible, that women are—now that they can move to the edges of institutions and exercise their own power—on their way toward becoming whole persons, breaking down stereotypes, and creating their own ways of living. And even if one observes that Daly's views change dramatically over the course of her life, one must still carefully consider and weigh Daly's early goals, one of which is "the becoming of androgynous human persons" (*Beyond*, 15).

2). Daly as Metaphysician

Related to this discussion of androgyny, however, is another discussion about metaphysics. And I believe that Daly begins and ends these two books as a metaphysician. That may be unfortunate for someone who wants to parallel her with Nietzsche—someone whom Heidegger called the last metaphysician because of Nietzsche's rejection of everything metaphysical save the contentless will-to-power. But nonetheless that is what she appears to be.

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40 Here I summarize Daly as I read her specifically in the early works—as someone who, while unwilling to tolerate oppression, is also unwilling to replace male domination with female domination or a plan to ignore all men. Later on, while she still quotes Eliot and others, it is obvious that she becomes less willing to admit that men have anything to offer.
True, Daly does reject the way women "are" or have been made to "be" in favor of their becoming or Be-ing something more fulfilled. But this process is really more of transforming one essence which has been mutilated and hidden from sight into another more dynamic. She wants to encourage human becoming, but hers is not an endless becoming, merely a return to something which she sees as having been before--a primordial state of harmony, an androgyny before the advent of male domination and violence.\textsuperscript{41}

In this sense, then Daly is also a meta-physician. She sees women as wounded, mutilated, stunted, malnourished, and unactualized. She prescribes "radical surgery" and healing. Her books are a moving toward health. In and through her writing, Daly calls women to reclaim their own being and to do it in their own ways and places--through self-transcendence and self-created expressions of participation in God the Verb.

While her metaphysics look immediately like a stumbling block toward a union with Nietzsche, however, it is not necessarily the case that they are incompatible. After all, it is still the case that Nietzsche--for all his discussion of the contentless "soul" which is will-to-power and nothing else--upholds gender distinctions as important and productive. The comparison and contrast between Nietzsche and Daly is delayed until the next section, however, and I again stress here that the reader should become more acquainted with Daly's more general projects and processes in order to evaluate this paper's conclusions.

\textsuperscript{41} This is in contrast to her statement towards the end of The Church which is quoted below (p. 47). But I think when she says the past cannot furnish the healing there, she refers to the past of Christianity. When her optic changes to include the "secular" history of the pre-Christians, I think she sincerely believes in the historicity of previous matriarchies and desires to return to their way of life.
C.) Daly's Projects

1). A History of Patriarchy--Her View of Past, Her First View of Church

Daly herself furnishes an excellent summary and critique of her first work--*The Church and the Second Sex*--in her introduction to its second printing. It is from this that I take the optic for my own summary of her, hoping "to do justice to the author in reviewing her book, judging it in its historical context" (*The Church*, 15). But, while I use her introduction to lay out what I think Daly finds most useful in this book, I leave most of the commentary and critique in her introduction for a later discussion on how she moves from this book to her second one, *Beyond God the Father*.

*The Church* is basically Daly's attempt, as Catholic feminist and theologian, to critique the Catholic institution while remaining fundamentally within its structures. In it are themes she will take up later--the critique of the Judeo-Christian mythological system, the historical and present role and effects of ecclesiastical misogyny, the cycle of women's self-degradation through patriarchal domination, the viability of Scripture, the possibilities for women's participation and creativity within churchly confines--but with a different optic. In this, her first book, Daly wants to save (as far as the 1975 Daly is concerned) the heart or the spirit of the Christian message and community. Later,

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42 It is interesting to note how Daly later considers her previous work as though done by a totally foreign woman (see introduction to *Gyn-Ecology*). This attitude of seeing oneself as someone in a process of always becoming, as not necessarily an essence which remains over time, seems very Nietzschean. I will talk about this in the following section.
she will be much more willing to cast these all aside as peripheral and worthless problems in favor of a leap outward, beyond religion as it is traditionally understood.

In *The Church*, however, there is something which still appeals to Daly in the life of St. Teresa of Avila and the works of Aquinas, among others. And Daly's affinity with these Christian figures should not be surprising. She has, after all, been a scholar who has grown up in this tradition, who is conscious of the stories of Mary Magdalene and Mary and Martha. Her tendency to preserve ideas or people within the tradition is thus evidence of an initial desire to retain some of the beauty and love which Christianity can sometimes present. In *The Church*, the atheism of some of Daly's contemporaries in feminism is not yet persuasive to her.

Instead, Daly turns to the emerging nun as the prototype for her reform. She cites Sister Charles Borromeo, C.S.C., as a particularly articulate example of Daly's own goal and methodology: "To preserve dead forms is to create museums; to grow in living and intelligent continuity with the vital past is absolutely essential. The moment of decision would seem to be upon us, as upon the whole Church" (*The Church*, 137). This is Daly's thematic throughout—-to preserve ties with tradition as something good-in-themselves, as something which locates us in a shared world and a shared path to transcendence or God and yet to transform it. In a sense, she wants to tear down the walls of the convent but keep the habit of convening.

So, with this in mind, Daly focuses on tearing down the stereotypes, confident that sexism or misogyny does not constitute the whole of Christianity. She critiques the symbols of the Church,
particularly that of the Virgin Mary, as ideas which do not allow women to evolve and become. There is no eternal feminine, the 1968 Daly says. Rather, symbols such as this should not be preserved, as though essential and immutable; symbols are never valuable in themselves and without a context. They are expressive only of the changing social conditions which are their context and source of existence.

Examples: men have handed women their identities through the pedestal of sainthood, as in Joan of Arc, or in the squallor of misogyny, as in pornography. They have allowed women to be virtually nothing else than virgin or whore. Why? Daly maintains that it is because of their accumulated guilt-complex--men have forced on women for the human's physical inability to live up to the standards of a metaphysical or perfect God. This is anathema to Daly, and continuously so in her later works. Not even an androgynous heaven can allow or justify women's mutilation here on earth (The Church, 58).

What is Daly's solution to this problem of the power of bad symbols? She has several--all of which involve a redefinition of the Church to include women and to alter its attitudes. Woman-man relationships must be re-viewed: "what this suggests is that men and women, in striving to overcome the effects of sin, should evolve toward that real partnership on all levels which is required if the image of God is to be realized in them" (The Church, 79). Scripture is to be re-interpreted. Everyone who has "benefitted from the insights of a later age have the task of distinguishing elements which are sociological in origin from the life-fostering, personalist elements which pertain
essentially to the Christian message" (*The Church*, 84). But even these responsibilities are not the primary one.

Above all, Daly says, the idea that the woman is this or that particular formula or set of characteristics must be overcome: "the characteristics of the Eternal Woman are opposed to those of a developing, authentic *person*, who will be unique, self-critical, self-creating, active, and searching" (*The Church*, 149). What it means to be a woman is changing, Daly says. And the Church, as respectful of persons, must change with it.

But Daly's claim that what it means to be a woman is changing is not absolute. Certainly, women are neither "naturally" passive nor "naturally" marginal (*The Church*, 93). And certainly Daly rejects the eternal feminine. But she also provides a static definition of women when she redefines them in terms of their political situation—as the oppressed—and of their biology in order to reach them as a group. Her conscience, however, refuses to agree that with these "givens" come inherent (or inherently negative) value judgments.

The overcoming of stereotypes, then, works out of an intuition of and leads to a sort of androgyny (or a bi-sexuality) which she hints at in the discussion of Thomas Aquinas (*The Church*, 93). But stereotypes are not easily dropped. Thus, Daly says, women must first "*raise up their own image*" (*The Church*, 156). Women themselves must display a concrete and active willingness to destroy stereotypes and to do so within a structure, the Church. Without the Church's basis of tradition and revelation, Daly does not think we can review our views of ourselves. This willingness to stay with the Church is important, I think—at least in regard to the later section linking her with Nietzsche.
It is a testament, I believe, to Daly's unwillingness in this book to
disregard completely the character of the past, as patriarchal as it may
be.43

In this first book, Daly's identifications of distortions, self-
fulfilling prophecies, and vicious circles of repression and limitation of
women lead to a conclusion of surgery or exorcism. Her diagnosis: the
Church "has been grievously hurt in its members of both sexes, for in a
society which welcomes and fosters prejudice, not only is the human
potential of the subject group restricted, but the superordinate group
also becomes warped in the process" (The Church, 177).

It may be objected that exorcism or surgery requires the killing
off of a portion of the past--a practice difficult to characterize as
Nietzschean! However, I think that, even though this surgery/exorcism
implies getting rid of at least a part of the past and of the present
Church, Daly is still hopeful that people--women and men--"will be
honest enough to admit the ambiguity of concrete reality, which the
theologian's abstractions cannot fully clarify or encompass" (The
Church, 190). In light of this and similar passages then, it is still fairly
safe to say that Daly characterizes herself, at least in the early works,
as being inside the Church.

Of course, her optic is not one of remaining completely in the
tradition, even a tradition purged of its misogynistic elements. Daly
looks outward, much as she does in her later works, even in her first
book. And, contrary to her 1975 critic's reading of her, Daly does not
promise that developing the idea of the kernel of Christian message or
spirit will, all by itself, heal women and the Church: "the healing which

43 This puts her in dialogue, at least initially, with the healthy thought of the
eternal recurrence.
we seek must not be understood as a return to a state of health presumed to have existed in the past. . . . Rather, we must strive for that forward leap into the future of human history which is now demanded of us. Then perhaps it will be understood that our sickness was only the growing pains of a species [women and men] on its way to maturity" (*The Church*, 194). At the end of this book, Daly intuits an influx into the Church, an influx of new revelation in order to compensate for that which has been discarded and thrown away.

2). A Re-viewing: Daly's Comprehensive View toward the Future

Daly previews the second edition of *The Church* with two short pieces: an autobiographical statement and a rather autobiographical "PostChristian Feminist Introduction." In both of these, Daly tries to show how she, in 1975, while having written and still speaking the words of her first book, "was already disconnected from the words, already moving through a new time/space" (*The Church*, 14). Particularly in the introduction, she emphasizes how much has happened between the formulation of that first book and 1975 A.F.--she uses the expression of women's new time-designation (*The Church*, 6). She even goes so far as to treat the author of *The Church* as completely "Other" than herself, often with humorous effect. But the humor has a way of proving her point.

She thinks differently. She is no longer the person who believed, naively, that the road to revolution lay in reform, in being "willing to cross oceans and face unknown dragons to obtain its objectives" (*The Church*, 8). There is no reform of patriarchy or of particular patriarchal
institutions from the inside. Remaining on the inside, to the 1975 Daly, was akin to allowing the male to control women's revolutions, which would essentially be a movement "in circles within the same senescent patriarchal system" (The Church, 10).

Instead, Daly argues, women must take up a position on the boundaries--and not the boundaries in the sense of the edges which really continue to remain inside. Women need to take up a position close by but completely external to all the insidious web-strands of patriarchy. And she criticizes the 1968 Daly for not coming to this realization, to the point of a complete break with the Church. Her 1975 critique is that the vision of her 1968 counterpart "had moved only partially outside patriarchy itself, and her visionary anger did not move her to take a qualitative leap into the new space and time of radical feminism as we know it" (The Church, 17).

By 1975 Daly has gained a new perspective--"in light of feminist philosophy of Be-ing, we are aware of the deep connection between women's becoming and the unfolding of the cosmic process--a process which some would still call 'God'" (The Church, 18). And this perspective is much more "separatist" than her previous one. Women need to seek transcendence in order to make their lives meaningful, and their transcendence needs to come from their own creativity. Women's gods must arise out of women's heads, hearts, and hands. God--if there is such a concept which actually exists in a dynamic way--will die out if women do not become; the being of God and the being of women are interdependent. The alternative is a static and mutilated God, one which represents only half of humanity.
This conclusion does not, for Daly, arise out of a void. In 1975, she sees it as arising very naturally out of *The Church*. And, indeed, the union of cosmic process and woman's process/progress may very well be implicit in *The Church*. But whether or not that text actually allows for her later conclusion is not an issue worth exploring here. For now, that she returns to her work and finds what she does is itself important.

In 1975, Daly has had recourse to the terminology and conceptual tools of the radical feminist movement, which prides itself on the complete detachment from the Church and from patriarchal movements. As a result, 1975 is also a year in which Daly must come to terms with her earlier tendency to remain part of the establishment. She does so by saying that, in 1968, "moving too far ahead would have meant venturing into an endless desert, into a state which an uncomprehending world would have called "madness" and treated as such" (*The Church*, 24). And she does so by seeing the 1968 Daly's basic projects of revising ontology and equality as necessary to the goals of contemporary radical feminism. The 1975 Daly is blessed with a wider perspective, but she asserts "that if it were not for Daly's early work, I myself would probably never have tried on a feminist space suit" (*The Church*, 21).

So much for the past. Daly proves in her introduction that this book is still worth the royalties she is collecting from it. Moreover, she has, in approximately fifty pages, summarized and shown the connection between where she has been (*The Church*), where she is now (*Beyond*) and where she hopes to go. The past, her past, has been
reevaluated. Her present is discussed below, in the summary of *Beyond God the Father*. What about the future?

The future is something exciting for the 1975 Daly. It is going to bring about becoming of women at their own hands, in their own ways—the formation of "an exodus community that would leave behind the destroyers to die of their own internal ailments" (*The Church*, 44). There are to be separate ludic celebrations (*The Church*, 49). And women embracing witch-hood (*The Church*, 50). But there is one problem. All this later seems undeniably separatist. Where is the continuity with *The Church*? It reappears at the end of the introduction, with a dream: "I dream of these, my sisters, as drawing from the vision of our past and future foremothers, waking the human species to glimpse still further stars" (*The Church*, 51).

3.) Moving Beyond Patriarchy: Transition Between Past and Future

The main points of Daly's second book, *Beyond God the Father*, emerge throughout the "Postchristian Feminist Introduction" described above. Thus, from the point of view of this thesis, summarizing her second book might seem to be unnecessary. They both speak the same language. In both the 1975 introduction and in *Beyond* present and future time for women seem almost to merge: where women are going, Daly wants to say, has everything to do with where they are now. Why take up more space? Basically, because everything has not been said yet. If I were to stop here without providing more information on how she tries to rescue ontology and form the "exodus community" about which she talks so glowingly in the introduction, I would be doing Daly a disservice.
a.) Rescuing the Project of Ontology

Daly is concerned about Being--and in particular the Being of women. She observes, with other feminists, that women have led particularly stunted or "shallow" lives at the hands of patriarchy, that women have been excluded for the most part from the history books. All this has to change, Daly says. And so her project is to rescue the project of ontology by rescuing a vision for women, a vision of themselves as autonomous and developing--becoming--persons.

For Daly, however, the rescue of this notion of becoming is not a Parmenidean dichotomy within being. Nor does she attempt, in her effort to return women to becoming, to return them to a telos (goal) or an ontology in the Aristotelian sense. It is precisely Aristotelian metaphysics, Daly would say, which limits women to the distorted symbols of the eternal Feminine, to stunting their potential because the telos supposedly does not evolve as women do.

Goals and process must both change, Daly might say, in order that people (women especially) do not live in static (inescapable) patriarchal mutilation:

if we perceive the good, the final cause, as not identical with the static, timeless being of Parmenides, and not identical with the intentions of the institutional fathers and their Heavenly Father, but rather with Be-ing in which we participate actively by the qualitative leap of courage in the face of patriarchy, the magic collar that was choking us is shattered. (Beyond, 189).

Thus, for Daly the goal and the process must come so near to each other as to converge.
Human becoming, women's becoming, is for Daly an active process. It is not passive participation in something which is completely beyond our control or question. It is not merely the attempt to orient ourselves in the correct way to the ontological, but it is an active taking-account and forging anew the meaning of the ontological, the transcendent for ourselves: "The essential thing is to hear our own words, always giving prior attention to our own experience. . . . Our process is our process" (Beyond, 189). And it is only out of practicing and participating that patriarchy can recede and be forced to break apart. Only out of women's own movement in becoming, can they "look forward to endless divergence. It makes us citizens of the future, where we are already finding it possible to know a new past" (Beyond, 193).

But before they can experience this new past, Daly and women need to get to the point of radical awareness which enables radical participation. The race is not yet won, but women are on the road. First, Daly says, women must move beyond. Beyond to where? To the boundary. Beyond what? Beyond God and patriarchal non-being: "To the degree that God the Father is dead, swept under by the Living Final Cause, our movement is in all directions: backward, inward, sideward, forward, as is the case with life itself" (Beyond, 193).

b.) What is Daly Moving Beyond? And Why? And How?

What women's becoming can mean is something beyond their death and beyond their rebirth. It is not a mere cyclic return or resurrection of the sacred into profane consciousness that is at stake. Rather, women's becoming is something more like a new creation. (Beyond, 68)
What Daly is moving beyond, at least one aspect of it, is evident in the book's title: the necessity of a patriarchal God as the only legitimator of self-transcendence. In her own words, Daly says that she is moving past God as transcendent noun to God as transcendent verb. Having given a partial answer to the question "what," the question of "why" rises again before we are ready for it. Why beyond God? What in the Judeo-Christian formulation of God alerts Daly to the necessity of movement?

The Judeo-Christian perspective, Daly says, is a limited perspective. This is not just an unproven assumption on her part; in *The Church* particularly she meticulously details how the misogynist views of the Fathers have caused or co-created the dogma we take for faith today. If the medium is the message, she says--and she continuously attests to just that--then the mythology of patriarchy (impossible symbol of the Virgin Mother) cannot be reformed or legitimized. After any attempt at reform from within the Church or the tradition, women would remain unfulfilled, ignored, and raped by Yahweh and his Son; their identities would still be stolen through the ever-widening circles of sexist structures which originated not just out of faulty interpretation of scriptural texts but in the "revelation" of the texts themselves.

What has happened because of the spread of the patriarchal gods has been the enforced experience of nonbeing on women. Women's names have been erased from history; their deeds, passed over. Their status has plummeted, and they have been looked upon as anomalies, valued only with regard to their reproductive capacities and their wombs. Even within the religions which are supposed to be liberating
and anti-society, women have only held marginal, male-defined roles. She has said all this by way of *The Church*, but she has expounded upon and sharpened her conceptions here.

Daly's call in her second book is thus to gather the courage and hope to face the experience of nonbeing, to turn towards it and gaze into the abyss. In confronting this, in confronting their past and present, Daly believes that women can gather energy to create and to bear themselves up. In facing the abyss, Daly believes it will be possible to live, move, and have their being. She even thinks that the rest of society, i.e. men-defined women and men themselves, will be able to benefit from women's turning away from patriarchy, re-locating on the margins and facing the abyss. Out of her project of rescuing ontology, there will come the process of becoming-androgynous. It is in fact only women who can now bring us out of the stunted and decaying period of patriarchy, for it is they who are bearers of the most painful experiences of nonbeing. Women see the symptoms--they see their own absence from the books and myths; women also bear the marks of the disease.

Women, because of their political situation as oppressed and divided, have always had the greatest potential for liberation in their reunion. And, because of the present circumstances, women have the greatest potential for success in their coming-together. This view of Daly's is not blaming the victim for the reality which is dumped on her. Rather, Daly sees in her project a way to transvalue the position of women into a positive one, one which enables women to have the desire and the necessity for an exodus community of sisters. She sees in convocation a way to make explicit the intuition women have long
had of the need for moving beyond their enforced roles, their intuition that there was something wrong which they could not explain, something which they had missed in their lives. In a sense, women have the most to overcome and so, to use a male metaphor, they can shoot for the furthest goal.

Saying no to patriarchy and making a break from patriarchy, however, are only the first two steps to Daly's projects. Women must also work on themselves, as is implied above. Daly calls women to engage in the eternal process of naming toward God, and she calls them to be bearers of history. This second call in particular is very interesting because it says that humanity as a whole has not been a bearer of history, that what we know as history has always been partial, perspectival, and exclusionary. With women bearing their own history—whether by going back to and rediscovering foremothers or concentrating on creating voices for "future" history in the present—we are ensured a more equitable text of the past.

Naming toward God and naming toward self—these seem to be Daly's two main projects in her second book. Women feel the presence of power within themselves, power which has been building through years of damming by the patriarchy. And this intuition of power and depth, this glance inside at what has stored itself through generations of women, Daly wants to encourage as an ultimately affirmative power. She wants to use this intuition to create beyond the institutions which are the root of the problem.

Out of depth and intuition, then, come a new space, a new time, and a new language. There is no more looking to a world beyond this one in order to endure, but rather a looking to a creation of a new
world in the here and now, on the boundaries. There are no more rituals, but self-decided and meaningful celebrations which do not have to linger to be valued. There are no more victimizations out of sexual hierarchy but "the radically loving act" (*Beyond*, 51).

But breaking out into the new space requires anger (negation) as well. Daly's project is not something which exists peacefully within the space defined for it by patriarchy. It makes a very real break, one that leaves behind the practice of acting vicariously through men and one that ultimately Daly defines as a Fall into freedom. To say it again: this break only comes for Daly with the release and sustaining of the basic anger at the oppression and coopting of patriarchy. The anger must be turned outward, not inward as it has been for centuries; otherwise the affirmation and creation Daly has in mind cannot come to fruition.
D.) Conclusion--Daly's Concept of Sisterhood

When I am coming alive [within the sisterhood], I know that I am coming alive. The cosmic covenant means coming into living harmony with the self, the universe, and God. *Beyond God the Father*, 172.

For Daly, women's becoming together is inseparable from the formation of this new community. Acting as individuals apart from one another, women cannot transvalue the old systems, they cannot engage a flow of healing. The sisterhood, as Daly calls this community, is a bond of those who share the same political situation at the hands of men, the same awareness of the need for self-transcendence, the same embrace of danger on the boundaries, the same desire for new expressions and language. And it is a bond that takes its roots from history, from the matriarchal spirit which has continued to exist even within the mythological structures of the Church, spilling over into the excesses of Mariology. The sisterhood is engaged in bringing the female presence radically, directly, and unashamedly to bear on the "reality" of the world; it wants to break the enforced silence and to end the oppression of the phallus.

Sisterhood embraces women-defined-women and rejects the devaluation of the terms "lesbian" and "homosexual." It works to overcome sexual alienation through rejecting as "inauthentic power" that which is "isolated from love and justice" (*Beyond*, 127). And it seeks to identify women no longer by their biological capacity to give birth but by their ontological capability to give birth to themselves (*Beyond*, 128). In sisterhood, hierarchy has no place. All embrace and empower one another on the common journey into and within freedom.
Above all, sisterhood gives focus to the coming-together of women. It keeps them from being defined only as struggling against the symbols, actions, and institutions of patriarchy. Sisterhood helps women "to learn to live now the future we are fighting for, rather than compromising in vain hope of a future that is always deferred, always unreal. This creative leap implies a kind of recklessness born out of the death of false hope" (Beyond, 138). Someone who continues the struggle at all costs does not develop an adequate vision of the future for Daly. Moreover, that person does not live the future within the struggle as Daly calls women to do.

Sisterhood is, finally, a spiritual uprising, a cosmic covenant but it is one that is essentially creative. It reaches beyond opposition, beyond virgin-whore dichotomy to something which transvalues--the rise of the Amazon in women's becoming. And it is ever-renewed. Nothing in the sisterhood is taken for granted or imposed for the sake of posterity. Posterity is created in the ever-expansive nature of the community.
IV. Linking them up--Nietzsche and Daly

When a human being resists [her] whole age and stops it at the gate to demand an accounting, this must have influence. Whether that is what [she] desires is immaterial; that [she] can do it is what matters.

--Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, p. 198

What is originality? To see something that has no name as yet and hence cannot be mentioned although it stares us all in the face. The way [people] usually are, it takes a name to make something visible for them. --Those with originality have for the most part also assigned names.


By creating, on the basis of the past, an acceptable future, we justify and redeem everything that made this future possible; and that is everything.

--A. Nehamas, p. 160

Woman must retain her deceptive fragility of appearance, combined with indomitable will, irreducible courage, abundant health, and sound nerves.

--Mina Loy, *Writing for Their Lives*, 117

A.) Introduction

It is apparent from her early texts that Daly has read and used Nietzsche.\(^44\) She is often explicitly concerned with Becoming, the eternal recurrence, the transvaluation of values (she makes this the

\(^{44}\) She cites him seven times in *Beyond* and names her fourth chapter of that book "Transvaluation of Values: The End of Phallic Morality." In addition, her entire project in *The Church* seems to gather at least some of its fire from Nietzsche's case against the Church in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Her determination that the Church prevents the development of "conditions in which a genuinely life-fostering evolution can take place" is itself indicative of this conclusion (*Beyond*, 73).
title of one of her chapters) and overcoming.\textsuperscript{45} And besides the evidence for similar content, it is also possible to make a case for the convergence of Daly's and Nietzsche's styles--in their incline to the autobiographical, in their revaluation and reuse of scripture and Christian metaphor, in their returns to a basic set of themes. Alongside these similarities there are also important stylistic and substantive (content) differences--and these differences are often just as important in tracking Daly's use of Nietzsche as the similarities.

For example, Daly's eclectic vision ultimately cannot admit Nietzsche's entire formulation of the eternal recurrence; instead she equates the eternal dead cycles of content (the circle of eternal recurrence) with patriarchy and moves to its boundary--not swallowing it but breaking it apart. This is a departure from Nietzsche in the sense that she does not seem to use the healthy interpretation of the eternal recurrence.\textsuperscript{46} That Daly differs from Nietzsche with regard to the eternal recurrence, however, supports this thesis--she is still dealing directly with Nietzschean concepts and concerns. Thus with sufficient textual evidence, I believe these authors may be (honestly)

\textsuperscript{45} The most obvious use of a Nietzschean concept is the eternal recurrence cited in the three following passages from \textit{Beyond} : first, "What women's becoming can mean is something beyond their death and beyond their rebirth. It is not a mere cyclic return or resurrection of the sacred into profane consciousness that is at stake. Rather, women's being is something more like a new creation" (68); second, "it is an invitation to leave the patriarchal space of alienative identity--the sacred circle of eternal return--and enter new space" (168); and third, "the circle of eternal return that neutralized the implicit futurism in Greek thought and that constitutes the alleged futurism of Christian symbols can be broken if women break the chain of non-being by be-ing" (189). Taken together, these three citations seem to prove that Daly is in great contact with Nietzsche's thought--at least in \textit{Beyond}.

\textsuperscript{46} More on this below, see page 77 ff.
linked together—and linked without needing a Procrustean bed to make their texts speak the same language.

What follows is therefore an attempt to link more specifically the places where I see Nietzsche in Daly—primarily in her first two books. To do this I have broken the following two sections into four parts. First, I take a general view of their methodologies. Second, I look at the relationship between Nietzsche's concept of the overgoer and Daly's concept of the Sisterhood, paying particular attention to how Becoming works in both of these ideas. Third, I look at specific places where I see Daly using or entering into dialogue with the eternal recurrence, the will-to-power, and self-overcoming. And finally, in the fifth section of this paper, I attempt to sketch out a series of provisional conclusions, some of which reflect upon this and the previous sections and others which point to further areas of possible discussion in Daly's later works, namely *Gyn-Ecology* and *Outercourse*.

B.) Prelude—Methodologies

[W]ithout an eternalistic countermyth, [there is] . . . the triumph of shallowness, the tepid cheerfulness which slumbers while God dies.

--Bernd Magnus, 192.

The first big question to answer with regard to these two philosophers is how they arrive at truth and what truth looks like for them. By outlining this process/goal, it becomes easier to identify the areas of overlap or conflict. With the development of each person's way to truth, there comes a view of the whole which is crucial in identifying and evaluating the parts.
Basically, Daly (in the early works)\textsuperscript{47} sees the process of truth as a freeing of myths and language from their patriarchal contexts in order to get to a more fundamental meaning which is never finished speaking to us: "The nun has always been the image of the old and the new woman, bearing in an extraordinary way the burden of the eternal feminine mystique, yet at the same time anticipating symbolically and sometimes in concrete reality the emancipation which has only recently begun to take hold in the world" (\textit{The Church}, 209). Truth is thus for her a process of re-vision. It is "the casting out of the demonic\textit{Beyond}, 122). It begins with an intuition that there is More, coupled with a self-realization of one's own anger and hope and courage which helps women remove themselves from untruth--patriarchy.

Women come to truth when they realize that they, women, are the truth or the bearers of truth. Truth is dynamic, but until patriarchy has been superseded, truth is fragile and in danger of being made static. Thus, Daly sees truth as woman-centered in the Now. It is women who have to speak if truth is to prevail, if lives are to be changed, if good is to be preserved or recalled. Truth is thus in the present words of the women, the process of those words coming to presence and the unfolding of their meanings. Truth for Daly is in speaking and listening and reclaiming the perspective of women on the male-centered past. It is a choice for participation which takes us to truth and its ever-changing nature. Truth is a sacrifice of the endless

\textsuperscript{47} In her later works, I believe that this notion of truth shifts quite dramatically to come into line with her movement to a separatist position. See below, pages 95 ff.
circle of "what is" (the trend toward ever more violent ways of appropriation) for the endless spiral of "what is yet to be."  

Nietzsche is different, although he too is interested in truth as process which never ends. For Nietzsche, truth is arrived at in the breakdown of the transcendent, in the final splitting apart of the distinction between the real and false world--the perishing of the notion of opposites. In the nihilism which comes about after the true world has become a fable, Nietzsche believes that the human has no choice but to confront itself as the creature that values. It then sees how the chaos is always "present," and it learns that all is interpretation without text. This excites Nietzsche and the human who reaches this point. Now he or she wholeheartedly makes coverings--and lives in/on/through these. Truth is thus the attainment of honesty and health for Nietzsche. No longer is Plato allowed to say that "I, Plato, am the truth" (Stambaugh, 2). Rather, truth is not contained in any-thing, but rather achieved in every moment through prolonged self-examination and self-control which enables creation. Truth is something actively put forth within the context of our life as will-to-power. It is not something received, contained, or even preserved.

Like Daly's women who enter the space and time of the sisterhood, Nietzsche's truth-seekers are those who move outside the town of common structures to the boundaries. How else but through this movement to the boundary and this refusal to accept the static

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48 As such, it is a process that Daly does not see as gender specific in her early works. Rather, she concentrates on the healing of contemporary reality through the truth-telling of women: see the passage on male liberation in Beyond (169-171). In her later works, however, this view appears to change--particularly in Gyn-Ecology where I think that she directly views women as the sole possessors and spinners of truth--see the passage on the Dionysian.
49 See "How the True World Became a Fable" in the Twilight of the Idols or Stambaugh, page 2, for this entire paragraph.
givens as truth is one to experience the nihilism of the eternal recurrence (which Daly sees)? How else but by experiencing the abyss is one to swallow its bitter poison and affirm it, thereby freeing oneself to create from within it?

Nietzsche's attainment of truth is different from Daly's in that his seeker more closely identifies truth with what the seeker herself creates and less with the process as truth-transcendent or the seeker as the truth-locus or truth-container. What is discovered is what is created and vice versa. And, according to Nehamas, Nietzsche includes a certain order to the attainment of truth which Daly does not; Nietzsche is concerned with carrying "together into One what is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident" (Nehamas citing Zarathustra, 142). Daly is more explicitly concerned with hearing the truth within the "substance" of our words now and ordering it later—just opening the human into the "worlds" of truth so long denied her is enough for now.50

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50 Not "denied" in the sense that one is denied money or a home, but rather in the sense that one is denied participation in the process, denied a voice. Nietzsche might have a problem with Daly's discussion of how women are cut off from participation in the truth—especially since, when the scientists are everywhere lifting up the skirts of the sciences to see what truth looks like under there, truth looks most like the dissembling "nature" which society sees as woman. In a very strange way, then Nietzsche may in fact suppose that women are the truth. But this would come into line with the later Daly and not here.

Nietzsche would agree with Daly, however, that men have not allowed women to have an easy time of participating in the bounding or creating of truth. In fact, his passages on women could be translated as reflections or musings on "what is" without him necessarily having added a prescription for keeping practices the way there are. In other words, Nietzsche sees that women have been given the confines of their sex roles as the easiest possibilities. But look what they have produced, Nietzsche might say. Look at the struggle, between the sexes and out of the struggle what creation and art. And look at the strongest women who do seize the opportunity to create out of themselves—look at what they have revealed in their dances beyond the fallenness of the rest of society.
But because both are boundary-lovers, however, and because both have at least an implicit (for Daly) need to pull together and reopen the past which sketches the future, it is not surprising that these two come out looking very similar. Both provide an eternalistic countermyth: Zarathustra is the sublime echo of Christ while he simultaneously transvalues (goes before, behind, beyond) the "truths" that have grown around the cross and crown. And Daly's Eve becomes a symbol of the fall into freedom—she re-views the long Judeo-Christian tradition as an evolution which prefigures and leads up to her own call for sisterhood. Both use new myths which counter and to some extent incorporate the myths of the past in order to continue to promote the becoming of the human. Both realize that not to do so would be to leave themselves and humanity in the state which the madman leaves the village after telling them that God is dead: afraid, without understanding, without transition.\textsuperscript{51}

C.) The Overgoer and the Sisterhood--Getting a Sense of the Whole

\[T\]he whole of religion might yet appear as a prelude and exercise to some distant age.

--Nietzsche, \textit{Gay Science}, 240

Our passion is for that which is most intimate and most ultimate, for depth and transcendence, for recalling original wholeness.

--Mary Daly, \textit{Pure Lust}, ix

1.) Human Becoming--a way of leading up to the Human Task

Similarities in Presentation of Becoming

\textsuperscript{51} See \textit{Gay Science} aphorism 125.
Daly and Nietzsche both see as problematic the idea of continuing the Western metaphysical orientation towards Being and Becoming--its diametrical opposition of the changeless to the always changing. Both authors see that there should be a radically new way of viewing the role of Becoming and that Being should be "phased out" as something idolatrous and dogmatic. As Stambaugh says, "Western metaphysics has perhaps exhausted the possibilities of the question, dominant since Plato, of Being and Becoming. . . . The question of finality or non-finality, raised in Nietzsche's thought of eternal return, opens up a new dimension of that problem" (xvi). Nietzsche generally did not believe in preserving static categories (gender roles is another, later issue). And in a remarkably Nietzschean passage, Daly remarks that "Women have the power to open the channel so that being and becoming find their essential unity" (*Beyond*, 184). Thus, the idea of Becoming is crucial for both authors in their final pronouncements of what they see as the human (or female) task.

There is more evidence that Daly is operating from a Nietzschean view of Becoming. First of all, Daly adds the word "human" to "becoming." This emphasizes, as is perhaps obvious, that becoming--as an issue and self-willed process for consciousness--is an issue for the human.\(^{52}\) For Nietzsche, to say "human becoming" is to put ourselves within the realm of interpretation, as conscious will-to-power, as the

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\(^{52}\) Dr. Wendy Sterba asks if Daly is perhaps making a different point here by her use of the word "human." Instead of concentrating on Becoming as a human (inclusive) process, Daly would then be using the word "human" here as a political move to include women (by faking an attempt at inclusiveness) in its scope. This may well be true here, but I think that, even if by the word "human" Daly is attempting to include women, that does not take away from the point that Becoming is not an issue for plants or animals.
creatures who can structure the future. It emphasizes the freedom of the human to create out of itself--instead of the traditional concept of Becoming as being carried along by a stream.

Second, Daly often presents becoming as the process in which the future comes to bear on the present, something which directs the future and does not stand with folded hands before it. Both she and Nietzsche are resistant, therefore, to seeing becoming as the mere passing away of the moment into nothingness. There is a cosmic unfolding of God the Verb for Daly, and the unfolding is guided by the actions of women in sisterhood (Beyond, 33 ff.). Her refusal to accept the roles and ontological categories of Christianity is Nietzsche's as well. Indeed, both writers are interested in the task which honest becoming requires of them: foregoing categories in favor of the courage and hope required of the "deep" person to open up the past into the radically new.

Third, Nietzsche would be interested in Daly's presentation because she talks about human becoming as "a process of integration and transformation" (Beyond, 27). Out of the past of patriarchy and its separation-return motifs, Daly sees the growth of the depth of the female person/personality. It has given "an interior freedom" similar to Nietzsche's discussion of the swords of Damocles (Will-to-Power, note 770).

Differences in Presentation of Becoming

Alongside these three similarities, however, there are major differences. For one thing, because she draws on so many different philosophers (Tillich, Whitehead, Nietzsche, etc.), Daly is never solely
Nietzschean with regard to any concept. Even though she often seems to speak of a Nietzschean theory of Becoming, she just as frequently foregoes it in favor of complete breaks with "what was" in bursts of lion-like anger. Thus, it is important to speak of emphases rather than to try to characterize one philosopher (Daly) as an imperfect mirror of the other (Nietzsche). The following are two perspectives from which it is possible to see that Daly's view of Becoming is different from Nietzsche's.

First, it appears that Daly often presents becoming as linear. One proceeds along the "line" of the cosmic process, often not looking back. Perhaps the greatest evidence for this linearity comes in her belief that women must first lay claims to a certain amount of "being" before they can start to "become." To become, one first needs to ascertain the abyss of nonbeing in which women have been trapped—as shown by their exclusion from the history books and from the structures under which they have served. To become, one must first start to be. This interpretation of Daly explains why she uses Tillich's terms of "New Being" to describe how women's becoming will influence the social reality that moves ever closer to the sisterhood. And it explains how the task of "integration and transformation" does not mean integrating and transforming the whole past but only that of the particular woman herself.

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53 "Lion-like" is used here by me as a Nietzschean appellation to apply to Daly; I do not think she uses the image to refer to herself or to women—rather, tigers. 54 Of course it may be argued that even in her early work the image is more of a spiral than a line, but I think the statements that follow support the view that her early work has a linear tendency. 55 "A central problem is to get to recognition of our own internalization of such soul-shrinking products and move toward externalizing our own being in objective social reality. This is another way of saying that the creation of new space involves facing nothingness and discovering power of being" (Beyond, 137). See also Blake's discussion of the Limit of Contraction in the Four Zoas.
This confined integration (limited Becoming) emphasizes the second difference: Women do not look outside their own experiences or the sisterhood for material that promotes the process of Becoming. Instead, Daly presents becoming as a process of breaking "from the past and consciously creating our [women's] own history... and [expanding] our understanding of it. This separation and return happens, for example, when we establish the significance of events that historians have disregarded, such as the achievement of great women and major landmarks in the history of the oppression of women" (*Beyond*, 27). The sisterhood generates its own material and itself forms the unity needed for the Becoming of the "world."

What does this mean? Basically that Daly remains within the realm of ontology or the substantive—of Being. She talks of getting past the objective structures that prevent becoming, but she presents Becoming as a means toward healing the divided self, going back to the past matriarchal wholeness, or moving toward self-actualization or "toward psychological and social fulfillment" (*Beyond*, 21). This is not a completely Nietzschean view, and it points to the possibility that there is within her work an assumed anthropology: the human is a subject and therefore substantive. Even to talk about the woman as a divided subject who needs to enter the new space/time of sisterhood for healing is to presuppose a pre-temporal and primordial unity that one could get back to—and an eventual whole that will be reached.

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56 For Nietzsche, Becoming is tied in with eternal recurrence and its affirmation of the entirety of the past.
57 This quotation may in fact put Daly firmly within the Nietzschean use of hierarchy with regard to the overgoer and the last people. See Audre Lorde's "Open Letter to Mary Daly."
In addition, Daly's cosmic process often appears as a substantive container in which the human subject participates: "religious experience is an encounter with a power beyond the appearances of things, persons, and events. This power, seen as an ultimate ground of existence, is experienced as sacred and elicits awe" (Beyond, 81). And "becoming androgynous" often seems to be a goal which will be reached at a definite point in time rather than an unending task--at some point, we will have injected enough newness into our becoming that we can finally stop and just be.\textsuperscript{58}

A discussion of how she and Nietzsche see the concept of newness may help better define the second difference. Nietzsche sees what is new as coming out of and through tradition. In her early works, Daly sees newness as arising only indirectly out of the past--women who have been denied are now speaking and their voice is completely new. For Daly, the old is most often and mostly nothing more than a dead shell to be discarded, an evil chrysalis. Now, what is possible for women is creation \textit{ex nihilo}: "the feminist experience is a coming out of nothing into a vocational/communal participation in being" (Beyond, 37). Once the woman has become an initiate, once she has discovered others with her, she may begin to find her voice, the past being left behind or at least put at a distance.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{58} This may not be fair to Daly, however, who does in fact use words like "process" and "toward" very often in Nietzschean ways. In addition, her recanting of the words "androgynous," "god," and "homosexual" in \textit{Gyn-Ecology} enables her to appear much more Nietzschean later on. See the conclusion section below, pages 89 ff.

\textsuperscript{59} It is true that both Nietzsche and Daly see that the creator must pass through nonbeing to create (Nietzsche talks about nonbeing as nihilism of the eternal recurrence or as the potential destruction of warring, multiple drives). Daly, however, sees the process less as one in every moment and more of a single lion-like burst of courage through the violence of patriarchy to the boundary.
Summary of the Presentations of Becoming

Daly is definitely concerned with Becoming—at least partially—as a Nietzschean problem. There is evidence that she is seeing the issue in other lights as well: process thought, Thomism, ontology, et cetera. But Becoming for Daly has a real emphasis in two of Nietzsche’s three metamorphoses: in the lion, who breaks with the past in order to create; and in the child who creates out of herself. For Daly, self-creation or self-overcoming or self-transcendence is the most important emphasis. Perhaps from Nietzsche’s standpoint, she may sacrifice what is most healthy in the eternal recurrence: becoming able to will even and especially the camel over and over. But for Daly the point of emphasis is now the woman as self-propelled wheel, to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche’s third metamorphosis. Newness and depth for her are cultivated for their own sakes—and they are ever more so. What is new yesterday is not necessarily retained as new or valuable when the next form enters our view: "I would analyze this as participation in God the Verb who cannot be broken down simply into past, present, and future time, since God is form-destroying, form-creating, transforming power that makes all things new" (Beyond, 43). And thus, while not fully Nietzschean, she does very often remain consonant or in dialogue with the past, and she places a great emphasis on a process of newness which often resonates with Nietzschean tones.60

60 To a large extent her call to newness is consonant with Nietzsche who emphasizes the need to speak one’s own word—and shatter. For one thing, Daly’s talk of radical newness is a way to get beyond opposition (transvaluation). In addition, making the words her own and the thoughts her own—and making the sisterhood its own—is important to the entire process of liberation for Daly. This tendency to self-creation may excuse, for me at least, why she is so Nietzschean
Therefore, even if Daly cannot fully accept the Becoming or the coming-back of the camel, even if her discussion of Becoming appears more restricted and linear than Nietzsche's, she is still well within the Nietzschean discussion of an existential, human imperative. There is still for Daly a sense that the challenge of people (especially women) is now to move to the boundaries and to create out of their pasts an eternally new and increasingly integrated present.

2.) The Human Task

The burst of anger and creativity made possible in the presence of one's sisters is an experience of becoming whole.

--Beyond, 41.

For Daly and for Zarathustra, the position on the margin allows the affirmation, the activity which is the ascending will-to-power. A new space and new time which allows the call to go out to other women (and ultimately men) is important to Daly. But while Nietzsche may agree with her call to marginality, he cannot see her through to her communal process of transcendence. And thus it is precisely this idea (the Sisterhood) which I think that Daly, because she is apparently in direct dialogue with or refutation of Nietzsche's presentation of singular carrying into one all that is riddle and dreadful accident, offers the most to Zarathustra, a lonely person with only his own animals for comfort on the way of going over.

What is so admirable or unique in Daly's treatment is that the process of the Sisterhood (and its task of overcoming patriarchal pain) can and must be engaged in as a group. The condition for their

and yet so reluctant to be called such. More evidence for Daly's belief in newness can be found on pp 39-43 of Beyond.
becoming or their overgoing is their discovery of the community in which they live. One cannot live in the town. One goes away and calls to/ discovers each other. There is a determination that Daly has which Zarathustra forfeits in favor of making his own ascent up the mountain.

There is strength in numbers for Daly. And her idea of transcendence is therefore radically different from Nietzsche's talk of the overgoer as solitary. In a way, she asserts that there are communities of overgoing women ready to spur each other on to new galaxies, ships ready to sail together on uncharted seas because women are able to feel the most distance from the categories of patriarchal ontology.

There is certainly in Daly's early works less of Nietzsche's searing self-examination in order to answer affirmatively the demon's question about wanting to live one's life over and over into eternity. But for Daly one worries about the eternal recurrence only within patriarchy and its tendency to return women to mutilating roles. Once women are in their own space and on their own mountains, creativity can bubble forth. Thus, the outcomes appear similar: both she and Nietzsche want to forego the fallen nature of the world in order to make poetry out of their lives.

By presenting the sisterhood, Daly presents the possibility of unending transformation (and poetic creation). In this sense, Daly sees immediate and prolonged liberation. Nietzsche's self-imposed task is much more difficult and, Daly may observe, perhaps impossible. Her life is more liveable, one might say; it emphasizes more of a united "will to change that externalizes itself in continually unfolding acts, so that the insight grows and the action becomes more meaningful"
(Beyond, 50). Sisterhood is also honest—Nietzsche, particularly in the Gay Science, would see much he would like in Daly’s talk about the discovery versus the creation of the sisterhood, the shared voyage (Beyond, 159).

D.) Nietzsche: Self-Overcoming, Eternal Recurrence, Will-to-Power61

Self-Overcoming

In her discussion of the sisterhood, Daly uses a concept of overcoming and self-overcoming which may not look immediately like the way Nietzsche uses these terms. Her freedom to create and the ability to forget may not quite be like the child of Nietzsche’s three metamorphoses. But a closer look is necessary.

Certainly, in line with Aquinas and Whitehead, she would rather say "self-transcendence" than self-overcoming. After all, she is concerned with "[women’s] own process" as it takes place within a cosmic unfolding (Beyond, 152). But even though women’s process

61 Regarding the will-to-power two points need to be made initially: Daly’s endless unfolding of the cosmic process of the Verb seems to have something in common with the discussion of Nietzsche’s endless will-to-power that ever expands outward, to More. And Nietzsche would fault Daly in her analysis of the sisterhood because it seems to offer no further vision—after a move to the boundary, Daly seems to imply the eventual attainment of utopia and the leaving-behind of the will-to-power as domination and hatred. We are will-to-power and nothing else, Nietzsche would say. Thus, to even consider the idea that we will not eternally return to domination—or to preclude that domination even lies within every attempt to get to the boundary or the end of domination—is to fail to see our own will-to-power clearly enough. In her hope or attempt to overcome patriarchy (and also Nietzsche) is a conceptual flaw—to do so would mean to create a void in the past which we cannot create even if we want to. Relatively speaking, however, I think she changes her perspective in her later works and talks of coming back to mazes of the past in order continually to regain strength to spiral out (see Outercourse).
seems to occur within a substantive framework of God the Verb, it often appears quite similar to Nietzsche's self-overcoming.\footnote{62} How?

First, she sees self-transcendence in terms of struggle and, to some extent, as a process of coming to stand apart (at least temporarily) from men or from the patriarchal modes of oppression. At some point, she has realized that one cannot feed a corpse— and she has realized that she must fish off mountain tops with a golden line.\footnote{63} There is in Daly's works a great realization of the power of forgetting in order to overcome the past and in order to reach (as self-propelled) beyond to More.\footnote{64}

As regards struggle specifically (or the struggle for self-transcendence) Daly advocates an overturning of the vicious and silencing powers that be, "a kind of exorcism that essentially must be done by women" \textit{(Beyond}, 10). But she does not see this as an end of the process of liberation, rather a part of a larger process of human becoming.

This would be a point of agreement with Nietzsche's self-overcoming. Struggle is never something he is willing to part with. His disgust with traditional or first-wave feminists would be that they wanted to level the "potential" of the human by getting rid of all hierarchical distinctions. Get rid of distinctions and you get rid of "external" or interpersonal struggle. Get rid of that and you get rid of

\footnote{62} There are sentences in Daly like the following: "we are breaking the dam of sex stereotyping" \textit{(Beyond}, 158). And images such as these seem to give at least an implicit understanding that women's strength to go over has come out of the going under or the past.

\footnote{63} The corpse and the fishing line are Nietzsche's images in \textit{Zarathustra}. See Zarathustra's Prologue section 8.

\footnote{64} This reach to More also points to a consonance of Daly's thought with the will-to-power.
the opportunity for the human to feel dissatisfied, to desire to struggle against herself.\footnote{See Beyond Good and Evil aphorism 238.}

First wave feminists wanted to posit radical equality and then level the men's potential to let in the women. Daly does not focus on the levelling aspect; she sees in that the preservation of tokenism. She does require a certain amount of empowerment for the women of the world, but she is unwilling to stop there.\footnote{"It is absurd for men to protest indignantly when women speak of wresting back our own stolen power and being" (Beyond, 173).} Women seek their own space and time in which to create--they are not inherently equal but celebrated in their differences. Her theory on struggle for self-transcendence appears to use a Nietzschean outlook:

> Let us not contend in a direct fight--and that is what all reproaching, punishing, and attempts to improve others amount to. Let us rather raise ourselves that much higher. Let us color our own example ever more brilliantly. Let our brilliance make them look dark. No, let us not become darker ourselves on their account, like all those who punish others and feel dissatisfied. Let us look away.

*(Gay Science, 254)*

In her own words, Daly warns against the downfall for the women's movement "when the struggle against oppression becomes an end in itself, the focal point of all meaning" *(Beyond, 25).*\footnote{Dr. Elaine Martin wonders if Daly really means this or whether, if she does mean that focusing on struggle is a detrimental practice, she ever escapes it. Daly's use of exorcism throughout her corpus suggests the possibility that she does not, that in fact she is always within a framework of dialectical negation.}

In addition to talking about a similar concept to Nietzsche's self-overcoming in her use of self-transcendence, Daly also worries, as does Nietzsche, about the human's eventual lack of freedom for becoming or overcoming. Men and women have given themselves mutilating roles,
Daly maintains; they do not see themselves either in or as process. And they may never be able to do so---unless they come face to face with the nihilism, the non-being, inherent in their lives: "We have been locked in this Eden of his far too long. If we stay much longer, life will depart from this planet. . . . The freedom-becoming-survival of our species will require a continual, communal striving in being" (Beyond, 198). Daly sees women as having the ability now to face non-being and transform their inherited and enforced essentialism into becoming androgynous.68 For her, men are not yet able to gain the necessary perspective. They are too busy "being." Nietzsche would mostly agree, I think, although he would shy away from making gender distinctions as regards who causes and who becomes the last people.69

For Nietzsche, the eternal possibility of the last people is something which Zarathustra must swallow as his own possibility in every moment. Both genders experience/comprise the last people because both essentialize, but their essentialism is ultimately affirmable for Nietzsche. Why? Without the human's ability to essentialize, or to divide the "world" into essences of good/evil, man/woman, and love/hate, Zarathustra realizes that his ability to

68 By "essentialism" I mean the tendency to see a male essence or a female essence and to see that as unquestionable and absolute. Daly's use of "androgyny" is a way to get past that initially, but I think it is ineffective. Androgyny seems to imply that the two genders (essesces) are kept and fused--she would thus remain linguistically tied to the distinctions she is trying to get away from. She eventually recants this term in Gyn-Ecology and clings more to the idea that the medium is the message. She would, at least in her later work, probably affirm the quotation from Mina Loy at the beginning of this section. There is something useful in essences for her, and what is useful is not their absolute, unchanging reality but the possibility for creation out of them.

69 Dr. Wendy Sterba suggests this is true because there is no reason to believe that Nietzsche incorporates women into his concepts of either the overgoer or the last people. However, I think that from his biography and from aphorism 75 of Gay Science and the end of aphorism 239 of Beyond Good and Evil suggest the possibility of its truth for reasons which suggest more of a gender sensitivity or awareness on his part.
become would not have the depth and the potential which it now has.

Essentialism is the basis of nihilism, but its tools are also the tools for human overcoming and human beauty—for becoming a dancing star. Only out of an imposed and dis-covered identity is it possible to see oneself as trying to Become. Only the creation of memory or a direction (that I am a man or a woman) allows for the will to break its tablets and change into the child of forgetting. The possibility and recurrence of essentialism must thus be confronted and affirmed in every moment in order to allow for human becoming.

Again to her credit, Daly confronts essentialism. She calls out to women to prevent their becoming the last people, clinging for warmth to various men. What she perhaps does not do enough for Nietzsche, however, is affirm the very necessity of the possibility and recurrence of the last people—and the gender roles—for the process of human becoming. Where would you be without the mountains of essentialism, Nietzsche would ask. You could not become now if it were not for patriarchy to make you rigid you and the possibility/reality of the "last women" who do not realize becoming's necessity. Where do you think you got your memory and your promise which you are using to bear your own history and become your own person?

Moreover, Nietzsche would point out to Daly that self-overcoming requires the honest affirmation of the eternal recurrence. And that self-overcoming therefore requires the eternal swallowing and transformation of the struggle between men and women, masculine and feminine models.\textsuperscript{70} For Nietzsche, overcoming is conditioned by his concept that the future is always already structured by the models of

\textsuperscript{70} For a contrast in Daly's view see pp. 69-97 of Beyond.
the past—not predetermined in all of its details, but sketched and bounded.\textsuperscript{71}

The Eternal Recurrence

"My method contains no built-in assumption that we should direct our efforts toward salvaging anything from the patriarchal past" \textit{(Beyond}, 85)--from this perspective, then, it seems that Daly cannot see Nietzsche's healthy aspect of the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche would talk neither of salvaging or destroying the past, as though we had some choice in that matter. Eternal recurrence is not for him a plan to save as much as possible or to remove surgically what one cannot tolerate. It is ultimately more than even escaping from the cycles one cannot bear.

For Daly, however, the endless circles of dead content—the continual separation from and return to the oppression of patriarchal structures—and their nihilism is the only "thought" of the eternal recurrence. Moreover, it has been the only reality. To her, the cyclic effect of patriarchy has been "the chain that has drained us [which] will be broken when women draw back our own life force" \textit{(Beyond}, 177). Patriarchy's eternal recurrence has broken women; it has, through its manifestations in capitalism, created false demands and false needs in women--it has separated them from each other. Return to the Same is the greatest weight for Daly.

\textsuperscript{71} An area that I did not have time to look at but which would benefit from further in-sight is the mutual references to castration by Nietzsche and Daly. Her attempt to see sexism as something which is able to be fully superseded comes out in her use of this metaphor, I think.
To leap forward into meaning, then, Daly wants to forget the necessity of the past recurring or opening up into the future.\textsuperscript{72} Now that women are starting to become, they are able--at this point in history--to reinvent the wheel. Moreover, they are able to break the wheel and move outward, without looking back, as a self-propelled wheel--this moment of liberation for Daly will free women from all of their ressentiment and their horror of their "it was."

Feminism, for Daly, is the "final cause." It is not a telos or that goal for which all things strive (not a stasis). It is primarily the final movement, the stamping of becoming with the character of being. But, unfortunately, Daly's view of feminism as final cause also has undertones of stasis which perhaps she cannot escape.

True, once all people have joined with the women who are becoming the bearers of a healed and new history, it will become obvious that "the final cause is the beginning, not the end, of becoming" (\textit{Beyond}, 190). At the same time, however, all that is dead will have faded from view: "it was once and for all. We don't need to walk out of churches over and over again" (\textit{Beyond}, 144). We will renew ourselves in the cosmic covenant of androgynous being, where we will eventually forget our violent past and where symbols will have matured enough for the medium and the message to merge without discrepancy: the Christs in this new time and space will be neither man nor woman, neither slave nor free. Until that time Daly accedes a bit to the past; she offers analogues, respun myths but always with the understanding that they are useful only "at times when there is nothing better we can do in the effort to say the really new" (\textit{Beyond}, 167).

\textsuperscript{72} "Far from being a "return" to the past, it implies a qualitative leap toward psychic androgyney" (\textit{Beyond}, 97).
Through the sisterhood, women will come to be "citizens of the future, where [they] are already finding it possible to know a new past" (Beyond, 193). Women will reconfigure the past, strip away what they cannot carry and lift high the banners of our forgotten loves: Joan of Arc, Stanton, Woolf, matriarchy. And thus Daly believes that women will finally regain (finally own) their own lives and become themselves.

To Nietzsche, this understanding is at least partially difficult to swallow: if these lives were not our own before, how can we claim them as separate now? Are they not equally the lives of our mothers and fathers? What makes us certain that we can separate the now from the necessity of an eternity of what was? What prevents the future from being a series of accidents if we do not affirm the eternal recurrence of the Same? And if the future becomes a series of accidents for us, what is left of human becoming?

But while Daly often finds it difficult to imagine the necessity of coming back to this same eagle, spider, and moonlight of the patriarchal past and while her talk of radical newness outlines a complete break, there is still within her presentation a complementarity with the healthy thought/response of Nietzsche.\(^7\)

Daly is not finished with the past. She returns to Tillich and Nietzsche and Whitehead. She does her own genealogy.\(^7\) Her break with the past, at least in these two books, is not complete; she knows

\(^7\) Later in *Gyn-Ecology* Daly speaks about reweaving the tapestry of the past, taking the threads out and reweaving all of them into a new design. This image is Nietzschean--none of the threads are destroyed--and it preserves the past as never completed, as continually pregnant with meaning and demanding more and more reordering as the threads grow longer.

\(^7\) "Genealogy" is used here as a Nietzschean term. It refers to the way in which he interprets/structures/observes the root system or the interconnectedness of the entirety past which leads to this moment. It is a term intimately bound with *amor fati* and the seeing of one soil and one air out of which we put forth fruit.
what she owes and to whom. In very concrete ways (citations), she
does not try to kill off what has been so oppressive of women, but she
works to use it and thus to allow it to perish in order to come again
with all the weight of the experience of women within its qualitative
newness.

A more specific parallel with Nietzsche with regard to the eternal
recurrence comes in her use of speech and writing as a means to affirm
the past and the Same. Daly, in her own "PostChristian Feminist
Introduction," in her plays with autobiography leading up to
Outercourse and in her struggles with the myths of patriarchy (what to
save, what to let perish) keeps writing as the healthy process of the
eternal return. She keeps trying to do the task of the overgoer, to
prove and re-prove continually that all has come out of one soil and
one country and one air. She is continually re-forming herself, always
aware of "the need to break out of the iron mask of language forms
that are strangling us" (Beyond, 167).

She craves the opportunity to
speak her word--and shatter the boundaries of patriarchy, letting all of
its imprisoned inhabitants run free on the paths of their hearts.

And this process of continually refashioning the poetry of our
lives is important to Daly, perhaps central to her method. She lauds the
sister who prescribes "the creation of an event...not to be repeated,
but the story of which could be told repeatedly" (Beyond, 145). For
Daly, poetry thus becomes the ultimate in momentous and momentary
acts. In the community of women which speaks its own words Daly
sees the greatest possibility to push the boundaries of language--and

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75 See also Beyond, page 145: "a feminist liturgy would change nothing, for...
the form was a dead shell...It was the form that counted, no matter what the
content."
thus to renew continually the potential for affirmation. As more is spoken, more is revealed—and more joy is created.\textsuperscript{76}

Thus, while she rejects a large part of the past, because of the poetic nature and prescriptions of her work, it is still possible to say that Daly retains the possibility of Zarathustra. The thought of the feminist consciousness is similar to the thought of the eternal recurrence: it is first an unbearable weight and then a joyous transformation. It is likewise a thought which wills something higher than a reconciliation with the past. It seeks to transform it.

Ultimately, this transformation comes to Daly as the new time/new space of the sisterhood as a way to break out of the nihilistic part of the ER which comes again and again—"the circle" of patriarchal separation and return. She sees that it allows for women to be angry, to affirm an anger that will rise toward creativity:

> When this happens, the past is changed, that is, its significance for us is changed. \textit{Then the past is no longer static}; it too is on the boundary. . . . I would analyze this as participation in God the Verb who cannot be broken down simply into past, present, and future time, since God is form-destroying, form-creating, transforming power that makes all things new.\textit{(Beyond, 43, my emphasis)}

And while Nietzsche would not agree with this talk of God nor with her definition of new space and time as equally substantive (container-like), he would see her struggle with the character of the past as valiant and honest to a great extent—an Athena-like labor of transvaluation.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{76} Poetry is thus the process of truth; new ways of communicating from sister to sister help the Sisterhood dis-cover or create more healthy or joyous meaning. Without poetry, truth stands still and is seen as something which one either comes within or from which one remains exiled.

\textsuperscript{77} "See
The Will-to-Power--Its Manifestation in the Transvaluation of Values

Nietzsche, the prophet whose prophecy was short-circuited by his own misogyny, wanted to transvaluate Judeo-Christian morality, but in fact it is women who will confront patriarchal morality as patriarchal.

---Beyond, 102.

Transvaluation, for Nietzsche, begins as a conceptual or descriptive tool that gives evidence of a structural "component" in the history of the human. It traces the root of the human plants. As such, it can provide evidence for the one soil, one country, one air of the will-to-power in the history of human projections. What follows is evidence for the character of the transvaluation of values as a structural component: In the Genealogy of Morals, the nobles, immediately acting upon impulse or instinct, are transvalued by those with ressentiment. How? Not everyone can eat, build, and kill "at will." Thus, there arises another class of people who, with the help of nature's development of memory, turn inward the experience of and reaction to suffered cruelty.

These weaker souls develop the slow poison of cunning and delay (or disguise) of the impulse to disperse their strength immediately. They develop psychological "skills," creating the guilt which ripens in the religions of Judaism and Christianity. Ultimately, the slave class or the priestly class transvalue what is noble and life-affirming (the activity of the will) into what is life-denying (reaction, ascesis, self-denial).

That no matter what you have done
I am still here.
And it has made me dangerous, and wise" (Daly citing Gail Murray, Beyond, 98).
This transvaluation effected by the slave class—viewed either as historical "fact" or Nietzsche's structural interpretation—accomplishes the turning on its head of the noble values. It disguises all the tendency of the human as will-to-power within what is now "holy" or democratic: cruelty, for example, becomes pity for one's neighbor. And thus there is in this transvaluation a certain degree of levelling for Nietzsche. By accomplishing their transvaluation, the slaves level the creative expression of the human and try to keep everyone at the same, low, comfortable point.

As a goal, then, the transvaluation of values is similar for Nietzsche to itself as a structural concept or historical givenness. There is to be another transvaluation of values, another calling into question of why we value what we do, a returning to what affirms life and the will-to-power. Because what is valued is now what is reactive or what denies life, Nietzsche favors a final leap beyond the created duality of good and evil into a state which is reminiscent of the activity of the nobility. His will be the final transvaluation of values, but not final in the sense of merely doing the exact opposite of what was done by the slave class. Rather, Nietzsche's final transvaluation of values is final in the sense that, if accomplished, the human moves to a different place or plane from which to view values and the process of valuation.

Certainly, one component of the Nietzschean goal is that actions previously labelled "evil" are once again open for human practice. But Nietzsche is not in this sense coming full circle; he is not simply coming back to the nobility who did not need or could not bear law, who had no conscience. Instead, Nietzsche gives a new and eminently personal hierarchy and a new method of evaluation: what is healthy or life-
affirming and what is unhealthy or life-denying. This yardstick (combined with his hatred of a single set of laws for all people and his advocation of perspectivism) allows people to see that they, as human, are the creature that values, and that their task is to act in whichever way that they can best dance out of one soil and air.\textsuperscript{78}

There is no longer to be a single set of tablets telling people what way to dance or what swords not to dance under. Rather, without denying or trying to destroy what has happened/come to presence along the way, Nietzsche requires that they take the mode of valuation out of the hands of the society and into the hands of the soul. Thus, Nietzsche keeps the acquired depth of the psyche, the ability of the human to make promises and structure (sketch) the future. Thus he affirms that the slave (the camel) needed to exist in order to say a final "yes" to the life-affirming values. In short, the final transvaluation of values will be a re-valuing (valuing again) of the activity of the nobility, but a this will be a revaluation which remains true to the growth of the human soul.

That Daly sees something of the twofold nature of the transvaluation of values is evident in her texts. Her first book is an attempt to chronicle the (masked) will-to-power of the Catholic Church as it has gained domination over millions of women and to categorize the effects of Christianity as harmful to the human. Human Becoming has halted, Daly says, because women have been moved and removed

\textsuperscript{78} Contrary to many interpretations of Nietzsche, transvaluation will not be relativism or permission for all people to do all things. Certainly there will be nothing forbidden in itself--the movement beyond dualistic value labels of good and evil affirms this. But the task of transvaluation is the task of becoming hard with oneself, knowing which impulses to forego and which to channel in the function of life. The battlefield of the "new" nobility is primarily in the province of the soul.
by the Father and Son into the realm of nonbeing: "women want to speak, but remain silent. The desire for action is by and large reduced to acting vicariously through men" (Beyond, 48). Basically, Daly observes, women have victimized themselves when situated within a structure of victimization.

Of course, using almost the same words and observations, it is possible to conclude that Daly either does not fully understand or fully utilize Nietzsche's development of transvaluation as a structural characteristic. If she did, she would have to admit the apparent similarity between the women's movement and the slaves mentioned above: both use ressentiment. Daly's genealogy, one could then say, is that of a woman who reacts to the cruelty of a more noble, more active group--or institution.

There is something flawed in this argument, however. If it were true that Daly is only evincing a more decisive, complicated and unconscious posture of ressentiment, she would not prescribe a motion outward, a process of self-transcendence. She would not liberate women to action, to More and from what has been forbidden by the cultivation of false opposites or false sex roles. She could not oppose God the Verb to the mutilating patriarchal God; she could not inspire women to become "acting subjects in history" (Beyond, 34, my emphasis).

In addition, to say that Daly operates primarily out of ressentiment one would have to come up with evidence that she argues primarily for the goal of democratic equality or a levelling the potential and creativity of men. In fact, she does not speak in these terms. Her talk of male liberation suggests that Daly seeks less to level
than to expand the creative potential of humanity (*Beyond*, 169). And Audre Lorde and Mary Jo Weaver both identify in Daly a tendency to retain hierarchical structures or perspectives: "Daly exhibits some peculiarly Roman Catholic dynamics: her later work, especially, is marked by dogmatic authoritarianism. . . [and] an elitist understanding of the intellectual life" (*Weaver*, 170-171). For Daly, it seems that there are fembots (patriarchally-identified females) and there are women.\(^{79}\)

Thus, Daly is not primarily in a posture of reaction; nor is she competing for equal rights within male space. One recognizes that this is true when one looks at her use/creation of language. Daly’s wordplay, alliteration, and renamings are themselves a primary part of her attempt at transvaluation as goal. Particularly in her later works, this revaluation and recreation of language helps her project to draw quite close to Nietzsche’s; her language allows her transvaluation to be always more than simple reversal or negation. Thus, instead of requiring a sex-change operation on God in *Beyond*, she leaves anthropomorphic terms behind in favor of seeing God as process. And thus she is proclaiming, in her own words, transvaluation as a goal—as

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\(^{79}\) Certainly, however, there is a tension in Daly’s works against certain kinds of hierarchy, a tension which sometimes resembles a posture of ressentiment. For her there is a "fullness of human being that is lost in sexual hierarchy" (*Beyond*, 51). And her campaign against this could quite easily be construed as a levelling of the expansion of the male. Again, however, I do not think that it is effective to make an all-or-nothing claim. Nietzsche, for example, does not always support hierarchy as an absolute. Indeed, there are several places where he throws out the obviously hierarchical ideal of romance in favor of a more egalitarian friendship between the sexes (*Gay Science*, aphorism 14). Thus, to oppose him as completely hierarchical to Daly as completely egalitarian is to do both an injustice.
a time for women to speak their own (won, now) words and to act out of their own spontaneity and impulses.\textsuperscript{80}

In \textit{The Church} and \textit{Beyond}, Daly begins her development of the idea of transvaluation by advocating the springing free of myths from their patriarchal contexts in order to let their meaning be free for the sacred and endless unfolding of the Cosmic Verb: "It is only female pride and self-affirmation that can release the memory of Jesus from its destructive uses and can free freedom to be contagious" (\textit{Beyond}, 96). She advocates the seizing of the power to name, to re-name, to expose why the values of patriarchy were/are valued (a Nietzschean project).

In the Church's relegation of the whore-virgin duality to women, Daly sees the repression of male fears of impotence and primordial, acquired, or created guilt which does not allow the male to feel good about his will-to-power as expansion. If the woman is seen as the site of all excess and she is treated as such, the male becomes free (temporarily) to dominate. In the "virtues" of humility and prudence, Daly sees subjugation and the insertion of a domesticated, tame "soul" into half the population. Out of this comes the feminine ideal--the idealization of some of the qualities imposed upon the oppressed--and feats of rationalization: women are not present in hierarchy though they embody the ideal (e.g., Mary).

These thoughts are not simply the thoughts of a slave, of one who is consumed by \textit{ressentiment}. Daly's vision goes beyond bringing the

\textsuperscript{80} While perhaps fledgling in \textit{Beyond God the Father}, Daly's project grows in later works: "Daly's adamant rejection of androgyny leads her precisely to where Friedrich Nietzsche's transvaluation of values led him: to a redefinition of what is good and what is bad, counter to prevailing notions of good and bad" (Tong, 105).
noble down to her level. She wants to make a qualitative leap beyond the male into new space and new time. She wants to leap beyond into activity and creation. She has certainly seized power, but hers is not a patriarchal seizure: "those who have been socialized most profoundly to live out the passive ethic are renouncing it and starting to affirm a style of human existence that has existential courage as its dominant motif" (*Beyond*, 104).

But while she attempts to go beyond patriarchy, has she also gone beyond Nietzsche? Is hers a "transvaluation of values undreamed of by Nietzsche?" (*Beyond*, 97) Rosemarie Tong thinks so:

> What is most impressive about *Pure Lust* is that in it, Daly surpasses whatever Nietzsche managed to accomplish in his transvaluation of values. Daly not only gives new prescriptive [sic], or evaluative, meanings to terms; she gives them new descriptive [sic] meanings at the same time. (Tong, 108)

But I disagree. First of all, I am not sure what Tong means here. But if she means that Daly makes her transvaluation of patriarchal values (and patriarchal language) more concrete, then perhaps Tong is right. Nietzsche refuses to be too concrete, however, because he does not want to prescribe one way for all people. He certainly wants to prioritize activity or affirmation over denial or passivity, but Nietzsche's transvaluation is the final one precisely because he prescribes so little.

And, even if Tong points to the fact that Daly (in telling women to rejoice and be strong in the activity which has earned them patriarchal disapproval) allows witches to claim themselves as such and to give new action and meaning to their witch-ness, this does not prove that Daly has therefore gone beyond Nietzsche. Through her own word-play
and definite prescriptions, Daly may have inadvertently limited—like Nietzsche through an elitist/misogynistic tone or style—the number and the expression of those who can follow her.

And, even given her project is more concrete and therefore beyond Nietzsche, Daly is still very Nietzschean in regard to content. When Daly decides, after meditating on the words’ more ancient or primary meanings, to emphasize that “lusty” or “wild” women really can rejoice in being so-called, she has done a more concrete project but one that remains Nietzschean. To her credit, Daly has certainly taken the values of patriarchy and transvalued them. She has not “reversed” women and made them men; nor has she levelled the sexual differences that have rooted themselves in the human psyche. Rather, she has taken into account the past and refused to let it go. She has taken the sexual roles which men have “created” or constructed or constricted through patriarchy, accepted their eternity, and demanded that women take the labels ascribed to them and transvalue (not escape) these words back into active verbs.81 But what purpose does it serve to say Daly has gone beyond Nietzsche?

Women can recall the action they are capable through the medium of the acquired strength they have achieved in the centuries of their one-down status. At once, then, Daly’s transvaluation points to a more noble past (the time of matriarchies and real witches) and to the reality of the present, an action remarkably similar to Nietzsche’s treatment of the nobility.

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81 In Tong’s own words: “The term lust is a case in point... Lust, then, is evil, but only because we live in a patriarchy with its slave morality, which resects women. Lust has other, nonpatriarchal, good meanings such as ‘vigor,’ ‘fertility,’ ‘craving,’ ‘eagerness,’ and ‘enthusiasm’” (108).
Aside from Tong's argument, however, it is still doubtful that one could construe Daly as having gone beyond Nietzsche with regard to the transvaluation of values. Nietzsche would point out Daly's own refusal or inability to see all of her own power-plays. Her occasional but categorical refusal of domination is itself an attempt at domination, Nietzsche would say. And to the extent that she still cannot affirm the whole of the (healthy) eternal recurrence, he would probably not agree that Daly had experienced the height of the will-to-power necessary for the transvaluation. Without Zarathustra's brightness she could not have the strength to perform the final transvaluation.82

If we asked Daly, however, she would likely respond as she does in *Beyond*: Nietzsche's transvaluation only rejects the Church and does not get at the structures of male oppression, thereby only partially getting beyond good and evil.83 But Nietzsche talks primarily about the highest goal being one of self-domination in order to leave it behind for the freedom to create. And he makes a qualitative leap, like Benedict, to put the battlefield on the grounds of the soul. Because Nietzsche

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82 Tong helps to see how Daly has gone beyond Nietzsche in the sense of having gone outside of his philosophy (and not beyond in the sense of having superseded): "Nietzsche hoped the advent of the *übermenschen* (overman) would unleash the potential in people for greatness. Similarly, Daly hopes the Elemental Women will inspire their sisters to release themselves from the pots and plastic molds that block their passions. Once woman's passions are released, no patriarchal morality will be able to restrain her volcanic and tidal forces" (109). Thus, while this may be evidence that Daly considers hers to be a final transvaluation, I think Tong demonstrates how Daly is really still hopes for the possibility of women's escape from patriarchy--a hope which suggests an inability to swallow the whole of the eternal recurrence.

83 It would seem, however, that this argument presupposes that Nietzsche is not using the terms "man" and "woman" in a metaphorical way. I think it is easier to see Nietzsche's aphorisms about pregnancy and masculinity/femininity as referring to things other than contemporary social situations. With Daly, the medium (the genitalia) is unquestionably the message. And thus for her to critique Nietzsche as she does may be unwarranted. At worst, Nietzsche uses the sexual differences much as Daly does in her later works. This entire discussion, of course, gets at the whole issue of Nietzsche's misogyny which I cannot address, so I leave this insight here in its germane form.
does not address the patriarchal values within his society, then, I do not think that means that Daly has gone beyond him. It seems to me a final transvaluation would include her project.84

Thus, the juxtaposition of these two philosophers with regard to their treatment of the transvaluation of values evinces more similarity than difference between them. Both Nietzsche and Daly look at Christian mythology as something which keeps the experience of chaos falsely at bay: it sets up its opposite values and then re-impresses them regularly upon the minds and hearts of its members. Daly, in particular, sees the insistence on ritual as needing to keep the tradition of male dominance memorable as truth: "the women's revolution as Antichurch represents this terror of chaos and says that it will no longer be kept at bay" (Beyond, 142). Both also see the transvaluation of values primarily as a return to and an embrace of chaos: I value because I must value in order to create; I value only after I have come to the edge of the abyss and almost suffered complete annihilation. Daly may be more concrete than Nietzsche with regard to her discussion of patriarchy and her use of specific words to provide a model for what she wants women to accomplish, but the prescription from both Daly and Nietzsche is that it is far better to create than to perish.

84 Yet it is true--Nietzsche is not putting the scepter in the hands of the oppressed. He is not concerned about movements; he does not care if there is ultimately a society of artists or a handful. This is where Daly diverges from him; hers is a communal transvaluation. Nietzsche's concentration, however, is on the assuredness of at least one dancing star surviving to dance itself into eternity. And in order for this to happen, the human must get beyond good and evil and reclaim the freedom to act. It might be possible, however, to argue that Nietzsche, when pushed, would admit that the transvaluation of values would ultimately have to become communal--if the community's power to level overcoming grew too strong.
Summary

The final transvaluation of values in Nietzsche's work can be seen as synthesizing the eternal recurrence, self-overcoming, and the will-to-power. It requires overcoming oneself and affirming the eternal recurrence. And, at least from one perspective, the final transvaluation is the height of the will-to-power. Without taking too much away from the remaining section, then, I offer a few summary comments.

For both philosophers, there can be no belief in opposite values in order to create a world under our feet. For, though opposites may help us avoid the prospect of facing the nihilism of the eternal recurrence, they also "are open to seductive advances, to offers of cooptation, as radical women know. . . . we have to reach toward something beyond opposition" (Beyond, 154). Daly is not just forsaking anti-sexuality for "free love" or patriarchy for the amazon warriors. She is not merely claiming patriarchy's "evil" as her "good."85 The world she offers for women's feet is one made of their own creation and language. It is close to Nietzsche's realization that all is interpretation and no text--her transvaluation is a reclamation of the right and the power to value (actively) what she needs to value in order to continue to unfold.

Perhaps Nietzsche sees the task of transvaluation as more momentary and individual: the chaos always returns, and we each always return to the moment as the possibility of the overgoer. But I think he also sees it as an historical event. Out of the past, we are preparing now (as race) for the final transvaluation, the ultimate appearance of the salvific overgoer, one who we are not but in whom

85 Daly still believes that, even after the formation of sisterhood, there is a problem of evil as substantive and thus does not leap as fully beyond the opposite values as Nietzsche does.
we believe and whom we try to become. And although Daly often sees the transvaluation as a communal event similar to women's walking out of a church--in a fragment of the eternal time, not to be repeated, she also sees how the journey is a long one. For her, transvaluation comes about when the only standards kept are what fosters health (or women's becoming) versus what fosters disease (women's mutilation). And while perhaps each uses different definitions of what is healthy or life-affirming, Daly and Nietzsche seem united here at least in method.
V. A Conclusion of Healthy Friendship—Brother and Sister

We were friends and have become estranged. But this was our right, and we do not want to conceal and obscure it from ourselves as if we had reason to feel ashamed. We are two ships each of which has its goal and course; our paths may cross and we may celebrate a feast together, as we did—and then the good ships rested so quietly in one harbor and one sunshine that it may have looked as if they had reached their goal and as if they had one goal. But then the almighty force of our tasks drove us apart again into different seas and sunny zones, and perhaps we shall never see each other again; perhaps we shall meet again but fail to recognize each other: our exposure to different seas and suns has changed us. That we have to become estranged is the law above us; by the same token we should also become more venerable for each other—and the memory of our former friendship more sacred. There is probably a tremendous but invisible stellar orbit in which our very different ways and goals may be included as small parts of this path; let us rise up to this thought. . . . Let us then believe in our star friendship even if we should be compelled to be earth enemies.


I hope for the arrival also of the sisters of Plato, of Aristotle, of Kant, of Nietzsche: sisters who will not merely "equal" them, but do something different, something immeasurably more. I dream of these, my sisters, as drawing from the vision of our past and future foremothers, waking the human species to glimpse still further stars.

--Daly, *The Church*, 51.

A.) What Has Been Said

In the previous section, I have tried to show that Daly, in her two earliest books, deals specifically if not directly with the Nietzschean ideas of Becoming, eternal recurrence, will-to-power, self-overcoming, and the transvaluation of values. The Sisterhood and the community of
boundary-dwellers beg for comparison with Zarathustra; self-transcendence, with self-overcoming; and women's movement outward, with the will-to-power. Her use of "androgyny" and "human becoming" and "God the Verb" also suggests an author who is weighing the Nietzschean move beyond essentialism or metaphysics with her Thomistic and Whiteheadian influences. And her use of healthy/unhealthy distinctions--in her talk of disease, surgery, and exorcism of strangling patriarchal myths--helps to recall Nietzsche's life-affirming goals.

In addition to these similarities in content, it is possible to see her unique contributions--the communal action of the Sisterhood--as direct responses to the parts of Nietzsche which are more difficult to reconcile with a feminist project. Solitary (secluded) poetry means little to Daly. But her emphasis on the radically new and on the process of creation provides fruitful comparison with the second and third metamorphoses of Nietzsche. And one does see the humps of the camel in the background of Daly's work--in her citations and footnotes.

But what does all this prove? First, it does not prove that she is first and foremost a Nietzschean. Really, this thesis only outlines areas of possible parallelism or borrowing. Whether Daly had Nietzsche in mind for all or most of her early work would be impossible to tell without asking her. And whether she understood Nietzsche in the ways I have described is also suspect. But consonance with authorial intent is not a necessary condition for what I set out to do.

Throughout the previous two sections, I looked at Daly from a Nietzschean optic. There is always the danger that I saw too much of what I wanted to see. But I think I stayed fairly true to her texts,
regardless of whether or not she intended to encapsulate Nietzsche within them in the manners I described. That it is possible to make a case for Nietzsche in Daly is enough.

B.) What Remains to be Said With Regard to Early Daly

Before making provisional conclusions as to how a deliberate and definite use of Nietzsche is apparent in Daly's later works, however, I need to present several observations concerning both philosophers' styles. First, as regards their mutual plays with autobiography, Daly's preface and "PostChristian Feminist Introduction" are a lot like Ecce Homo. In her introduction, she is coming to terms with her past, her work, her limitations. In effect, her self-conscious writing is an attempt to do the task of the overgoer as Nehamas describes Nietzsche's work:

One way, then, to become one's own thing, one's own character, what one is, is, after having written all these other books, to write Ecce Homo [Outercourse] and even to give it the subtitle "How One Becomes What One is" ["The Be-Dazzling Voyage."] It is to write this self-referential book in which Nietzsche [Daly] can be said with equal justice to invent or discover himself [herself,] and in which the character who speaks to us is the author who has created him [her] and who is in turn a character created or implicit in all the books that were written by the author who is writing this one. (Bloom, 159, my substitutions)

Looking back into her past work for a development, a way in which she can construe and transform everything as a single growth from a single soil, Daly takes over her past and affirms it, opens it up, and transforms it. She sketches the future by means of it and thus comes to a view of the self which is surprisingly like Nietzsche's: momentary, unstable,
needing form and expressive of great beauty when it is trained by long, persistent exercise, surgery, and periods of silence.\textsuperscript{86}

This similarity of style and approach to writing make more evident what each has to offer the other as friends. In its rethinking of duration and of the character of the moment, Nietzsche's perspectivism allows for Daly to see that the women in the past are part of Daly's long thought of human becoming. There is meaning there--horrible and yet liberating meaning; it has taken all their blood and mutilation to produce the strength of a Mary Daly.\textsuperscript{87}

To some extent Daly does see this. But to the extent that she has not, in these two books, been open to the non-great foremothers or to the millions of women who are living now and who will not be able to join the sisterhood in their conscious movement, she needs a perspective like Nietzsche's if she is going to be able, honestly, to escape the labels of elitist and patriarchal methodologist.\textsuperscript{88} Making poetry of our lives, Nietzsche would say, involves expanding ourselves as much as possible in an ordered way. Daly's concept of sisterhood then, in its hope of going beyond the patriarchal power as domination, must carry the whole past into the future somehow or it risks repeating history. By not seeing all women and patriarchy as things able to be willed--as necessarily to be willed and affirmed and ultimately loved for the sake of the present power to create--Daly has a tough time not becoming an individualist, a fragmentary voice in a world that needs unity.

\textsuperscript{86} She reintegrates the past even to the point of her latest book \textit{Outercourse} in which she says that "the philosophical theory and biographical events are parts of the same quest" (12).

\textsuperscript{87} It has taken all the thousands of rehearsals of "Daily, Daily Sing to Mary" to produce a final transvaluation in the form of Mary Daly!

\textsuperscript{88} See the works by Mary Jo Weaver and Audre Lorde.
Likewise, Daly can offer something important to Nietzsche out of this discussion of style. It may be very good to affirm the eternal recurrence, Daly may say. But if we do not start to incorporate the community of women into this process, our ability to dance is restricted. And we will never affirm the eternal recurrence as a broken community.

Because we have not realized that "men and women are in history, in time, existing only in dynamic relationship to each other. . . [because] we have in the past been chained to the wheel of psychological processes whose nature was not understood, living out roles which seemingly were predestined, written in the heavens," Daly would say, we have not been able to become who we are (The Church, 194). It is not just the transvaluation of the slaves that has brought becoming to a halt, but the elimination of half the race from view. The most potent overgoers will now be the women because they have undergone the longest--their bows are drawn with the greatest tension. Nietzsche must be able to incorporate them into his soil in order him to reach his highest goals--and vice versa.

C) Nietzsche in the Later Daly

The major conclusions to this thesis lie in the previous section. They are also the better grounded. However, in my cursory readings of the later Daly, I have identified areas which deserve further attention and may in fact point to an increased reliance on Nietzsche--at least an increase as compared with The Church and Beyond.

First, however, I would like to share a serendipitous event that happened shortly before I was sitting down to write this conclusion.
As I was searching through *Beyond Good and Evil* for some support for my Nietzsche section, I came across an aphorism which shocked me. It was one of the ones on women, but it did not shock me because I saw it as an example of Nietzsche's misogyny. Rather, I experienced shock because it seemed as though Daly had copied it into her later work—almost word for word. I reprint a large part of it here just to astonish those familiar with Daly and her tendency to use felines for familiars:

What inspires respect for woman, and often enough even fear, is her *nature*, which is more "natural" than man's, the genuine, cunning suppleness of a beast of prey, the tiger's claw under the glove, the naïvete of her egoism, her uneducability and inner wildness, the incomprehensibility, scope, and movement of her desires and virtues—What, in spite, of all fear, elicits pity for this dangerous and beautiful cat "woman" is that she appears to suffer more, to be more vulnerable, more in need of love, and more condemned to disappointment than any other animal. Fear and pity: with these feelings man has so far confronted woman, always with one foot in tragedy which tears to pieces as it enchant.

What? And this should be the end? And the breaking of woman's magic spell is at work?

(*Beyond Good and Evil*, aphorism 239)

I do not include this merely because Daly uses words like "Wildness" and "tiger" and "cat" in *Outercourse*. Rather, I include it on the larger suspicion that she has, like Tong indicates, now transvalued Nietzsche's talk on women. Whether his aphorisms are misogynistic or not, Daly has come to see what Mina Loy meant when she said that women must keep up their appearances. Daly in her later works has dropped the attempt to get out of roles because they are essentialistic and has celebrated, perhaps with greater Nietzschean fervor, the creation that is possible out of the separation of the sexes.
Particularly in her section on the Dionysian in *Gyn-Ecology*, Daly seems more and more eager to assent to the following statement of Nietzsche's (ripped out of context): "I do not see how one can get around this natural opposition by means of social contracts or with the best will in the world to be just, desirable as it may be not to remind oneself constantly how harsh, terrible, enigmatic, and immoral this antagonism is" (*Gay Science*, 319). And thus for her, women really do represent or present to men the chaos which men cannot bear to look at and which they therefore project upon each other in warfare: "we do not become swallowed up in the male-centered (Dionysian) confusion. . . . As we [women] move we mark out our own territory" (*Gyn-Ecology*, 67).89

But this one aphorism of *Beyond Good and Evil* and the explicit connection with the Dionysian in *Gyn-Ecology* are not the only signs of further contact with Nietzsche. There is her treatment of aphasia and amnesia in *Outercourse* which suggests that she is still dealing with a Nietzschean problem of forgetting.90 And her discussion of spinning or weaving in *Gyn-Ecology* and *Outercourse* appears to have resonances of the affirmation of the eternal recurrence. And, most importantly, her references in *Outercourse* to the model of the spiral may help to find a new way to image the eternal recurrence--indeed, she often speaks directly about spiralling back to the past and to past lives.91

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89 Or, to put it another way, she more fully assents in her later work to Nietzsche's statement at the beginning of *Beyond Good and Evil*; she supposes truth is a woman.

90 The occurrence of these words is also enhanced by the citation in *Beyond* (142) and *Gyn-Ecology* (pages 109-110) of Nietzsche's discussion of memory in the *Genealogy of Morals*..

91 Also see her references to Moments and instantaneous time in that book to get a feel for how her time-concept has come quite close to Nietzsche's--at least as Stambaugh has described it.
There may yet remain connections between the two philosophers. However, they do not come under the scope of this thesis. As I put closure on something which really cannot admit of closure, however, I think of how both authors have continually gone back to the beginning of a theme or a project or a life in order to draw something more out of every moment. In this action or re-action, they are attempting a project much like William Blake did in his repeated attempts to write one epic poem: perhaps one soil and one air really is the unifying thematic in both Daly and Nietzsche. Perhaps trying to see one root system underneath them is the only way they see to reach Beulah or the Fourth Spiral Galaxy or the eternal joy in the moment.
Bibliography


