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The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Germany's Pursuit of Power in the Twentieth Century

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The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same: German Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century

A THESIS

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Germany's Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century

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Abstract

Germany faces a “German Problem” because of history and ideology. Branded an aggressor nation because of its role in the two World Wars, Germany is still attempting to succeed in a competitive, anarchic world similar to that described by Hobbes’ State of Nature. I illustrate this international environment through game theory’s Prisoner’s Dilemma. Viewed in this manner, Germany feared defection by neighboring states and its actions to protect itself helped cause the First World War. Contemporary Germany has learned from its past experiences and has a new anti-aggression stance which competes with an old Faustian German ethos. I shall argue in this work that while some of Germany’s tactics may have changed this century, its fear of defection and its overall strategy to overcome this fear have not. Germany must continue to pursue power for its own self-interest and the European Union is a return of Mitteleuropa. The more things change, the more they stay the same.
Acknowledgments

To my parents, with my eternal love and respect. If this thesis represents the sum of my undergraduate education, I believe my cumulative tuition makes it about $1000 per page.

To all the friends I’ve made and lost over my years here, especially the Symposium bunch, Androo, Glen and Pam. “Mmmmm, beer...” - Homer Simpson

To Jen, both for distracting me when I should have been working and for forcing me to work when it was necessary. “Short help’s better than no help, Chewie.” - Han Solo

To my professors, who taught me a surprising amount in my years here. Special thanks to those who attended my defense. The best of the best: Scott Johnson, Wendy Sterba, Gary Prevost, Margaret Cook, Scott Richardson and Otmar Drekonja have each inspired me and left me in awe of their talents. My desire to become an academic can be directly traced to these individuals. Thank you.

Additionally, Wendy and Scott have each provided me with different examples of how professors may remain in touch with the lives of students and still maintain TRUE professionalism. This extends education and ties beyond the classroom and I believe this is part the explanation why these two professors have had the biggest influence on me academically. Once again, thank you.

And to Viktor, who always chews on my arm when I come home.
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Introduction: The Origin of Conflict

Whatever, therefore, is consequent to a time of war where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation nor use of commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

-Thomas Hobbes Leviathan

A debate exists in the study of international relations between those who interpret the foreign policy of states as rational pursuits of power in a competitive world and those who believe that the actions of states are neither fully rational nor predictable. Thus Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealism and Samuel Huntington’s primacy arguments compete with Donald Green and Ian Shapiro’s analysis of how rational choice fails to explain empirical realities or John Lewis Gaddis’ observation that since such theories did not predict the end of the Cold War, they are inherently flawed. I do not believe that either side is completely correct. Rational choice offers a great deal to the study of international relations, despite being somewhat incomplete in terms of its explanation of empirical realities.

Although Hans Morgenthau characterized most Realist theories when he stated that “the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power;” he also felt that humanity is concerned with history, “dominated by interests and driven by emotional impulses, as well as motivated by reason.” For this reason, although states rationally compete for power in the international system motivated by their own self-interest, such pursuits may be guided by a nation’s past experiences and ideology. In order to fully understand the behavior of a state,

rational choice theories must therefore be mixed with historical and psychological analysis. This work is an attempt to utilize a combination of these two approaches, using Germany as a model to illustrate how a nation’s pursuit of power is inspired by the international system and its historical, ideological and geographical realities.

**Why do states compete for power in the international system?**

To avoid Hobbes’ State of Nature and the consequences therein, humanity created states, with rules and regulations to safeguard against the behavior of others and help insure an individual’s survival, but no such authority exists over nations themselves. While the last fifty years have seen the growth of the United Nations and international law, a state of nature still endures between states. As no outside force serves to protect a state’s existence, it becomes the responsibility of each actor in the international arena to ensure its own survival.

The above is a Realist approach to international relations, echoing Hans Morgenthau’s belief that nations pursue their self-interest through power. Under this view, power may be considered relative, because territory and available resources are finite. This fact lends credence to the idea that competition exists between states. If one nation controls more of a given finite resource, another consequently controls less. Competition and power may thus be understood as a system of relative rather than absolute gains. As Robert Jervis defines the problem, “The claim is that, now as in the past, the anarchic nature of international politics requires states to be deeply concerned not only with how various policies and outcomes directly affect them, but also with the question of whether they are gaining more (or losing less) than others.”\(^6\) In this manner, even a nation’s economic strength can mean power and not just well-being.\(^7\)

Within this competitive atmosphere, power may be defined as a state’s ability to engage in strategic moves that influence an opponent’s choices. As power is affected by so many finite variables, such as territory, population and economic strength, it too must be relative. An

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\(^7\) This argument is made in Huntington, p. 311.
increase in one state's power relative to another allows a state not only to pursue its own ends, but to be more immune to the machinations of others. Thus, Samuel Huntington argues that "States pursue primacy in order to be able to insure their security, promote their interests, and shape the international environment in ways that will reflect their interests and values." In this way, while international primacy does not allow a state to escape from the anarchical nature of the global community, it does allow it to limit the degree in which it may be adversely affected by others. Power thus allows a state to attempt insuring its own survival. It is a possible solution to the anarchy of the State of Nature, but as each nation seeks relative power positions, a system of conflict results.

**How do we interpret and predict a state's actions in this system of conflict?**

A theory which helps interpret the strategy of nations involved in such conflict is game theory. The use of game theory places a framework of expectations upon the "international dilemma." In this Realist view, states are self-interested actors in constant competition. The competition is continual, because central to game theory is the idea that it does not matter whether the conflict is between potential enemies or potential friends. Thus a nation's rational decision-making in peacetime should arrive at similar conclusions to those reached in war, as the anarchy of the state of nature always exists. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

I believe that the use of game theory can therefore not only help explain the historical actions of countries, but their contemporary actions as well. If the foreign policy of Germany at the beginning and end of the twentieth-century is examined, I maintain that the threats Germany faces and the actions taken to address these threats will be nearly identical, even though it is no longer in imminent danger of war. This is because in a scenario within game theory known as the Prisoner's Dilemma, it is the POSSIBILITY of betrayal that is the pressing issue. If the

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8 Ibid., p. 309.
international system is viewed as a Prisoner's Dilemma, the pursuit of power is a constant necessity of all nations. Although Morgenthau believes this pursuit will be tempered by psychological and historical influences, power is still the over-riding drive.

**What do I hope to demonstrate in this paper?**

This paper will demonstrate that Germany fears for its security and its contemporary reasoning follows the same lines as in the Imperial era, because Germany's actions are reactive to a competitive world system that has not fundamentally changed in the past century. One of the best ways to perceive how this affects Germany's rational decision making in foreign policy is to use game theory. For this reason I will first examine what game theory is and how it can be used in international relations. A simple model of game theory known as the Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates what I believe are the key aspects of the international system: anarchy, defection, competition and cooperation. Following this, I shall demonstrate how strategic moves can be used by a state in this model to promote its own interests. As I define power as a measurement of a one's ability to engage in these strategic moves, a nation which wishes to increase its power for its own protection needs to acquire more options. I call strategic moves aimed at acquiring these other options "branch moves" and will offer evidence that much of Germany's foreign policy at the beginning and end of this century has used branch moves to address recurring security fears. These fears of defection stem from the international system represented in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Germany was chosen as the focus of analysis because it has often been labeled the most aggressive nation of this century and the guilty party in both World Wars. I hope to challenge part of this claim. Much recent scholarship has suggested that Germany was no more to blame for the ravages of World War I than its neighbors. Nonetheless, Germany continues to be feared today by many European leaders who continually bring up the "German Problem," the fear

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10 Among these scholars are V.R. Berghahn, David Calleo and Imanuel Geiss. Their work will be examined in subsequent chapters.
that Germany is a natural aggressor bent upon conquest. I will examine how this "German Problem" began, because addressing it is a key concern of Germany's present foreign policy. Germany realizes that nations which fear it may be more inclined to engage in actions harmful to Germany. I also hope to show that while the ethos that has become known as the "German Problem" exists in Germany, it is a similar condition to the national character of many other nations, most notably the United States. All of these national characters are formed by the pressures of the Prisoner's Dilemma that represents the international system and the fear of defection it generates. Such an analysis of the emerging German state will also demonstrate how the fear of defection has affected German policy since its formation and help illustrate Morgenthau's belief that a nation's rational self-interest, history and ideology are intertwined.

The security fears of present-day Germany include both military and economic threats from surrounding states which are almost identical to those which faced Imperial Germany. Germany's reoccurring problems include the direct military threat of an encirclement of enemies and the loss of access to economic trade. I argue that Germany has tried many ways to alleviate these continual problems, including securing its borders through military strength, economic domination and influence in international organizations, all in an attempt to secure itself as Europe's hegemon. Imperial Germany pursued this goal through a customs union known as Mitteleuropa.¹² Contemporary Germany is pursuing the European Union. I hope that by examining each of these time periods, direct connections will be made between Germany's historical and present actions. Germany is responding predictably according to the dictates of game theory. It's final goal is stability and increased power relative to other states, thus reducing its vulnerability to other states' actions. Germany is ending the century as it began, in pursuit of international power, primacy on the Continent and an empire in Europe. Everything remains the same.

Game Theory: What and Why?

The ancients exchanged hostages, drank wine from the same glass to demonstrate the absence of poison, met in public places to inhibit the massacre of one by the other, and even deliberately exchanged spies to facilitate transmittal of authentic information. It seems likely that a well-developed theory of strategy could throw some light on the efficacy of some of these old devices, suggest the circumstances to which they apply, and discover modern equivalents that, though offensive to our taste, may be desperately needed in the regulation of conflict.

-Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*

In the viewpoint of most Realists, the main premise of Realism, that states are independent actors functioning in a State of Nature, seems an unyielding truth. States compete for primacy, economic and political security, even prestige. I agree that what results is conflict, unfettered by any overseer and, as Schelling argues above, it is advantageous to develop a strategy within to compete. Having a strategy to deal with conflict allows one both to regulate the conflict and interpret the behavior of the actors involved. One of the theories used to solve this dilemma is game theory.

Game theory represents a very systematic approach to strategic conception. Its simple principles create a method through which to interpret the international environment, its pressures upon states and their probable actions. Although game theory is a strategy for dealing with conflict, it is important to note three things. First, although conflict may sound somewhat macabre to some, the theory is not necessarily concerned with aggression, but rather with the use of threats and promises to deal with any situation where the aims of one state may cross those of another. Secondly, competition draws no clear line between peace and war. Schelling supports this view, arguing that the "theory is nondiscriminatory as between the conflict and the common interest, as between its applicability to potential enemies and its applicability to potential friends." Finally, game theory uses models to illustrate its conclusions. One must keep in mind Henri Theil’s observation that, "models are to be used but not to be believed."

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13 I draw primarily from the Realist ideas of Thomas Schelling and Robert Jervis, who, for the most part, show how states can pursue mutual self-interests without exclusive reliance on threats and a completely one-sided approach. I feel this is truer to Morgenthau’s vision than Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealism.
14 Schelling, p. 15.
limited in the scope to which they address problems and cannot be used alone. They can be used, however, to investigate actors' choices, the relationship between choice and outcome and the patterns such outcomes represent.\textsuperscript{16}

In examining game theory I shall try to accomplish three things. First, I shall explain the game known as the Prisoner's Dilemma and how it may be used to illustrate the four main tenets of the international environment, 1) anarchy, 2) competition, 3) defection and 4) cooperation. Secondly, I will examine the strategic moves that actors may make which enable them to gain an advantage in this competitive international environment. Finally, I shall briefly investigate the application of game theory in explaining real-world scenarios, such as arms races. The international system that the Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates is the one I believe has faced Germany through-out this century.

**The international environment as a Prisoner's Dilemma**

The simplest, and perhaps best, model for an introduction to game theory is the oft used Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) attributed to A.W. Tucker. PD suffers from a number of objections to its use in political theory. Although Schelling points out that a zero-sum game, such as PD, is a limiting idea and argues that it therefore forbids cooperation and other strategies,\textsuperscript{17} it is useful as a departure point, illustrating well the lack of authority in the international system and the inherent fear of betrayal. Charles Lipson also offers the objection that the model is too simple.\textsuperscript{18} While this is true, the game can be expanded later or replaced with a nonzero-sum game after the initial point is made and this will allow more advanced moves, such as cooperation, to occur.

For my purposes, PD serves well to depict the main aspects of conflict resolution, cooperation and defection, and in fact, Jon Elster once described politics as "the study of ways of

\textsuperscript{16} Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics* (October 1984) also discusses the use of models, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{17} Schelling, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{18} Lipson, p. 10.
transcending the Prisoner's Dilemma. In all, PD seems to represent a good model with which to represent game theory's application to international relations.

The most popular version of the Prisoner's Dilemma is as follows: Two people commit a felony together. While escaping, they are caught committing a separate, much smaller offense. The District Attorney, knowing they are guilty but unable to prove it, separates the two individuals. Each felon is offered a choice. The smaller offense carries a one year sentence, the felony a nine year sentence. If the criminal, unable to consult the partner, denies involvement in the felony and the partner also denies it, both will be convicted of the lesser crime and spend one year in jail. If both confess to the felony, they will each be pardoned for the lesser crime but convicted of the felony and spend nine years in jail. If one remains silent while the other testifies, the confessor will be acquitted while the partner receives a ten year jail term. Each prisoner thus has a choice, cooperate with the other and plead not guilty, or confess and thereby defect from their partner.

Although the answer to the dilemma threatening the prisoner seems simple, if both stay silent they both walk away in one year, when one places them within the scenario as Lipson describes them in his analysis of PD, as "a self-interested, self-reliant maximizer of his own utility, an assumption that clearly parallels the Realist conception of sovereign states in international politics," a different picture emerges. Nine years is less than ten and no jail time is better than one year. Although it remains within the communal best interest if both remain silent, an individual actor considering her own plight will soon realize that, regardless of the actions of her accomplice, it is in her interest to confess. With no way of making an agreement (and no way of ensuring that it would be binding), if the prisoner confesses she faces nine years in the event that her partner also testifies (rather than ten if she had remained silent) and if her partner remains silent she walks away free (rather than facing the one year). The situation can be

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20 Lipson, p. 2.
written as a 2 X 2 model as illustrated below. Such models work well in game theory to represent the pay-off matrices for different choices within a conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Player 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>-1,-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>-10,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>0,-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>-9,-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PD embodies the main spirit of game theory, especially if the situation is as R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa argue, that "the problem of conflict of interest is, for each participant, a problem of individual decision making under a mixture of risk and uncertainty, the uncertainty arising from his ignorance of what others will do."\(^{21}\) PD allows three important observations to initially be made about international relations which I shall briefly examine in subsequent pages. 1) PD portrays the anarchical nature of the international community; 2) it illustrates the competitive nature of states; 3) it shows the temptation to betray. All three are very important in understanding international relations. If PD is expanded, it can also 4) explain why nations cooperate as well. These four primary tenets of game theory, anarchy, competition, defection and cooperation, will be used throughout this work to examine both the use of game theory in international relations and the specific case of German foreign policy. I will examine each of them briefly and explain their significance.

**Anarchy's role in interpreting the international dilemma**

The dilemma posed by Hobbes’ State of Nature is well depicted in PD. No authority exists to ensure that agreements will be kept. As Lipson points out, even if the prisoners could communicate, the temptation to defect would still exist, possibly to a greater degree as an actor may feel better able to play another for a “sucker.”\(^{22}\) PD is a one-time scenario; as such, no


\(^{22}\) Lipson, p. 2.
retaliatory measures can be used by a burned opponent. Although international relations cannot be viewed as a one-time game, such a portrayal of anarchy can illustrate the power of a state immune to the retaliatory actions of another.

**Competition's role in interpreting the international dilemma**

PD displays the effects of interdependence upon nations. Each prisoner can be affected by the actions of the other. This is not in the prisoner’s self-interest, because it allows another actor to choose which set of options is available. This limits the prisoner’s choices and thus limits her power. It can therefore be assumed that each actor would ideally wish to limit the power of the other and become immune to the effects of their decisions. This lies within an actor’s self-interest. Thus states compete against each other, as each seeks to gain primacy sufficient to place itself outside the bounds of the other states’ control. In turn, as one nation manages this feat, others worry at the threat inherent in its power and work against it.

Christopher Layne portrays the mind-set of nations of lesser power: “Others must worry about the hegemon’s capabilities, not its intentions. The preeminent power’s intentions may be benign today, but may not be tomorrow.”

States pursue primacy partially as a security measure, trying to limit the threat other nations would pose with a defection. As Huntington argues, "Primacy is thus an alternative to war" and is pursued as a way of maintaining control through peaceful (albeit still aggressive) competition.

**Defection's role in interpreting the international dilemma**

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23 A repeated PD makes the situation more similar to the international environment, thus allowing cooperation. This will be explained later within this section.


A player who cooperates gambles immensely in PD. The "sucker's pay-off" may vary widely from game to game in the original scenario, from probation to a life sentence. In the international arena it may range from a minor loss of face to the complete destruction of a nation. As Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing point out, in this manner war is the ultimate betrayal, because it can result in the greatest loss for a state which trusts too greatly. It is thus important for a state to guard itself against defection and states seek to forge both economic and military defenses to ward against betrayal. Unfortunately most attempts at self-protection force others to be apprehensive. Rousseau pointed this out:

It is quite true that it would be much better for all men to remain always at peace. But so long as there is no security for this, everyone having no guarantee that he can avoid war, is anxious to begin it at the moment which suits his own interest and so forestall a neighbour, who would not fail to forestall the attack in his turn at any moment favourable to himself, so that many wars, even offensive wars, are rather in the nature of unjust precautions for the protection of the assailant's own possessions than a device for seizing those of others. However salutary it may be in theory to obey the dictates of public spirit, it is certain that, politically and even morally, those dictates are liable to prove fatal to the man who persists in observing them with all the world when no one thinks of observing them towards him.

Thus one of the most fundamental tenets of game theory is exposed, the constant fear of betrayal. It is for this reason that the theory makes no division between allies and enemies. Although one may be more likely to defect than another, both still possess the ability to do so. This fear of defection will be used later in this chapter to explain arms races and why economic strength is now more powerful than military might. Additionally, the fear of defection will later be shown to be the main stimulus behind German foreign policy this century.

**Cooperation's role in interpreting the international dilemma**

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26 As Lipson illustrates well in his analysis of PD, p. 7.
If Realism is correct and self-interested actors have such a strong temptation to defect, then why do so many examples of interstate cooperation exist? It appears initially that the state of anarchy and the motives of game theory prohibit cooperation, however this view is incorrect. Wilfried Siebe argues that the "interaction of states over time is an essential aspect of international politics" and Luce and Raiffa observed in their studies that the same game played repeatedly by the same players will yield different results. Unlike the original model for PD, states in the international system do not simply interact once. Only in the event of the complete annihilation of a state will such a scenario occur. Thus both actors know that the other will be in a position to respond to a defection and will act with this fact in mind. Cooperation can, in this way, even be pursued by non-cooperative means, as it will be in the competitive best interests of both actors to cooperate.

Consider this, the prisoner in PD must make her decision knowing she will be indicted on an almost identical charge with the same partner the next day (and possibly the day after as well, ad infinitum). Realizing that if she defects today she will be treated in kind tomorrow, it is in her best interest to cooperate and hope for a similar deduction by her partner. If she were to defect the first day, she would benefit by possibly receiving no jail time the first day, but that would be followed by an almost definite nine year sentence as both would defect in the second round. Thus if her partner cooperated the first day and then reciprocated her defection, she would receive nine years altogether rather than the two years for mutual cooperation. Through this method Robert Axelrod establishes that "Mutual cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists without central control, by starting with a cluster of individuals who rely on reciprocity." This counters Schellings’ earlier argument that PD was incapable of illustrating cooperation.

30 For a complete argument of this idea see Siebe, p. 196.
31 This would happen because the victim of the original defection would most likely feel vindictive and the original defector would have nothing further to lose.
The idea of an infinite number of games is very important to understanding how game theory explains cooperation between actors. If the prisoner knew that she and her partner would only face the decision twice, there would be no incentive to cooperate on the second day. Following the second decision, her partner would have no power over her, thus she should, in her own interest, defect. The prisoner should realize, however, that her partner also has no reason to cooperate the second day and that therefore she has no reason to cooperate the first day in hopes of reciprocation the second. (Unless she is attempting to foster trust in order to undertake a more successful defection, which is a possible move.) Her partner, if also a rational, self-interested actor, will also realize this and so mutual defection will result each time as would be the case in non-repeated PD. Time and repeated interaction are thus important and better illustrate the international system than a single PD.

The motives of each actor must also be considered. Although Jervis argues that PD cannot adequately illustrate the temptation to defect when mutual cooperation is beneficial,\textsuperscript{33} when one considers the advantages of primacy and the fact that primacy is a position relative to that of another, it may actually be pursuant of an actor's preference to defect and thereby ensure either a positive result or a deadlock. Thus states may pursue policies detrimental to their own interests, if such actions might more adversely affect the competing interests of another actor. Consider a prisoner in PD for whom forcing the partner to serve jail time is more important than staying out of jail herself. Perhaps her syndicate would gain more power if her partner were not out on the streets to compete. The gains on the pay-off matrix would have to be re-adjusted, but this example displays the importance of relativism to game theory and international competition. Through this method, PD can help illustrate deeper levels of preference than simply a choice between cooperation or defection. In the international arena, this may be illustrated with government subsidies that may hurt the sponsoring actor, but hurt another far state more in the long run.

\textsuperscript{33} Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," p. 326
It is precisely because of the reasoning that an actor may benefit by defecting, if such an action hurts itself it may hurt an opponent more, that states must continually be on guard against defection. Thus even two allies may maintain spy networks to inform on the other's actions, as recent cases between the U.S and South Korea or the U.S. and France have illustrated. Although an actor should pursue policy that is beneficial, it must have a strategy for dealing with possible defection. Such a strategy devised by Axelrod known as TIT FOR TAT serves to display such behavior in the international community.

TIT FOR TAT is a strategy that in repeated games of PD always initially begins with cooperation, thus attempting to create the highest absolute gain. Thereafter, TIT FOR TAT responds to an opponent with the identical response it received in the last round. Thus a TIT FOR TAT strategy rewarded with mutual cooperation will encourage it and the strategy will also punish betrayal. As Lipson observes, it "simultaneously offers to cooperate, to retaliate, and to resume cooperation after punishing defection." This strategy helps create an environment similar to the one which actually exists in the international environment, where perceived defection, such as price fixing when such actions are against a bilateral agreement, may be met with the threats of sanctions, actual imposition of tariffs and the lifting of such actions after cooperation is resumed.

**Summation of PD's influence on the international environment**

These four tenets illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma, anarchy, defection, competition and cooperation, display game theory's principles on viewing the international environment and offer a lens through which to interpret states' actions. In an anarchical, competitive world, a state must continually be on guard against defection by other states, even those with whom they

34 It should also be noted that states may pursue cooperative efforts that aid one nation more than another, but are still in the best interest of both states. Although I shall argue that Germany's pursuit of European integration is in its self-interest, this does not mean it is not also in the self-interest of other participants. Germany may simply be gaining a greater strategic advantage than some others.

35 An American civilian spied for the South Koreans, see *New York Times*, Oct. 3, 1996 and an American attaché was caught spying on the French government, see *Newsweek*, April 29, 1996.

36 Lipson, p. 5.
cooperate. This is the condition that my thesis assumes has existed since the beginning of the nation-state and which continues to influence the tactics of contemporary policy makers. Germany's foreign policy this century has been aimed at reducing this condition\textsuperscript{37} and it has used the strategic moves I shall now discuss to attempt to gain more power and render itself less susceptible to the effects of the defection of others.

**Strategic moves in game theory**

Within the framework of the environment that game theory perceives, several tactics are commonly used by actors in conflict with one another. These strategic moves are methods of achieving one's goal through an overall strategy. Schelling defines such a move as "one that influences the other's choice, in a manner favorable to one's self, by affecting the other person's expectations on how one's self will behave. One constrains the partner's choice by constraining one's own behavior."\textsuperscript{38} These moves which Schelling defined range from threats and promises to ensuring that communication exists between competitors. I shall briefly describe a few of which will be used later to examine Germany's foreign policy. A nation can attempt to utilize these strategies in order to influence the choice of other actors, by either altering the pay-offs or ensuring that a non-beneficial situation for the other actors may result.

As stated in the introduction, power may be defined as a measure of one's ability to engage in strategic moves and thus influence an opponent's choices. Thus states which wish to engage in such moves, an advantage in most cases, should seek to establish power relative to other states. Access to strategic moves enables a state to either render itself immune to the machinations of others, thus limiting the potential "sucker's pay-off" for a defection, or to influence strategies so as to bring about an advantageous result. Either way, as a nation's ability to make threats and other moves corresponds to its position relative to its opponents, nearly all

\textsuperscript{37} I do not think it can eliminate them entirely, because they are inherent in the system.

\textsuperscript{38} Schelling, p. 121.
nations seek to either gain more power or maintain that which has already been acquired. This conclusion is the result of the chaotic international environment like that described by Hobbes.

**Threats**

Being in a position to make the first move in most games is often an advantage. The same is true in many scenarios in game theory. Although in classic PD players are not allowed to communicate with one another, if this is allowed a whole new range of possible moves appear. In PD, player's choices are made simultaneously, no ability is granted to delay a move until after an opponent (although this is a possible strategic move in other simulations), therefore players must make their decision without knowing what the other will do. Threats are a method of capturing the initiative, of moving before the opponent. If Player A threatens to choose red in the following scenario no matter what, Player B is left with a choice between no gain and a positive reward. Player A has thus seized the initiative, gaining power by restricting Player B's possible outcomes (blue, blue is no longer possible) and unless it would be to Player B's advantage to also hurt Player A, Player A will usually benefit the most.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Red</th>
<th>Blue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most important part of a threat strategy is the commitment (or the other player's belief that one is committed) to see it carried out. If Player B has any doubt as to Player A's resolve, the threat has no meaning and does not restrict Player B's choice. For this reason, reputation and commitment are powerful weapons in an actor's arsenal. In many cases, the threat may only work if a player lacks the ability to back down. This is why many of the nuclear

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39 This and the other strategic moves I shall now examine are all attributable to Schelling and can be found in his work.
responses of both sides in the Cold War were automatic. It left neither nation with the ability to
back out completely and thus assured that the threat of complete nuclear retaliation was taken
seriously enough that both nations were restricted to the option of uneasy peace.

**Promises**

A promise is slightly different than a threat, because it is a response to a previous move,
rather than a pre-emptive move itself. It usually occurs when another actor has left itself open to
retaliation, but knowledge of a reprisal or commitment to maintain reputation forces one to fulfill
an earlier commitment even if a short-term gain is unfulfilled. Such an idea can be illustrated as
below, where Player B promises to choose blue if Player A first chooses red, thus insuring the
best collective result. Without this promise, stated or unstated, blue, red would almost inevitably
result as both actors would safeguard themselves.

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
& \text{Red} & \text{Blue} \\
\hline
\text{Red} & 1,5 & 4,4 \\
\text{Blue} & 1,1 & 5,1 \\
\end{array}
\]

Promises are interesting in that they emphasize the importance for an actor to honor the
pledge, perhaps due to future games with either the same or other opponents. Promises can be
made at the same time as threats. For instance, Player B can also threaten to always choose red if
Player A chooses blue, thus making the risk of allowing Player B the chance of fulfilling his
promise a little more enticing.

**Enforcement**

Another important strategic option is enforcement. Enforcement is a major part of both
threats and promises. A nation must possess power to make believable threats, relative to the
other nation. Whereas a threat by Albania to invade the United States is laughable, it may not be
if the threat is directed towards Macedonia. Non-enforcement is also a strategic option. For whatever reason a player may be unwilling or unable to retaliate. Other events could also block the ability to enforce threats or promises, such as interference by an outside actor.

**Selection**

Other strategic moves seek to change the options with which an opponent is presented. A selection strategy seeks to alter the opponent. On a small scale this is done through identification, seeking to understand the opponent sufficiently to predict their moves completely or identify weaknesses. A more advanced strategy is to change the opponent's mindset to one's own selection. Ideally one would like to reach the point where one virtually makes the decision for one's opponent, as if the same player were playing himself. Although two completely self-interested actors would protect themselves by choosing red, red in the matrix below, a single selected actor would almost never make any decision other than blue, blue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Red</th>
<th>Blue</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>-2,-2</td>
<td>6,-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>-1,6</td>
<td>5,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selection strategy can be pursued by nations which support friendly candidates in other states or Senators who support members of their own party in a challenge against an opposing incumbent. Each seeks to create a situation where someone trusted is making opposing decisions, thereby decreasing the fear of defection. Under game theory it can also be pursued by a nation wishing to create an empire, as I will argue later that Germany has done.

**Communication**

A communication strategy can have two forms: fostering communication and destroying it. Without a method of communicating, most strategic moves cannot occur. Promises and
threats cannot be made if dialogue is not possible. It would represent a return to classic PD. Nations wishing to influence decision-making by an opponent, whether for mutual gain or simply their own use of power, must find ways to communicate. Alternatively, a nation wishing to escape from the maneuvering of another might shut down communication lines. Thus nations in conflict may pursue two paths. A nation protesting another's human rights violation may withdraw its representatives, thus making negotiation impossible, even for mutually beneficial scenarios. Another nation may restore a diplomatic presence in the hope of fostering communication and opening lines of dialogue which enable it to utilize its own strategic moves in order to shape the actions of the other country.

Other strategic moves, including "branch moves"

Many other strategies are available for nations in conflict, such as relinquishing the initiative, offers to mediate in other conflicts and delegating one's move to others. Schelling describes all of these in his work, but the moves which have been detailed above are some of the most prevalent and will be cited in my analysis of Germany. These moves however, while important, do not adequately explain all of Germany's actions. I believe an additional strategic move I have devised can help interpret Germany's foreign policy through game theory.

Within game theory, power may be defined as a measurement of one's ability to engage in strategic moves and influence opponent's choices. The more powerful the state, the greater the range of its choices. The United States has, by virtue of its greater power, far more options available to it when facing a sudden crisis then does a nation like Burundi. It may threaten to invade, impose trade sanctions or simply ignore an adversary. But how do states gain power? Obviously factors such as population, wealth and military strength are important for the equation, but these are ends. A move such as building up a strong army allows the army to be used to accomplish further moves, such as threats. This strategic move is unlike many others. It is preemptive rather than reactive to current situations. Unlike strategic moves already discussed, such
as threats or enforcement, these moves enable a range of other options for use in future conflict. They therefore help promote a nation's power. These "branch moves" create other options.

It may even be argued that such branch moves are preferable to any other kind of move, as once most other actions begin to be taken a nation may be stuck upon a certain path and unable to alter it without adverse effects, such as being unable to back down from an ultimatum on trade talks without "giving in" to an opponent. I believe that branch moves work better with threats than promises. One can always speak in the subjunctive case, implying the range of options a nation is considering rather than one set of immutable responses. True power may rest in always having at least two options in every situation. Branch moves help to enable this situation.

One of the most crucial aspects of game theory, Schelling argues, is the fact that potential conflict may exist between allies as well as enemies and the potential for defection creates the desire in all states to insure their own protection. Although the situation Germany finds itself in has changed dramatically over this century, the more things change the more they stay the same. In later chapters I will attempt to argue that Germany at the end of the twentieth-century is engaging in a pursuit of hegemony which is strikingly similar to the beginning of the century. In both time periods, Germany has engaged in numerous branch moves to establish the strategic options of a hegemon. By investigating these two cases of German foreign policy, it will be easy to see how in each example, the use of branch moves created future options for Germany.

Germany has been approaching hegemony within Europe for several years, enroute to recapturing a position of power on a global scope. These present moves are concrete attempts to facilitate this feat. These branch moves are aimed at the re-establishment of a German Vaterland and include the privileges of military influence, roles in world government organizations and the spreading of German cultural identity. A comparison between the two time periods, after

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40 My choice of words. Although the idea is hardly new and has been incorporated into a number of other political theories, I have not seen it applied to game theory specifically.
41 As Faust did eventually in Goethe's work
exploring a few real world applications of game theory and the reason Germany was chosen as an object of analysis, will hopefully display the game theory's ideas.

Real world applications of game theory

As a brief illustration of game theory's validity in considering questions in international relations, two immediate examples may be considered which will also be useful in the rest of this work. These two examples help illustrate how a changing world has forced Germany to alter some of its tactics in pursuit of hegemony. Game theory can easily and briefly explain both arms races and the idea that economics is now the primary scale on which to judge a nation's power. The following are my own observations and I maintain that the fact that a relative neophyte in the field of game theory can use it immediately to analyze real world events offers an example of its simplicity, applicability and effectiveness.

Arms races

Ideally nations would probably seek to spend as little as possible on defense, thus allowing them to concentrate their spending in other areas which benefit their populations. Each nation however most likely prefers some small measure of military superiority over their neighbor just in case of defection and the onset of war. The situation can be illustrated as below, where each state is given the choice between escalating or limiting their military arsenal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nation B</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Escalate</td>
<td>-10,-10</td>
<td>10,-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escalate</td>
<td>-20,10</td>
<td>5,5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

We can see how a situation similar to the classical PD develops. It is in each state's best interest to escalate, regardless of what the other does. Thus if no system of communication exists which allows nations to make promises or other strategic moves with each other or if insufficient
trust exists between states, neither will feel willing to risk defection and pursue arms reductions, even though it is in the best interests of both sides. However, if the ability to monitor an opponent's actions could be achieved, for example through satellite imagery or personal inspections, and if nations were to have time to counter a defection by building up their own arsenals, then arms reduction would be possible. It is for this reasons that nearly all cease-fires and arms agreements demand observers to oversee compliance.

**Why economics is now the world's primary power**

The nuclear shield has resulted in relative peace amongst the world powers for over fifty years. The military's usefulness in making threats against other powers is not as effective as it was before the atomic age, because the threat of conventional force may easily be overshadowed by the prospect of nuclear annihilation. For this reason, economic influence has become an even more important tool for use in strategy. In the event of conflict, the threat of economic sanctions or tariffs is usually considered before invasion strategies. Huntington argues that economics has even surpassed military strength as the most fundamental form of power.\(^{43}\) Despite its continued military strength, Russia may no longer be a super-power due to its loss of economic muscle and Germany and Japan's contemporary entrance into the rank's of world powers is almost entirely due to their economic strengths. Russia has lost some of its ability to make threats and other strategic moves; it has lost power, while Germany and Japan have gained options and continue to pursue more. Germany has been engaged in this pursuit of additional options throughout this century. This behavior stems from the international competition which has affected both Germany's actions and its national character. This German ethos will be examined in the next chapter.

\(^{43}\) Huntington, p. 320. This may not be entirely true, but economic strength has certainly made immense gains relative to military might.
The German Problem: Origin of an Ethos

Edel sei der Mensch, 
Hilfreich und Gut! 
Denn das allein 
Unterscheidet ihn 
Von allen Wesen, 
Die wir kennen.

Er allein darf
Den Guten lohnen,
Den Büschen strafen,
Heilen und retten,
Alles Irrende, Schweifende
Nützlich verbinden.

Honoroble is humanity,
Charitable and good!
And that alone
Differentiates it
From everything else in Nature,
That we know.

Humanity alone can
Reward the worthy,
Punish the evil,
Save and heal,
Everything that is wandering in err
and bind it together in order.

-Johann Wolfgang Goethe Das Göttliche

What is the "German Problem"? The phrase has been repeated in many contexts for well over a century. Common consensus holds the German nation as an inherently aggressive people. Following the end of the Second World War, the victorious Allies concluded that the answer to the German Problem lay in a divided Germany, never allowed to reunite. This stance echoed world sentiment at the time. The noted British historian, Lewis Namier, asked in 1947: "Why do individual Germans in non-German surroundings become useful, decent citizens, but in groups develop tendencies that make them a menace to their fellowmen?" For years after the war, German scholars labeled this aggression as an aberration conceived during Hitler's rule and stressed the cultural and artistic achievements of a more refined Germany.

These ideas were challenged in 1961 as a German historian named Franz Fischer emerged with a book entitled Griff nach der Weltmacht, or bid for world power, which concluded that Imperial Germany's aims during the first World War were fashioned by the same Wille zur Macht that guided Hitler's attempt. Fischer believed that the German Problem was real and inherent in the culture. He placed much of the blame for the First World War squarely upon Germany's shoulders. Although there was a great deal of controversy aroused by Fischer's

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44 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, "Das Göttliche" (1783), first and eighth stanzas. English translation my own.
venture into previously unspoken ideas,\textsuperscript{46} it also aroused a great deal of further research into the German ethos and war guilt.

Like Fischer, I agree that there exists a German ethos, a "German Problem," but unlike Fischer, I do not argue that it is unique to the German people, simply more pronounced. Germany is essentially no more imperialistic than Britain, France or the United States, but as the "new kid on the block" challenging the existing Powers (often very successfully), the Germans were labeled as the aggressors. I argue that the German ethos began truly forming in the late 1700's, was captured in its essence by Johann Wolfgang Goethe's \textit{Faust} in 1831 and began skyrocketing towards its future form almost immediately afterward.\textsuperscript{47}

The Problem is now labeled as German in character because of Germany's unique status as the Great Power to emerge late and the incredible speed with which it industrialized. This meteoric explosion of technology had rippling effects through the worlds of science and the humanities until the ethos became ingrained in almost the entire culture of the emerging nation, as evinced most emphatically by Goethe's \textit{Faust} and Richard Wagner's \textit{Nibelungen Ring}.\textsuperscript{48} In a circular effect, the awakening German ethos continually influenced the national literature, which due to Germany's high literacy and education, promoted the ethos further in its populace.

These effects are actually quite similar to what has occurred in other nations (although the national literature would of course be different). After examining the origin of the German ethos, I will discuss briefly how a similar ethos can be expected to develop in any successful and newly emerging state, because of the influence on the international environment that PD represents.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} Although it will not be examined in this work, information on this controversy may be found in John A Moses, \textit{The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography} (London: George Prior, 1975).

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Faust} was written long before many of the events which helped create the ethos occurred, but I think that Goethe managed to capture a spirit that coincided with what would later occur. Although I credit his skill in tapping into the beginnings of this emerging ideology, I think he was lucky in a way. It is as though he were a psychic who happened to predict an earthquake because he was dizzy earlier in the day.

\textsuperscript{48} Although several authors use Faust as an exploration into the German soul, I recommend David Calleo, \textit{German Problem Reconsidered}, Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{49} I will show later how this is very similar to the United States and a slightly modified German ethos could very easily be labeled as American in character.
Technology's rise and its effect on an emerging ethos

Why should rapidly increasing technology so affect a nation's way of thinking and why was Germany more susceptible to its influence? After all, every other Power industrialized and Russia's program was started much later than Germany's. The difference lay in the combination of speed and timing in technological advances which is unique to Germany. Russia's industrialization was relatively unsuccessful until long after the Communists came to power (and is perhaps now showing that it never fully succeeded). Germany came late to the world stage and had unparalleled success in an explosively brief period of time.

The 1830s marked the beginning of Germany's rise in status. Although Goethe completed Faust, illustrating the quintessential Germanic drive, in 1831, even he doubted at that time, shortly before his death, that the German people could ever form a successful, unified nation. By 1834, however, the German states had united into the Zollverein, a customs union that enabled them to industrialize for the purpose of trade and freed them from the yoke of Austrian dependence. The German states began building railroads and other infrastructure necessary for growth. Population boomed and the movement of people from rural agriculture to urban factories enabled large-scale growth in machinery and other technologies. Public education became almost universal (as opposed to Great Britain, who by 1860 had only half its children in school).

Once begun, the pace of advancement became almost incomprehensibly accelerated and the speed increased nearly every year, despite a continent wide depression toward the end of the century. Germany's population rose from 41 million in 1871 to 68 million by 1915, in direct contrast to France, the traditional continental giant, which remained stationary at only about 40 million. The life expectancy of a child at birth, a good method with which to measure a nation's technological prowess, rose from 35.6 years in 1870 to 44.8 in just 30 years and the percentage

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50 Calleo, p.61.
51 Ibid, p.71.
of children reaching the age of fifteen rose by nearly ten points, thus yielding much of the population boom.\textsuperscript{52}

The result of this population growth was that the spirit of adventure captured by youth flooded the German nation. As Fischer argues, "more than one-third of the population of Germany was under fifteen years of age, and this gave the national consciousness a dynamic element which further reinforced the demand for Lebensraum, markets and industrial expansion."\textsuperscript{53} Lebensraum represented a Vaterland, a glorious homeland expanded into an empire. The German people, especially the youth, were thus inclined to look with grand vision into the future and Fischer argues that much of Germany's claim to world power was based on its perception of being a young, growing and energetic nation.\textsuperscript{54}

Technological and industrial advances followed suit with the population's expansion. Machine growth in Germany was immense; employment in industry jumped twenty-fold in the last forty years of the nineteenth-century. Germany, once lagging sharply behind, became Europe's leader in the production of iron and steel. Domestic production was five times greater in 1913 than in 1850. Real industrial wages doubled from 1871 to 1913 and most Germans experienced a profound increase in their standard of living.\textsuperscript{55} The meteoric rise of technology created a vision of anything being possible, humanity's future unlimited. Nature could be conquered and a Faustian dream realized.

This increased production and industrialization came at a price. German imports of raw materials grew steadily and between 1887-1912 actually trebled.\textsuperscript{56} South America and other undeveloped regions began to occupy a greater and greater proportion of Germany's trade.\textsuperscript{57} It became obvious, despite Germany's maintained status as the leading trader in Europe, that something must be done to guarantee access to raw materials.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{55} Calleo, pp. 62-63.
\textsuperscript{56} Calleo, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{57} Fischer, p. 12.
For these reasons, I feel the nation began to feel an impetus to expand. The cries of the youth for Lebensraum, combined with experienced leaders' perceptions that secured raw materials were needed as a measure of defense (to secure itself from outside threats, such as France cutting off supplies of unrefined ore) led to Germany's desire to establish what every other Power possessed, colonies abroad and international influence upon the Continent. Caught in a PD, Germany saw that it needed to do something to reduce the risk of defection. If anyone argues that Germany was in any way unique in these expansionary feelings, they need only look at other Powers, such as frontier America, New World Spain, British Asia, French North Africa and the Belgian Congo. Germany's aims were no more imperialistic than its predecessors, but it became known as an aggressor because of its late formation as a nation.

Germany emerged as a Power in 1871, following two surprisingly successful wars, against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. This was long after the other Powers were already in existence as nations. Many were in fact nearly deceased, such as Portugal or Spain, and the new Germany was eager to gobble the remains. As any new actor threatening the established status quo might be, it is not surprising that Germany became labeled the aggressor, but its actions and aims were basically the same as those pursued earlier by the established Powers, to succeed in its own advancement and defense. As David Calleo notes, "...hence the German Problem was intrinsically no different than the British or the French." Imperial Germany was seeking to acquire colonies abroad, a naval force capable of protecting its imports and the prevention of a war along two fronts. It tried to achieve what any other Power would have. The key difference was simply timing; the victors had already divided the spoils.

**How the ethos was strengthened through literature**

The rush of Germany's rise was the important factor in creating its ethos. It must have seemed that the technological advances were limitless and Germany was hurtling toward its destiny. The rush prompted some German literary figures, such as Karl Kraus, to predict an end

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38 Calleo, p. 206.
of the world at the end of the nineteenth-century, fearing that rising technology would over-run and overpower humanity.\(^5^9\) The ease with which Germany sought and gained power manifested itself in various ways as the German ethos was captured by various artists following Goethe's footsteps. As the Faustian dream came closer to realization, Hegel, Nietzsche and Wagner built upon it, refined and expanded it. It is not surprising that Marx was German, for he too captures the key components. Even artists who criticized the ethos became infected or at least illustrated the infection, such as Hermann Hesse or Thomas Mann. As Fischer argues, the movements within the Third Reich did not originate strictly with Hitler, they built upon movements from before the First World War, an ethos that "the German" had carried for well over a century.

As already mentioned, the German ethos became so ingrained in the culture because, once sparked by booming technology, it was spread by Germany's high literacy rates and advanced education system. The circular pattern that caused most writers to build upon the ideas which came before allowed books and ideas that were never directly read to affect the populace. Thus, even after \textit{Faust} was banned, children were still influenced by its message. Such early impressions also helped the ethos capture its youthful orientation and drive.

\textbf{Goethe's \textit{Faust}}

Although Goethe completed \textit{Faust} in 1831, the German ethos was far from being fully conceptualized until much later in the 1800s, after technology's impact became hugely apparent. Goethe himself did not originate the ethos. I argue that it is a result of the Hobbesian State of Nature, epidemic in most Western cultures since the creation of humanity. Deed oriented Germanic heroes such as Siegfried and Dietrich from the \textit{Nibelungenlied} or Charlemagne, existed for ages, nor did Goethe invent Doktor Faustus, but rather merely reincarnated earlier stories. Goethe was a part of the circular pattern, influenced by technology's wonders and those artists who came before, building upon their work and influencing the next generation. \textit{Faust} simply became the most complete model for the future ethos, incorporating what I believe are the

\(^{59}\) Karl Kraus published essays in \textit{Der Fackel}, an alternative literary paper
four major demands of the ideology: anti-establishment, action, pursuit of social order and dissatisfaction with anything short of perfection. In support of my claim that the German ethos is the result of the demands of the State of Nature, I will demonstrate how these four ideological pieces display much of the four tenets of the international environment illustrated by PD: anarchy, competition, defection and cooperation.

Anti-establishment

In pursuit of knowledge, Faust turns to magic, "Drun hab ich mich der Magie ergeben," and magic is what the burgeoning technology must have seemed. It allowed new effects; it allowed action. Mephisto himself may easily be viewed as an epitome of technology. I have often heard it said that this or that new scientific breakthrough was against God's will. What else is Mephisto other than the counter-stroke to God's plan? Consider the introduction he gives himself.

"Ich bin der Geist, der stets verneint! Und das mit Recht, dann alles, was entsteht, ist wert, daß es zugrunde geht." I am the spirit of eternal negation! and rightly so, since all that has been created Is fit only to be destroyed;

That which already exists has no redeeming merit based on its age. The existing order is fit only to be cast down, thus the balance of power that existed previous to the German state is nothing, an obstacle to be overcome. Mephisto offers a spirit of rebellion, thus capturing the enthusiasm of youth. The rules and social norms are immaterial. Even religion, Christianity, that cornerstone of "civility," becomes surmountable. Mephisto views religion as a means of holding down the superior, "Sie denken: duckt er da, folgt er uns eben auch" and Faust, the German epitome, argues that he can only be true to himself, what matter that it is in a different manner than commonly accepted? "Alle Herzen unter dem himmlischen Tage, Jedes in seiner Sprache; Warum nicht ich in der meinen?" In this manner, Faust idealized a spirit of anti-establishment,

60 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Faust: Der Tragödie erster Teil (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1986), line 377.
61 Dr. Otmar Drekonja mentioned this idea in class briefly in March 1997. I incorporated it into this work.
62 Goethe, Faust line 1338-40. All the translations of Faust that follow are my own.
63 Goethe, Faust line 3527.
64 Goethe, Faust lines 3463-65.
which would greatly influence Germany's *Griff nach der Weltmacht*. This was Mephisto's main embodiment, a direct result of technology.

This spirit of anti-establishment seems to incorporate a great deal of both anarchy and defection, two of the tenets that PD illustrates in the international system. There existed no power over states which forced a particular world order. A nation was free to go against the status quo and raise itself up. An anarchical State of Nature prevailed and Germany’s anti-establishment ideology was a massive defection against the existing order.

**Action**

Ultimately the driving force behind Faust himself is *die Tat*, the deed. At first Faust pursued knowledge, but knowledge without application is useless. He must strive toward happiness, toward order, toward perfection. As proclaimed by Faust, "Am Anfang war die Tat!" In the beginning is the deed! Thus the spirit of youth is captured in another aspect by Faust himself. The will to action. As Mephisto freed Faust from the bounds of society, allowing him to quest after whatever he wished, so technology allowed humanity to strive for greatness.

Consider Mephisto's offer:

Verbinde dich; du sollst, in diesen Tagen,  
Mit Freuden meine Künste sehn, 
Ich gebe dir, was noch kein Mensch gesehn.  

Bind yourself and you shall, in these days,  
Bear witness in full pleasure to all that my art  
Can give you, things no mortal has ever seen.

With technology freeing it from the limits of an agricultural state, the German nation became free to ACT, to see things no one else has seen and make progress toward an end.

This drive toward action seem to have helped instill a spirit of competition in Germany. By seeking to accomplish and experience things that no other nation had, Germany proved itself superior. It could strive against others for greatness and compete in the world system.

**Pursuit of social order**

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65 Goethe, *Faust* line 1237.
66 Goethe, *Faust* lines 1672-74.
To pursue simple pleasure was not enough, not for a nation with a work ethic of action. After dabbling with women, wine and song in a *Walpurgian* orgy, Faust longs for something greater and comes across the dream that would give him the greatest happiness, to strive for order (the catchword of the ethos) and to create the perfect state.

Eröffn' ich Raüme vielen Millionen,
Nicht sicher zwar, doch tätig-frei zu wohnen.
Grün das Gefilde, fruchtbar! Mensch und Horde
Sogleich behaglich auf der reusten Erde.
Gleich angesiedelt an des Hügels Kraft,
Den Aufgewält kühn einsige Völkerschaft
Im Innenhier ein paradiesisch Land67

If I can but open up space for millions,
Not in safety I know, but with freedom to live
In green and fertile fields, with man and beast
Soon happy in this newly-built place,
Settled up on high
Where they have built so long,
Here creating a new garden of Eden.

The desires of the German ethos become akin to the view expressed earlier by Goethe's poem *Das Göttliche*, that humanity and humanity alone can correct where God has failed. Humanity has lost Eden, the gods will not help. Humanity (read as Germany) alone can bring order to the world, punish the evil and reward the good.

This drive for social good allows the German ethos to capture some of the spirit of cooperation that PD illustrates can exist in the international system. Germany can thus work toward a common good for its own self-interest, doing what God could not and imposing some order in the anarchic world.

**Dissatisfaction without perfection**

The final facet captured by Goethe is discontentment with anything less than total perfection. In Faust's final scene, he expresses his dissatisfaction with what has been heretofore achieved and, speaking in the subjunctive, expresses that he would be happy if only everything could be accomplished. "Zum Augenblicke dürft' ich sagen: "Verweile doch, du bist so schön!"68

The German ethos captured a spirit of incompleteness. Germany would only be complete once all Germanic peoples were included (Austria and Czechia, etc., in Hitler's dream) and Germany's safety secured. The world stage must be entered in a pursuit of *Weltpolitik*. "Es muß etwas

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67 Goethe, *Faust* lines 11563-69
68 Goethe, *Faust* lines 11581-82.
Something must happen! With these four facets, the German ethos became an egoistic drive for supremacy and autonomy, with the goal of freedom to live, unburdened by the regulations of others. This was a reaction to the “international dilemma.”

Other artists

Although Goethe provided the basic precepts of the ethos, other artists helped refine it, being influenced by his work and in turn influencing others, thus furthering the circular pattern. Even though they may have gone in different directions and their work appear conflicting, all of these artists expanded greatly upon one or more of the four demands of the ideology.

Wagner (1813-1883) treated harmony in such a way that he pushed the traditional to its limits, breaking down the conventions that gave keys and chord relationships their identity. He disobeyed the rules with vigor and action. His masterpiece, the Nibelungen Ring reveals the destruction of civilization itself by the finale. Yet at the same time, he espoused the German people’s superiority and right of inheritance. As V.R. Berghahn notes, "[Wagner's] audiences loved him as a Germanomaniac mythmaker, who perpetuated the canon of classic drama with his final victories of good over evil...The Kaiser could be heard raving about the heroic themes of Wagnerian operas..."\(^6\) The spirit of Wagner's work was the action of the German ethos put to music, a departure from previous work and abandonment of everything held sacred. Truly a Götterdämmerung, a twilight of the gods, was championed and other dogmas, such as organized religion, were rejected.

Marx (1818-1888) also sprang out of the burgeoning technology. He felt, "Technologie ist eine Befreiung"\(^7\) and would provide an impetus to social revolution and change. Thus Marx too, although opposed to ways in which the ethos could be interpreted in a Darwinistic approach, advocated action and discontentment with the existing order. He promoted the well-being of all

\(^6\) Although Heinrich Böll's short story, "Es muß etwas geschehen," is written in critique of this ethos, this quote sums up this drive for incompleteness quite well.

\(^7\) Berghahn, p. 141.

\(^7\) Technology is liberation.
(except the bourgeois of course) and sought to create a union of all people through the idea of a worldwide Revolution. This is really not that far removed from other ideologies of the time which sprang from this German ethos. It builds upon the same values.

Nietzsche (1844-1900) may have expanded the ethos more than any other artist, because he stretched it Jenseits von Gut und Böse, beyond good and evil. As in Faust, the existing status quo held no power. Everything was either strong or weak and if tottering, must be pushed over the edge. "Was wankt, das soll man stoßen."\(^{72}\) Thus the existing balance of power was meaningless, something to be overcome. By this argument, those Powers which could not compete (in the view of Imperial Germany's leaders, that meant all other European Powers other than Britain) were to be conquered. The great are discontent with their status and strive for perfection, the others fall. Everything which had come before was but a step on the road. "Der Mensch ist ein Seil, geknüpft zwischen Tier und Übermensch - ein Seil über einem Abgründe."\(^{73}\) Germany, the new kid on the block, was soon the most powerful state on the Continent.

Darwin's theory had an immense influence on this outlook. The ethos, as portrayed by Nietzsche, demanded that the new actor take action and succeed to its proper place. The quest for social well-being in Faust became a personal quest for perfection under Nietzsche.

These artists were among those who ruled nineteenth century thought in Germany. Although some of their work was opposed in nature (Nietzsche's Übermensch versus Marx's Proletariat), all three display themes of anti-establishment, action, well-being and discontentment. Later artists, even those who criticized these ideas, displayed evidence in their writing that they had at least been exposed to such an ethos. Thomas Mann's Zauderberg illustrates the spirit of youth driven in its final impetus to act, displaying its final discontentment with the satisfaction provided by a Walpurgis Nacht (straight out of Faust). Tod in Venedig offers a similar view of the entrancement of youth. Hesse's Demian also criticized the spirit that moved the youth toward war, but his writing displayed that he understood it, that he had been

\(^{72}\) Friedrich Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, Vorrede.

\(^{73}\) Ibid.
exposed to the ethos and sought perhaps to warn others or at least comment on its dangers. The circular pattern is continually exposed, each succeeding generation building upon the one before.\footnote{Thomas Mann, Der Zauberberg: Roman (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1974), Kapitel 5; Thomas Mann, Der Tod in Venedig (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1969); Hermann Hesse, Demian (Boston: Suhrkamp/Insel, 1985/1923).}

**How the ethos has carried on into contemporary times**

The ethos grew ever stronger and Germany's unique status enabled it to achieve infamous heights. The ethos' exact root is indistinguishable, but it is important to note its continuity. The ethos built upon itself for easily one hundred years before the emergence of Bismarck's *Zweites Reich*. It would be foolish to believe that such a deeply ingrained ethos would disappear following Germany's defeat in the First World War, especially as no Allied troops stood on German soil. And, as Fischer argues, Hitler's rise illustrates that the ethos was not killed by the introduction of Weimar and loss of an emperor; it continued. It is just as foolish to believe that the German ethos and national identity were destroyed following Germany's second defeat and separation. Although the horrors of Nazi atrocities have had an immense impact, two hundred years of an ethos' evolution and the realcitics of the State of Nature will never be destroyed overnight, or even in fifty years.

The main drives of the German ethos are to succeed and survive in a competitive world. "Act or be pushed aside." The forces that created this ethos are not unique to Germany, but are part of an anarchical international environment that forces all states (and peoples) to pursue their self-interests or face annihilation. The fear of defection that PD helps illustrate pressures actors to work to prevent betrayal. A state can only alter its situation by challenging the existing order, taking action, improving its social standing and continuing to improve. To do otherwise is to fall victim to the continual challenge of the international environment which PD demonstrates. These four steps are identical to those fostered in the German ethos. For this reason, Germany is not unique in its aggression this century, but is simply the most easily cited example. Other
countries, particularly the United States, can briefly be shown to hold the same values and do so for their own self-interest.

The United States was created long after many of the other Powers. Like Germany, it enjoyed rapid technological advances, soon surpassing most other nations. The United States had an immense population boom, causing it to pursue expansion westward and instilling a vibrant, youthful drive into the populace. In a desire to control other nations, prevent their defection and protect American economic interests, the United States pursued a policy of "Manifest Destiny," essentially attempting to create an American empire in the Western Hemisphere. The United States emerged as a super-power, eclipsing all those who had gone before, and continues through to the end of the century as the only remaining such Power. Like the Germans, Americans have become known as challengers to the existing order, driven with a desire to act, pursue a "more perfect Union" and promote democracy and capitalism throughout the world in a search for a utopian civilization. Like Germany, the United States continues to seek primacy as a measure of defense against a competitive, anarchical world.

The United States has not suffered from the same label of aggression which has plagued Germany. I believe this is because the original victims of American expansion had too little power to defend themselves. Although American actions in seizing land from the native American populations or Mexico may have been just as aggressive as the German invasion of the Netherlands, the United States was not challenging the existing world order. Unlike Germany, the United States had room to grow without competing against powerful neighbors. Geopolitics placed Germany in the center of Europe, surrounded by established continental and world Powers. Germany is not more aggressive than the United States, simply more constrained by surrounding variables.\(^75\) I find that the German ethos of anti-establishment, action, social order and perfection to be very similar to the American spirit of independence, success, justice and

\(^75\) Calleo also discusses the geopolitical surroundings of Germany and how they differed from the American in his work, p. 115.
truth. In fact, if a PD exists in the international environment, any state that wishes to be successful must display similar tenets for its own advancement and protection. Without them, the continually competitive nature of the international system will keep nations ever vulnerable to the actions of others which are striving for primacy themselves.

In many ways, if one views it as a PD, the contemporary international environment remains essentially unchanged from that facing states at the beginning of the century. The pressures do not evaporate in the absence of war, competition remains. Just as it would be foolish to assume that the German ethos would disappear following the World Wars, it would be foolish to assume that the fear of defection dissipated. I maintain that both the international pressures that PD illustrates and the German ethos support the idea that Germany will end the twentieth century as it began, in an attempt toward hegemony in Europe. This echoes Morgenthau’s belief that both such influences, national interest and psychological forces, are important when judging a nation’s policies.77

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76 Although the various American literature which captures this ethos would, of course, be different than the German.

77 For this analysis of Morgenthau’s work I turned to Robert Jervis, “Hans Morgenthau, realism, and the study of international politics” Social Research, (Winter 1994), p. 853-877. Periodical database, InfoTrak, ASAP, Article A15955163, because Morgenthau’s work is so wide-ranging that I found it difficult to examine in its entirety in the time I had available.
Mitteleuropa: The First Attempt

Economic and political preparedness designed to hold what one has is apt to create the potential for taking territory from others. What one state regards as insurance, the adversary will regard as encirclement. This is especially true of the great powers. Any state that has interests throughout the world cannot avoid possessing the power to menace others.

-Richard Jervis Perception and Misperception in International Politics

After the resignation of Bismarck in 1890, imperialist Germany began engaging in aggressively expansionistic policies to reduce Germany's perceived vulnerability. German leaders sought to do three important things, establish military muscle, change economic links and further German participation in international coalitions, with the goal of creating a new Vaterland. Each of these strategies was a branch move, creating a wealth of additional possibilities, and therefore increasing power. The ultimate goal was complete primacy, hegemony and domination of Europe with the object of maintaining security.

Germany felt completely surrounded by powerful neighbors prior to the first World War and its resultant insecurity led its leaders to feel the need to establish more options in the event of the outbreak of hostility. These increased options were created by enhancing Germany's international role in three areas, military strength, economic dominance and international participation, and were to make Germany more immune to the defection and influence of other nations. Germany almost succeeded. When war did eventually break-out, Germany's superiority on the Continent was demonstrated by its near victory on the battlefield against numerous opponents and its paranoia of encirclement was rendered valid when attacked on all sides, but Germany's frantic quest of hegemony left it vulnerable to the fears of others and created the coalition which destroyed it. As Jervis' observes above, a state capable of defending itself will make a neighbor very nervous. Much of Germany's reasoning was sound, but its inherent

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situation, surrounded by established Powers, caused it to become trapped in a situation with limited choices and Germany's actions, while viable, did not succeed.

In this chapter I hope to examine a number of ideas: the reasoning behind why Imperial Germany wished to improve its standing in each category, military muscle, economic links, international influence and Vaterland; how such actions removed some of the fear of defection and granted Germany more power; and how Germany went about trying to pursue these branch moves. In the next chapter, I will examine the contemporary situation and attempt to illustrate how the reasoning and actions today strongly resemble Imperial Germany's actions, although the tactics have been slightly altered because of Germany's experience since the outbreak of the Second World War.

**The reasoning behind strengthening military muscle**

Long before overt hostilities began to reassert themselves in Europe after nearly a century of peace, the German leaders recognized Britain's potential role in a future conflict. The British fleet, conceived for the purpose of defending its island nation from attack, was also capable of blockading German ports and strangling its international trade. If Germany was to establish colonies and pursue a policy of restructuring the existing status quo of trade, as has been illustrated as necessary in the preceding chapter, it must first possess a navy capable of, at the very least, defending its ports against a British defection. The creation of a navy was not just a matter of prestige, but a branch move, potentially allowing pre-war Germany to respond to threats of economic blockade with its own, defend its ports and otherwise have more strategic moves from which to choose. Thus several bills around 1990 (immediately after Bismarck's ouster) led to the first massive buildup of the navy.⁸⁰

The problem lay in Britain's perception of Germany's move. A fleet capable of defending German ports would also be capable of attacking British shipping lanes, just as Jervis

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points out. Thus, following German build-up, an arms race scenario developed as detailed in the section on real world applications of game theory. The numbers on the chart below represent the preferred situation for each country. The higher the number, the better the situation for each state. For Germany, the best scenarios (positive gain) involved building up the fleet. Britain benefited most from maintaining its military superiority by whatever means necessary. The situation thus resulted in both nation’s increasing their navies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Build</th>
<th>Status quo</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Build</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1,4</td>
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Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, eventually responded to the German build-up with a whole new class of Dreadnoughts, because neither nation was capable of backing out of the escalation. Newspapers of the time were quick to point out the potential for war in this situation, as a cartoon in the German satirical paper *Simplicissimus* in 1912 depicted rival sailors juggling arms full of ships and asking each other, "How are we supposed to shake hands?"

\[\text{Wie sollen wir uns da die Hand geben?}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{81}}\text{ Artist unknown, "Karikatur zum Flottenwestrüssen", Simplicissimus (1912). This cartoon was distributed in a class hand-out several years ago.}\]
As the buildup of the German fleet was perceived as a direct challenge to Britain, the German leaders took great pains to hide its creation until it was able to compete openly with the British. Attempts were also made to obtain Britain's neutrality in the event of war, therefore allowing Germany to focus its strategic options upon the continent, but both of these efforts at preventing British defection were unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{82} Germany's leaders illustrated one of the most important strategies within game theory, the importance of predicting an opponent's actions, and were initially successful, playing upon Britain's reluctance to become involved in the growing conflict with threats and promises. Indeed Germany came terribly close to success with its offensive and Fischer believes that Britain almost intervened too late to prevent Germany's victory.\textsuperscript{83}

Germany's increased military expenditures, in the army as well as the navy, enabled it to employ a number of aggressive strategic moves prior to the outbreak of war which Germany did not previously possess. The threat of war and the promise of strangling blockades was very effective in causing other nations to meet German demands. Had Germany's gains not made Britain incredibly nervous because of possible German occupation of Belgian and French coastlines, Germany might have been able to continue along its course gaining more and more power.\textsuperscript{84} Germany's mistake may simply have been one of pressing an advantage too far. Up until this point, it had successfully played the game.

**The reasoning behind changing economic links**

The main purposes of the strategies enabled by military protection, besides national defense, amounted to additional branch moves. These strategies were aimed at reducing Germany's economic vulnerability by granting access to oversees markets and colonies to

\textsuperscript{82} For an analysis of this situation see Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911-1914* (New York: Norton, 1975), pp. 55-56.

\textsuperscript{83} Fischer, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{84} Fischer, pp. 174-175.
generate raw materials. The grand idea was the creation of Mitteleuropa, a "United States of Europe" aimed against the upstart America and controlled by Germany.\textsuperscript{85}

By broadening the scope of the nation's economic influence through increased access to overseas markets, Germany sought to open up a wide range of possibilities. Expanding the potential buyers of the nation's finished goods allowed Germany to escape the trap of being dependent on any one nation's consumers. This limited its adversaries' strength, because in the viewpoint of game theory, power is relative and one way to increase one's own primacy is to reduce the strategic options, and thereby the power, of others. Additionally, an extensive economic playground also opened the doors to political influence in the host country and granted Germany additional options in the game of statecraft.

The expansionist purpose of colonies followed the same conditions as increased overseas markets. Access to raw materials lent an even further industrializing Germany a degree of self-sufficiency that freed it from the influence of its neighbors. In addition to increasing Germany's options in the event of crisis, such as choosing to import grain from a colony rather than France in the event of rising tariffs, such actions limited the range of strategies available to France. A threat of raised tariffs was no longer of any influence. Although it was in both the Continent's and Germany's interest to have a customs union, it was also in the interest of Germany to be immune to outside pressures should it choose to go its own way or attempt to apply pressure within an alliance. Germany's growing dependence on the imports of raw materials was a direct threat to its power, limiting its options. This had to be changed, because it placed Germany too much at risk of being damaged by an opponent's defection, such as a blockade of German shipments.

\textsuperscript{85} For a good description on Germany's aims in this area, see Fischer, pp. 11-12, 137-138, 174-175 and Calleo, chapters 3-4.
The reasoning behind international community influence

The primary object of Germany's pursuit in the years before the First World War, never achieved, was Kaiser Wilhelm's plan to establish Mitteleuropa, a customs union on the Continent. Although some Realists claim that such economic interdependence could only lead to conflict and war, Germany's aims were to escape such a scenario by ensuring possession of sufficient power to prevent its falling victim to the machinations of others. With self-sufficient resources, it could leave the union at any time and, if it succeeded in dominating the new organization, could expand its already growing sphere of influence to include complete military and economic subjugation of the Continent. Political control could be established in time, but Wilhelm's government was unwilling or unable to wait and this may have been his downfall. Instead, Germany took the grand gamble and pursued the creation of a greater Vaterland by the sword.

Why would a nation wish to establish a Vaterland?

It is odd to consider the creation of a national identity as a strategic move, but if a branch move is considered to be a strategy that enables other strategies to be pursued within the framework of game theory, than the establishment of a greater Vaterland is the ultimate such move and the grand strategic objective of the three tactics previously discussed, military muscle, economic strength and international community. This Vaterland must be a place of safety, hence the need for military might; a place of prosperity, hence the stress on economic success; and an empire, which seeks to band all nationalities under one flag.

Security is the ultimate incentive for a nation's pursuit of primacy. This stems from a fear of defection and three rarely used strategic moves previously discussed can be used to address

86 For this view please refer to Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.:Addison-Wesley, 1979). There are others. I believe this is escapable, otherwise the current European Union would fill me with dread. The key is in the creation and preservation of peaceful means of resolving unavoidable disputes.

87 Balance-of-power theory (also to be found in Waltz) The theory states that weaker states will always "gang up" upon the stronger until equilibrium is achieved. I feel this theory is uncertain. The degree to which all the other states have "ganged up" against the U.S. to control its domination is limited.
this fear: selection, communication and identification. These three strategies give a *Vaterland* its highest degree of protection from betrayal and foster both stability and security. These two aims were the ultimate goals of Imperial Germany and continue to be the aims of contemporary Germany.

Selection strategy aims essentially at choosing moves for your opponent, to eliminate an opponent as a true adversary. In PD this can be demonstrated by allowing one actor to choose whichever pay-off it wishes. This signifies how opposing parts of a state may occasionally work at cross purposes, but rarely do they fear each other as they would another nation. The creation of a greater *Vaterland*, a German empire, would have allowed Imperial Germany to control its opponents.\(^{88}\) The creation of "buffer states" to ward off attack against the empire has been common through-out history, most recently by the Soviet Union in creating the Iron Curtain. Thus the fear of a surprise attack by the French would be greatly reduced if the French were constricted militarily and some territories incorporated into a German *Reich*.

Communication strategy closely relates to such an idea. The idea is that the better one is able to communicate with a neighbor, the better one is able to understand the motives behind their behavior and influence it. Understanding is key because successful use of strategy in game theory requires correct prediction of opponent's actions. By insuring the ability to communicate, one allows identification to occur. It may be assumed that a *Vaterland* would promote a common language and education (this would also spread the German ethos), with the goal of promoting better understanding and successful interpretation of moves.\(^{89}\)

Identification strategy entails causing one's adversary to establish an identity very similar to oneself. Thus, pursuing a cultural identity is an example of this strategy. Attempts to re-create nationality and establish similarities is an example. We fear and hate the enemy more than

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\(^{88}\) I use the subjunctive occasionally in this section, because Germany never succeeded in gaining these powers, although they were among the ultimate aims of the government.

\(^{89}\) Germany's Goethe Institute is an example of this policy. Germany has tried to extend its language and culture to many other countries in this manner.
ourselves. We hate what we cannot understand. By promoting a united cultural identity under the *Vaterland*, a greater sense of safety develops.

Imperial Germany's strategic goal of creating a *Vaterland* was pursued through the three branch moves of military strength, economic power and international influence. The achievement of a *Vaterland* would have been a further branch move, allowing the use of the three moves of selection, communication and identification. Each subsequent branch was used to further solidify Germany's goals of security and stability. Thus the reasoning behind the entire attempt can be mapped out as illustrated below, like a network of roots stretching toward hegemony.

![Diagram of German strategy]

**The attempt: Bismarckian era**

Germany's first attempt at hegemony had two distinct time periods. 1871-1890 was the Bismarckian era, characterized by many of the strategic moves already discussed. Bismarck maintained Germany's rise in status through a complex system of threats, promises and identification, as he constantly juggled nations against one another by simultaneously threatening alliance with an enemy, offering aid to another and seeking alliance with a third. All these moves were aimed at reducing opponent's options (one cannot invade a treaty partner legitimately) and keeping them off balance. These moves required the use of one of game theory's most significant principles, attempting to predict the actions of others.
Bismarck knew that Germany was not yet ready to challenge the World Powers, but Imanuel Geiss argues that Bismarck felt the nation could succeed if the attempt were made at the right time. His goal was to stall for time and create a new balance of power, therefore Germany would not be viewed as the lone aggressor. Bismarck's plan was fine in theory, in fact very sound under game theory, but ultimately could not be maintained for three reasons.

Kaiser Wilhelm's Putsch was the first reason that Bismarck's plan could not succeed. Only in his late twenties at the time of his coronation, he brought the youth embodied in the German ethos into power along with a dynamic drive for expansion and Germany's rightful "Stelle in der Sonne," or place in the sun. No longer content with Bismarck's policies, his first official action was to remove the aging pilot of German foreign policy. Action became more important, especially as Germany faced an economic crisis and Wilhelm's Weltpolitik was aimed at distracting the populace from concerns at home.

The second reason was the precariousness of the situation. Although Bismarck gained a justified reputation as the "grand statesman of Europe," his foreign policy required constant attention as other nations must constantly subtly be encouraged both to distrust one another and maintain alliances that were illogical. France and Russia should have been natural allies. They competed in few arenas, had no mutual borders and presented Germany with the possibility of a "war on two fronts." As nations generally follow the idea that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," keeping these two apart for so long was one of Bismarck's greatest accomplishments. Perhaps even Bismarck could not have maintained this situation indefinitely, but when he was pushed from office, the burden fell on less experienced shoulders.

The third reason relates to the theory of balance of power, which suggests that even Bismarck's brilliance as a statesman would not have been sufficient to establish this feat and that Germany would not have achieved a hegemony's role without war because of a leveling effect.

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91 Argued in Geiss, p. 78. Domestic politics may occasionally cause states to engage in foreign policy which is actually against the true national self-interest. This must be reflected in the pay-off matrix as a loss for the ruling government. I believe that Morgenthau would view this as an illustration of how national actions are a combination of self-interests and psychological forces.
The theory argues that weaker states will always "gang up" upon the stronger until equilibrium is achieved. Bismarck sought to avoid this by pursuing power slowly, but it is uncertain whether this could have succeeded.

**The attempt: Wilhelminian era**

German policy from 1890-1914 under Wilhelm was more aggressive, but followed much of the rational decision-making that game theory would predict. Much of the military build-up and naval confrontation with Britain was his doing. Wilhelm took great personal control over the nation's policies, believing he ruled by divine right. His advisors were also far less careful than Bismarck, letting treaties expire when they could have easily been renewed and creating an additional fear of defection in opposing states through rhetoric that advocated the principles of the German ethos. Germany's political leaders were not the only ones inflicted with the growing *Wille zur Macht*. Germany's teachers also began giving speeches that influenced the national spirit. Max Weber's speech at the Universität Freiburg in 1895 was one of the greatest examples:

> We will have to accept that the unification of Germany was nothing more than the foolish, senile prank of an aging nation, better left undone because of its cost, unless it is the beginning and not the end of German *Weltpolitik*.

The influence of education upon the young caused this rhetoric to slowly become ingrained in the populace. This was furthered by the same circular pattern which influenced the German ethos. This mood built until the international situation facing Germany made stasis inadvisable and the ethos made retreat unacceptable. Germany could not remain stationary. It had to

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92 This theory is fully explained in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
93 See Geiss for examples of this, p. 50.
94 Although his advisors were also guilty of this, Kaiser Wilhelm was probably the censurable. He often demonstrated a hyperbolic style in advocating Nietzschean assertiveness and action by Germany. Calleo describes this, p. 23.
advance or be defeated. Germany continued the three policies, already discussed, of military build-up, economic advancement and international influence until the outbreak of war.

The war itself will not be examined. It is enough to say that Germany failed in its grand risk. By 1914, the German leaders felt they were faced with an *Einkreisung*, encircled by enemies who were ready to attack the nation at any time.\(^{96}\) Germany felt it was thus faced with a choice, fall back into second power status and act placatingly or challenge the existing order by attacking first and take the grand risk. Imanuel Geiss concludes:

> Germany's position, in fact, amounted to one of a latent hegemonial power in Europe, whether it knew it or not, whether it wished it or not. This state of affairs was bound to create new suspicions and tensions. The future depended on Germany. Either it yielded to the temptation of converting its latent hegemony into an open one, or it remained satisfied with its present position.\(^{97}\)

Germany chose the former option. Had it remained in what Geiss calls its "present position," the theory of balance of power maintains that it would necessarily be pulled apart. The German ethos would also not let the nation retreat. Viewed through game theory's lens, Germany not only made the correct choice, but faced with an identical situation, would repeat it. Indeed Germany's fear of defection, inspired by France and Russia's alliance and re-armament, seems justifiable. Germany felt it had no choice. It became trapped because it was caught in-between positions. Like Nietzsche's *Seiltanzer*,\(^{98}\) it had to move forward or fall. Germany took the grand risk and went to war.

Germany's stated war aims illustrate that it pursued its primary security goals throughout the war. In the *September Programme* of 1914, the German Chancellor disclosed his provisional notes on the balance of power after an expected peace was declared. "The general aim of the war [is] security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time."\(^{99}\) War aims included: a weakened France and Russia, incapable of threatening Germany militarily; numerous

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\(^{96}\) Geiss describes this mood, p. 121.

\(^{97}\) Geiss, p. 12.

\(^{98}\) The tight-rope walker in *Also Sprach Zarathustra* was caught on the middle of the rope over an abyss. He did not move forward fast enough and fell to his death.

measures meant to secure German prominence in international affairs, such as the acquisition of colonies; and:

[The creation of] a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be formally equal, but in practice will be under German leadership and must stabilize Germany's economic dominance over 'Mitteleuropa'.

Note the three components, military and economic security with international influence achieved through a 'Mitteleuropa' economic union. Almost immediately after this peace plan was formalized, the German offensive met with crushing defeats and the war would go on for four years before a British blockade and American troops caused Germany to lose the war of attrition, but its goals remained always the same.

In this first attempt at the creation of a grand Vaterland, Germany failed. It tried to create an actual empire. Contemporary Germany faces many identical threats, because the fear of defection in the PD scenario which is the international environment remains unchanged. In its second attempt, Germany modified its original march on power and is trying to pursue security through the creation of an empire based not around itself, but around Europe. This new Vaterland is Europe, but the three components, military and economic security with international influence achieved through an economic union it controls remain the same. Germany is ending the century as it began, in quest of hegemony and security within Europe.

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100 Fischer, p. 104.
101 I say second attempt when referring to contemporary Germany's actions, because they follow the same reasoning in responding to the same fears as Imperial Germany. While Hitler's Third Reich also pursued an empire in Europe through many of the same means, it did so for slightly different purposes. My point is that Imperial German and contemporary German actions are not more aggressive than other nations'. The same argument can not easily be made about Hitler's actions.
European Union: The Second Attempt

Shall we have a German Europe or a European Germany?
- Thomas Mann

Any use of the phrase national self-interest has been avoided by contemporary German leaders for some fifty years. It brings to mind too many unpleasant memories of nationalism and National-Socialist, a natural result of the horrors of World War II. As Hans-Peter Schwarz points out, "After the catastrophe of the Third Reich, Germans underwent a reeducation process and have spent decades trying to establish themselves as good democrats; they shun nationalism as vigorously as born-again Christians shun sinners," but this attitude has changed in recent years. In the mid-80s, Helmut Kohl became the first German chancellor to appear in television commercials before a German flag and this simply marked the beginning of a quiet change in policy. By 1995, the German President was delivering keynote speeches that bluntly violated the taboo, asserting that:

One is now reading a great deal about the contradiction between a foreign policy based on interests and one based on responsibility. According to common views, realists create a policy of interest, idealists create a policy of responsibility. Actually German interests and German responsibilities to the world are the same thing.

Although this statement in itself does not appear that meaningful, such comments would not have been made as little as five years earlier. Germany was not allowed to pursue its own interests in an outright manner before the fall of communism. However since the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, Germany has begun to outwardly promote its own interests, just as it did in the Imperial era. Germany is ending the century as it began, in pursuit of its own security.

103 Detailed in Jacob Heilbrun, "Tomorrow's Germany," The National Interest (Summer 1994), pp. 44-53. Periodical database, Infotrack, ASAP, Article A15593283, p. 5 of 8. Some of Heilbrun's points are very interesting, but it should be noted that both National Interest and Heilbrun seem very reactionary.
104 Original German text may be found in President Roman Herzog's speech at the German Society for Foreign Policy on March 15, 1995, "Die Globalisierung der deutschen Aussenpolitik ist unvermeidlich." (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung @government.de)
In attempting to assert this claim, I will first briefly explore the difference between Cold War Germany and contemporary Germany. As in the previous chapter, I will then examine a number of ideas: the reasoning behind why contemporary Germany wishes to improve its standing in military muscle, economic links, international influence and Vaterland; how such actions remove some of the fear of defection and grant Germany more power; and how Germany is trying to pursue these branch moves. Two specific cases will also be examined, how Maastricht and the European Union are in Germany's self-interest and how Germany's actions in the former Yugoslavia demonstrate its growing independence. I hope to illustrate how contemporary Germany's fear of defection is causing it to take the same actions as Imperial Germany. Everything remains the same.

1945-1989

Despite a continual fear of nuclear war, the Cold War solved many enduring security problems between 1945-1989. As John Mearsheimer argues, the Cold War created blocs, East vs. West, and thus no mass of independent actors existed as in the beginning of the century. The Cold War actually created stability in Europe and that locked away many ethnic and national rivalries until the fall of communism. Additionally the nuclear shield and combat readiness provided by America solved most of Germany's other direct security concerns. Even the "German Problem" was answered, as the two Germanys lay divided for forty-five years, and the rest of Europe had less to fear.

During this time, Germany was not idle. As Timothy Garton Ash writes, "The quiet widening of the bounds of German power has been a central purpose of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic for more than 40 years." Germany has acted slowly. It began by solving its major security concern of the past two centuries by creating a new alliance with France through

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the European Coal and Steel Commission and the European Economic Community. Konrad Adenauer and Willie Brandt each pursued policies of *West-* and *Ostpolitik* aimed at reducing other security concerns by making other nations, both east and west, less likely to defect against the German state. Everything was done humbly and quietly, because various international agreements still bound Germany's options. Their country was divided; German soldiers were not allowed to operate outside of narrow NATO bounds; Germany was not even represented in the United Nations until 1973. If power is measured in available moves, Germany had very few, and a stable (albeit tense) Europe provided it with very little incentive to push its shackled boundaries.

1990-

Everything changed when the wall came down on November 9, 1989. Germany was reunited and within two years, well over a dozen new states had been established. A map of Europe now closely resembles a map of Europe after the First World War,\(^\text{107}\) a time infamous for its environmental instability. Germany shares a border with nine countries, more than any other member of the EU, and turmoil in Russia and many of the other former Communist countries forces Germany to be well aware of the fact that it lies in closer proximity to them than any other member of the Western alliance. Thus geopolitics results in Germany once again fearing a possible *Einkreisung*, or encirclement by enemies, and the United States does not stand where it once did. After the wall came down American troops in Europe were reduced to only a third of their previous levels. For these reasons, Germany feels more vulnerable now in some ways than it did before the collapse of Communism. Although Europe is primarily at peace (outside of the Balkans) and Germany has many allies, viewed through game theory the situation facing Germany remains the same. It is still caught in a PD and Germany must fear the defection of

others from the international community. Even if such defection does not result in a military
threat to Germany, refugees and the other effects of instability are a menace.

This situation Meirsheimer describes, closer to a Hobbesian State of Nature than anything
seen in Europe in the past fifty years, demands that Germany act or continually fear defection.
With the fall of the Wall came the return of Mitteleuropa.\textsuperscript{108} This time it is called the European
Union, but the basic reasoning remains the same. As W.R. Smyser notes:

This united Germany stands before us. It is different from the old Germany in
countless ways, whether in politics, economics, or strategy. But it is still
Germany. Therefore, the new German question must be examined in the light of
the past as well as the present. It must also be examined in the light of what the
new Germany is now trying to achieve.\textsuperscript{109}

Germany is trying to achieve security through the same means as it did at the beginning of the
century. Germany is once again trying to reduce its perceived vulnerability to outside threats by
establishing military muscle, changing economic links and promoting German participation in
international coalitions, with the goal of creating a new Vaterland. This time the Vaterland's
vessel is Europe, not Germany, but the ultimate goal: hegemony in Europe, with the object of
maintaining security, remains the same.

**The reasoning behind strengthening military muscle**

Although the number of German soldiers has actually declined since unification, German
military options have steadily increased. Germany currently possesses one of the most highly
trained and best-equipped armies in Europe.\textsuperscript{110} As before, increased military strength enables a
number of other moves by Germany, both in response to direct security threats and to promote
German interests abroad. I shall discuss both the threats faced by Germany and the steps it is
taking to address them.

\textsuperscript{108} For an argument on this theme, see James Kurth, "Germany and the Reemergence of Mitteleuropa," *Current
database, Infotrac, ASAP, Article A15954143, p. 4 of 10.
\textsuperscript{110} Both Ash and Heilbrun make this assertion, but regardless of its exact placement in European standings,
Germany maintains a very effective military.
**Threats to security**

The removal of Soviet troops from the former East Germany allows Germany to anticipate a major Russian offensive a few months in advance rather than only a few hours. However, this does not mean that the Russian threat has been removed. If anything, the imperial legacy of the Soviet Republic has been passed to an imperialist Russia which has intervened militarily in Moldova, Georgia, Chechnya and Tajikistan; has troops stationed in other former Republics, as along the Iranian and Afghan border; and has an increasing nationalist element which eyes an encroaching NATO with apprehension. Viewed in a PD, Germany fears a potential defection by Russia. As James Kurth describes, that "From a German perspective, it is clear that Russia will eventually reestablish sway over most of the territory of the former Soviet Union. As such, it can again pose a security threat to Germany."\(^{11}\) Even if Russia remains friendly and a nationalist megalomaniac does not succeed Yeltsin, any of the remaining former Soviet Republics (particularly Ukraine, large, militarized, nearby and nuclear) could easily become a threat. As argued by Layne in the game theory chapter, the important thing is not a neighbor's intentions, but its capabilities.\(^{12}\) The fear is not so much present as future, but every heart problem affecting Boris Yeltsin makes Western governments nervous.

Germany faces this exposure because it is a front-line state and any turmoil in the eastern half of Europe directly affects it. For instance, in just two years (1992-1994) Germany accepted over one million refugees, primarily from Turkey and the Balkans, the centers of the latest conflicts.\(^{13}\) Such indirect effects are not the only danger. Poland is now only an hour's drive from Berlin by car, but it is only a few minutes flight by military jet. The fear is not necessarily that a threat presently exists, but that it could exist if one of the newly freed nations regresses and defects from Europe, falling into either tyranny, aggression or anarchy. As recent history demonstrates, as in Albania, a nation is unlikely to remain stable if it is not prosperous. For

\(^{11}\) Kurth, p. 384.

\(^{12}\) Layne, p. 253.

\(^{13}\) Figures from Jacob Heilbrun, "Tomorrow's Germany"
Germany to feel any real degree of security as a Western nation, it must have what most other members of the Western alliance enjoy, the countries to the east of it must be Western.\textsuperscript{114} Without this situation, Germany fears another \textit{Einkreisung}. It is for this reason that Germany has been so adamant about welcoming Eastern countries into NATO and the EU. Germany feels that such moves will hasten their "Westernization" and therefore both prosperity and stability.

**Military moves to address these threats**

Unlike Imperial Germany, contemporary Germany is not using primarily military means to solve the threats to its security. However, while it is not building up a large army so as to invade Poland, it is making two distinct moves toward furthering its power in the military arena. It is eliminating the limitations on the \textit{Bundeswehr} and opening the way for possession of nuclear weapons. Both moves are aimed at increasing its foreign policy influence.

Since its conception, federal Germany has had severe limitations placed on its army, both by outside treaties and its own constitution. It was forbidden to participate in any action outside of the NATO countries. This has changed since unification. Although the Two-Plus-Four agreement renewed a German pledge not to possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and forbade a NATO presence in the five new \textit{Bundesländer}, it also lifted some of the other restrictions. The final obstacles to outside deployment remained the German constitution and continued public horror at the use of the \textit{Wehrmacht} under Hitler. The German government has adopted a different argument in the past five years to address these concerns. Elizabeth Pond analyzes the new government argument as follows:

Precisely because the SS and Wehrmacht committed atrocities in the past, it reasons, Germany cannot remain neutral when decency and peace are threatened in the present. Germany is too big and has too large a claim on its conscience to abstain in the world.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} Ash makes this brilliant point in his piece. His argument is that democratic, Western nations find it more comforting to have stable, Western-style neighbors on all sides. These nations believe that Western-style nations are less likely to defect from their peers.

The German Constitutional Court agreed with this argument, as did the German public. More than 75 percent of a recent poll's respondents supported the use of German armed forces abroad for humanitarian or peace-keeping missions to prevent genocide, defend allies or block the proliferation of nuclear or chemical weapons. On July 12, 1994 the Court approved the use of the Bundeswehr outside of NATO so long as it was approved by the Bundestag and guided by an international organization such as NATO or the UN. These new-found freedoms have enabled Germany to act concretely to pursue its foreign policy objectives, such as promoting stability in Europe through peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. 4000 German troops participate in IFOR in the former Yugoslavia and other German forces have participated in UN missions in Georgia, Cambodia and Somalia. The German nation can no longer be accused of "freeloading" by its allies in the peace-keeping arena.

Additionally, the German military structure has changed. Until unification, Germany was not allowed direct operational control over the Bundeswehr. It has now reestablished a Führungs­kommando, a general staff, creating a national command and control structure, thus regaining command of its own army from NATO. The German military has even demanded command positions in NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps, something which they were formerly denied. All these moves allow Germany to pursue its own interests. In fact, a new military guidebook originally contained phrases such as the military's purpose in protecting the German interests in "maintaining free world trade and unobstructed access to markets and raw materials in the entire world" before they were struck by the Foreign Ministry. A powerful, active army under the direct control of the German government allows Germany several more options in pursuing its foreign policy interests, as well as limiting the power of other nations over Germany. The reasoning is much the same as in Wilhelm's day.

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118 Cited in Jacob Heilbrun, "Tomorrow's Germany", pp 4-5 of 8. Once again it should be noted that Heilbrun is very reactionary, but his evidence may be considered if questioned heavily. If true, this makes the Bundeswehr's new role very similar to that of the Imperial German navy in protecting economic access.
Germany is bound by two treaties never to pursue nuclear weapons, the Two-Plus-Four agreement and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, having some possession of the nuclear trigger allows Germany a measure of security should the United States remove its nuclear shield. In each treaty, Germany has given itself an "out." Although Germany signed the agreement that extended the NPT indefinitely, it attached diplomatic notes to its ratification documents that stated that Bonn was "convinced that no stipulation in the Treaty can be construed to hinder the further development of European unification, especially the creation of a European Union with appropriate capabilities."119 and under Article 10, any member whose "supreme interests" were in jeopardy was free to quit the treaty. Germany's escape clause from the Two-Plus-Four is not to acquire weapons independently, but establish a common European nuclear defense, a proposal which Jacques Chirac suggested two years ago and was labeled by a cautious German Foreign Minister as a very "interesting" idea. A Germany attempting to maintain the core of the EU which is the German/French alliance has quietly begun moves toward such an arrangement.120 One of the main incentives may be the obvious connection to the UN Security Council, which has no non-nuclear members and which Germany has continually expressed desire to join. Just as a grand navy was a prerequisite to join the ranks of the Great Powers in the early twentieth century, control over nuclear weapons may be viewed as the contemporary equivalent.

**The reasoning behind changing economic links**

Many of Germany's defensive moves at the beginning of the century were aimed at protecting its economy, particularly its imports and exports. The situation now is much the same. Germany is the world's third biggest economy, second biggest exporter and relies on exports to supply one third of its jobs.121 Today, instead of needing to defend its importation of raw materials as under Wilhelm, Germany is finding it necessary to protect its export markets.

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120 For a complete discussion on this topic, see Hibbs' article
Germany was able to industrialize so rapidly in part because it learned from those countries who had gone before (most notably Britain) and created a new infrastructure and technological base which allowed it to function more efficiently than its predecessors. In this same way, the Asian threats of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have learned from the United States and Germany and improved upon their techniques. German products are becoming increasingly less competitive.

Germany must try to remain competitive, but, as in Imperial times, is also seeking to establish concrete economic links. Previously they sought to set up colonies abroad. Today Germany seeks to set up a Wirtschaftsraum, a German economic realm, in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe. The new democracies in Europe already maintain over one third of all their trade with Germany and Germany is trying to increase this preference to its products. In some ways the Deutschmark is the new Prussian army, as Germany has poured billions of Deutschmarks of investment into the new democracies. Such moves not only create a measure of dependence on Germany and create clear economic benefits, but enable Germany to use pressure to sway the other nations' policies. This is a quintessential branch move. In addition, Germany sees such measures as helping to contain nationalistic elements and political instability through economic prosperity. The biggest recipients of this attention are the Visegrad Four (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), which would offer Germany an immense buffer zone for direct security threats if they were welcomed into the West, completely enclosing Germany's eastern border.

The reasoning behind international community influence

As mentioned previously, the unification of Germany has led to a return of Mitteleuropa. However instead of a German Europe, another Reich, the new goal is a European Germany and a

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122 Berghahn, Part I: Economy, pp. 1-42.
123 Kurth discusses this, p. 384.
124 Figures from Schwarz, p. 11 of 15.
125 Kurth points out this fact also, p. 384.
European Empire. This is the new *Vaterland*. This does not mean that the main goals have changed, simply that they have been moved to a new arena. In the contemporary world there exist several organizations through which Germany may exert international influence which did not exist at the beginning of the century. The most notable are the United Nations and its Security Council, but Germany has expanded its influence in other areas as well.

One of the most concrete forms of international influence today is the Security Council and it is not surprising that one of Germany's main goals is a permanent seat. This move would allow Germany an incredible range of powers in terms of projecting its opinion on international issues. As it stands, Germany has just rotated out of the Council and is now no more than a prominent member of the General Assembly. While Germany is not in the league of the United States or even Russia, viewed impartially, the only reason that France would belong on the Council instead of Germany is nuclear capability. This is one of the reasons that Germany might wish to have some portion of control over the button.

Germany advocates an increase in both the number of permanent and non-permanent seats of the Council, giving the new permanent members the same powers and responsibilities as the old (including the veto). Additionally, Germany would like to have the Council reflect the growing number of countries in the world and make the proceedings more transparent and democratic.¹²⁶ These moves are two-fold. By admitting Germany onto the Council, Germany gains more power and by limiting the power of the present Council (possibly by pressing to remove the veto if they do not receive it), Germany's position, relative to the other powers, is raised. France would no longer have an insurmountable political advantage. By admitting non-nuclear members to the exclusive club, the shift in world power from nuclear weapons to economics would be even more pronounced (as detailed in the chapter on game theory), to the direct benefit of Germany.

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¹²⁶ From a report marking the sixth anniversary of the German unification on October 3, 1996, "Part II: Germany in the United Nations." (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung @government.de)
Additionally Germany has long pursued more direct ties to the East than any other European country. Ostpolitik continues, as Germany is the only European power with embassies in all of the former Soviet republics. When Eastern European people were asked in the EU’s 1995 opinion survey where their future lay, a significant number wrote-in 'Germany' even though the choice was simply 'EU vs USA'. Germany has rapidly become a nation of great political clout as Elizabeth Pond describes:

In one not untypical week in the spring of 1995 the Italian and Thai prime ministers, the South Korean president, and the Russian minister of culture all visited Germany; Foreign Minister Kinkel helped broker an agreement in Bonn between Muslim and Croat officials...; Chancellor Kohl announced a DM50-million program to eradicate child labor around the world; Kohl helped stabilize the franc during exchange rate turbulence by praising the strength of the French economy; and Defense Minister Volker Ruhe was in the United States with his American, British, and French counterparts to coordinate strategy on Yugoslavia and NATO expansion...In addition, Kinkel and the troika of EU foreign ministers...got Yeltsin to accept a permanent Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mediation mission to the secessionist republic of Chechnya, in return for unfreezing an EU-Russian trade pact; and media continued to dissect a middleman attempt by Germany to secure release of an Israeli pilot held for nine years in Iran.

Germany has already achieved a great deal of international influence and it desires more. Please note that most of the German actions listed above depend greatly upon Germany’s recently increased military and economic influence in world affairs, i.e. Germany’s participation in IFOR allows Defense Minister Ruhe to participate in the Yugoslavian strategic talks mentioned above. The moves it makes available with such influence, such as encouraging global efforts to promote prosperity and peace, directly affect Germany, by reducing influxes of refugees, preventing wars and promoting universal well-being. The main objective of Germany's drive in this area is the creation of a new federalized Europe. One German politician even stated at the first meeting of

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127 Mentioned in Jacob Heilbrun, "Springtime: Germany's newfound strength", p.4 of 5.
128 Elizabeth Pond, "Germany finds its niche as a regional power", p. 13 of 15. The numbers ranged up to nearly 10 percent of the respondents in Hungary, with significant numbers in several other countries. No other single country was added in measurable amounts.
129 Elizabeth Pond, "Germany finds its niche as a regional power", p. 8 of 15.
the Bundestag after unification that the new state was merely a "transitional stage since we intend for it to be absorbed in a United States of Europe." While an extreme view, it is not uncommon, and Mitteleuropa and the German Vaterland have become encompassed in the European Union.

**Why would Germany wish to establish a Vaterland?**

After considering the idea of a Wilhelmian Mitteleuropa and the quote by Thomas Mann at the beginning of this chapter, it becomes obvious that the European Union is not a terribly modern invention. The EU began steam-rolling after German reunification and will be examined in terms of the Maastricht treaty in the next section. For now, let us examine why a European Union is in Germany's interest. Why should Germany, after struggling to recapture its autonomy, be willing to throw it in again, even surrendering its beloved Deutschmark, one of the most stable currencies in the world?

As before, the establishment of a greater Vaterland is the ultimate branch move and the grand strategic objective of the three tactics previously discussed, military muscle, economic strength and international community. This Vaterland is a place of safety, hence military might; a place of prosperity, hence economic success; and an empire, which seeks to band all nationalities under one flag. It is not a matter of Germany surrendering itself completely. Indeed Klaus Goetz argues that "the Europeanisation of the German state makes the search for the national, as opposed to the European interest, a fruitless task. The national and the European interest have become fused to a degree that makes their separate consideration increasingly impossible." Germany needs to achieve a united Europe for its own military and economic security concerns and it is willing to give up some measure of its autonomy; it is also in the

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130 Quoted in Schwarz, p. 2 of 15.
131 I will argue later that Maastricht was a direct result of German unification
interest of Europe itself. Germany is pursuing Europe for these reasons and believes it can
dominate the new creation culturally and thereby preserve its own heritage.

Additionally, Germany has been using the moves of selection, communication and
identification to advance these aims. Selection strategy encourages Germany to form "buffer
states" around itself for protection, exactly as it seeks to do by expanding the EU eastward.
Communication strategy is pursued by teaching the German language to these new entrants and
ensuring that German companies play a huge role in their development. Most importantly,
identification strategy allows Germany to pursue a Germanization of the new Vaterland by
spreading German culture, especially in the new democracies.

It is not a coincidence, after reviewing the idea of the German ethos and its
conceptualization in Faust, that the German program for promoting its culture abroad is known
as the Goethe Institut. Just as Adenauer's Westpolitik sought to turn Germany into a "magnet"
that drew Eastern Europe to it through social and cultural forces, present-day Germany sees itself
as the center of Europe (both geographically and culturally) and believes it can draw in the rest of
Europe. In a speech before the Bundestag, Chancellor Kohl stated that Germany should try to
have as many youth exchanges as possible, teach as many people German as can be arranged
(particularly in Eastern Europe, Germany's new Wirtschaftsraum) and continually emphasize
Europe's common bonds of culture (he mentions Faust in particular). 133 Kohl aims to instill
enough of Germany into Europe that it cannot be lost in the mix, by continuing to emphasize the
education of youth in German culture and language both at home and abroad. By strengthening
Europe's cultural identity, Kohl hopes to strengthen Germany's and in strengthening Europe's
appeal as an economic location, he seeks to strengthen Germany's as well. Thus a European
empire would only aid Germany and, in consideration of the fact that the EU, currently almost
entirely an economic union, will have its economic center in Frankfurt, it is easy to see how
Germany could dominate the organization, particularly if the Eastern nations, with their

133 Original German text may be found in Chancellor Helmut Kohl's speech before the Bundestag on June 13, 1996
(Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung @government.de)
dependence on Germany, join the Union. Culturally, the fact that the national anthem of the EU is Beethoven's "Ode to Joy," a universal overture of peace and happiness (with German text), seems a symbolic representation that the cultural heart of Europe will remain Germany. As a final addition, by integrating itself in Europe, Germany loosens the bonds imposed on it simply because it is Germany, the "golden handcuffs" that will be identified when considering Maastricht. All these factors encourage German leaders to believe that its best strategic option in the face of security threats is European unification. Once again, Germany's actions toward security may be viewed as a network of roots, leading to ever-increasing options.

The attempt: a European Germany AND a German Europe

Germany has tried to secure its borders through military strength, economic domination and influence in international organizations in an attempt to secure itself as Europe's hegemon and establish a "United States of Europe." I will focus on two case studies, the Maastricht treaty as an explanation for the EU in terms of Germany's interests and the disintegration of Yugoslavia as an example of Germany's increasingly pervasive reentrance onto the world stage.

A brief look at Maastricht as a political response to German unification
The European Union can be seen as serving three strategic goals for Germany. The first, preventing possible defection by promoting stability and prosperity in Europe, has already been advanced. The remaining two, ending concern about the "German Problem" and releasing Germany from its international constraints, are connected. How Germany has attempted to overcome these problems is best illustrated by the Maastricht treaty, which was a political response to German unification and the end of the Cold War. The agreement resulted in a strategic advantage for Germany based on the available choices.\textsuperscript{134}

The prospect of a united Germany filled many European leaders with dread and it was felt that only by integrating a unified Germany firmly within a united Europe could it be prevented from pursuing an independent course. This view was held most strongly by the president of the EC, who argued that a federal Europe was "the only satisfactory and acceptable response to the German question."\textsuperscript{135} For its part, the German government was well aware of these fears and Kohl felt that integration into Europe was a price to be paid for reunification.\textsuperscript{136} Thus Germany received the blessings (albeit gingerly) of its neighbors to unification and France received the unconditional support of Germany in pursuit of integration. The "German Problem" was not ended, but a mechanism was established by which it could be resolved.

For its part, by submitting itself to Europe, Germany regained a measure of freedom. Ash makes the point well:

> But the paradoxical effect of this readiness to surrender sovereignty was to convince Germany's key allies and partners that Germany could again be trusted with full sovereignty. It was by laying on the golden handcuffs that Germany set itself free.\textsuperscript{137}

Along each step of its unification and integration, imposed restrictions upon Germany have been relaxed. It is now free to utilize and command its own military, continue to pursue economic

\textsuperscript{134} This is well argued by Michael J. Baun, "The Maastricht Treaty as high politics: Germany, France, and European Integration," \textit{Political Science Quarterly}, (Winter 1995), pp. 605-625. Periodical database, Infotraf, ASAP, Article A18074732.

\textsuperscript{135} Cited in Baun, p. 4 of 22.

\textsuperscript{136} Original German text may be found in Chancellor Helmut Kohl's speech before the Bundestag on May 10, 1990 (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung @government.de)

\textsuperscript{137} Ash, p. 5 of 10.
interests (it has been able to do this all along) and begin to exert even more pressure politically both regionally and globally. In this way, Germany has actually gained power by limiting itself, just as Jon Elster argues that Ulysses did in tying himself to the mast before facing the sirens.\footnote{Jon Elster, *Ulysses and the Sirens* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge, 1979), Chapter II.8.} It is ironic that this process will only be complete after Germany has entered fully into a federalized Europe, but the German leaders and the German people are pursuing Europe as the most viable means of ensuring their own security in a Hobbesian environment.

Germany had other options, but chose to put on the “golden handcuffs” because, as Schelling would argue, “One constrains the partner’s choice by constraining one’s own behavior.”\footnote{Schelling, p. 13.} Germany could have continued along an independent path, but this would have resulted in mistrust directed against Germany and made the risk of defection more likely. Even if Germany had pursued an alliance limited to the Benelux countries and France, it would have made a number of other neighbors very uneasy. This would also not have helped satisfy Germany’s need for a stable, prosperous Europe. Among the available choices, European integration was the best available option for Germany.\footnote{I would also like to note that it led to a strategic advantage for both sides. Although I believe that Germany will dominate the EU, this does not mean that other participants will not benefit, simply that their pay-offs may not be as high.}

**The Balkan crisis as an example of Germany’s new-found political influence**

Germany’s role in the present Balkan conflict has historical ties leading back to the beginning of the century. Germany supported its Austro-Hungarian ally in its invasion of Serbia during the First World War and during the second War, German soldiers and the Ustachi, the military of the Croatian puppet state founded by the Nazis, mounted a genocidal campaign against the Serbs and other groups throughout Yugoslavia. Thus the region has a long history of German intervention and this continues into the modern era. Germany strongly supported the break-away nations of Yugoslavia and in doing so, acted unlike it had in nearly fifty years, standing up against its European and American allies.
Acting in this manner was in Germany’s self-interest in three ways, economically, culturally and politically. It was concerned primarily with its closest neighbors among the breakaway republics, Slovenia and Croatia. Just as Germany has pursued a Wirtschaftsraum, or economic realm, in the other former communist countries of Eastern Europe, Germany saw the advantages of having such ties with its former Balkan allies. Helping these nations Westernize, thus ensuring German influence in their development, would expand the Wirtschaftsraum to ports on the Mediterranean. Beyond this, as Kurth argues, “Germany acted out of economic interest but even more because of cultural tradition (an understanding that Croatia and Slovenia were part of the same Catholic civilization as southern Germany).”\textsuperscript{141} Germany aided those allies which were most like it, partially because such neighbors are less likely to come into conflict and possible defection. So just like the Visegrad Four, with their historical, geographical and cultural connections to Germany, Croatia and Slovenia were recognized by the German government because doing so was seen as a way to prevent their possible alignment against Germany.

Germany’s main goal in this area, however, was political influence. As has already been illustrated, Germany has been quietly gaining strength for years, but until this point had been unwilling to challenge its powerful allies, such as the United States and Britain. As Moran describes, “the reunified German state lately has stepped out of World War II’s shadow and bluntly asserted its sovereignty...Bonn’s unsettling independent thrust became apparent in West Germany’s last days, when Kohl and Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev struck a deal on the departure of the USSR’s forces from East Germany”\textsuperscript{142} Thus it is shown again how Germany since the fall of the Berlin Wall has strengthened its resolve to involve itself in world affairs.

Germany used its new-found political clout to accomplish this goal, partially because power which is never used may not be viewed as a believable threat. Thus if Germany wished to make strategic moves involving threats, promises or enforcement, it had to make its resolve clear in this or a similar situation. This situation was convenient for Germany to make such a

\textsuperscript{141} Kurth, p. 385.
statement because of its economic and cultural ties to Croatia and Slovenia. Essentially, for Germany to rise to a position of primacy within the European Union, it had to insure that its interest would be obeyed by others. Germany’s strategic advantage lay in maintaining its resolve to recognize the break-away republics even after other nations expressed their disapproval, forcing the other European nations to either capitulate or risk European unity. Germany could have chosen otherwise, but by backing down would have illustrated their utter dependence on other nations and thereby prevented its quest to primacy.

Germany’s actions in Yugoslavia were a risk, essentially betting that it had already established enough primacy within the Union to prevent the EU from falling apart when it stood firm against its allies. Germany engaged in a surprise defection from the rest of Europe, received its pay-off and then fell back into the fold. In doing so it demonstrated that Germany is no longer utterly dependent upon the security shield of other nations and is reaching the position of a hegemon in Europe, capable of pursuing its own interests and dominating the Continent. Germany is well on its way toward primacy.
Conclusion: The More Things Change

Deutschland,
Deutschland,
Über alles,
Über alles in der Welt.

Germany,
Germany,
As the highest,
As the highest in the world.

-Stanza of German national anthem\textsuperscript{143}
(no longer sung when played)

Game theory advances a number of claims in international relations, but the most pressing is that the demands of the State of Nature upon the international community remain constant. If the international system is viewed as a PD, pursuit of self-interest created, in part, by a fear of defection will always remain. Although the world has changed radically in the past century, German foreign policy is pursuing the same goals at the end of the century as it did in the beginning. Germany has tried to reduce its perceived vulnerability to defection through military strength, economic domination and influence in international organizations, all in an attempt to become Europe's hegemon. Germany is ending the century as it began, in pursuit of international primacy, and it is obeying the central ideas of game theory in its quest. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Germany, faced with similar threats and similar options has made similar choices. Although the reasoning behind each era's strategic moves has already been examined, a brief, concrete comparison between the two may help cement my claim that the strategic moves used in pursuing its policies are identical in many ways.

Military threats and countermeasures

The threats to Germany now are very similar to those that faced Imperial Germany. The threat of defection is very real, particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics. This defection is not limited to invasion. It may take the form of economic blocks or domestic

\textsuperscript{143} English translation my own
turmoil that results in refugees. This fear is not necessarily a reaction to the present situation, but as many of game theory's commentators, such as Jervis and Lipson, point out, it is the POTENTIAL threat which is important. Although the Einkreisung is not as pressing as before (France is unlikely to invade), Germany still feels a measure of encirclement as the EU's major front-line state in the East. It now wants stable, prosperous Western nations on all its borders.

In previous times, the German government built up an huge military complex in response to this fear of defection, either to defend its borders or to attack and remove the threat entirely. Today, the D-mark has replaced the cannon and the renewed military is authorized to help maintain stability in other regions, not conquer them. However, the aim of such actions, removing the threat to security, remains the same.

Under Wilhelm, a grand navy was a sign of a Great Power. Beyond its practical use, Germany sought to create a navy so as to assume its "Stelle in der Sonne." Today's conceivable (but quiet) pursuit of nuclear controls is much the same. Partial German control over a common European nuclear defense will give Germany its missing component of the modern power formula and perhaps allow it to strengthen its argument toward entrance to the Security Council.

**Economic threats and countermeasures**

Imperial Germany's main economic goals were to establish an extensive economic playground and thereby ensure both export and import markets. It feared that a defection by its competitors could block its markets. Today, Germany's export markets are similarly threatened, this time by the Pacific Rim. As before, Germany is trying to establish colonies of a sort, turning Eastern Europe into a guaranteed market for its products, a source of labor and a bastion of raw materials. Additionally, this promotes stability in these newly democratized regions and thereby helps reduce Germany's security fears. This is a new application for the modern era, a creation of advanced technology (see the section on game theory and the effect of nuclear weapons on the international environment) but simply represents a shift from military to economic (but still aggressive) means. The basic situation remains the same.
Growing international influence

Although established international organizations were few in the Imperial days, Germany always tried to deal with many other countries. The degree to which Germany is now courted by international concerns would impress even Bismarck. Maintaining such ties allows Germany to engage in strategic moves with other states, such as threats and promises. Additionally if one looks at the German war aims in the September Programme and compares the Mitteleuropa it advocates with the European Union, the comparison is striking.

[The creation of] a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be formally equal, but in practice will be under German leadership and must stabilize Germany's economic dominance over 'Mitteleuropa'.

The idea of the EU is not a new one. Although today's EU has a common constitutional authority, this simply illustrates that the shift has gone from a German Reich to a European Empire. Germany will dominate the European Union. This seems quite natural as it is the largest participant in population, economic strength and political clout, as well as occupying the center of Europe geographically and (some would say) culturally. Germany will not be a world hegemon like the United States, but it will be Europe's hegemon. This degree of primacy will help reduce other nations' power over Germany.

Vaterland as a goal

The key goal of the creation of Vaterland is stability and prosperity with shared cultural values. In previous times, Germany tried to unite the German people under a common heritage by espousing "German values" and sought to encompass parts of the Czech Republic, Poland, France, Austria and the Benelux counties. Today's German leaders, especially Kohl, again repeatedly emphasize Europe's shared cultural values as they try to unite it. In the September

144 Fischer, p. 104.
Programme, Germany's main goal was "security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time." For this reason Germany is not satisfied with a Western European Union. It wants Western neighbors on its east. Stability is the most concrete form of ensuring Germany's long-term security and reducing its fear of defection, thus it turns to a European Vaterland, a European empire. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

**Germany's four contemporary foreign policy goals**

In order to pursue its ultimate goal of security, Germany must continue its present moves and pursue four foreign policy goals into the immediate future. Germany needs to aid Russia; hold onto American involvement; create a European system; and expand it to the east. Only after achieving this goals will it have any degree of real security and remove much of the risk of defection.\(^{146}\)

The reasoning behind special relations with Russia is obvious. It has been the most direct threat to German security for fifty years and the fall of communism has merely eased tensions, not removed them. A Russia in economic chaos is dangerous; unpaid soldiers with hungry families and access to the Soviet Union's vast military arsenal are a direct threat to Germany. The former Yugoslavia or Albania, while tragedies, cannot pose such a large-scale military threat to their neighbors. Russia is entirely different and geopolitics makes it far more important to Germany than other NATO countries. For this reason, Kohl has paid particular attention to Russia. In the three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany gave more than $52 billion in aid to Russia and another $25 billion to other states in Eastern Europe.\(^{147}\) These policies have continued in the years since and the concessions have not been merely economic. While Kohl endorsed allowing former Warsaw Pact members to join NATO's Partnership for Peace, he vetoed recommendations that they be offered full membership and offered Russia an important

\(^{145}\) Ibid, p. 103.  
\(^{146}\) These goals for Germany are not original and are discussed in slightly different forms in the works of both Pond and Smyser, among others.  
\(^{147}\) Figures from Smyser, p. 4 of 10.
role as an observer. Kohl has even advocated Russian membership in the G-7, at least in political discussions. These are concrete strategic steps to ensure that Russia does not defect from the new order and fall back on old patterns. A defection by Russia would result in a negative pay-off for both countries and Germany is thus willing to pay to prevent that scenario.

In addition to maintaining relations with Russia, Germany needs to insure that the United States does not retreat further from Europe. In the past few years, German officials have made great efforts to remind the United States of the role it played during the Cold War, protecting Germany as a divided country with a divided capital. The Germans do not want the Americans to leave and, in this area, have been willing to offend their Russian and French friends. The United States plays two important roles for Germany within Europe. First, the United States has occupied the true command position within NATO since its conception and it remains difficult for the European countries to act without American guidance, as the intervention in Yugoslavia demonstrated. Although Germany is trying to surmount this obstacle by integrating its officers into high ranking positions and gaining expertise thereby, it knows that Europe is not yet ready to cast aside fifty years of cooperation and dependence and still needs an American shield in the event of a massive defection by the former Soviet republics. Secondly, Germany needs an American presence to keep Europe appeased. The "German Problem" has not disappeared in the mind's of some and Germany's neighbors still look upon a reunited Germany with some apprehension. The German government realizes that it must make steps to reassure Europe of its commitment to continental unity (as it did at Maastricht) and a continued American safeguard helps assure Europeans that they will not be left alone with a powerful Germany. Thus a continued American presence makes the rest of Europe less likely to pursue policies aimed at safe-guarding a German defection and pursuing this aim lies in German's interest.

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148 Smyser, p. 4 of 10.  
149 Especially various comments by Klaus Kinkel, including "U.S.-German relations: cooperative discussion (transcript)," US Department of State Dispatch, (May 13, 1996), p. 243.  
150 The Russians have asked that all U.S. troops be removed from Germany. France would like the Western European Union to supply a European army to provide for its defense and replace NATO. Germany has thrown its support behind Washington in this area, trying not to anger its other friends too much in the process.  
151 Discussed in Elizabeth Pond, "Germany finds its niche as a regional power", p. 5 of 15.
With the Cold War ended, many European leaders see this euphoric time as an opportunity to prevent the reemergence of the nationalistic hostilities that have long haunted Europe. Germany offers "the idea of a united Europe which would be able to tame the German tiger," while at the same time hoping that the other European nations allow themselves to be tamed by integration, reducing the fear of defection as much as possible. A true European federation will help promote stability and prosperity throughout Europe, a key desire of Germany. For these reasons, Germany has been the most ardent supporter of true integration, pushing the single currency relentlessly, maintaining that most vetoes on common action should be removed and moving to cut unreasonable farm subsidies. All because it feels that only pan-Europeanism can keep ruinous nationalism from rising again.

Extending the EU to the east is both in Germany's and Europe's interest. Germany feels that prosperous, democratic states on its border will be less likely to fall victim to old habits. George Soros makes the point well when describing this POTENTIAL risk of defection:

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe desperately need to get closer to the European Union. Although communism is well and truly dead, the patterns of thought and behavior learned in a closed society linger, and the institutions and attitudes of an open society are not yet firmly established. Without the prospect of joining the open society of Europe, the countries of the region could fall back on the kinds of arrangements they are familiar with. Since communism is no longer acceptable, they are liable to turn to some form of nationalism.

The incentive is the same for the rest of Europe, although Germany is closer geographically. The problems presented by unrest in Europe (such as in the Balkans) affect everyone and public scandalization at the outbreak of war has once again jump-started integration. Germany (and Europe) will feel less fear of Einkreisung and solve the dilemma faced by Germany at the beginning of the century.

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153 Elizabeth Pond, "Germany new foreign policy: looking both east and west", p. 3 of 6.

154 Soros, p. 4 of 6.

155 Ash points out a change in public attitude toward Europe since the Balkan crisis peaked.
With these four goals met, through the various strategic moves of military, economic and international strength, Germany will have attained the measure of security that is has been lacking and find in Europe a new *Vaterland*. By tying itself so firmly to Europe, Germany will finally have avoided the "German Problem," that a prosperous, powerful Germany will be a threat to its neighbors and the balance of power. These goals will give Germany its greatest measure of security against defection in the competitive, anarchic world community.

**The differences today from Germany's past**

The main difference between each era quest for hegemony is that Germany's modern quest is peaceful. It has learned from its past experiences and mixture of ideologies and thus illustrates Morgenthau's point that nation's tactics may change in the strategic pursuit of power. Although Germany, like most other states, maintains and seeks to increase military options as a security measure (and indeed, the previously discussed military moves have been essential to fulfilling German aims), today's quest for an empire is done in the classroom and at diplomatic conferences. As W.R. Smyser observes:

> The fact that Germany is acting not by military means but by diplomacy, money, and carefully calculated transformations of existing organizations makes the effort the more extraordinary. ... The new Germany will achieve far more by working with others than the German General Staff ever achieved against them.\(^{156}\)

Although Germany is pursuing its own interests by promoting an integrated Europe, this is not a uniquely aggressive move, a visible return of the "German Problem." As David Calleo reasons, "No one would bother to accuse the French of pursuing their national interests in their European policy. Everyone would take it for granted."\(^{157}\) Unlike most of recorded European history, this revolution has not had much beyond the saber-rattling seen in the Yugoslav crisis.

The other key difference has more to do with the change in German policy of the past few years rather than the past century. Although the international dilemma of the State of Nature

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156 Smyser, p. 6 of 10.
remains constant, Germany's situation within it has not. This century has seen radical changes in German primacy, from the heights of empire in the World Wars to the lows following each conflict. Today's change has been more gradual. As Germany has slowly regained autonomy and its rightful place in the international community over the past fifty years, it expects to be treated as an equal, not a supplicant. This change in relations has been most notable between Germany and France, with Kohl's government willing to state concretely in recent years that there will be no more "kow-towing." Furthermore, although Germany wishes to remain solid allies with the United States, Germany has acquired the recent ability to say 'no' to the United States in many areas. This also does not reflect an aggressive posture, merely a wish for Germany's rightful place in the family of nations.

**Everything remains the same**

Easily the most symbolic measure of modern Germany's return to the Germany of old is the forthcoming return of Berlin as the German capital. Berlin, a divided city, represented a divided Germany and it seems appropriate, as Germany regains its autonomy, that Berlin return. Some authors, such as W.R. Smyser, feel that Berlin will become the true heart of the new Union, the diplomatic and cultural center of Europe, replacing Brussels in all but name. Berlin will finally have what Wilhelm wanted, a place among the centers of power, secure, influential and prosperous. The goal will finally be achieved after nearly a century, through virtually the same means. Germany will have finally reduced the possibility of defection that it has faced for more than a century. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

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158 Argued in Pond, "Germany finds its niche as a regional power", p. 6 of 15.
159 Heilbrun discusses a number of examples, such as Germany's recent independent dealings with Iran and Iraq, in "Springtime: Germany's newfound strength", p. 3 of 5.
160 Kurth uses this observation for another purpose. Other authors also point it out (it's fairly obvious), but I recall reading it in his article first.
161 Smyser, p. 10 of 10.
162 Germany cannot rest however. It must continually make other moves to protect its place. If it remains stationary, it may risk losing its primacy and falling back fully into the PD. So an integrated, European Germany will advance European aims into the next century, protecting its military and economic security, and thus continuing the game...