The Fall of Sendero Luminoso

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The Fall of Sendero Luminoso

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by

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The Fall of Sendero Luminoso

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Introduction: Who is Sendero Luminoso?

At first glance, Peru seems to be a country ripe for revolution. Successive government administrations have not been able to overcome a national legacy filled with foreign dominated interests, despotic military regimes, corruption, indigenous repression, and drastic economic disparity. A suffering people have become accustomed to a long history of hardship and marginalization. Contemporary conditions offer little hope. A large sector of the Peruvian population continues to wait for better times despite the nation’s recent economic boom. Indeed, Peru’s 12.9% economic growth in 1994 was the highest in the world.\(^1\) But as of 1996, 45% of all Peruvians still live below the poverty line.\(^2\) The situation is even more grievous considering indigenous communities that constitute one-third of the population have limited participation and social recognition in Peruvian society. It would appear that if the right catalyst came along, Peru’s poor would be united into revolution.

For twelve years Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso, appeared to be this catalyst. Since 1980, the guerrilla organization had worked among the peasant population to mount a violent offensive against the Peruvian government. The organization’s call for depolarization of Peruvian wealth and destruction of a Eurocentric society through means of revolution had won over many supporters. By 1992 the organization’s control over large sectors of Peruvian territory and endless number of successful attacks seemed to place Sendero on the verge of victory until a dramatic event gave the tactical advantage to the Peruvian Armed Forces. On September 12, 1992 a special police intelligence unit captured Abimael Guzmán, the mastermind of Sendero Luminoso. Since then, a weakened Sendero has lost much of its territorial control and support base. The level of armed
actions have decreased significantly since 1992. But why did the capture of Guzmán along with the
top leadership of Sendero signify a sudden collapse of the movement? Much of the containment of
the movement can be attributed to President Fujimori’s commitment to fighting terrorism. But many
weaknesses in the strategy of Sendero Luminoso also left the organization susceptible to collapse
after the capture of Guzmán. In this paper I will argue that the decline of Sendero Luminoso cannot
only be attributed to the government’s military response, but also to internal weaknesses in the
organization. Three particular policies of Sendero Luminoso made the movement vulnerable to
collapse: the use of guerrilla tactics limited support for revolutionary change, an acrimonious
relationship with the peasantry contradicted its own revolutionary goals, and Sendero’s refusal to
unite with other more moderate leftist parties opened up other political outlets for traditionally
repressed Peruvians.

The roots of Sendero Luminoso can be traced back to José Carlos Mariátegui, a Lima
journalist who founded El Partido Socialista del Perú (PSP) in 1928.³ Mariátegui in his Seven
Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality made an historical and socioeconomic assessment of Peru
since the pre-conquest period. He adopted a Marxist view of the problems of class division and the
imbalance of power that had characterized Peru since the Spanish conquest. The lack of justice for
mestizos, people of mixed indigenous and Spanish blood, and the Indian community particularly
concerned Mariátegui. Direct descendants of the Spanish continued to socially dominate and dictate
Peruvian politics. To confront these problems, Mariátegui advocated a new socioeconomic system
in which old Incan forms of communism that stressed family cooperatives and social duty would
combine with modern socialism to end the economic repression among Peru’s mestizos and
indigenous peoples.⁴
Dr. Abimael Guzmán, a professor of political science at the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH), took up these ideas of Mariátegui and became head of a new communist party in 1970 rooted in the old PSP party, *Por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariátegui* (PCP-SL). Guzmán’s communist ideology not only comes from Mariátegui but also from his trips to China in the 1960s and through his studies of Leninism. These early life experiences led him to believe that true reform can only come through revolution. Guzmán noticed important similarities between conditions in China at the time of their revolution and conditions in Peru which he believed would foster a national communist revolution. Peru shared with pre-revolutionary China a semicolonial and semifeudal system, a large rural population, and trauma from industrialization. Guzmán then applied two important elements of the Maoist revolution to his own strategy, a revolution born in the countryside with the goal of creating a “New Democratic Republic.” This new republic would not be democratic as understood by today’s capitalist countries, but would nationalize all means of production under a collectivist system involving the joint leadership of workers, peasants, and petite bourgeoisie. Unlike Mao, Guzmán does not provide for any transitional stage where some private property is maintained. Ultimately, Sendero strives for the creation of a nationalistic, Indian, and popular democracy “to unite the marginal classes in a violent, vindictive revolt that would destroy Eurocentric Peru and build a new nation grounded in indigenous institutions. In the process, Indians and mestizos - the genuine Peruvians - would be redeemed."

The general strategy of Sendero Luminoso rests on six stages. The first phase attempts to raise class consciousness by bringing attention to the “corrupt system” through propaganda and by developing strong ties to the peasant communities. The second stage calls for sabotage and guerrilla action against the state. An offensive begins against the bourgeois state, including its symbols and
supporters. The objective is to "attack the glue that holds society together." The next phase involves a more intense guerrilla warfare aimed at certain individuals and communities, leading to the "liberation" of certain areas from the state. The movement enters the fourth stage with the consolidation and expansion of support bases, often isolating major cities. The fifth stage occurs with the fall of the cities and total collapse of the state. With city supply routes cut off, the government eventually capitulates. The final stage, only recently revealed from an incarcerated Guzmán, calls for preparation of the collapse of the state and global revolution. This stage involves converting the Popular Guerilla Army into a more regular People’s Liberation Army and widening the political base internationally. Sendero Luminoso thus far has only made it through the fourth stage as the capture of Guzmán in 1992 has halted much of their progress.

All of these stages rely on Sendero’s principal tactic for carrying out the revolution: guerrilla warfare. Guzmán’s interpretation of Peruvian history and dedication to Marxist-Leninist ideology justifies his belief in revolutionary violence. Marx’s Communist Manifesto states that "the Communists... openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing conditions." Guzmán notes how only through violent uprisings against the political structure in power has Peruvian society been radically transformed in its history, citing examples such as the fall of the Incan empire and the wars of independence ending Spanish colonialism.

Some authors on Sendero such as Tarazona-Sevillano assert that Sendero’s use of guerrilla warfare includes terrorism. She defines terrorism as an act of violence that threatens or causes "a loss of life among innocent noncombatants for the purpose of achieving political goals." Other experts on terrorism claim that two practices distinguish terrorism from other forms of revolutionary violence: the sheer spread of terror (not just violence), and indiscriminant violence aimed at
civilians. The moral or emotional justification for a violent act can never serve as a determinant in the qualification of the act as terrorism. Using the definition of terrorism as an indiscriminant violent act against civilians, Sendero writings seem to suggest that the party does not advocate terrorism as a revolutionary tool. Rather, Sendero attacks are highly selective and aimed at the armed forces. Heriberto Ocasio, national spokesman for the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, describes the role of the People’s Liberation Army. The army “carries out mainly guerrilla actions against the armed forces, leads the masses to attack and liberate the so-called ‘strategic hamlets’ of the government, [and] carries out selective annihilations of proven enemies of the people who have a blood debt.” However, statistics on the number of civilians killed by Sendero attacks reveals the fatal effects of guerilla warfare on the civilian population. According to Peru’s Ministry of the Interior, 7,700 Peruvian civilians died from Sendero-related incidents from 1980 to 1988, a majority of them were unarmed. Such a high number of civilian deaths challenges Sendero’s claim that their attacks are directed only toward selected “enemies of the people.” Even though Sendero doctrine does not openly support terrorism in fighting the state, the high number of attacks directed against unarmed civilians seems to characterize Sendero as a terrorist organization.

Many civilian deaths have resulted from guerilla attacks against infrastructure. These attacks have important economical effects. The government is forced to repair damages caused by acts of sabotage with funds that could be potentially directed toward relief, social programs, and regional investment, leaving economic problems unaddressed and giving Sendero more fuel to criticize the government. Electric plants and oil pipelines have been favorite targets for Sendero attacks because they are explosive and difficult to repair. Electro-Perú, the Peruvian National Electric Company, reports damages of U.S. $600 million from 1980-1987.
In addition to infrastructure, typical targets of Sendero include the armed forces, high status people, embassies, foreigners, or anything or anybody that represents the enemy, including civilians. As Charles Maechling, an expert on terrorism, explains in the Foreign Service Journal, “The legitimate guerrilla fighter strikes at military targets, but if civilians are singled out as victims, or targets are selected in such a way that makes loss of innocent life inevitable, he or she is considered a terrorist and a criminal outlaw.”\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, conservative estimates put the number of deaths contributed to the war with the insurgency at over 25,000, many of whom were civilians.\textsuperscript{16} According to Peter Sederberg from the University of South Carolina, Sendero’s willingness to accept the loss of civilian life as inevitable violates the “well-established limits” on the conduct of warfare in two ways. First, the military contenders should confine their attacks to other combatants and second, they should use discriminating weapons to minimize the number of losses among noncombatants.\textsuperscript{17} Sendero combatants have not demonstrated any aspirations to limit themselves to either one of these two conditions.

Despite Sendero’s violent tactics, the organization appeals to large segments of university students, the Indian population, and to the cocaine syndicate. Young university students are often drawn to Sendero because the movement offers them hope for a better future when economic disparity will be diminished and everyone will find employment. Many university students are frustrated with current system because they cannot find work after graduation and often find themselves turned down by higher institutions of learning. The Student Revolutionary Front (FER) is one of Sendero’s most important national networks. The student organization was already teaching the intricacies of socialism in the early 1970s when it absorbed Guzmán’s ideology and began publishing Sendero documents. Well-trained students from the organization visit campuses
throughout Peru to promote student awareness of class struggle. The students are also expected to return to their home districts to teach Sendero doctrine to their respective communities.

Indigenous peoples are attracted to Sendero as traditionally repressed victims of a Hispano-centric society. Since the Spanish conquest in 1532, Peru’s indigenous have experienced economic and social oppression as their traditional way of life and values disappeared in the face of an expanding “western civilization.” Sendero promises them the return of an indigenous voice in Peruvian politics. Ayacucho, an area primarily populated by Indians, served as an ideal birthplace for Sendero because the area was neglected by many Peruvian administrations and lacked a tradition of the modern democratic state. Among Peruvian cities, Ayacucho had the nation’s lowest income per capita in 1980, the year Senderistas began their assault on the state by burning ballots at the election polls.

Finally, Sendero shares a profitable relationship with narcotic growers and traffickers. The insurgency has concentrated its efforts to exploit the coca industry in the highly profitable drug economy of the Upper Huallaga Valley, currently the largest coca-producing region in the world. The coca harvest provides small growers and laborers with more income than any other crop. One acre of coca generates an income equivalent to the income earned from five acres of coffee or seven acres of corn. Sendero protection against traffickers and the Peruvian military helps coca growers to increase this income to even higher levels because they can raise more crops of coca leaf and negotiate better prices for their product with paste producers. The Peruvian government often limits the amount of coca crops farmers can grow and drug traffickers exploit farmers through harassment. But the traffickers themselves also benefit from Sendero’s presence because Sendero’s rigorous work ethic increases coca production and the government’s focus on fighting Sendero rebels takes
attention away from the traffickers. However, in reality the greatest beneficiaries from the drug trade come at the consumer end of the chain. According to a study conducted by the London-based *Latin American Newsletters*, over 90% of all dollars spent on cocaine by U.S. consumers remains in the U.S. economy.¹⁹

To combat the flow of drugs into the U.S., President Bush launched the Andean Initiative on September 5, 1989. The program provides for training of military and police forces in Latin American coca growing areas and supplies economic aid for eradication programs and crop substitution. The Fujimori administration has been receptive to U.S. initiatives to curtail the drug industry and issued the Fujimori doctrine in January 1991. The doctrine outlines a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Peru which includes debt relief, crop substitution programs, and access for alternative crops to U.S. markets.²⁰ For Sendero Luminoso, the cooperation between the U.S. and Peru on the war on drugs represents a form of collaboration with the imperialist powers on the part of the Peruvian government. The cooperative relationship with a perceived imperialist power fuels Sendero’s drive to protect narcotic growers and to use cocaine growing areas for support bases. Control over narcotic growing regions also provides the organization with an important source of revenue. Reports indicate that Sendero has collected millions of dollars in charges to traffickers for regulating and protecting their areas.²¹

Sendero’s organization evolves around the National Central Committee. The committee has undergone a significant transformation since the capture of Guzmán. The committee once consisted of Guzmán and his top twenty-three lieutenants who made decisions regarding ideology, policy, and strategy. But according to sociologist Raul Gonzalez only four of the original twenty-four members now remain on the committee and the absence of Guzmán raises questions about the effectiveness
of the committee. Under the Central Committee are six regional committees broken into zones, sectors, and cells with several divisions and subdivisions. Each regional committee manages issues facing their respective areas. Special squads of militants who actually carry out acts of sabotage or terrorism report to the regional committees.

Four levels of hierarchy stratify Sendero Luminoso. The first level consists of sympathizers who hold demonstrations and aid Senderistas in any way they can such as food or shelter. The second level is composed of students, workers, and underclass people who are activists. They are not yet fully committed to the organization, but distribute propaganda and organize indoctrination drives and demonstrations. Militants, the third level, must have demonstrated commitment to Sendero through terrorist acts or life threatening situations. Finally, the Central Committee, the mastermind of Sendero, represents the highest level.

Numerous organizations support Sendero and work to spread its doctrine. Important national support organizations include the Popular Aid of Peru, Laborers and Workers’ Class Movement, and the Popular Peasant Movement. Peasants, the poor, and even women make up a majority of these support groups. Sendero realizes the importance of allowing women to participate in the movement. Women searching for gender equality in a sexist society can feel liberated from their traditional second class roles by receiving administrative and military positions in the Sendero organization.

Sendero also relies on external organizations for support. The Peru’s People Movement seeks to “radicalize sympathetic political factions and groups” that already exist anywhere in the world. Sendero Luminoso’s second external organization, the Committees to Support the Revolution in Peru, works to put together a broad united front of supporters across the world. These committees are known to operate in the United States, Europe, and Scandinavia.
The Government’s Response

From 1980 to 1992 Sendero Luminoso seemed to be steadily gaining strength through expanding support bases and increased terrorist attacks against the state. A weak democratic government was unable to control the spread of Sendero violence in the countryside and a growing number of attacks spread into metropolitan areas. The government’s inability to control the movement can largely be attributed to President Belaúnde’s initial reluctance to confront Sendero while the organization was in its developing stages. Belaúnde dismissed the strategic and political importance of Sendero’s activities due to his earlier battle with a left-wing guerrilla movement during his first presidency from 1963-1968 that resulted in a military takeover of the state. In an effort to avoid a similar outcome, Belaúnde allowed Sendero to remain unchecked by the military and free from other forms of government intervention.

The government’s disregard for the power of Sendero Luminoso ended on December 26, 1982 following a series of armed attacks by Sendero in almost every department of Peru. The attacks proved that Sendero had the ability to launch attacks outside of the highlands and the government was forced to react. President Belaúnde issued a state of emergency in the city of Ayacucho and eighty other provinces which suspended all constitutional rights of liberty and freedom to citizens in these areas.24 For the next two years aggressive military operations killed thousands in Ayacucho. Nearly all Quechua speaking peasants were suspected terrorists in what came to be known as the “dirty war.” The authoritative powers given to the military led to serious human rights violation charges against the government and instigated a pattern of military authoritarianism that would continue until the capture of Guzmán.
Not only did the government have to address charges of human rights violations against the military, but it also faced legislative and judicial challenges in its fight against Sendero. An inept and bureaucratic judicial system failed to convict many accused terrorists while proposals of economic assistance for the peasantry often failed to pass Congress, allowing the social and economic tensions that fueled Sendero’s support to build. President Belaúnde issued the first law on terrorism in 1981 that penalized terrorists with ten to twenty years of penitentiary service. The law defined terrorism as an intent to create a situation of terror; act against life, health, property, and other individual and community interests; or destruction through the use of fire arms, fire, or explosives.\(^2\) In addition, terrorism became classified as a common crime so terrorists could not benefit from extradition or asylum.

However, in 1987 Congress revoked the above legislation in response to a campaign by Marxist groups sympathetic to the revolution that wanted greater security of Constitutional freedoms. This led to the reinstatement of three categories of terrorist offenses in Law 24953 issued in December 1988. A terrorist was one who belonged to an organization of two or more that engaged in “planning, encouraging, or committing acts of terrorism,” incited the public by means of mass media, or apologized for or praised a terrorist action.\(^2\)

Outside of actual terrorist legislation, special tribunals were set up to deal with Sendero cases and all cases were moved to Lima in 1982 to protect the magistrates. By moving the cases to Lima, Senderistas would not be on trial in areas where they already had strong influence. Still some judges were provided with masks to protect their identity. However, overloaded court rooms allowed many Senderistas off the hook. In the first two years of Fujimori’s government, 220 suspected terrorists were released.\(^2\) The president believes threats from Sendero frightened judges into releasing
accused terrorists.

The judges’ fear of Sendero threats should come as no surprise considering the degree to which Sendero influence infiltrated the prison system during the 1980s. The organization earned extremely liberal concessions from the judicial courts through bribes and threats. Cell blocks were essentially converted into liberalized territory, areas where guards were prohibited from entering and where Sendero indoctrinated young recruits. Prisoners even cooked their own food which entitled them to possess potential weapons such as knives and cooking gas. Journalist Charles Lane in following the 1997 MRTA hostage crisis observed how the liberal conditions of the prisons along with the intimidation of the judges gave Peruvian soldiers and police incentive to kill captured terrorist suspects on the spot rather than hand them over to the courts.

The inability of judicial system to control Sendero combatants during the Belaúnde and García administrations was further exacerbated by failed attempts to provide economic assistance to the Indian population, which would give those most attracted to Sendero teachings a new sense of confidence in the government’s commitment to ending centuries of poverty and neglect. A lack of resources restrained the government’s ability to distribute economic aid to Peru’s poorest. In 1983 the Belaúnde administration proposed twenty-eight million dollars in aid to Ayacucho and Apurímac regions that were devastated by the war. The aid would fund desperately needed irrigation and development projects. However, the proposal fell through due to natural catastrophes and an economic crisis. Then in 1985 the García administration suggested a “pacification drive” through the areas of Ayacucho and Apurímac that would give emergency economic assistance, grant selective amnesty to those who supported Sendero, and encourage dialogue between Sendero and the government. But Sendero opposition to dialogue caused the rest of the plan to fail.
Although initial efforts at economic assistance misfired, the government launched an unprecedented development program in 1986 that targeted the basic needs of the Indian population in the central and southern sierra in the areas of health, education, transportation, and farming. Unlike earlier proposals of economic aid, this program made it past the Peruvian Congress and had immediate political payoffs with Aprista (Popular American Revolutionary Alliance) candidates winning mayoral positions in the 1986 municipal elections in Cuzco and Puno. The success of the Aprista candidates in the municipal elections represented an important political victory for the government because the PAP (Peruvian Aprista Party) offers peaceful alternatives to overcoming peasant marginalization. The party advocates action against all forms of imperialism, nationalization of land and industries, and solidarity with all oppressed classes of the world. At the same time the party admits to the importance of co-existing with capitalism in order to obtain the funds necessary to modify the economy and implement financial democracy. The support for a democratically elected party showed the people still had confidence in the government’s institutions and helped to keep Sendero out of the region.

The election of Alberto Fujimori as head of state in 1990 eventually led to a dramatic shift in the government’s strategy against Sendero. The conservative president promised to prioritize the fight against Sendero as a part of his platform in the 1990 elections. Then on April 5, 1992, frustrated with the lack of progress in fighting Sendero, Fujimori used the armed forces to carry out his own coup against the government. He dissolved Congress, suspended the constitution, and closed down the Supreme Court. The armed forces even imprisoned members of Fujimori’s opposition and silenced Peru’s news outlets. However, Fujimori pledged to hold a national referendum in November of 1993 in which Fujimori won 38% of the vote, enough to maintain his
Following the 1992 coup, Fujimori launched an aggressive campaign against Sendero Luminoso. To rehabilitate the efficiency of the judicial system, Fujimori sent the military to restore order in prisons being used by Sendero as liberated zones for the indoctrination of young recruits. He also moved terrorism cases from civilian courts to military courts where suspected terrorists could be tried at much faster rates. By 1994, these military courts had a 97% conviction rate and over 2,700 jailed rebels are in custody as of 1996. On the ground, the military stepped up its efforts as well by raiding Sendero liberated areas and establishing emergency zones that suspended all constitutional rights for those in the emergency zone. Sendero rebels initially welcomed the violence because they believed repression against the proletariat would lead to revolt against the state. But the government soon realized how a violent military campaign against Sendero could backfire and Fujimori shifted his strategy more towards espionage and intelligence rather than widespread armed attacks against Sendero controlled areas. The number of arrests rose significantly and Sendero, realizing that Fujimori was establishing the government as a legitimate authority, reacted by sacrificing long-term strategy for short-term exposure through bomb attacks against international entities.

In spite of domestic and international criticism of the armed forces’ violent counter-insurgency that added thousands more to the death toll of the war, the capture of Guzmán on September 12, 1992 along with three other high ranking Sendero officials raised Fujimori’s political fortunes. Fujimori’s approval ratings soared to 80% and Sendero influence began to wane despite a series of attacks in Lima. Fujimori felt well justified in counting on the military to destabilize the strength of Sendero. After the capture of Guzmán he proclaimed:
It took 12 years for the international community to realize that it was facing a war criminal, a genocidal person who [...did not] learn from the fascist war crimes of the Second World War. In 12 years, the malovent genius of Comrade Gonzalo sowed death and destruction under the silent, protective cloak of organizations that defended human rights. Peru had to count its dead, bury its dead, and remain impotent. The human rights of terrorists...were more important than the rights of 22 million Peruvians.\textsuperscript{43}

Charles Lane credits the exceptional national conditions that Fujimori faced as critical to his popularity ratings. The threat posed by violent and fanatical groups such as Sendero drew support for Fujimori’s methods and seems to have paid off in the long-run. Since 1992, the level of political violence in Peru has decreased significantly. Politically motivated assassinations and deaths in terrorist attacks or armed conflict fell from 2,900 in 1992 to 1,300 in 1993 \textsuperscript{44} and as of August 29, 1995 only 249 people had died that year from politically motivated assassinations.\textsuperscript{45}

The detained Guzmán soon wrote two letters to Fujimori calling for peace talks. Guzmán did not change his ideological or political stance toward the “imperialist” government, but believed “the leadership of any revolutionary movement should take precedence over all other variables.”\textsuperscript{46} Accordingly, the attempted peace process represented a temporary diplomatic strategy that would help Sendero regain its ability to effectively carry out a war against the government by clarifying Guzmán as the leader in command of Sendero strategy. Guzmán wanted Senderistas to avoid “desperate adventurist actions that would undermine and impede the implementation of the Proposed Peace Agreement.”\textsuperscript{47} The Central Committee viewed the letters as “sinister,” claiming that Guzmán had lost his sense of focus and vision while behind bars. In any case, Fujimori refused to accept Guzmán’s call for a cease-fire on both sides, fearing a cease-fire would give Sendero the opportunity
to regroup. Despite Guzmán’s plea for peace talks, Sendero continued its armed attack against the government. Oscar Ramirez Durand assumed leadership of the movement while Guzmán remained behind bars. Durand currently retains control over all regional committees and the Popular Liberation Army. In a 1994 interview conducted by Peru’s National Intelligence Service of 2,651 Sendero cadres, the agency found that nearly half of them supported Durand in place of Guzmán. Under the leadership of Feliciano, Sendero has continued its armed struggle, but in a weakened state. Since the capture of Guzmán, Sendero has lost control over most highland areas, allowing thousands of peasants to return home. At one point, the organization was believed to control 25% to 40% of Peruvian land. Sendero control is now generally limited to the central jungle area where a local tribe of Ashaninkas live. Reports of forcible recruitment of Ashaninkas by Sendero continue to the present day. In terms of numbers, Sendero, once believed to number 8,000, is now believed to be about an eighth of this size and twenty of the twenty-four members on the Central Committee in 1992 have been captured.

The Peruvian government’s changing strategy toward Sendero Luminoso since 1980, culminating in the aggressive policies of Fujimori, can be credited with forcing the collapse of the organization. The administration’s commitment to prioritizing their attack on the movement, improving the military’s relationship with the peasants, and creating a more efficient judicial system gave the military an upper hand in dealing with the insurgency.

Looking further back into the 1980s reveals key strategic steps taken by the government that improved its relationship with the peasantry. One of these steps required the military to switch to a more selective strategy of assault targets and gave the peasant population a greater degree of authority in its battle against Sendero. One of the first moves made to gain a more intimate
relationship with the peasantry came in 1985 with the replacement of the *La Mar* infantry with the regular army in many areas such as Ayacucho.\textsuperscript{51} The *La Mar* infantry was composed of primarily soldiers from the coast while the regular army was more representative of the Andean region. The indigenous peoples who populate the Andean highlands therefore could better relate to the army soldiers. In addition, the military's ability to break many networks of Sendero support caused Sendero militants to flee to the cities in the late 1980s which gave democratic parties the opportunity to establish themselves in municipal elections in areas formally controlled by Sendero such as Huanta.\textsuperscript{52} By 1990, the military started living among the peasants, receiving their information directly from them and recruiting soldiers through their SMO (Obligatory Military Service) program that issued licences to those peasants who wanted to fight. However, the FFAA, or military units, still allowed the peasants to live their daily lives with little interference. After the election of Fujimori, the government also set up the Fund of Compensation and Social Development (FONCODES) and the Program of Repopulation Support (PAR).\textsuperscript{53} The two programs distribute guard livestock, construct highways, and provide health care for many peasants.

Perhaps the government’s greatest success can be contributed to the development of the Civil Defence Committee Program. This program was initiated during the García administration after witnessing the success of *rondas campesinas*, peasants who took up arms against Sendero by forming Civil Defence Committees (CDC). By the early 1990s these committees had begun to multiply because Sendero intensified its attacks on the peasant population and the FFAA started a policy of more selective repression and better relations with the peasantry. According to the Research Institute for National Defence, by 1994 1,655 CDCs sprang up in Ayacucho and Huancavelia that included over 66,200 members.\textsuperscript{54} Although CDCs became subordinated to the
FFAA, they were allowed a great deal of independence. Many rondas became better fighters than the military and were proud to be winning the war. One CDC member explained the importance of the rondas, "They have raised moral, elevated self-esteem and brought certain power to the peasantry, including those of the most Indian blood (Quechua speaking), rural populations, and the poorest."\(^{55}\)

But despite some progress in the government's relationship with the peasantry, continued forms of repression overshadow a weak government effort at improving the lives of the peasantry. In reality, Peru's poorest and indigenous populations have few reasons to support the state outside of protection from brutal Sendero attacks. Many peasants disdain the military for invading their villages and killing thousands of their people. At the same time, the government has failed to deliver on promises of rebuilding communities under former Sendero control and the recent economic boom in Peru has not trickled down to the poor.

The government's harsh counter-insurgency cannot be overlooked as a serious violation of human rights. As of August 1992 the government's own figures indicated the killing of 11,872 Peruvians on the part of the military.\(^{56}\) Between 1980 and 1992 more than 3,000 Peruvians disappeared, giving Peru the dubious distinction of having the highest number of disappearances in the world.\(^{57}\) Highland peasants did not flee from their communities only because of Sendero attacks, but also from the danger brought by the presence of the military forces. When government troops arrive at a Peruvian province to force out Sendero combatants, citizens' rights are often suspended, as was the case in Ayacucho in 1982.\(^{58}\) Everyone becomes suspected as a Sendero sympathizer and the military or police forces take control over the area. Consequently, innocent indigenous communities often paid the price in the exchange of violence between Senderistas and the military.
Even while human rights abuses have decreased since 1992, the judicial system does not meet international standards of due process. New laws making it easier to arrest and convict those suspected of “subversive activity” may have increased the efficiency of convicting the guilty, but unfortunately have also increased conviction rates of the innocent. According to the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, the Peruvian government now holds over 4,000 political prisoners. 59 However, government sources put the number of jailed “rebels” at 2,700. 60 Regardless of the exact numbers of detained suspected terrorists, the denial of defendant rights in military courts has clearly precipitated hasty convictions. Defense lawyers do not have access to evidence nor can they interview police or military witnesses for the trial. Above all, military judges are not held accountable to the public because all trials are closed to the public. Some human rights groups even charge that military courts have sentenced defendants without notifying their attorney. 61 Indeed, human rights groups have compiled 177 cases of mistrial. 62 According to Supreme Council of Military Justice statistics, between 1992 and August 1996 only one individual was found not guilty of the 1,498 treason cases brought before the military tribunals. 63 In spite of the blatant miscarriages of justice performed by the military courts, in October of 1996 Congress extended the trial of terrorism cases under military tribunals for another year. The public's confidence in the nation's judicial system became further shattered with the promulgation of the Law of Amnesty on July 16, 1995. The law grants amnesty to all military officials, law enforcement officials, and civilians who committed human rights abuses during the war on terrorism from May 1980 to June 1995. 64

Economic Conditions

In addition to the judicial system, a continued high level of economic disparity between the wealthiest and poorest sectors of the population gives Peru's poor further reason to lose faith in the
ability of the government to solve their problems. In several cases, the economic plan of the Fujimori administration has made conditions worse for many Peruvians. While the economy is growing at a fast rate and foreign investment continues to pour into the country, the ordinary Peruvian citizen has not reaped the benefits.

Economic conditions clearly play a critical role in the revolutionary process. Karl Marx identified revolution as an “economic cataclysm” when he formulated his concept of economic determinism which says “the fundamental motivations and forces determining social relationships derive ultimately from economic factors.”\textsuperscript{65} Lyford Edward, a scholar on revolution, has also identified economic growth as a long term cause of revolution and economic depression as a “middle-term” cause of revolution.\textsuperscript{66} Accordingly, fluctuations in the economy over short and long periods of time can help or hinder a revolutionary cause.

Indeed, the state of the economy was an important ingredient for the inception of Sendero Luminoso during the late 1970s and early 1980s. When Velasco seized power in Peru in 1968 he set forth a plan to end peasant poverty through agrarian and industrial reform. The agrarian reform advocated the expropriation of farmland owned by joint-stock companies and latifundia landowners, although hacendados (large landowners) could retain their land if it was primarily worked by the family with a limited number of hired workers.\textsuperscript{67} Traditional indigenous communities received priority in the award of land and the regime favored the establishment of cooperatives that would help to centralize the agricultural sector of the national economy. Many of the largest Sierra estates were transformed into cooperatives called “agricultural societies of interest” (SAIS) where former tenants shared lands and profits with neighboring indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{68} In regards to industry, the concept of “labor community” was introduced. Manufacturing firms employing more than five
workers or earning more than 24,000 dollars annually were required to join an “industrial community” (CI) that took 15% of every member firm’s profit for stock investment and then distributed the dividends among CI members.69

Overall the reforms were a success in spite of protests that the state bureaucrats had merely replaced the old owners and despite the eruption of violent struggles between cooperative members and indigenous communities. Between the years of 1968 and 1972, the rate of inflation was reduced from more than 19% to less than 7%, the GNP grew by a cumulative annual average of 6.5%, and the cost of living was held to an average increase of only 7%.70 At the same time, people were insured a free education at all public institutions. The future even seemed brighter with the promise of a return to democracy in 1980, but the new democracy would not meet the high economic expectations. The return to democracy gave Sendero an ample opportunity to begin their insurrection because the military regime had already begun retreating from their earlier reforms and most democratic parties advocated a market-oriented economy. Sendero claimed that such a retreat would unravel any gains earlier made by the peasant and indigenous populations. The economic recession that followed with the newly elected Belaúnde administration only added fuel to Sendero’s fire as confidence in the Belaúnde administration quickly waned. The foreign debt increased from nine billion in 1979 to nearly fourteen billion in 1985 while by 1984 inflation averaged 11%.71

Sendero recognized the poor state of the Peruvian economy as an important indicator for when the organization should begin its insurrection and felt the economic decline following the transition to democracy served to help provoke the revolution. Theorists on revolution differ on the correlation between a nation’s economy and a successful revolution. Early philosophers like Plato and Aristotle believed widespread poverty provided the necessary conditions for a successful
revolution while more modern revolutionary theorists like Crane Brinton (1952) have pointed out how strong economic growth preceded the American and French revolutions. But perhaps the best explanation of the right economic conditions for revolution stands somewhere in between. James Davies points out how sharp economic decline after long economic growth can create a gap between the public’s aspirations and their achievements, setting up a period of “relative deprivation.” A period of long-term economic growth raises the public’s expectations for the future. Consequently, when a sharp economic decline hits, these expectations are not met and people lose faith in the existing government. Such an occurrence preceded the American, Russian, and Cuban revolutions. Sendero appreciated the value of shifts in the Peruvian economy as important factors in determining when the organization should begin its insurrection. The state of the Peruvian economy today offers insight into the government’s relationship with the Peruvian people, especially the peasantry.

Carlos Boloña, minister of the Peruvian economy from 1991-1993 and the current president of the Institute of the Free Market Economy in Lima, outlines five principles of economic reform under the Fujimori administration. All stress belief in the private market to heal Peru’s economic problems. They include the privatization of public owned utilities, protection of the right to private property, opening of the economy to international trade, reduction of the size of the government, and equality before the law. Ultimately, the government hopes to alleviate the conditions of the poor through private market based initiatives while at the same time developing the right conditions for national economic growth, namely encouraging foreign investment and reducing the national deficit that stands at over twenty-three billion U.S. dollars as of 1995.

To attract foreign investment the administration has reduced tariffs and opened the economy to competition through privatization measures. The government has privatized most state enterprises
and plans to sell those remaining by 1997. Tariffs have been reduced from an average of 75% to an average of 15% to 25% and the government has privatized fifty-one former government enterprises since 1990. The move towards a more open market economy has directly increased foreign investment, augmenting from $1,257 million in 1989 to $5,476 million in 1995.

Reducing the deficit has involved normalizing relations with multinational financial organizations in order to come to agreements on how to reduce Peru’s debt with these organizations. After the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank had suspended 1.5 billion in debt relief and development grants in condemnation of the 1992 coup, Fujimori reversed his fortunes by promising a return to democracy and respect for human rights. In September of 1992 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) awarded Peru $147 million in credit guarantees and the Inter-American Development Bank resumed funding to Peru. Of even greater importance, the United States has reinstated funding to Peru after suspending aid to the country following the 1992 coup and Peru is the largest recipient of U.S. aid in South America.

Although the administration’s plan for economic growth primarily rests on the private market, the government has implemented some social programs for the poorest sectors of the public. In 1991 the Fund of Compensation and Social Development was created as a principal relief organism for the poor, in 1992 the National Program of Nourishment (PRONAA) was formed and in 1993 the International Program of Social Matters began to play a fundamental role in determining how the public sector should go about helping the poor. The commission also worked to elaborate the Program of Basic Social Spending. The government credits the 16% increase in the level of income per capita of the population between the years of 1993 and 1994 and an average spending increase of 47% in 1993 and 36% in 1994 amongst the poorest one-fifth of the population to these
social programs and other economic reforms.  

The instituted economic reforms of Fujimori have helped the national economy to expand at near record levels. In 1994 Peru registered the highest national economic growth in the world at 12.9%. GDP growth in 1995 measured 11% while the rate of inflation held fairly steady at 10% (although up from 7.65% in 1990). The slow rate of inflation, that was over 100% for much of the 1980s, is reflected in the Consumer Price Index that slowed to 11.1% in 1995 as compared to 2510.3% in 1990. The 1995 unemployment rate was also kept under control at 8.2%. To go along with a low unemployment rate, fiscal income has increased from 4.5% of the GDP in 1990 to 13.9% in 1994.

But the economic surge has not transpired without costs to the ordinary Peruvian citizen. Carlos Boloña recognized the reality of the situation of many Peruvians when he said, “This was the first time that someone [the government] told the average Peruvian that they weren’t going to have what in reality they never have had.” Boloña here alludes to difficulties involved in transforming the Peruvian economy. A more equitable distribution of wealth cannot be achieved overnight as suggested by left-wing radical groups. The transition requires sacrifice and patience. In accord with this economic philosophy, long-term national economic goals have taken priority over immediate relief.

The Fujimori administration has devoted some attention to the needs of the peasantry returning home to areas formerly under Sendero control. The Program of Support to the Repopulating (PAR) distributes cattle, constructs highways, and helps to expand health programs in areas devastated by the struggle with Sendero. However, Alberto Yamamoto, head of Peru’s National Institute of Development, has criticized the government’s efforts to get aid to returning
peasants. He points out how the repopulation has been more rapid than expected and that much of the promised aid to peasants has not yet reached their communities.\textsuperscript{87} Isabel Coral, head of a non-profit agency that works with displaced peasants, agrees with Yamamoto that many promises of aid to returning peasants have fallen short of expectations. In her experiences of working with returning peasants, the government has only provided trucks to move the peasants back to their homelands which in many cases remain devastated from the twelve year war.\textsuperscript{88}

Not only do the peasant communities most effected by the war still need significant rebuilding and economic assistance, but the instituted economic reforms of 1990 have not resolved the problem of underemployment in Peru. While economic reforms have lowered consumer prices,\textsuperscript{89} such progress is of little value if consumers experience stagnant or declining income. The Fujimori administration immediately froze salaries just one week into his term after campaigning against such practices in 1990. The freeze in salaries doubled the number of Peruvians in poverty at a time when the average household income was barely enough to buy food, less than U.S.\$27.\textsuperscript{90} Some Peruvians could not even keep their jobs when over 85,000 government employees were laid off in 1990.\textsuperscript{91} Of those still employed, only 18\% had full-time employment\textsuperscript{92} and between 1987 and 1993 the population “adequately” employed fell from 60\% to 13\% while underemployment grew from 35\% to 77\% in Lima.\textsuperscript{93} Of particular concern to the peasant population is the 80.4\% underemployment of those working in agriculture as of 1993.\textsuperscript{94} Although unemployment was held to just 8.2\% in 1995, this statistic does not accurately reflect the level of employment in Peru.\textsuperscript{95} Of those considered employed, a clear majority remain underemployed and lack sufficient income for basic necessities.

The above employment indicators reveal the dire poverty situation in Peru. Poverty has especially become prevalent in the capital of Lima where 80\% of the population lives in shanty
towns that surround the city's perimeter. Poverty has especially been hard on children, in 1994 53.4% of Peruvian children faced chronic malnutrition in rural areas and 25.9% of children suffered from chronic malnutrition in urban areas. Despite increased foreign investment and solid economic growth, the employment and poverty indicators continue to show widening inequities in the distribution of Peruvian wealth.

The economic reforms initiated by the Fujimori administration have not improved the lives of those who need the most assistance. A massive wave of privatization has left the poorest sectors of the Peruvian population struggling at the mercy of market forces. The poor do not have the capital or other resources to take advantage of the investment opportunities presented by the private market. As a result, those constituting the bottom of the social ladder need substantial state assistance. The department that managed public spending literally disappeared under the Fujimori administration. The government also should promote job growth instead of lay-offs. The Peruvian people will need some immediate relief along the way if long-term economic goals are to succeed.

Even when traditionally poor regions do become more developed, the new economic conditions can threaten social stability. Díaz Martínez in his 1969 book Ayacucho: Hambre y Esperanza (Ayacucho: Hunger and Hope) argues that the infrastructural and investment improvements that appeared in Ayacucho during the 1960s and 1970s actually served as a catalyst for Sendero Luminoso. He maintains that the necessary technological and financial requirements “completed the integration of the region into the urban-dominated, dependent capitalist economy of Peru.” The economic transition stripped local natives of their traditional self-sufficient ways of life. Martínez suggests that peasants should have received land from decaying haciendas which would have allowed them to solve their own problems and come up with their own solutions.
Although an isolated case, the social change instigated by development in Ayacucho points to the potential social and cultural challenges presented by economic growth. The method in which the government administers economic assistance to the poor, often inclusive of indigenous communities, must not destroy deep social traditions and ways of life.

The observations of Martínez of the events in Ayacucho highlight the need for political regimes to take into account important cultural factors of a community when evaluating their economic conditions. Not all communities aspire better economic conditions if such a transformation requires a loss of their traditional way of life. The cultural difficulties associated with the development in Ayacucho challenges James Davies’ theory that a sharp economic decline after a long period of economic growth sets up the right conditions for a revolution. On the contrary, the experience in Ayacucho demonstrates that rapid economic growth can also provoke suitable conditions for a revolution due to the high degree of social transformation. The manner in which economic growth is attained can determine the people’s expectations for the future. If economic growth lowers a community’s level of self-sufficiency, cultural expectations may fall below aspirations and provide the right environment for a revolutionary movement.

Attitudes among the impoverished peasantry in Nicaragua at the time of the Sandinista revolution exemplifies the dangers of rapid economic growth in areas with deep cultural traditions. According to James DeFronzo, the Indian population of the Atlantic coast relished the freedom to maintain their own customs even in poverty. Some Indians viewed the new schools, clinics, and public works projects built in their communities as a threat to their local cultures. In recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of the region, the government in 1987 granted limited autonomy to the Atlantic Coast region.¹⁰⁰
Despite the challenges emanating from the economic reforms of the Fujimori administration, the president maintains a strong base of support. Fujimori received a 64% vote of approval in the April 1995 elections. As an alternative to Sendero Luminoso, the Peruvian government seems to be winning the battle despite a record of human rights violations and uneven economic growth. The policies of Sendero frighten the poor and indigenous communities more than their long wait for social justice under Peruvian democracy. In order to understand why the Peruvian people have given their vote of confidence to the Fujimori administration, it is necessary to undertake a thorough examination of how Sendero policies have undermined their attempt to appeal to the masses and gain power in Peru. A careful analysis reveals several Sendero policies that disenabled the organization to recover from the capture of Guzmán.

**Internal Breakdown**

As the founder of Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán cannot be overlooked as a once prominent strategist and inspirational leader for Sendero followers. His incarceration in 1992 severely lowered his stature as an almost infallible leader. Gordon McCormick, a scholar on Sendero, has identified four elements in Guzmán’s perceived reputation that gave him spiritual like qualities in the eyes of Sendero activists: he has a unique vision with superhuman qualities, followers do not question his judgements, his orders are to be followed without conditions, and he requires unqualified support and devotion. Guzmán believes the leadership and centrality of any revolutionary movement must take precedence over all other variables. He addressed the issue of leadership in his second letter from jail, “complex and very serious problems have arisen recently, presenting the Communist Party of Peru with fundamental questions of leadership and this is precisely where our party has received the harshest blow.” In an attempt to preserve his status as
supreme leader of Sendero, Guzmán condemned the new leadership of Durand and the continuance of violence at a time when Guzmán was seeking peace.

As a part of its strategy, the government exploited the vision of Guzmán as an infallible leader following his capture. The Fujimori administration wanted to humiliate Guzmán and presented him to the public wearing a black-and-white striped prison uniform while inside of what resembled a circus lion’s cage. The hope was to demoralize the lower ranks of Sendero through the humiliation of their “infallible” leader. The government’s strategy clearly did create a division within the organization and disoriented Sendero’s top-level organization. However, the capture of Guzmán alone can not be entirely responsible for the collapse of Sendero Luminoso. A well supported organization would maintain a strong influence in national politics despite the capture of one leader. Internal weaknesses in Sendero policies seem to provide plausible reasons for the recent decline in Sendero strength. A confrontational relationship with all those outside of the immediate confines of the organization has left the movement with minimal support.

_Guerrilla Warfare_

Sendero’s close adherence to guerilla warfare as the only means to bring about change in Peru can be closely linked with the undoing of the organization. Guzmán has affirmatively acclaimed that “violence is a universal law [...] and without revolutionary violence, one class cannot be substituted for another, an old order cannot be overthrown to create a new one.”\(^{104}\) The result of Sendero’s commitment to an armed struggle has been the loss of over 30,000 lives, many of them civilians.\(^{105}\) The use of guerrilla attacks as a key tactic in the armed struggle has hurt civilians and Peruvian citizens more than anyone else. Between the years of 1980 and 1988, during the height of the war, civilians by far outnumbered soldiers as victims of political violence, 4,887 to just 292.\(^{106}\)
And the number of civilian deaths does not account for the sheer terror and disruption of so many lives affected by Sendero attacks.

Sendero's use of guerrilla warfare (what some classify as terrorism) in fighting the Peruvian state victimizes and alienates the civilian population. It is difficult to imagine how the killing of innocent people raises class consciousness. If such tactics are successful in drawing support for a revolution, why did the number of Sendero members never exceed 5,000?\textsuperscript{107} Graphic examples of the cruelty of Sendero behavior reveal how their tactics hurts the very people Sendero claims to fight for. In February of 1992 a Sendero column assassinated María Elena Moyano because she founded a “bourgeois” Glass of Milk program, occupied office of deputy mayor in Villa El Salvador, and refused to participate in a Sendero strike.\textsuperscript{108} Sendero deliberately killed Moyano for her efforts to provide relief to peasant communities. The indiscriminateness of Sendero attacks became especially apparent in July 1992 when Sendero stepped up its violence by rigging tricycles with dynamite on elementary school grounds, placing mines on PCP banners and flags that state supporters would pick up, and putting grenades into automatic change counters at highway toll booths.\textsuperscript{109} These assassinations and attacks call into question such claims that Sendero Luminoso has a “selective, highly effective application of violence in targeting the Peruvian state” as suggested by Gary Leup in his editorial on the organization.\textsuperscript{110}

Sendero’s assassination of locally elected leaders also gravely castes doubt on the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare in looking out for the needs of the people. Sendero attacks have included the assassination of dozens of peasant community leaders accused of being “at the service of the state.” In 1990 alone, Sendero killed a recorded 1,249 victims, 60% of whom were peasants.\textsuperscript{111} But to the contrary of being servants of the state, these community leaders are locally
elected and work to improve the conditions of their respective communities. Many Indian leaders belong to peasant organizations that have chosen peaceful and democratic methods to overcoming state suppression. Sendero views such separatist movements as threatening to the insurgency and carry out armed operations against peasant organizations or leaders that refuse to integrate themselves into the Sendero revolution. By the end of 1989, Sendero had performed more than 200 armed operations in the highland province of Puno, nearly half of which involved assassinations against peasant and union leaders. In a case study performed by José Coronel in the province of Huanta, an area primarily populated by Quechua speaking peasants, a series of testimonies revealed that Sendero’s assassination of local authorities was the principal cause for the condemnation of the organization by the peasant community. By killing local peasant leaders instead of working with them, Sendero becomes the enemy of the people and an obstruction to the attainment of peasant needs.

Sendero’s destruction of infrastructure has been especially damaging to the lives of Peruvian citizens. From 1980-1992, Sendero was responsible for over nineteen million dollars worth of damage to the Peruvian economy, only slightly lower than country’s external debt. Popular bombing targets include infrastructures that are critical to providing services to various communities such as electricity plants, satellites, and oil pipelines. In the department of Junín, Sendero singled out mass transportation links such as railroads that connect the highlands with Lima. The destruction of rail line left surrounding communities isolated. Such tactics by Sendero certainly have not gained them support in communities most devastated by these attacks. Bombings against community facilities also do not fall in line with revolutionary theory. As noted by Rodrigo Montoya, nothing in the content of classic socialist or Marxist texts promotes the destruction of infrastructure like
Sendero has done. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the time of their revolutionary struggle quickly learned how placing military objectives over the security of the population endangers the legitimacy of a revolutionary movement. In the late 1920s and early 1930s Mao, in contrast to the Communist Party’s Central Committee, actually favored excessive force and mass recruitment as the primary means through which a revolution should be won. The Central Committee ardently criticized Mao’s determination to focus on military victory over the “anti-Bolsheviks” before securing popularity with the people through education and proposed solutions to their problems. A Central Bureau resolution in January of 1932 addressed the indiscriminate use of force within the party:

In fighting the anti-Bolsheviks, the indiscriminate use of prisoners’ confessions and of physical torture has made counter reaction work a subjective proposition:...consequently, many revolutionary organizations and offices have been made to mobilize, educate, and win over the masses. On the contrary, a reign of terror has been created among the masses, permitting them to be utilized by counter revolutionaries.

Much of Mao’s early belief in aggressive revolutionary practices that forced communist ideology on people in the countryside came at the advice of the Soviet Union. But as Mao began to realize the failure of these methods in China, he wanted to develop a strategy appropriate for the uniqueness of his country. As his power within the party increased after the mid 1930s, he became a full supporter of mass work to win over the support of the masses. Concentrated efforts began in the areas of education, land reform, increased production, and the creation of town committees to provide full public participation in issues arising from the “new democracy.” With Mao directing the implementation of these policies from the late 1930s onward, the CCP grew in number and strength.
which ultimately led to the revolution's victory.

In contrast to the change in revolutionary strategies in China, Sendero continues to place military objectives over community needs. The composition of armed columns that carry out these military adventures further alienates peasant communities. In his studies in the province of Huanta, José Coronel observed how Sendero columns were comprised of sixteen to twenty year olds often recruited from the city or the valleys, areas foreign to the Andean people. The minds of these young students contain concepts unfamiliar to local Indian populations. Indian communities could not culturally understand ideas such as the state, social class, party or new democracy. In addition, at least 50% of the members of armed columns are well-educated small landowners, the very same people who have exploited the indigenous population for years. As a result, Sendero attacks came to be seen as acts performed by foreigners and traditional allies of the state who were trying to forcefully convert the mentality of an Indian population rich in tradition and culture.

The Red Army that led the successful revolution in China was also largely composed of young students as in the case of Sendero columns. Estimates indicate that 51% of the Red Army was made up of fifteen to twenty-two year olds. The difference lies in the origin of these young students. Most of them came from peasant backgrounds, with peasants constituting 68% of the Red Army. Young students in Sendero columns typically come from the richer areas of the coast or metropolitan areas. The high percentage of peasants in the Red Army during China's revolution reflected the commitment of the CCP to use the issues that were important to the peasantry as potential tools to increase mobilization. If the party could properly address these issues, the peasantry would be more willing to join military units. This strategy accordingly prompted military units to link up with civilian organizations to form a “mass line” to discover what issues regarding
land distribution, education, and advancement could mobilize the peasantry. These ideas were then taken up by the party. Through the concept of “mass line,” the military units became responsive to peasant concerns which in turn aroused peasant participation in the Red Army.

Rather than encouraging peasant enrollment and support for armed columns, Sendero’s guerrilla attacks drove the peasantry into retreat from the Andean highlands. During the twelve year war the population of the highland communities fell a phenomenal 60% as the peasants migrated to the lower valleys or to Lima. Even in Ayacucho, the birthplace of Sendero, nearly one-third of the population fled for safety in Lima. Degregori has observed in his on-sight studies that the principle problem for Sendero created by the massive migration was the simple loss of people itself. Sendero was often left in control of areas without people or populated by poor mono-lingual peasants who had difficulty communicating to Sendero soldiers only fluent in Spanish.

But Sendero cannot be held completely responsible for the peasant migration from their homelands. Clearly the violent counter-insurgency by the Peruvian military worsened conditions for the peasant population by forcing them to choose between the orders of Sendero combatants and the orders of the military, resulting in the deaths of innocent victims caught in between the power struggle. The difference in the treatment of local civilians came when government units began integrating themselves with the local peasants and took steps to ensure the involvement of the population in determining their own future through CDCs, local elections, and citizen generated programs. At the same time, as a part of their second phase of “equilibrium”, Sendero required more combatants and arms from the “masses” and by clamping down on local populations through the use of the death penalty and drainage of local resources. This destructive relationship with the peasantry generated desires to leave local communities rather than tolerate harsh Sendero policies.
The tendency of Sendero's terrorist attacks to victimize and alienate the population points to the dangers of guerilla warfare. Revolutionary theorists have long realized the possible weak points in using acts of terrorism. William Friedland has composited four dangers of guerilla warfare recognized by most revolutionary theorists. According to Friedland, guerilla warfare is illegitimate if the population has "democratic illusions"; it becomes a substitute for popular participation because of the required level of secrecy, it places too much emphasis on technique and details, and it decimates the population from which it draws support.

These four potential problems associated with guerilla warfare became apparent in the execution of Sendero strategy. Democratic solutions to overcoming poverty and political isolation remained a viable alternative in areas under heavy Sendero influence. Local fear of Sendero arising from their infatuation with controlling all aspects of community life lead many peasants to turn to democratic processes as a means of taking control of the community.

The proliferation of grass roots organizations has made active political participation and the fulfilment of social needs more attainable for the peasantry. Over the past few decades survival organizations have sprung up across the poorer communities of Peru to address a wide variety of social ills left unabated by a lack of state services. Communal soup kitchens, children centers, communal stores, health care brigades, water supply communities, and construction and manufacturing cooperatives are just a few examples of survival organizations designed to attend to peasant needs. In addition, peasant patrols have successfully deterred livestock rustlers in the countryside. All of these organizations serve to improve the well-being of peasant communities outside of Sendero influence. In fact, the local peasant controls (rondas campesinas) were originally created to protect community livestock from Sendero columns who would butcher the livestock for
their own political purposes.128

The formation of peasant organizations has given the peasantry active participation in the political arena. Peasant federations have historical roots that go back to the 1940s when The Peasant Federation of Peru (CCP) was established as a national union for departmental and provincial peasant federations. The National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) was initiated in 1972 by General Velasco’s military government to give political unity to independent farmers and agricultural wage laborers.129 Today these two confederations coordinate efforts in lobbying for credit, technical assistance, guaranteed crop prices, and restructuring of government-managed agricultural cooperatives. Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique have affirmed the political power of peasant organizations and other social movements in Peru, claiming that “their central role has radically altered the nature and terms of political debate in Peru.”130 Since the inception of peasant organizations decades ago, political parties of both the Right and the Left have attempted to link themselves with these movements to gain votes and credibility.

Sendero’s determination to breakup peasant federations confirms the strength of these organizations. Their capacity to represent the interests of the peasantry through alternative forms of politics threatens the ideological foundations of the insurgency. Sendero perceives organized peasants, NGOs, and other leftist parties as collaborators with the government. Luis Arce Borja, editor of the pro-Sendero newspaper “El Diario”, justifies Sendero’s antagonism toward these groups:

Their activities are financed by the state and by foreign powers because they all live on NGO money. Selective executions of United Left, police, members of paramilitary groups, government functionaries, foreign officials, yes, all that happens. There is no
alternative...Whoever thinks that a war can be fought with rose pedals is wrong.\textsuperscript{131} These words certainly clarify the insurgency's perception of peasant organizations, NGOs, and the Left as one interwoven enemy that stands in the way of revolutionary success. They also point to Sendero's recognition of the ability of these institutions to delegitimize guerrilla warfare a warranted means of improving the lives of the peasantry.

The activities of the departmental peasant federation in Puno during the war with Sendero exemplifies the powerful presence of peasant federations in the highlands. The Departmental Peasant Federation of Puno (FDCP) is affiliated nationally with the CCP and won important reforms for the peasantry during the 1980s, including the placing of peasant communal enterprises at the center of Puno's regional development. The FDCP also played a leading role in the May 1987 national peasant strike that resulted in the take over of almost 400,000 hectares of land from the state-run associative enterprises.\textsuperscript{132} To limit such successes of the FDCP, Sendero launched a terror campaign against important elected peasant officials and by September 1989 nearly three-fourths of the elected peasant and municipal authorities in Azángaro Province (located in the Department of Puno) resigned out of fear from Sendero threats.\textsuperscript{133} Although the PCP-SL has often been able to temporarily disorganize peasant federations such as the FDCP, they remain a potent force in Peruvian politics and continue to draw support from peasant communities.

Civil Defense Committees (CDCs) also spawn a sense of unity amongst the peasantry that places them in direct confrontation with Sendero. The sheer size of these defense committees, armed citizens ready to fend off Sendero attacks, underlines their popularity. In Ayacucho and Huancavelica alone, around 1,655 CDCs with 66,200 members existed in March of 1994 according to Peruvian government's Institute of Investigations for National Defense.\textsuperscript{134} The committees are
linked together by a General Assembly that nominates its own members and develops a coordinated strategy between the activities of the various CDCs. The function of the General Assembly subsequently promotes community determination and unity. Following the capture of Guzmán, the tasks of CDCs expanded beyond armed defense for their respective communities. In Cangari-Vinu, CDCs now concentrate their efforts on productive tasks such as financing and agrarian credit. Their initiatives have led to the installation of electricity, portable water, and health services. Many CDC leaders have also become politically involved. In January 1993 eighteen peasant CDC members from Ayacucho ran for political office as candidates for the Independent Civic Union (UCI), comprised of peasants representing their own solutions to the countryside’s problems which challenge the proposals of the Left. And for the first time in history the UCI obtained more votes than the United Left (UL), a national communist party faithful to the Moscow line of communism. Through their increased responsibilities and political penetration, CDCs have managed to further marginalize the influence of Sendero in the countryside. By paying greater attention to community needs in addition to armed defense, they have shown their disdain for guerrilla warfare and preference for more peaceful means of solving the nation’s cultural and economic disparities.

In the metropolitan areas, forms of self-management and self-government associated with the growth of pueblos jóvenes, or shanty towns, give these communities a high level of self-sufficiency and influence in national politics. Their need for such basic services as water, electricity, and transport inspires them to earn legal recognition in the political arena. They also push for national objectives pertaining to issues of external debt, national sovereignty, and popular democracy. Shanty town political groups were active participants in the 1977 national strikes that helped to bring about the collapse of the military government in 1980. More importantly, these
urban political groups oppose PCP-SL ideology and tactics in dealing with the Peruvian government. Their commitment to influencing Peruvian politics through peaceful mechanisms prompts their resistance to Sendero.

Finally, organized labor generated from within the working class helps to shape the unity of the lower classes and enhances their participation in the political process. The General Confederation of Workers of Peru (CGTP) serves as the central national labor federation and has over 80,000 workers from various sectors of the economy. The CGTP represents general labor interests and is composed of numerous unions that have organized eighteen national strikes against state-imposed austerity packages since 1977. These strikes reveal the concentrated efforts of unions to play a role in Peruvian politics. The government cannot afford to ignore the influence of this powerful social movement. Unions have also seriously contested the pragmatism of Sendero tactics to overcome labor problems. Although often faced with limited success, multi-faceted channels of political participation have given Peru’s poorest a voice in the democratic system. The strong presence of these institutions brings into question the legitimacy of using guerrilla warfare to surmount past grievances when accomplishing these goals peacefully still appears to be an attainable alternative.

Che Guevara, an Argentinean guerrilla leader who played a role in the Cuban revolution and perished while attempting to establish a guerrilla movement in Bolivia, foresaw how peaceful methods of overcoming societal grievances could undermine a revolutionary movement. He argues, “Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.” Indeed,
leaders of the former Soviet Union, China and most communist parties have come to similar conclusions, claiming that a revolution cannot succeed in countries where viable democratic possibilities exist because the people would understand any revolutionary violence as terrorist, without clear goals or purpose other than the killing of civilians.\textsuperscript{142} In Peru, both of these elements exist; practical democratic solutions remain a possibility and most Peruvians view Sendero’s guerrilla attacks as acts of terrorism.

In accord with the warnings of communist leaders, Sendero often fails to clearly communicate its goals and objectives to the Peruvian people due to the organization’s overwhelming emphasis on the armed struggle. While the use of force has historically proven to be a strategic advantage in class struggle, for no socialist revolution has succeeded yet without armed insurrection, a doctrine that places total primacy on guerrilla attacks can lose sight of the needs of the people. In their 1982 pamphlet, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare}, the PCP asserts that people are the crucial element in a revolution, “We can never forget that an armed force [...] strategically, is only as strong as the social order it defends, no matter how heavily armed it may be tactically.”\textsuperscript{143} Any examination of earlier successful social revolutions reveals the importance of a well-educated population and maintaining extensive mass participation in determining revolutionary policy. Doctrinally, Sendero recognizes the vitality of mass involvement in their revolutionary struggle. The Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru has outlined four “Principles of Unity” followed by Sendero. Among them is “to distribute and make known the writings of PCP and other materials that help the people to understand the goals of the revolution; and to denounce and combat the lies and slanders with respect to the revolution.”\textsuperscript{144}
Revolutionary theorists long ago appreciated the need to establish clear goals and to integrate the people into the revolutionary process. Friedland has identified two principal objectives of mobilization in his book on revolutionary theory:

1. The goals of mobilization in terms of revolutionary interest must be clear. Without the establishment of clear goals, mobilization degenerates into a set of limited procedures and the purpose of revolutionary action - societal transformation - is forgotten.

2. Mobilization should involve people in the determination of policy and not simply in implementation. Unless people begin to control their own lives, the goals of mobilization may be impeded by groups acting to further their own interests.

In observance of these mobilization objectives, Guzmán emphasizes societal transformation and the participation of the people in Sendero doctrine, claiming that the “People’s Army is led by the Party and not the other way around.”

But in spite of Sendero’s declaration to involve the masses in determining policy, this ambition remains secondary to combat goals. The People’s Guerilla Army (EGP) is the primary mechanism through which Sendero spreads its influence, leading to the high prioritization of combat objectives. PCP-SL claims to fight its war against the Peruvian government through four methods: guerrilla warfare, sabotage, selective annihilations, and armed propaganda. Sendero has declared EGP responsibilities ranked in the order of importance to include combat; mobilization, politicalization and arming of the masses; and finally food procurement and production. Most Peruvians find it difficult to understand how sporadic guerrilla attacks against unarmed civilians can help lead to a more egalitarian society when Sendero continues its armed struggle without identifying with the people. Coronel attributes the peasantry’s resistance to Sendero in Huanta to
Sendero's amplification of their war effort in the area without seeming to achieve any objective. The feeling of isolation from the movement becomes further exacerbated by the use of young "outsiders" in Sendero columns that come from the city or the coast, areas foreign to the peasant population.

Suppressing the Populace

Sendero policies that sever its relationship with the lower classes go beyond the use of terrorism. A general inquiry into the activities of Sendero reveals the organization's inclination towards establishing a dominant hierarchy, negating traditional community values, and shattering local security and welfare. On the surface, Sendero doctrine would seem to represent peasant interests. Heriberto Ocasio, national spokesperson for the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (CSRP), has summarized how revolutionary base areas are organized by the People's Revolutionary Army. Each base area has collective planting and harvesting in which the army participates in the labor. All animal raising and seed exchanges are carried out by the whole community, not individual families. People trials in which mass meetings of the community decide the guilt or innocence of the accused provide for local justice. In regards to community values and tradition, full freedom of religion is recognized and all education courses are taught in Quechua, the language of the people. Finally, popularly elected People's Committees govern revolutionary base areas. A delegate assembly (composed of one-third "party people," one-third poor peasants, and one-third middle peasants) elects the People's Committee. Through this type of structure peasant interests are protected and the local population fully participates in the revolutionary struggle.

Sendero believes such an intimate arrangement with the people aids them in their struggle against the counter-revolution of the government. In 1991 the PCP publicly declared, "Obviously they [the counter-revolution] do not represent the interests of the people, we do, they cannot win the
support of the masses, they have to force them, to oppress them in order that they follow and that generates resistance; in our case we can be followed because we can make them see our objective, that we represent their interests..."\textsuperscript{149} Public statements like these along with Sendero documents show the movement's appreciation for the value of a mutually beneficial relationship between the peasantry and revolutionary combatants.

However, in practice Sendero attempts to fully integrate with the peasantry have been undermined by the movement's overwhelming emphasis on maintaining order and party direction in areas under their control. One manner through which Sendero preserves order is by establishing the superior authority of the People's Committees. Although supposedly "democratically" elected, Sendero columns control these committees. There is no reliable information to indicate that delegate assemblies have actually been established in Sendero base areas. Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique, researchers at the Latin American Bureau in London, contend that the People's Committees are nothing more than "party-sanctioned" governing bodies.\textsuperscript{150} As noted by José Coronel in his studies in the province of Huanta, many middle and upper class high school and university students from the coastal areas or the city participate in the armed columns that dominate the People's Committees.

Taking into account such a composition, poor peasant communities often perceive Sendero combatants as foreigners because they do not consist of the local people. The very makeup of Sendero columns reinforces the old fear of coastal and urban organizations among the peasant population. This discrepancy sets up a competition between the popular committees and local authorities. Sendero columns accordingly depose of popularly elected local authorities, viewed as
an obstruction to Sendero progress and control over base areas, by driving them out or through executions. Armed columns do not hesitate to threaten, beat, or kill peasant leaders. Nearly 300 political authorities have been executed by Sendero columns. Coronel has concluded that the popular committees in Huanta demonstrated superior authority to the local officials in order to undermine any local authority deriving from popular support. When Sendero takes over an area, it knows all and controls all. Few organs are created to allow the local population input or participation in setting Sendero policy other than through compliance with Sendero orders. These authoritarian practices embark on long held feelings of exploitation among the peasantry and may explain the development of separate peasantry organizations such as the Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP) and the various CDCs that attempt to create alternatives for the peasantry in place of Sendero controlled organizations.

As a Maoist communist organization, Sendero bases much of its doctrine and practices on the guidelines designed by Mao. But unlike Sendero, Mao aligned revolutionary forces with peasant organizations already in place in order to address the peasants on their own ground. This alliance gave the peasants ample opportunity to influence revolutionary policy and allowed the revolutionary movement to address important peasant issues. Party branches sought to strengthen existing farmer and peasant unions rather than dismantling them. As a result, the people and revolutionary forces shared a common experience that gave the communist party not only physical control over an area, but deep interaction with the common people.

The ability of the CCP to integrate people from a wide range of economic backgrounds into the revolutionary movement proved critical to the success of the revolution. Indeed, DeFronzo asserts that elite groups can bring “crucial organizational and intellectual skills” to a movement.
Mao intentionally reached out beyond the peasantry in a strategic initiative for support. He openly appealed for support from the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and liberal-minded middle classes. He justified his solicitation of these groups by claiming that China was not yet ready for complete socialism. Mao's determination to enhance the attractiveness of the Communists to all Chinese despite their anti-bourgeoisie character became particularly revealing in the "New Democracy" government institutions. In March 1940 the CCP enacted the "three-thirds" system across all Communist areas. Under this plan, the Communists could hold no more than one-third of government positions. The remaining seats were shared with Nationalists, non-Communist leftists, and independents. Although all local government voices were ultimately screened through the Communist Party, the resulting government structure allowed for the political participation of all economic and political groups in China. Accordingly, the democratic system of government relaxed tensions resulting from the CCP's anti-bourgeoisie stance and united together various sectors of the Chinese population. The hierarchical structure established by Sendero shows no willingness to listen to other voices like the "New Democracy" permitted in China.

Since the days of Marx and Engels social revolutionary theory has recognized the need for a connection between the daily lives of people and revolutionary objectives. Increased encompassment of local issues and greater mass participation produces a revolution more representative of the people. Friedland distinguishes the community's articulation of their personal problems in the revolutionary struggle as a pivotal ingredient for a revolutionary success. According to modern revolutionary theory, organizers of a revolution must encourage the expression of local needs. Sendero practices do not advocate free expression, but conformity to Sendero ideals and goals often out of touch with the real desires of the peasantry. Modern revolutionary theorists
acclaim that only through communal activity, common experience, and cooperative action with the people can a revolutionary movement gain large numbers of followers. Enhanced participation derives from a “social energy” which determines policy, including the planning of strategies and an analysis of events.

The entrenched authoritative position of the People’s Committees in relation to the common people consequently leads to the suppression of traditional indigenous values and customs. As a class-oriented movement, Sendero does not fight to uphold the cultural values of the Indian population, but attempts to introduce a new set of concepts unfamiliar to the indigenous communities. Although Sendero focuses on the Indian peasantry for primary support, the struggle remains class-oriented and insurgency leaders used their authority to impose “class concepts” on the local population in their base areas. Sendero’s move into the metropolitan area of Lima and the Upper Huallaga Valley by the mid-1980s confirms the class orientation of Sendero’s program rather than an ethnic or regional based movement.

Rodrigo Montoya, in his book Al Borde del Naufragio (On the Verge of Shipwreck), characterizes the historical alienation of the indigenous identity in Peruvian society. In his work, Rafino Mamami, a Quechua speaking professor from the province of San Román, summarizes the popular Indian sentiment about their role in Peruvian society, “We Indians do not form a part of nor participate in this Peru; we find ourselves forgotten and put to the side as if we did not form a part of this territory.” The isolation of indigenous communities has caused many Indians to have negative images of themselves and a lack of cultural identity. Fifty-eight ethnic groups have been placed outside of the “dominant model” of western standards that saturate Peruvian society. According to Montoya, western democracy attempts to homogenize the culturally diverse Peruvian
people in five distinct ways: belief in technology, a capitalist market, the attainment of greater knowledge, a standard way of life, and a pre-determined conduct of thought and feeling. By placing these five beliefs in the social norm, the Indian population becomes socially unaccepted and is faced with two choices; to change their personal identity and integrate themselves into the dominant culture, or to combat and rebuff the dominant culture. Left with these two options, western democracy and capitalism curbs the influence of the indigenous culture in Peruvian society. Perhaps Montoya best describes liberty in Peru when he says, “The ideal of liberty, which is a primary contribution of the west, has to leave from the simple prison of suffrage in which capitalism has enclosed it.”

The majority of the indigenous population finds that the insurgency’s ideology does not offer any significant progress in the recognition of indigenous rights. Montoya has concluded that Maoist orthodoxy, like popular democracy, also fails to address societal differences. In collaboration with Montoya’s assertions, Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique distinctly identify Sendero’s “refusal to recognize pluralistic, cultural and political traditions” as a fundamental characteristic that differentiates the insurgency from other left-wing organizations. However, other writers on the movement such as Gloria Caudillo claim that the Maoist, Lenin, and Marxist texts used as an ideological base have been carefully linked to Andean history and culture. The ability of José Mariátegui, an inspirational visionary for PCP-SL, to apply Marxist literature to the Peruvian reality attests to the insurgency’s connection with the cultural roots of the indigenous people. Themes of national integration based on indigenous heritage and condemnation of an existing European cultural bias in Peru both appear in Mariátegui’s *Siete Ensayos*. Sendero has accordingly assimilated these ideas as principles of their ideology. A closer look at the actual doctrine and practices of Sendero
provides helpful insight into analyzing the contrasting opinions surrounding the organization’s concern for protecting the indigenous culture.

The sixth goal of Sendero’s General Program of the Democratic Revolution reads, “to establish the People’s Republic of Peru as a united front of classes based on the alliance of the working class and peasantry led by the proletariat headed by its Communist Party; this is the formation of the New Democracy which will carry forward a new economy, a new politics, and a new culture.” These few lines illustrate Sendero’s understanding of the world’s political and economic structures along complete class lines. A restructuring or elimination of these classes, characterized by their levels of power and economic wealth in the production structure, will begin a new type of economy, politics, and culture. Under such a perceived conception of all power struggles emanating from a materially exploitative system, Sendero doctrine simply does not address ethnic or racial issues. Poole, Degregori, and Montoya have all noted the absence of “Indianness” in official Sendero ideology. Any acknowledgment of the role of ethnic differences in the development of an exploitative society would undermine the importance of class distinctions as a catalyst for revolutionary change. Consequently, all individuals are placed into a certain class of people based on their position of power in the capitalist system regardless of their cultural or ethnic origins. Sendero does believe in religious freedom and women’s rights, but only so far as religious sects and women are also crucial elements of class composition. Degregori in El Surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso (The Emergence of Sendero Luminoso) articulates his interpretation of the insurgency’s response to the ethnic tensions in Peru, “Reading through the documents of PCP-SL, one might think that Peru was as homogeneous as Japan or Scandinavia-not a line refers to ethnic or racial problems.”164
The failure of Sendero to associate ethnic and racial differences with forms of social oppression opens the door for the organization to suppress traditional beliefs and customs that are believed to interfere with Sendero objectives. In his studies in Ayacucho, Degregori identified four local practices quelled by Sendero cadres: the esteem for the extended family unit, the formation of separate community organizations, rules of reciprocity, and all religious rituals and outings. Poole and Rénié have also observed how the “New Order” requires the banishment of all religious fiestas and rituals considered “archaic superstitions.” These practices hardly promote freedom of religion, as promised by Sendero leaders. On the contrary, these deeply rooted and highly valued local traditions become replaced with concepts not culturally understood by Indian communities such as the state, social class, party, and new democracy. In forcing these new ideas and principles on the indigenous population, the insurgency asserts itself as a ruling elite who has moral and cultural superiority.

The recruitment of secondary and university students for armed columns as well as the presence of young party members in the Popular Committees also produces a rupture with local customs by destroying traditional concepts of age authority. Young students in new positions of authority break away from the traditional hierarchial structure, subordinating their elders to child-like roles of having to learn new ideological perceptions of the world from young students. Poole and Rénié point out how Sendero’s retreats from the highlands instigated family rivalries and abuses due to the disruption of the hierarchial structure which can be largely contributed to the assigned positions of coastal secondary and university students unfamiliar with indigenous communities. In their attempts to unify the people through class antagonisms, Sendero units ended up dividing communities torn by the cultural disturbances stimulated from the insurgency.
One of the primary inspirations for Sendero’s revolutionary movement is its demand that the ownership of land return to those who work the land. Old feudal practices of latifundia should be replaced with communal ownership and modes of production. The General Program of the Democratic Revolution mandates the “liquidation of semifuedal property and all of its subsistent modes, confiscating it to give the lands to the peasantry, primarily the poor peasantry, applying the principle of ‘Land to those who work it.’” The redistribution of land is designed to assist the poor peasants in becoming self-sufficient and to increase their overall standard of living. The People’s Committees have been quite successful in dividing up land equitably amongst the peasantry after expropriating the land from big landlords and the government. However, the redistribution of land often does little to raise the subsistence levels of the local population because militants extract much of the agricultural products and destroy peasant-owned goods deemed to be “bourgeois-like” in origin, leaving many peasants worse off than they were before the arrival of Sendero. Without any aid from other communist states, the insurgency relies to a great extent on financial support and resource allocation from its base areas. Sendero extracts 50% of the agricultural production in its support bases that goes toward the feeding of armed columns and other food necessities. The reservation of certain amounts of agricultural products for political purposes occurs on top of already curtailed food supplies designed to block the flow of products to the cities, thereby depriving state-dominated metropolitan areas of essential food supplies. The “New Order” even calls for the closing of weekly markets. Degregori parallels the destination of products for party objectives and the curtailing of food supplies with peasant discontent with Sendero policies in Ayacucho.

Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlansky in “A Theory of Revolution” express the need for revolutionary movements to initiate positive change in the social structure if the masses are to
support the revolution. An ideologically oriented insurgency must work to institutionalize their doctrine and objectives in a manner that raises the people’s hope for the future. Without implementing any changes in the social structure, the masses do not see any tangible benefits from the revolution and therefore come to understand revolutionary agitation as a simple replacement of power in the old political structure. Sendero policies that lower agricultural and other productive output in already economically struggling peasant communities only impose tangible costs on these communities, not tangible benefits.

Mao’s revolutionary land and production policies in China intentionally sought to improve the well-being of peasant communities under their control. Although Nationalist military blockades and the need for CCP income forced the Communists to confiscate some cash from land transactions and to tax many poor peasant communities, these measures were secondary to the Party’s unification with civil organizations in bringing about land reform and increasing production. Land reform would be carried out only at the will of the peasantry. The “principle of equal distribution of land” stated, “the local soviet governments shall on no account carry out this measure by force...[but] only with the direct support and at the desire of the basic masses of the peasantry. Thus if the majority of the middle peasants so desire, they may [be allowed] not to participate in the redistribution [of land].” To the contrary of Sendero practices, the CCP did not force lands on the peasantry through centralized Party actions. Peasant federations, tenant farmer unions, and other mass organizations assisted village and township land committees backed by the Red Army in executing new land laws as early as the early 1930s. By October of 1947 the Outline Land Law gave full land reform powers to peasant associations and leagues, peasant congresses, and subsidiary organizations. The powers granted to these civil organizations over land reform gave the masses a voice in political directives
and a feeling of common purpose.

Communist attempts to organize and increase production in their base areas were also largely successful. Peasants were encouraged to increase sowing and harvesting while all government officials and party members also cultivated land to raise their own food which lifted the burden from the local population. In 1994 Mao claimed that army and government officials in the Shan-Kan-Ning border region were producing 40% of their needs on their own, reducing the number of taxes collected from the peasantry used to buy supplies for the army or for other Party needs. A CCP conference in Yenan from October 1942 through January 1943 discussed the challenges of improving production methods and the overall economy. At the conclusion of this conference, members agreed to the formation of mutual aid cooperatives for much of the countryside which united laborers together for planting, irrigation, and harvesting projects. In the far reaching efforts of the revolution to encourage efficient levels of production and commerce, the CCP made extensive concessions to landlords and rich peasants on the grounds that they would improve the working conditions of the poor peasants. As a result, capitalist modes of production remained intact for the sake of increasing the productive capacities of peasant communities. A May 1946 directive actually set limits on peasant actions against landlords and rich peasants while ensuring these two groups a greater than average share of land. In defense of the directive, Mao exclaimed:

When solving the land problem, we should distinguish the ordinary rich peasants and middle and small landlords from the traitors, bad gentry, and local tyrants. We should be more strict in our treatment of the traitors, bad gentry, and local tyrants, and more lenient in our treatment of the rich peasants and middle and small landlords...

Mao’s desire to protect landlord and rich peasant interests not only demonstrates a strategy to draw
the support of elite groups, but also a deep concern for fomenting the development of agricultural production that can provide resources for the revolution and lessen the hardship on the peasantry.

Sendero’s governing of base areas, in contrast to Mao practices that supposedly guide the revolution, inhibit the self-sufficiency of the surrounding agricultural areas. Peasant communities have watched their production capacities fall on account of Sendero’s destruction of peasant goods, production facilities, and limits on agricultural output and exchange. In his case studies on Sendero Luminoso, Henry Dietz reports “numerous incidents” of armed columns destroying tractors, feed, seed, and livestock essential to the daily needs of communities. He accordingly concludes that “Sendero behavior would seemingly alienate precisely those people who should be the target of persuasion... but such is the ideology of Sendero that it will attack anyone perceived as even possibly capitalist, bourgeois, or otherwise unreliable.”178

In the department of Puno, Sendero’s insistence on controlling all aspects of land takeovers endangered the security of the peasantry. Sendero demanded the breakup of state “associate enterprises” must be conducted through total destruction. Associative enterprises were formed during the Velasco years of the 1970s as part of a land reform program. Technicians, administrators, workers, and peasants formed partnerships managed by state appointed bureaucrats. But the enterprises often failed to initiate real land reform because in many cases the administrators were hacienda foremen or relatives of hacendados who had formerly owned the land. Therefore, the repressive social structure between the ruling elite and the workers remained intact.

Sendero proposes an aggressive and violent approach to bringing an end to associative enterprises that victimizes the peasantry. The revolutionary movement consistently attempts to undermine any “pacifist” takeovers carried out by peasant federations, building up frustrations
amongst those who benefit from the peaceful redistribution of land under former associative enterprises. Sendero’s infiltration into peasant land takeovers has even resulted in the loss of lives. In July 1990 a Sendero cadres killed six workers leading a peasant federation’s land takeover in Quisuni. The combatants justified their violence by proclaiming destruction and armed takeover as the only “correct revolutionary strategy.” On several occasions armed cadres in Puno also forcibly distributed livestock collected from enterprises to the peasantry from surrounding communities. The livestock were no gift for their new owners. Police units searched down the livestock looking for the terrorists who stole them. Consequently, many peasants were forced to slaughter valuable breeding animals or to sell them on the black market for the sake of their own security. Sendero appropriation of enterprise property and goods accordingly only victimized surrounding communities, leaving them with few benefits of the insurgency’s so called “land reform.”

Sendero activities in the department of Junin deliberately sought to disrupt agricultural and dairy production. The central highland area is home to a dynamic livestock, dairy, and wool economy. Since Velasco’s agrarian reform, peasant communities have participated as partners in associate enterprises created out of haciendas. Sendero units soon took advantage of developing conflicts between peasants and administrators of the enterprises by enforcing more radical land reform upon their arrival. The insurgency’s land reform policies suppressed independent peasant and labor movements in favor of restructuring the associate enterprises instead of totally dismantling them. When Cahuide’s general assembly approved the creation of a new multi-communal enterprise from a former SAIS (Agrarian Society of Social Interest) enterprise’s installations and land, Sendero reacted by destroying Laive, “the most technologically advanced and productive of Cahuide’s seven production units.” The improved breeding stock of sheep and cattle were distributed to the
peasantry, but cadres ordered the immediate slaughter of these valuable animals, depriving the community of over 5,000 liters of milk a day and 150 metric tons of wool annually. In the following month of December 1988 Sendero demolished one of Peru’s largest milk and dairy processing plants in Concepción.\textsuperscript{181} No “partial” land reform could be accepted by PCP-SL, even at the expense of reducing production capacities which directly inhibited the peasantry from attaining their daily needs. In fact, much of the destruction of processing plants and other productive structures fell in line with Sendero’s strategy to obstruct the flow of food and energy to Lima. Unlike Mao’s revolution in China, Sendero policies do little if anything to improve the economic well-being of the peasantry while simultaneously focusing on the war effort. The insurgency must demonstrate a visible commitment to quality social reform if they are to gain the support of the masses.

\textit{Disorientation of the Left}

Sendero’s need for manpower and supplies that must be forcefully extracted from the peasantry stems from the insurgency’s official condemnation of Peru’s leftist parties and other international communist parties. Support from these parties could enhance Sendero’s popularity and benefit the organization strategically. However, Sendero’s strict adherence to a rigid ideology leaves no doubt about its desire to completely disassociate with other leftist movements. The PCP-SL proscribes all communist parties in Russia, Cuba, and China (which has turned away from “true” Maoism). Guzmán has called Castro, the Sandinistas, and the M-19 in Colombia “petty bourgeois reformists.”\textsuperscript{182} Sendero’s contempt for Peru’s left wing parties has been well manifested as well. In 1988, assassination directives included the annihilation of members of the United Left (IU) council in the province of Huanta.\textsuperscript{183} Sendero’s rejection of other leftist parties and movements sets the organization up for direct confrontation with all of those outside of the party line.
The insurgency's observance of strict dogmatism lowers the appeal of PCP-SL to the poor who are looking for social transformation through democratic and more flexible methods that adapt to their particular needs. Many of Peru's leftist parties have concentrated their efforts on renovating Marxism so as to offer a plan of democratic socialism aimed at ameliorating the lives of the poor by giving them freedom of expression and mass participation combined with drastic socialist reforms to carry out Marxist ideals of income redistribution. This new type of Marxism proposes a more gradual transition to a socialist state by working within the current capitalist and democratic system to institute reform. The idea of peaceful and effective socialist reform attracts support from the poor sectors of society who are willing to exchange votes for promised aid and technical assistance. A coherent leftist program can accordingly introduce effective reform while maintaining the liberties of a democratic system. An affluent leftist party consequently constrains support for a radical revolutionary movement like Sendero that advocates a violent overhaul of the entire democratic system.

In light of recent changes in the world's political environment as well as a series of crises for Marxism in Latin America, Marxist parties have been forced to significantly renovate their policies and strategies. The collapse of the "workers states" in Eastern Europe and fundamental changes in the political regimes of the former Soviet Union and China present serious challenges to the feasibility of implementing traditional Marxist doctrine. Marxists and other leftist parties have also faced debilitating setbacks in Latin America where the polarized tendencies of the Left led to the rise of military regimes and the suppression of the Left in the 1960s and 1970s. Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Argentina all provide convincing examples of the dangers of leftist polarization. Richard Harris, coordinating editor of Latin American Perspectives, attributes the suppression of the
Left in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s to its inability to mobilize sufficient support and to a lack of overall long-term strategy on how to transform a capitalist oriented society. An historical analysis of this period in Latin America reveals that the radical policies and proposals of the Left directly threatened the security of many Latin American governments which instigated the reactionary rise of the Right. The failure of the Left to propose pragmatic policy changes that would not provoke starch opposition from the middle classes and the Right prompted most leftist intellectuals and organizations to revise their ideological and political positions. These revisions focused on new approaches to mobilizing popular support and gaining political legitimacy.

The more modern forms of leftist ideology, in contrast to Sendero, seek a democratic means of instituting social reform instead of orthodox revolutionary methods. Many political parties of the Left in Brazil, the Andean states, and the Caribbean have taken up this line of Marxism. Richard Harris points out how the FMLN/FDR in El Salvador has even replaced “revolution” with “democracy” as a central concept of their political strategy. He attributes this new political orientation to four factors:

- The Left’s participation in the struggles waged in defense of human rights under repressive military regimes;
- Their involvement in the process of limited political democratization that has accompanied the transition from military to civilian rule during recent years;
- The recognition on the part of some leftists that the lack of importance given to democracy in the past—both in their programs and in the internal organization of their parties—was to some degree responsible for many of their past errors and failures;
- The influence of the discussions on democracy and the process of political democratization
that took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s...\textsuperscript{185}

Roberto Barros has identified three recent developments in the Left in Latin America that recognize the importance of democratic socialism as opposed to forced revolutionary change that can inhibit mass participation in the political process. One position holds that the contradictions between democracy and capitalism necessitate a working class struggle that strives for a more democratic form of government as a tactic in the revolutionary struggle for arriving at socialism. This line of revolutionary strategy primarily surfaced in the 1960s and 1970s and has been followed by the Communist Party of Chile and the IU of Peru in recent years.

A second new outgrowth from the Left advocates the consolidation of democratic institutions to create a democratic political culture which de-emphasizes class struggle and concentrates on the political measures needed to overcome the exploitative tendencies of capitalism. This leftist sect avoids using the terms “revolution” or “Marxism” and in some cases even “socialism.” They consider themselves “post-Marxists” who can achieve a socialist state without instigating severe class conflicts. The Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in Venezuela adheres to this strategy and refuses to identify itself with the rest of the Left. Another example is the Party for Democracy in Chile which deliberately dropped the term “socialist” from the party name in order to distinguish itself from traditional socialist movements.\textsuperscript{186}

While these first two groups offer a peaceful approach to promoting the interests of the poorer masses, their effectiveness in bringing about real social change remains doubtful due to their tendency to revert back to the practices of capitalism. Roberto Barros notes how these new leftist sects seem to assume that they can redefine and conceptualize a new democracy which will respond to all popular demands. They fail to recognize how the interplay of various actors can prevent the
implementation of popular demands:

By de-contextualizing democracy, these predominantly political and institutional perspectives on democratization run the risk of ignoring how objective institutions and strategic interactions intertwine to produce very different types of democracy, including variants that are not able to satisfy popular demands or lead to a greater democratization...\(^\text{187}\)

The interests of the bourgeoisie can in effect lead to the consolidation of centrist political parties that protect all old capitalist modes of production. In fact, James Petras characterizes these new leftists as neoliberals whose “adaptation to the needs of capital lends directly to an attack on the class content and program of labor unions and left parties.”\(^\text{188}\) However, the IU in Peru, considered a coalition with revised Marxist strategies that place their faith in democratic institutions for social change, has shown some electoral success among the poorer sectors of the Peruvian population. In 1983, the IU received 49.9% of the vote in Lima’s twelve poorest districts and came in a strong second place in the 1985 presidential elections.\(^\text{189}\) But this coalition comprised of the majority of Peru’s socialist and Communist parties has undergone several internal divisions since its formation in 1980 with some factions sympathetic to the armed struggles of MRTA and Sendero while other more moderate factions are willing to cooperate with the private sector in their vie for social transformation. The inability of the IU to remain united in policy objectives inhibits an accurate evaluation of the coalitions’ effectiveness in creating true social change.

Finally, the third development in the Left as identified by Roberto Barros seeks to replace the rigid dogmatism of Marxism-Leninism with a social democratic project that will produce democratic socialism. The radical democratic project is based on popular demand in which the lower classes express their culture and struggles through democratic participation. Brazil’s Workers
Party (PT) and the Committee for Labor Solidarity (CLS) in the Caribbean have adopted similar ideas. Under democratic socialism, the development of local forms of participation curtail the alienating effects of bureaucratism and merely formal democratic institutions while democratic institutions allow for a smooth transition to socialism. The prospects for the success of democratic socialism remain unclear. Past attempts to institutionalize radical democratization have often run into serious challenges from the Right (such as the Allende administration in Chile) and concentrating on narrow democratic projects like labor rights does not necessarily create socialism.

Adapting traditional Marxism to the modern political world through democratic socialism faces many challenges of pluralism and fragmentation as a result of working within the democratic structure. However, the importance of these parties rests not solely on their electoral success, but on their ability to present peaceful solutions to the problems of the lower classes by enhancing their participation in the democratic process which stands in the ways of the success of radical revolutionary movements. Carol Graham, professor of government at Georgetown University and guest scholar in the Brookings Institutions’s Foreign Policy Studies Program, has studied the unique political relationship between the marginalized and political parties in Latin American society. She defines marginalization as “the exclusion of certain sectors of the population from participation in the socioeconomic change that occurs as a developing country industrializes its economy.” Political parties respond to the needs of the marginalized by promising public or private assistance to the poor in exchange for votes, a political strategy she terms “clientalism.” This type of relationship provides the poor with a cheap and effective way to attain needed services.

More importantly, clientalism can facilitate democratic consolidation across all sectors of society, incorporating the marginalized into the formal political and economic structure.
enhanced political participation in the democratic process, issues of socio-economic development are absorbed by political parties looking to appeal to the lower classes who often constitute a majority of the population. Huber-Stephens, an expert in democratic development in Latin America, has drawn similar conclusions on the correlation between increased political participation and socio-economic change. He argues that “significant increases in popular participation and in the spheres of democratic decision are bound to raise issues of distribution and socioeconomic structural change.”\textsuperscript{193}

At a more local level, Carol Graham also recognizes the important contributions of grassroots organizations in initiating reform programs that force political parties to respond to the efforts of popular organizations. The state, political parties, and popular organizations form democratic consolidation which promotes economic reform and democratic restructuring that does not alienate certain sectors of society.\textsuperscript{194} The proliferation of grassroots organizations in Peru that have come under attack by Sendero have helped to build the type of democratic unity to which Graham refers to in Peru. Populist parties like APRA, at least in theory, and those under the coalitions of ASI (Left Social Agreement) and PUM (United Party Mariáteguista) coordinate their efforts with popular organizations to implement social and economic reform. They receive their support from a heterogeneous class structure and work within the constitutional structure to undermine it through reformist policies that avoid the tension of class conflicts. Conciliatory reform practices that protect the private sector in order to maintain a broad spectrum of support can threaten revolutionary movements like Sendero that practice far more radical reform policies and tactics. But before examining Sendero’s relationship with the Left, it is important to note the proposals presented by leftist parties in Peru and how they have played a role in Peruvian politics since the commencement
of Sendero’s armed struggle.

The modern establishment of the political Left in Peru can be dated back to the late 1920s and early 1930s. One of the major leftist parties to form was the Popular American Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) in 1924 under the leadership of Haya de la Torre. The party describes itself as a mass socialist Marxist party that seeks to unite all oppressed social classes through democratic means in order to form a more economically equitable democracy. Haya de la Torre did not believe that the word “revolution” mandated violent change. Rather, revolution could be accomplished by working with the boundaries of the democratic institution and without alienating the strategic political importance of the professional classes. As a party developed around an anti-imperialist philosophy, its primary national programs include decentralization, the nationalization of land and selective industries, the establishment of a National Bank, social security, free education, and the introduction of credit cooperatives to assist in the areas of agricultural production.¹⁹⁵

For more than three decades up to the 1968 military takeover, APRA remained a party of opposition that failed to capture the presidential office. The appeal of the party’s social and economic reform proposals along with its commitment to peaceful transition became outweighed by an increase of “ideological fervor” and exclusionism that drove away support from the Right and the Left.¹⁹⁶ Apristas suffered persecution, imprisonment, and social isolation at the hands of the elite and the military who feared APRA’s mass appeal and organizational capabilities. When Velasco’s military government came to power in 1968, the Aprista Party was banned from participating in Peruvian politics.

The return to civilian rule in 1979 gave the party an opportunity to erase past associations of exclusionism and an austere ideology. While capturing only 27.4% of the vote in the 1980
presidential elections, APRA went through a critical period of structural reform over the next five years that would lead to its first presidential victory in 1985. The main shift in APRA strategy moved the party toward the center of Peruvian politics. The party opened up to support from non-party members in an effort to remove its image as a closed, fragmented, and violent organization while making special concessions to the private sector in order to draw the support of the professional classes. García Pérez, APRA’s 1984 presidential candidate, still advocated traditional APRA themes like the integration of the Indian population into the democratic process, agricultural development, decentralization of the government, and assistance to the poor. However, APRA proposals sought to address these issues through an “internally based economic reactivation scheme” that would benefit the marginalized (peasants and urban poor) while protecting entrepreneurial assets.

This renewed faith in the ability of the private sector to facilitate social reform coupled with high inflation and low economic growth during the Belaúnde administration (1980-1985) expanded the appeal of APRA’s proposals to all social classes of Peru. The result was electoral success. García won more votes than all other candidates combined with over 47% of the national vote. In the twelve poorest districts of Lima APRA even won a clear majority with 53.6% of the vote. The voters sent two important messages to the government; first, the Left had become a potent force in Peruvian politics and second (and most important for organizations like Sendero), businesses and other private sector entities would not support radical Marxist governments, but would back up more moderate social reforms.

In unfamiliar territory, APRA used the office of the presidency to begin its program of concertación, or cooperation with the private sector, to implement social reform. The business
community welcomed government intervention in the economy after years of confrontation between business and labor. The core of APRA’s economic programs centered on investment in short-term labor projects and providing credit to the traditional agricultural sector and to informal entrepreneurs. Key programs in rural areas included government sponsored dialogue with peasants and floating agricultural prices. In urban areas, the government set up emergency employment programs and organizational support for pueblos jóvenes.\textsuperscript{200} These programs formed an important part of the government’s strategy in combating Sendero. When asked by a Peruvian journalist in a 1984 interview how to best confront the challenge of Sendero, García pledged to destroy the organization through economic assistance to the poor that would improve the very lives and conditions Sendero feeds off of for support.\textsuperscript{201} The initial results of APRA’s economic program looked promising with inflation reduced from 163.4\% in 1986 to 64\% in 1987, a GDP growth rate of 8.5\% and 7\% in 1986 and 1987 respectively, and substantial real wage increases.\textsuperscript{202} However, more difficult times resulting from incoherent policy making and ideological inconsistencies loomed on the horizon.

By November 1989 Aprista dominance of Peruvian politics had come to an end. The party secured only 17\% of the vote in nationwide municipal elections and 19.6\% in the presidential election won by the conservative Fujimori.\textsuperscript{203} Two party practices primarily incited the collapse of APRA from power: ideological disparities and unpractical economic proposals that widened the gap between state and society. Contentions within the party over the correct ideological orientation of APRA doctrine and the authoritarian tendencies of García leadership created considerable sectarian problems. García often failed to discuss policy objectives with other party members and introduced legislation at his will without the support of party members. The lack of open debate turned García into a caudillo like figure that would not tolerate public dissent over his policies. Party discontent
with García’s leadership was further exacerbated by his fundamental shifting between radicalism and conservatism, speaking one day on revolutionary terms and the next on the need to cooperate with other political parties and the private sector.204

The authoritative nature of APRA highlights the importance of Richard Harris’ understanding of democratic consolidation. By refusing to coordinate their reform efforts with grass roots organizations already in place, APRA actually widened the rift between state and society. The poor had come to place their trust in locally oriented forms of assistance that showed real results. APRA’s interference in the efficiency of community organizations and establishment of centrally run programs of assistance broke the poor’s faith in APRA as a true reformist party that would protect the interests of the poor. Rather, APRA became another political party caught up in elitist politics. The party’s antagonism toward community organizations seriously damaged APRA’s ability to unite the poor with the party.

The political rise and decline of APRA offers substantial insight into how the strong influence of leftist parties in the democratic system can threaten the legitimacy of Sendero’s revolutionary policies. García promised in his election campaign to grant aid and technical assistance to the poor without impairing the stability of the private sector through his program of concertación. The government would implement social programs that co-opted with the private sector by assisting the poor while still preserving private institutions. A peaceful transition to greater socialism that avoided class conflicts and maintains confidence in democratic institutions would draw support away from Sendero which imposed high costs on the populace in the name of revolutionary objectives. The danger Aprista power posed to Sendero instigated terrorist attacks and assassinations against APRA leaders. In August 1987 Rodrigo Franco, head of the government’s
food distribution agency, was brutally assassinated by Sendero combatants in front of his wife and children for allegedly leading a hunger strike.205 This is just one example of several assassinations between the years of 1985 and 1989 when Sendero killed forty-five mayors and 120 elected officials and municipal candidates prior to the 1989 elections.206

The waves of violence preformed by Sendero combined with a determination to breakup peasant federations and other grass roots organizations raised fear among the populace of Sendero’s extremism. The revolutionary movement sought to destroy programs and organizations such as PAIT, mothers’ clubs, and communal kitchens highly esteemed by the poor for their distribution of resources. The Aprista party had created or promised to uphold many of these institutions, even though party intransigence and poor economic planning ultimately inhibited effective relief strategies. The initial ideas and proposals of APRA drew significant support not only from the poor, but also from a wide spectrum of classes in Peru. This potential inter-class unity endangered the foundation of Sendero principles based on class conflict. Aprista proposals, if implemented efficiently, could have substantially undermined the legitimacy of Sendero doctrine and tactics. As Carol Graham has rightfully pointed out, dictatorships and ultra-rightist parties do not threaten Sendero nearly to the extent that popular parties and organizations of mass appeal can weaken support for Sendero’s radical policies and tactics.

On the surface, the collapse of García’s administration represented a victory for Sendero. A revolutionary movement had played a critical role in disrupting national and municipal elections and challenged the ability of a mass socialist party to transform society democratically. At the end of García’s presidency, Sendero was stronger than ever with one-third of Peru declared under a state of emergency due to terrorist activities by the end of 1989.207 However, a deeper look into the
decline of APRA reveals some destructive party practices shared in common with the policies of Sendero. The more radical actions taken by APRA such as the nationalization of banks in an attempt to reform credit and the decision to limit debt payment to 10% of export earnings had serious economic and political consequences. These measures put an extreme financial strain on the economy as international creditors cut off funding to Peru. The government consequently had to limit funding for several national social programs. On account of these economic actions, APRA infuriated the upper and professional classes by negating on its promise not to nationalize private banks and disappointed the poor by denying them essential social opportunities. Plainly stated, the impracticality of the financial measures cost APRA votes from both the lower and upper classes. The more radical leftist economic proposals of Sendero also lack pragmatism. Sendero doctrine does not allow for a transition period to communism as did Mao. The sudden shift from a highly privatized economy to communism would create drastic economic disorder and collapse. The extreme nature of Sendero economic policies frightens lower and upper class Peruvians alike.

The fanatical party loyalism found in APRA is also evident in Sendero. Along with APRA, the revolutionary movement’s unyielding demand that social reformation be achieved through party directives has resulted in the suppression of many community programs and organizations not directly affiliated with party politics. Both APRA and Sendero, despite their political positions as reformist parties, have been guilty of disrupting effective grass roots programs in the name of party objectives. The contention for domination over all political and social aspects of society destroys community pride and feelings of accomplishment, the same elements Sendero seeks to generate as weapons for revolutionary struggle.
The emergence of more radical Marxist parties to the left of APRA has challenged Sendero to an even greater extent because their platforms of greater social justice through Marxist principles have the potential to gain mass appeal, but without imposing the high costs of guerrilla warfare demanded by Sendero. Primarily consisting of communist and Trotsky parties, they fully participate in the democratic system. However, party factionalism and fragmentation has compelled most leftist parties to form coalitions in order to achieve electoral success.

The Communist Party of Peru (PCP), founded in 1930, can be traced back to José Carlos Mariátegui. He differed with Haya de la Torre over how to best implement a socialist state. Mariátegui opposed de la Torre’s emphasis on anti-imperialistic measures and willingness to cooperate with the bourgeoisie. Mariátegui agreed with de la Torre that imperialism had to be eradicated, but he also believed the elimination of class differences played a crucial role in bringing an end to imperialism. Therefore, only the proletariat along with the peasantry could initiate a revolution.

The PCP quickly underwent party fragmentation as different factions adopted their own policies, ranging from collaboration with the bourgeoisie to the implementation of tough anti-bourgeoisie initiatives. Successive military takeovers and a lack of sound leftist programs limited the success of communist parties in the years following up to the launching of Sendero’s revolution. But the return to civilian rule in 1980 gave leftist parties an opportunity to realign their positions after more than a decade of suppression by military rule. With the first parliamentary elections being held in 1978, seven socialist and communist parties registered for the 1978 Constituent Assembly, receiving a total of 34% out of 100 seats and a total voting percentage of 36.25%. Although all the Left parties put together received a large percentage of the national vote, the highest total for a single
leftist party was 12.34% by the *Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular*.\(^{210}\) Electoral success for the Left would require the formation of a coalition.

Following several earlier attempts at unification, a majority of socialist and communist parties put aside their differences to form a coalition in 1980. Known as the United Left (IU), the coalition consisted of various communist, socialist, and Trotskyist parties. The IU was able to offer a viable alternative to APRA politics in the 1986 elections when the coalition came in a strong second in the presidential elections with 22.2% of the national vote compared to APRA’s 47.8%.\(^{211}\) The IU also won the parliamentary elections by a wide margin and more importantly for its status as a coalition geared toward addressing the needs of the poor, the IU took all but two of the twelve poorest districts in Lima.\(^{212}\) But despite the large capture of votes in 1986, the coalition faced considerable internal incohesion. Rolando Breña Pantoja, director of the communist party PCP-*Patria Roja*, argues that four distinctive weaknesses existed in the coalition: incoherent programs, sectarianism and dogmatization of each party member, a lack of audacity, and alienation from the masses.\(^{213}\) These weaknesses led to a split in the coalition by 1989 with the moderate socialists forming the Leftist Socialist Accord (ASI) and the more radical parties sympathetic to the armed struggle forming the United Party Mariáteguista (PUM). The result was a dramatic decline in support. The ASI and PUM together only received 11.1% of the vote in the presidential elections and had a poor showing in the municipal and parliamentary elections as well.\(^{214}\) However, the IU did maintain a support base among the urban poor, taking seven of Lima’s poorest districts.\(^{215}\) The political tide had turned against a fragmented Left as the “political outsider” Fujimori emerged to lead Peru in a more market oriented direction.
The deep rifts and ideological divisions within the Left upheld Sendero’s cause by preventing a mass party or coalition from obtaining power, but it also hurt the revolutionary movement by isolating PCP-SL as a radical sect unable to draw substantial support from other leftist parties. Even Tupac Amaru (MRTA), Peru’s other major revolutionary party, does not support the actions of Sendero. The MRTA defends the efforts of existing peasant and labor federations, grass roots organizations, neighborhood associations, and IU parties. Sendero clearly has expressed its disdain for these organizations and parties. Guzmán refers to the social movement in Peru as a proletarian movement that “generates garbage which has to be continually swept away bit by bit.”216 Sendero attacks against socialist leaders seems to confirm this assertion. Between 1987 and November 1990, Sendero murdered sixty-three mayors, many of them from the IU.217 While some socialist and communist parties are sympathetic to the revolutionary movement, they have little incentive to completely corroborate with a revolution that demands deep ideological adherence and the eradication of all other leftist sects that do not comply with revolutionary philosophy. Indeed, Sendero doctrine asserts “the necessity of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Communist Party, which applies with firmness its independence, independent decision, and self-reliance” during the revolutionary struggle.218 These words certainly do not advocate the absorption of other leftist movements or parties into the revolution, a move that could be of strategic importance, especially considering the strong opposition to Sendero coming from the popular movement outside of PCP-SL. Only months before Fujimori’s coup which left the popular movement voiceless in parliament, some members within the United Socialists (IS) and IU proposed the cooperation of the army and the popular movement in fighting Sendero.219 But the following coup clearly discouraged the Left from collaborating with an army responsible for the suspension of Peru’s constitution.
As a revolutionary movement incited to represent the interests of the marginalized, Sendero certainly has an obligation to maintain a coherent program that does not lose sight of social objectives. However, a popular revolution must obtain mass appeal which requires compromise and unity between various factions. In the Sandinista revolution, the consolidation of different leftist groups proved critical to the success of the movement. James DeFronzo contends that Nicaragua in the 1960s was not yet ready for a revolution because the Sandinistas had not convinced most Nicaraguans that only a revolution could bring an end to the suppressive Somoza regime. In addition, revolutionary goals and objectives were not clearly communicated to the people. But as the potential social benefits of a revolution became clearer in the 1970s, membership in the movement expanded to include non-Marxist groups such as NGOs, priests, and social activists. There were even indications of bridges being built with the moderate upper class. The social diversity enabled the revolution to gain mass appeal and take a more moderate direction.\textsuperscript{220} In contrast, Sendero’s exclusionary policies deliberately prevent the inclusion of other leftist groups in the revolution that could soften the radical orientation of the struggle. The rigid ideology and destructive nature of Sendero takes away important potential support groups such as NGOs and the progressive Church which played a prominent role in the Nicaraguan revolution. Frightened by the policies and tactics of Sendero, NGOs, the Church, and other social activists have tended to support social reform efforts outside of the political framework of Sendero. These groups have particularly shown support for the peasant strikes suppressed by revolutionary combatants.\textsuperscript{221}

The consolidation of various classes and factions reflected an important element of the Sandinista revolution because of the diversity of the population alienated by the Somoza regime. Not only were the lower classes hurt by the Somoza government, but the moderate upper class had
also undergone marginalization. The social context in which the revolution developed required a united opposition that would reach out to various social classes and not confine itself to an exclusionary ideology. Not all other socialist revolutions have faced such a socially diversified opposition to a government. The Communist Party in China sought to mobilize a much more homogeneous population in terms of class. Although different levels of wealth existed among the peasantry, warlords and the Kuomintang government dominated the political and social realms of society. More importantly, the absence of truly democratic institutions limited the formation of political parties outside the Kuomintang. The lack of other socialist parties left the Communists in a position of great potential to mobilize the masses who had few other channels of political representation.

In contrast to the CCP at the time of its revolution, Sendero must confront the challenges posed by the strong influence of other socialist and communist parties. APRA and those parties pertaining to the IU coalition have demonstrated in the past their ability to capture the support of the poor. Sendero’s response to other leftist parties through assassinations and other forms of political suppression produces damaging consequences for the reputation of the organization. Sendero becomes the perpetrator for the losses of community elected leaders who represent the interests of the people. But Sendero’s strict adherence to the teachings of Marx and Mao imperatively compels the insurgency to oppose the growth of other socialist parties or movements that could facilitate social reform not in line with Marxist ideals. Consequently, Sendero channels a considerable amount of its activities into silencing other leftist parties. PUM, the more radical member of the IU, claims that by late 1990 Sendero had gunned down more than forty of their party members in protest of the upcoming national elections.²²² Sendero’s systematic elimination of the Left and popular
organizations polarizes Peruvian society with the radical guerrilla activities of Sendero at one end and the conservative military at the other. Ironically, this strategy gave Fujimori extra incentive to carry out its ultimately successful crackdown on the Left, especially guerrilla activities.

Conclusion: A Dead End for Sendero

Fujimori’s close ties with the military and corresponding capture of Guzmán has meant more than Guzmán’s assertion of “a pebble in the road” for Sendero. The organization’s top leadership has been dismantled and the government has recovered a majority of the territory once lost to Sendero. The military’s resilient counter-insurgency eventually outmatched the capabilities of Sendero to sustain a solidified movement. However, Sendero doctrine itself welcomes confrontation with the military, calling for the development of the people’s war “through a revolutionary army [that] destroys part by part the old power, principally its armed and repressive forces...” Furthermore, the decision to launch any revolutionary movement entails a preparedness for military counter-reaction that could impose potential setbacks on the revolution. Therefore, the capture of Guzmán alone does not fully explain the inability of Sendero to recover from Fujimori’s militant approach to addressing the revolution. Deeper answers lie within the policies and practices set forth by Sendero.

The essential element of any social revolution is support from the people. They are for whom the revolution is fought. The masses give strength to a social movement by consenting to its legitimacy as a movement able to institute beneficial social change. Without the support of the masses, the very foundation of a social revolution falls apart. This crucial relationship between the people and revolutionary leaders quickly deteriorate following Sendero’s attempts to convert the masses through fear rather than working with them to create tangible social reform, an achievement
that would enhance the people’s esteem for Sendero. The revolution’s breach with the indigenous population was to a great extent the result of adherence to Marxist principles that did not account for the unique social conditions of Peru. While indigenous communities are fully aware of their marginalized state in Peruvian society, they do not culturally believe in foreign concepts of class and revolutionary struggle. They are more concerned with the preservation of their traditional values and customs. Sendero does not seek to protect their cultural heritage and has demonstrated a willingness to suppress indigenous practices and customs for revolutionary objectives.

Sendero’s victimization was not limited to the indigenous population. Attacks against social organizations and facilities designed to assist the poor alienated large sectors of the population. All forms of aid to the poor had to run through PCP-SL. Grass roots organizations, peasant federations, and other leftist parties were not viewed as potential allies, but as threats to the revolution because they did not follow Sendero’s ideology. Revolutionaries insisted on complete political control over society which necessitated the breakup of institutions highly valued by the poor as forms of humanitarian relief and opportunities for greater social integration. At the same time, Sendero offered few alternatives to these institutions, leaving communities worse off than before the arrival of Sendero. While some communities did witness a redistribution of land, these benefits were outweighed by the costs imposed on the people. Combatants destroyed dairy processing facilities, lowered peasant incomes by blocking the flow of agricultural products to the cities, and established Sendero leaders as new local authorities. These practices resulted in considerable destabilization of communities already suffering from impoverishment and social marginalization. The repressive policies carried out on the people, particularly the killing of progressive community leaders and disruption of humanitarian services, severed Sendero’s relationship with the masses. The subsequent
lack of support deprived Sendero of a deep social foundation and left the movement susceptible to military defeat.

In the aftermath of the military’s counter-insurgency, the increased popularity of Fujimori paints a bleak picture for the future of Sendero Luminoso. Fujimori’s clamp down on guerrilla activities has been accomplished with substantial support from the people despite the administration’s close ties with the military and suspension of the constitution in 1992. A political outsider with a business background, Fujimori has reinstated order and stability. The high approval ratings for the president indicates the people’s commitment to solving Peru’s social problems without intense party and inter-class conflicts. Many marginalized sectors of the population have instead placed their faith in grass roots organizations and autonomous local groups that offer peaceful alternatives to the violent, contentious policies of Sendero.

While many economic and social problems remain unresolved in Peru, the current practices and policies of Sendero do not seem to provide a solution. The victimizing and alienating effects of Sendero’s political objectives unmask the party’s intransigent drive for power which inhibits true social reform. The large percentage of Peruvian poor seek economic assistance and greater political and social integration into Peruvian society. The difficult task of achieving these goals promises more rocky times ahead for a society inflicted with exploitation coming from the outside world and from within the nation’s socio-economic structure. In light of the high degree of party rivalries and loyalism in Peruvian politics, the best hope for a better future may emerge from below, a movement instigated by the marginalized themselves. For now, the prospect of Sendero Luminoso as the “shining path” to the future seems to have faded.
End Notes

1. Boloña, Carlos.
3. Tarazona-Sevillano, 1.
4. Tarazona-Sevillano, 10-17.
5. Tarazona-Sevillano, 19.
7. Manwaring, 161.
8. Manwaring, 162.
10. 39.
12. “Why the People’s War in Peru is Justified and Why it is the Road to Liberation.”
15. Tarazona-Sevillano, 39.
17. Sederberg, 154.
18. Poole, 171
19. Poole, 176.
20. Poole, 199.
21. Manwaring, 163.
22. Johnson.

23. Manwaring, 160.

24. Poole, 6.

25. Tarazona-Sevillano, 80.

26. Tarazona-Sevillano, 82.

27. Johnson, 630k281.

28. Lane, 10.

29. MRTA stands for the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement which formed in 1984. The revolutionaries consider themselves a part of the leftist movement, but differ from Sendero in that they support existing leftist parties, labor organizations and peasant federations. They also employ militarism as means to overthrow the government, but do not advocate the killing of the common people. The organization is considered considerably weaker than PCP- SL. However, MRTA has recently been able to take several diplomats and high-ranking officials hostage at the Japanese embassy in Lima. The crisis ended with the military’s storming of the embassy which resulted in the death of fourteen MRTA members.

30. Lane, 10.

31. Tarazona-Sevillano, 92-93.

32. Saba, 78.

33. Rodriguez, 133.

34. Nash, A8.

35. Adams, 126.

36. Spalding, 32.

37. Sims.

38. Johnson, 630k281.

39. “Peru Country Report on Human Rights Practices.” A suspension of constitutional rights in emergency zones dictates that security forces do not need an arrest warrant, those detained for terrorism or treason may be held for up to ten days in solitary confinement, and detainees do not have the right to an attorney during the ten day period.
40. Tyrone, 247.
41. Tyrone, 247.
42. Nash, A8.
43. Tyrone, 167.
44. Speck, 031k4984.
45. Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos.
46. Burt, 7.
47. Burt, 7.
49. Monagle, 7.

50. Johnson. Carlos Tapia, a former legislator and expert on Shining Path, estimates Sendero’s numbers and sociologist Raul Gonzalez reports on the remaining members of the Central Committee.

51. Degregori, 48. Degregori had performed a case study in Ayacucho following the departure of Sendero. His information rests on official records and interviews with Ayacuchans.

52. Degregori, 58. According to José Coronel in his case study of Huanta, the APRA Party grew in power and presence in the area, achieving important benefits for the peasants including zero percent interest on agrarian loans and the sanctioning of massacres.

54. Degregori, 24.
55. Degregori, 26.
56. Leupp, 28.
57. Montoya, 10.
58. Poole, 65.
59. “Long Live the Day of Heroism in Peru.”
60. Johnson, 630k3281.

62. Speck, 031k4984.


64. “Informe de la Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Ante La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos.”

65. Hagopian, 77.

66. Edward, 151.

67. Werlich, 262.

68. Werlich, 311.

69. Werlich, 315.

70. Werlich, 323.

71. Saba, 74.


73. Ed. Welch & Tainter, 161-162.

74. Boloña.

75. Peru: Basic Soci-Economic Data.”


77. “Haciendo Empresa en Perú.”

78. “El Programa Económico.” Source: CONITE.

79. Tyrone, 136.

80. Tyrone, 173.

81. “Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru Demands Basic Rights for Lori Berenson-NY Native Currently on Trial in Peru for Treason.”

82. “El Programa Económico.”

83. Boloña.
84. Boloña.


86. Boloña.

87. Speck, 1125k5356.

88. Speck, 1125k5356.

89. "La Milagrosa Fórmula de Fujimori." America Latina. According to the International Monetary Fund, consumer prices fell nearly 8,000 % in Peru from 1990 to 1993.

90. Monagle, 7.

91. Spalding, 33.

92. Spalding, 33.

93. Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos.


95. "Peru: Basic Socio-Economic Data." Source: Programa Regional de Empleo para America Latina y El Caribe (PREALC)

96. "Haciendo Empresa en Perú."

97. Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos. Source: UNICEF.

98. "La Milagrosa Fórmula de Fujimori."

99. Dietz, 123.

100. DeFronzo, 209.


102. Tarazona-Sevillano, 23.

103. Burt, Jo-Marie, 8.

104. Starn, 29.

106. Montaya, 101. The number of political victims are determined from Peruvian periodical reports, including *Oiga*, *Caretas*, and *Sí*. Please see the chart on page 101 for further information on the number of political victims in other classified groups.

107. Spalding, 38. Observers have never believed Sendero numbers to surpass 5,000. Reports of former Sendero strength at 100,000 come from an unknown sociologist.

108. Spalding, 37.

109. Tyrone, 159.

110. Leupp, 30.

111. Poole, 29.

112. Poole, 77.

113. Degregori, 47.

114. Montaya, 10.

115. Poole, 80.


117. Harrison, 216.

118. Harrison, 207-208. The National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic controlled much of the governmental and military affairs of the CCP in the early 1930s. The Congress was dominated by Soviets during its developmental stages. At the advice of the Soviets, Mao initially favored military factors over security of the population. But as Mao emerged as the prominent leader of the revolution in the mid 1930s, he broke away from the advice of the Soviets and focused on organizing the masses over military objectives.

119. Degregori, 45.

120. Poole, 60.

121. Harrison, 201.

122. Harrison, 201.

123. For a more detailed description of the CCP’s mass line, please see Harrison’s chapter on “The Growth of the Rural Soviets.”

124. Degregori, 106.
125. Sims, A4.

126. Degregori, 209.

127. 184-185.

128. Poole, 26.

129. Poole, 27.

130. 28.

131. Quoted by Poole and Rénique, 29.

132. Poole, 75.

133. Poole, 77.

134. Degregori, 24.

135. Degregori, 102.

136. Degregori, 63.

137. Rodríguez, 202-216.

138. Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique write a more in-depth analysis of the role of *pueblos jóvenes* in Peruvian politics in their chapter titled “War on Democracy”, (see pages 24-29).

139. Poole, 27.

140. Poole, 27.

141. Friedland, 181.

142. DeFronzo, 177.

143. “Why the People’s War in Peru is Justified and Why it is the Road to Liberation.”

144. Nuestros “Principios de Unidad.”

145. As proclaimed by Herbert Ocasio, national spokesperson for CSRP, in his speech in May 1995 describing the governing of revolutionary base areas.

146. Poole, 61.

147. Poole, 60.
148. “Why the People’s War in Peru is Justified and Why it is the Road to Liberation.”

149. Degregori, 215.

150. 62.

151. Dietz, 125. Numerous incidents of Sendero combatants torturing peasant leaders and others have been recorded.


153. For more information on the conduct of Mao’s revolutionary forces toward the peasantry, please see the section titled *Mao on Mobilization* in *Revolutionary Theory*, p. 120-123.

154. DeFronzo, 14. The author maintains that dissident elite political movements can increase the probability of revolutionary success in two ways: by creating confusion and disorganization within the state and by swaying their support over to the revolutionary forces.

155. White, 228. Mao’s appeal to the upper strata of Chinese society heightened in the late 1930s and continued through the 1940s as the Communist leader realized the CCP would need their temporary support for the revolution to succeed. Mao immediately tightened down on these groups once again after the CCP’s victory in 1949.

156. Harrison, 311.

157. Friedland, 163.

158. Friedland, 125-126. *Common activity* creates a shared set of understandings, *common experience* gives individuals a sense of common strength, and *common action* allows people to believe in the possibilities of social transformation.

159. Montoya, 16.


161. 38.

162. 47.

163. 2.

164. Starn, 216.

165. 216.

166. 62.
167. Manwaring, 163.

168. 189.

169. Welch, 157-158.

170. Harrison, 207 & 316. Many poor peasants who were virtually exempt from taxes at the beginning of the war saw their taxes increase to as much as 13% by 1941, but the rate leveled off to about 10% for the rest of the revolutionary struggle.


172. Harrison, 413.

173. White, 228.


175. Harrison, 317.

176. Harrison, 410.

177. Harrison, 411.

178. 125.

179. Poole, 77.

180. Poole, 82.

181. Poole, 80-81.

182. Dietz, 126.

183. Degregori, 60.

184. Harris, 194.

185. 195.

186. Harris, 195-197.

187. Harris, 196.

188. Harris, 197.

189. Graham, 92.
190. Harris, 197-198.


192. Graham, 3-4.

193. As quoted in Graham, 5.

194. Graham, 4.


196. Graham, 27.

197. Graham, 28.


199. Graham, 91.


201. Rodriguez, 41.


203. Graham, 85, 153. Fujimori pulled off a surprise victory by gaining steam over the last month before elections to win over the favored candidate Mario Vargas of the Democratic Front (FREDEMO), an ultra-conservative party.

204. Graham, 128-130.


206. Graham, 159.

207. Tarazona-Sevillano, 94.

208. Graham, 112. Since 80% of Peru’s banks were already owned by the state, García actually only nationalized 20% of Peruvian banks.

209. “General Programme of Democratic Revolution.” Sendero doctrine explicitly calls for an overhaul of the current government “without any transition period.”


211. Graham, 86.
212. Poole, 26.
214. Poole, 144.
215. Poole, 27.
216. Poole, 47.
217. Poole, 135.
218. “Communist Party of Peru Programme”
219. Poole, 163.
220. DeFronzo, 199.
221. Poole, 75 - 77.
222. Poole, 29.
223. “General Programme of the Democratic Revolution”
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