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## A Mission for Peace: United Nations Peacekeeping in the New World Order

John Butler

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**A MISSION FOR PEACE:  
United Nations Peacekeeping  
In the New World Order**

**A THESIS  
The Honors Program  
College of St. Benedict/St. John's University**


**In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Distinction "All College Honors"  
and the Degree Bachelor of Arts  
In the Department of Government**


**by  
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May 7, 1993**




**Project Title:** A Mission for Peace: United Nations Peacekeeping in the New  
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## SYNOPSIS

The end of the Cold War has sparked a fundamental change in global politics, a change that affects the United Nations in its role as a collective body mandated to maintain international peace and security. One such aspect of that mandate, United Nations peacekeeping, will also be affected, leading one to wonder what the role of United Nations peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era--the so called "new world order"--will be.

Peacekeeping itself is a peculiarity of the United Nations, a novel approach invented by the Organization to respond to threats to international peace and security. It is a response which was born from the inadequacies of the established Charter guidelines, as well as from the inhibitive political realities of the Cold War geopolitic. Peacekeeping as developed from the Cold War essentially involves the deployment of a non-partisan, international force into a disputed region or regions, with the consent of all parties to dispute, in order to secure and monitor an agreed upon cease-fire. To fulfill this role, peacekeeping also performs a number of tasks, such as election monitoring, oversight of troop withdrawal and disarmament, and even civilian administrative tasks. To adequately perform its role, peacekeeping requires several things; among these are political, material, and financial support. Although peacekeeping has been fairly successful during the Cold War, it nonetheless has its limitations, which are in part inherent, and in part due to lack of support.

The fall of the Soviet Union has meant the end of the era of Cold War tension. Its end has meant much for the United Nations in fulfilling its commitment to international peace and security. The onus now placed on the United Nations is to fashion for itself a "new world order" that will ensure peace and security for the future. One way to fashion a new international world-view is to try to redefine the balance that serves as the foundation of the United Nations: the balance between the state's inviolable right to sovereignty and the state's responsibility to the world community to uphold its commitment to international peace and security. This "rebalancing" will have to be done so as to allow as much individual sovereignty and self-determination for states and sub-national groups as possible while still providing collective organizations the authority to meet effectively with international crises and disputes. To ensure consensus, such

balancing will have to include equal participation by all members of the world community. This balancing is important for peacekeeping because it will determine how peacekeeping may be used in the new era.

Current events, however, have not allowed the world community the benefit of time to decide this consensus. In the former Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions long suppressed by the Cold War have arisen again, taking the form of bitter conflicts of separatism. In the fighting, the United Nations has had to face difficult situations, and resolve complex problems when trying to respond to the situation. Specifically, the Organization has come to understand the limits and capabilities of peacekeeping, and the need to improve its overall response to international crises. In this sense, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia provides a major test to the United Nations in its resolve to establish a peaceful new world order.

The crisis in Somalia offers another such test to the world community. The fall of the oppressive Barre regime has left national authority largely absent in Somalia, resulting in a humanitarian crisis of profound proportions. Again, as in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia shows the limitations to what peacekeeping can do in crises, and highlights the need for an improved United Nations crisis response apparatus. Similarly, it also highlights the need for the Organization to decide for itself the new balance between collectivism and self-determination, and to act accordingly, and swiftly.

As the Balkan crisis and the Somali situation indicate, there is a need to establish definitively the role of peacekeeping in the new world order. The membership must first understand the abilities and the limitations of peacekeeping, and must secondly develop a holistic and comprehensive response to international crisis, to which peacekeeping plays an essential role. Regarding peacekeeping, this would necessitate recognition of the role and limit of peacekeeping as well as the improvement of support for peacekeeping, politically, financially, and materially. But an overall plan must also be developed, incorporating all aspects of dealing with crises, such as peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, and peace-building. Such development will allow the United Nations to deal fully and effectively with future conflicts. In conclusion, the responsibility for such improvement rests with the membership of the organization.



## INTRODUCTION

Over the years the United Nations has launched peacekeeping missions in a variety of situations. All of these were undertaken during a phase of international relations overshadowed by the cold war. Now, when the frozen positions of that dark and dangerous phase have given way to a new open mindedness, and there is much greater willingness to look at situations of conflict from the common standpoint of peace, it is foreseeable that peacekeeping missions will have to play an even more versatile role. They will have to be adjusted to all types of situations not encountered before. This will inevitably affect their structure and scale and will certainly require that they be provided with resources commensurate with the mandates given them.<sup>1</sup>

These comments by former Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1990 were made as the world was witness to the genesis of a fundamental transition. The end of the Cold War was being declared, and prospects for a new era of peace and progress now seemed more plausible. The world community finally started to realize that perhaps now, in this new era, a more peaceful and lasting unity among the world's nations--first visualized over 75 years ago with the end of the First World War--could actually begin to exist. As Perez de Cuellar also noted, "as rarely before, nations are recognizing that they must address international problems multilaterally, through consultation and compromise. Solutions can only be found through collective action." <sup>2</sup>

However, the current headlines and news reports seem to be painting a different picture of the post-Cold War era, one where there is no such peaceful order. The surge of optimism for collective peace and unity that the world community felt has quickly become tempered by the emerging realities of the post-Cold War world. With the fall of the Cold War geopolitic, the old status quo has been swept away, leaving an uncertain, and even unstable, global dynamic. Such instability translates for many into confusion and fear of the unknown. Nations and social groups, no longer acting with regard to or influence by Cold War alliances or animosities, are acting independently to establish for themselves their place in the new world. In several instances, this change has inevitably meant conflict and violence--violence which is in

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<sup>1</sup>1. Javier Perez de Cuellar, U.N. Chronicle v.27 #1, March 1990. P. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, p. 3.

part a direct result of the end of the Cold War. Thus comes the reality of the "new world order:" that a new era also means new conflicts, new dilemmas.

In light of this reality, The increasing importance of the United Nations is being made clear. The world community is now coming to realize that, in order to seize upon the potential for international peace and security, it will have to deal with difficult new situations and make some hard choices that require the active participation and contribution by the community--both as a whole and as individual nations. This means that the United Nations must also recast itself into an improved, legitimate, capable, and cohesive collective form. In its structure, organization, and operation, the United Nations will have to adapt to meet effectively with the myriad of needs and conflicts posed by the new world. One aspect of the United Nations which has become of central concern in this new era is United Nations peacekeeping force operations. Since its inception in 1956, peacekeeping has provided a vehicle through which the United Nations responds to threats to international peace and security. With the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has increasingly become relied upon in response to the new conflicts. So, to remain an effective response to the new international conflicts, peacekeeping will have to change and adapt as well.

Consequently, the purpose of this analysis is to answer the following thesis question: what is the role of United Nations peacekeeping force operations in the new world order? The method of analysis will be presented in five-sections. In section one, the history and evolution of peacekeeping during the Cold-War era will be examined, in order to gain an understanding of what peacekeeping is, and what it does. Section two will look at the end of the Cold War and its importance for the United Nations, particularly in its attempt to establish a "new world order." Sections three and four will treat two current international crises as case studies for peacekeeping's role in the new era.<sup>3</sup> Finally, in section five, I attempt to answer my thesis question based upon the foregoing analysis, and establish what the role of United

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<sup>3</sup> NOTE: For this section, I have chosen the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic, and the Crisis in Somalia. My reasons for choosing these are due to their unique claim that they are exclusively post-Cold War conflicts, independent of any Cold War saliency, and even due in part to the end of the Cold War itself. They are also important for consideration when viewing peacekeeping because of the highly complex problems that they present to the United Nations and peacekeeping.



Nations peacekeeping will be in the post-Cold War era. What one will hopefully come to recognize in my analysis is that peacekeeping in the new world order will play a role as a clearly defined part of a comprehensive and holistic response plan established by the United Nations and the world community.

## **THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING**

### **Pre-Peacekeeping History**

To understand what peacekeeping is, one must look first at the historical roots of the concept of collective action and cooperation between the world community of nation states. For, it is within this context that peacekeeping derives its roots. The context in which peacekeeping was created and developed dates as far back as the end of the First World War and the founding of the League of Nations. The horrors endured during the 1914-1918 War inspired the surviving community of nations to attempt a novel international organization of the world's states, dedicated to preserving world peace. Called the League of Nations, the collective organization posited as its central Covenant the obligation to "protect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all."<sup>4</sup> From this agreement came the revolutionary concept of preserving the peace through collective, international action. The League Covenant went beyond the idea of a simple, traditional alliance between nations--a practice seen by many to be the reason for the war in the first place. Instead, the League members sought to preserve peace through the universal recognition of the inviolable sanctity of a nation's sovereignty.

The League Covenant was indeed a novel way to pursue world peace through collective action and dialogue, but it was an approach that was in reaction to the conflict that the world had just endured. The methods to

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<sup>4</sup>Article 10, League of Nations Covenant

ensuring the maintenance of world peace were responses to situations that had brought about the previous conflict. Specifically, the drafters of the Covenant blamed the principle of "antagonistic alliances and the faulty mechanism of the balance of power" as contributing to the outbreak of the war.<sup>5</sup> To prevent such alliances from occurring again, the Covenant drafters designed the League of Nations as a forum whose use was supposed to bring about the peaceful settlement of international dispute. In so designing the League, the drafters hoped that, instead of pursuing their foreign policy goals through the antagonistic practice of alliance-building, nations would use the mechanism of dialogue provided by the League to air their grievances instead of warfare. It was a response to the absence of such a forum in the preceding years of the War--a forum which could have addressed conflicts such as the Austrian-Serbian antagonism (seen by many to be a chief contribution to the War) before it turned violent. In short, the League Covenant was a reactive approach to ensure peace by attempting to address the troubles that led to the First World War so that, hopefully, the world community would avoid a recurrence of the conflict which they had just experienced.

But the hope that the League could maintain a lasting peace was put into doubt as it soon became apparent that the League was ineffective to stop conflict. Moreover, such hope was eventually consumed by the fires of the Second World War, just thirty years after the end of the First. Rising from the ashes of the war yet again was the hope of maintaining the peace through collective action, a hope that took form in the United Nations. In many ways, the Charter of the United Nations echoed the concept of maintaining peace through recognition of a state's sovereignty espoused by the League Covenant. The two "pillar principles" in the United Nations Charter--the sovereign equality and integrity of all nations and the collective responsibility to maintain international peace and security--exhibit this similarity.<sup>6</sup> But, just like the League Covenant, the Charter was written as a reaction to the previous conflict. In the Charter, the drafters constructed the method of ensuring peace in terms that remedied the reasons why the world

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<sup>5</sup>Haas, Ernest P. "The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984," The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 1987, P. 5.

<sup>6</sup>Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.

community failed to maintain international peace and security in the 1930's-- a failure that helped precipitate the Second World War. Specifically, the drafters sought to avoid the situation that existed in the years prior to the War, where the world community stood timidly by whilst the Axis powers expanded their grasp by annexation and outright invasion.

To ensure against such aggression by individual states in the future, the drafters relied upon the mechanism developed during the War that succeeded in defeating the Axis aggressors. In the war, it became apparent that the best way to respond to aggressive acts by one or more nations was as a unified world community, resolved to condemn and reverse any acts of aggression against a sovereign nation. After the War, this notion, which came to be called *collective security*, was adopted as the United Nations' principal weapon against threats to peace and security. Collective security was established as the response, codified in Chapter VII of the Charter, that the United Nations was to elicit when a nation threatened to or proceeded to invade the territory of another sovereign nation or state.<sup>7</sup> In essence, when a hostile act was taken by one nation against another, the Chapter VII provisions authorized the United Nations to "take such actions by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."<sup>8</sup> Different from the traditional notion of alliances, which was blamed for World War I, collective security was the agreement made by all nations in the world community to unite against a single aggressor who violated the the principles of the Charter and invaded another state. Thus, the concept of collective security relied upon the strength and unity of nations against acts of aggression and expansion--much in the same way the allies joined together to defeat the Axis powers.

The power to order and exercise collective security measures was vested in the Security Council, whose mandated responsibility was to handle all peace and security matters such as international crises and disputes. Specifically, the Charter gave the Security Council the authority to make recommendations to the peaceful settlement of dispute, and take

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<sup>7</sup>Russett, Bruce, and James S. Sutterlin. "the U.N. in a New World Order." Foreign Affairs, v.69 n. 2, Spr. 1991. P73.

<sup>8</sup>Article 42 of United Nations Charter

enforcement action (collective security measures) to deal with threats to international peace and security.<sup>9</sup> In crafting the Security Council, the drafters attempted to establish a sort of exclusive ruling body for the United Nations, a small, cooperative elite in which all binding decisions concerning peace and security matters were to be made. The drafters apparently felt that a small and powerful group capable of quick and decisive action was essential for the principle of collective security to be successful. So, the Security Council was composed initially of nine members--five permanent member seats and four temporary seats (though the number of temporary seats was later expanded to ten). The five permanent seats were filled by delegations representing the five main World War Two allies--the United States, France Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China--while the remaining seats were filled by the rest of the United Nations membership on a rotating basis. Moreover, the five permanent members were given the power to veto, which essentially meant that each permanent member had the power to block any resolution debated over by the Security Council. All decisions made by the Council were binding to all member states.<sup>10</sup> The Security Council so constructed would have given the allied powers virtual control over deciding issues of peace and security.

In forming the Security Council, the Drafters were again thinking in terms of the conflict they had just endured. After the end of the Second World War, the geopolitical strength and the military might enjoyed by the Allies was the unifying force that the Drafters (who incidentally were the Allies themselves) were relying upon to establish and maintain international peace and security. It was thought that the Allied force--in the form of the Security Council--would ensure peace in the world community; the vehicle for this task was to be collective security. The other member states could only participate in one of two ways: they could either be part of the General Assembly's limited suggestion-offering role concerning matters of peace and security; or it could, when its turn came up, participate in the Security Council directly, albeit for a limited time. But the essence of authority in matters concerning peace and security rested with the five permanent members. According to Ernst B. Haas' description, the Drafters "opted

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<sup>9</sup>Article 24 (1) of United Nations Charter

<sup>10</sup>Article 25 of United Nations Charter

instead for an oligarchy of the powerful. . .dedicated to the preservation of the status quo."<sup>11</sup> The status quo that the Allied Powers envisioned was to be one of their own design.

### Problems for the New United Nations Structure

The new Organization soon ran into difficulty, however. The constructions for collective unity and security established by the Charter presupposed some basic evaluations about the nature of conflict and the international political dynamic. First, as stated earlier, the drafters of the United Nations saw the nature of conflict to be faced in the post-Second World War as similar to the conflicts experienced in the War. Second, the drafters also assumed that the alliance which defeated the Axis powers in the War would be a lasting alliance. The resulting limitations in a Charter that envisioned conflict and geopolitics in this way became clear shortly after the United Nations was christened.

The newly established system for dealing with threats to peace and security fell into question when it became evident that conflicts no longer fit solely into the category of aggression and outright invasion by one state into the sovereign territory of another. As Alan James writes, "the emphasis changed from worries about a frontal assault upon a state's territory, with the adversary hungry for a substantial slice, to anxieties about the loss of political independence."<sup>12</sup> Instead, countries began to experience conflict through internal upheavals and intra-national political conflicts. While the borders of nations were respected and considered sacrosanct, immense conflicts would occur over the political orientation and/or ruling apparatus of the country. Such conflict was increasingly inspired by outside states in an effort to install leadership of their choice.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, any "traditional" political upheavals

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<sup>11</sup>Haas, p.6.

<sup>12</sup>James, Alan, "The Enforcement Provisions of the United Nations Charter," The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff Pub., pp.217-218.

<sup>13</sup>NOTE: in the period between 1919-1939, 19 % of internal conflicts were inspired by outside nations; in the period 1946-1965 that number jumped to 27%, and rose again for the period 1967-1977 to 36%. See Wiseman, Henry, "The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: a

(those not inspired by an outside state but instead by the country's people or powerful organized factions), however violent and upsetting to international peace and security they might be, were not reachable by the United Nations Security Council because of their inherently "internal" nature. In James' words, "so far as the international society is concerned, [internal change] is no formal change at all; the state, as an established order, has simply come under new management."<sup>14</sup> Between 1945-1976, 88 percent of all wars were internally oriented, occurring within the territory of only one state.<sup>15</sup> Because of this, the United Nations could do nothing to prevent the warfare.

In addition to the "internalization" of conflict, there was a proliferation of other different types of conflict in the world. For example, when the sovereignty of nations and the principle of self-determination became a priority with the establishment of the United Nations, an independence movement by the world's colonies and mandated territories began. This movement inevitably meant conflicts between the colonies and their imperial colonizers, conflicts within the colony itself over who would come to ruling power after colonial or mandated rule, and attempts by outside nations to install their own ruler in the newly freed nation. Not essentially a situation where one sovereign state invaded another, a colonial conflict posed a problem to an international organization equipped only to deal with conflict in the "classic" sense. Another grey area was when a state did indeed send its forces into another country, but at the request of the government in order to stop an attempted overthrow, or conversely, at the pleadings of the vast majority of a nation's people in order to depose a tyrannical ruler.<sup>16</sup> None of these situations were provided for in the collective security provisions in the Charter.

Another problem that the United Nations faced was whether or not a unified collective security force could actually be achieved. It is axiomatic that states usually act on the basis of their own best interest in terms of

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Comparative Analysis," The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p.265.

<sup>14</sup> James, p. 219.

<sup>15</sup> Wiseman, p. 265

<sup>16</sup> James, p. 218.



international relations rather than in the spirit of some global and collective ideal. When a situation arises and the threat of military confrontation becomes imminent, nations may think twice about whether or not a potentially costly war is indeed in their best interest. Indeed, James writes, "a government that shows too much inclination to get involved in distant wars often finds itself replaced."<sup>17</sup> In addition to a nation's hesitancy due to the cost of acting in the spirit of collective security, there are always political dilemmas that it faces. Nations who have close and friendly diplomatic and economic ties to a country that invades another may be hesitant to take up the standard of collective security against their erstwhile ally, especially if that ally supports the nation in some substantial degree. Thus, for any substantial implementation of collective security to take place, a large majority of member states--including the five permanent members in particular--would have to see collective action against the aggression in their personal interests.

But the change that was perhaps the most profound and had the most impact on the United Nations during the postwar period was the rupture in the alliance between the Security Council members. The lasting alliance upon which the Charter Drafters relied did not hold together after the war. Instead, a conflict of ideologies as well as foreign policies, kept suppressed during the war in the interest of maintaining the unity needed for victory, flared up between the Allied members, aligning the United States, France, Britain and other Western nations against the Soviet Union, China, and the Eastern states along the symbolic and physical barrier, ominously named the "Iron Curtain." It was a conflict that sprang from different ideological world views: between the concept of free market and democratic government used in the West versus a communist market system and a totalitarian governmental structure in place in the East. Each side saw the other as intent upon converting the world to their ideology by every means possible, and eliminating the very way of life that their opponent enjoyed. Instead of working together to preserve peace in the world community, the two sides came to view each other as the primary threat to world peace.<sup>18</sup> These basic

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p. 220.

<sup>18</sup> Malitza, Mircea "The Improvement of Effectiveness of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces," The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 1987, p. 237.

differences in ideology, coupled with the mutually held fear that each side was bent on the elimination of the other, inevitably evolved into international conflicts between East and West. These conflicts were not direct confrontations between the two ideological blocs, however. The conflict assumed the shape of a "cold" war: instead of outright military battles, clashes between East and West emerged as conflicts of proxy within the less developed nations in the world, where East and West supported opposing sides in internal battles over which ideology would prevail. In this way, the emergence of the Cold War contributed to the new nature of conflict that the United Nations faced--due in part to the actions of the permanent members themselves.

The Cold War animosities inevitably served to paralyze the Security Council when trying to decide any issues concerning peace and security that also had some basis in the Cold War conflict. It became clear, given the power that each permanent member had in its use of the veto, that any Security Council collective security actions that dealt with conflicts which had to do with Cold War issues would invariably be blocked by either the Eastern permanent members, or by the West. As a result, United Nations maintenance of peace and security--even in the narrowly defined parameters of the Charter--became an even more remote possibility. In fact, throughout the Cold War period, the United Nations was able to enact collective security measures just once, in 1950. It was in response to the invasion of democratic South Korea by communist North Korea. In this instance, Security Council action was only possible because the Soviet delegation to the Security Council happened to be boycotting participation at the time of the crisis. But in all other substantial crises in which collective security might have been called for, the Security Council was deadlocked.

Frustrated by the impasse in the Security Council, the Western members formulated the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution shortly after the outbreak of the Korean conflict. In essence, Uniting For Peace gave the General Assembly the authority to act on issues concerning threats to international peace and security in the event of Security Council stalemate.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 337 (V), Nov. 3, 1950. The full text reads: "Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act

The Resolution was an attempt by the Western powers to free up United Nations action on divisive Cold War-related conflicts by shifting the power to respond to crises to the General Assembly, where the United States and the West could marshal enough support to initiate response plans. By shifting the power to respond to crisis away from the Security Council, the West effectively excluded the Eastern countries from participating in the initiation of crisis response. For this reason, the Soviets and the East rejected the Resolution, claiming that it violated Article 11(2), which gave the supreme authority in deciding courses of action in international conflicts to the Security Council, not to the General Assembly. Soviet opposition to United Nations action under Uniting For Peace aegis would go on to plague the Organization in the future. Clearly, it became evident that the established system for responding to threats to international peace and security would not work. As Richard Renner states, "the vision of the United Nations was downsized from world policeman to world volunteer fire brigade."<sup>20</sup>

### **The Peacekeeping Invention**

It was within this context that the concept of peacekeeping took shape. In late 1956, British and French forces, along with Israeli assistance, invaded the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula in an effort to regain possession of the Suez Canal, which was nationalized by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nassar.<sup>21</sup> The eruption of the Suez Canal Crisis immediately sparked debate in the General Assembly on how to best resolve the conflict (as two permanent Security Council members, France and Great Britain, were parties to the conflict and would most likely veto any move against the invasion). Protest by Egypt and its ally, the Soviet Union, threatened to escalate the conflict into a potentially deadly showdown between East and West. Wanting earnestly to

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of aggression, the General Assembly will consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the members for collective measures, including in the breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

<sup>20</sup>Renner, Richard, "A Force for Peace." *World Watch*, V. 5, August 1992, p. 27.

<sup>21</sup> Jit Rikhye, Indar, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*, New York; St. Martin's Press, 1984., p. 47.

avoid such a dangerous confrontation with the East, and desiring instead to contain the conflict, The United States pressed its allies France, Britain, and Israel to discontinue the attack and to establish a cease-fire, and to return to the pre-invasion borders. Working with the representatives from the states involved, and aided by outside mediation, particularly United States involvement, a cease-fire was established. In order to ensure the maintenance of the cessation of hostilities, a novel method of United Nations action was developed. Analyst Mircea Malitza describes this new method: "The innovation consisted in putting an international force under the authority of the United Nations, stationing it on Egyptian territory and keeping it there in order to avoid the resumption of hostilities."<sup>22</sup> Designated as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), it was the first force of its kind.

UNEF exhibited several new and interesting characteristics. First, it was a non-partisan force whose mandated goal, as stated in General Assembly Resolution 998 of 3 November 1956, was to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and its attackers."<sup>23</sup> Once there was an agreement made between the opposing parties to conflict, UNEF went in to provide a physical presence between the two parties in order to monitor and maintain the cease-fire. It was not an offensive force designed to repel the encroachment by the French, British, and Israeli forces into Egyptian territory, as a collective security response would have been mandated to do. Instead, UNEF was a small, lightly-armed, and non-partisan force deployed in an effort to secure--not enforce--a cease-fire. In effect, the peacekeeping force was a confidence-building measure, designed to establish a basis of trust between the two disputing sides by ensuring that no further attacks would take place from either side. Second, the force was deployed with the *consent* of both parties; as Malitza notes, "a central point was their acceptance by the state on whose territory they were stationed, without its sovereignty being infringed."<sup>24</sup> Third, UNEF was a force with a task that was not explicitly

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<sup>22</sup> Malitza, p. 239.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p. 239.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. p. 237. NOTE: Although both sides gave consent for the presence of UNEF, only Egypt gave explicit consent for the stationing of United Nations troops on its territory; Israel did not. However, the point remains valid that consent by both sides to the conflict was necessary for

spelled out in the Charter; the ad-hoc nature of this new force and its mandate was revolutionary to the United Nations. Fourth, in an effort to ensure that the force remained non-partisan, it was composed of personnel from many different nations, preferably from the most neutral nations in the Organization membership.

### Advantages Offered by Peacekeeping

These peacekeeping characteristics offered several advantages over collective security. First and foremost, it offered the United Nations the possibility to react to a peace and security crisis when regular Chapter VII measures were inappropriate or would most likely end in permanent member stalemate. Peacekeeping was a new form of contingency plan developed that was conscious of the fact that, without superpower support, United Nations action would most likely be halted. To ensure that this did not happen, the impetus for collective action turned from condemnation and forceful ejection of the invader to non-partisan negotiation and monitoring in order to get both sides to agree to end the military conflict. Since the peacekeeping force was less drastic than collective security, and since therefore the superpowers did not perceive a threat to its interests in the conflict, they would be more open. This way, if either party to a conflict had ties to a permanent member or the member were itself a party to conflict, resistance to a United Nations peacekeeping force would be diminished. Peacekeeping was a less drastic option that permitted the superpowers to respond to international crises free from the fear that the other side would try to expand its sphere of influence in the world through the use of force disguised as collective security. It was an option that both sides truly wanted; as Henry Wiseman states, "because of the grave dangers of the extension and the escalation of conflict, the Permanent Members, in particular the United States and the Soviet Union, . . . found it mutually necessary to halt or contain hostilities."<sup>25</sup>

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deployment of the peacekeeping force. Israel, Britain, and France all agreed to the cease-fire, and agreed that a peacekeeping force would be established to monitor the cessation of hostilities.

<sup>25</sup>Wiseman, p. 309.

It is ironic to note, then, that the initiation of the UNEF peacekeeping force for the Suez Canal crisis met with opposition not only by the Soviets, but also by Britain and France as well. Given such opposition, it may not have seemed that peacekeeping offered any such advantage at all. But, when regarding the UNEF force, it is important to note two things. First, the Suez Canal crisis was not a typical clash between East and West. In this instance, the Western alliance found itself divided over the issue. Britain and France moved without regard to the East-West balance of power and, therefore, without regard to the views of the United States. The United States, on the other hand, saw the importance of containing the conflict in the interest of avoiding a deadly showdown between the West and the Soviets, and accordingly sought to ease tensions by pressing its allies for withdrawal. This in effect placed the United States and the Soviet Union on the same side of the conflict. It was a peculiar situation where the West found itself at odds because of differing interests. Later on, the West would be remain more or less united on the use of peacekeeping. Second, as for the Soviet opposition, it seems at first contradictory that the superpower who condemned the attack would therefore be opposed to the UNEF force. The reason why the Soviets did so, however, was not because they were opposed to the cease-fire and peacekeeping force. Instead, they opposed UNEF because it was under the aegis of the Uniting For Peace Resolution, and not the Security Council. Like the United States, the Soviets themselves preferred to contain potentially unstable conflicts, and indeed gave their sanction to many subsequent peacekeeping missions. They instead objected to peacekeeping as initiated under Uniting For Peace, an initiative they saw as unconstitutional.

A second advantage to the peacekeeping invention was that, since it was not explicitly enumerated in the Charter, it had the luxury of flexibility. The mandate of the force could be constructed so as to suit the particular situation; in other words, the mission could be fashioned to suit the demands of all parties to conflict, without the possible constraints imposed by institutionalization. Peacekeeping as an ad-hoc action also offered the advantage of being flexible to the changing nature of conflicts in the Cold War period. Recall that, in certain conflicts that developed after the Second World War, the United Nations would be stymied as to how to react to the crisis, even despite agreement in the Security Council. Peacekeeping was a versatile tool that offered the world community a real response to a crisis to



international peace and security. Indeed, peacekeeping proved to work for a "traditional," invasion-type conflict, such as the Suez Canal invasion.

Not only was peacekeeping a more attractive crisis response option for the superpowers, it also was more attractive to the general membership, and even the parties to conflict themselves. Since the peacekeeping force was to be allowed or even invited by the parties to conflict, the potential threat to the force itself was minimized. The less dangerous degree of the mission would be a selling point for nations not eager to get involved in a costly foreign conflict for collective security. Moreover, the strength behind the peacekeeping force came not from the force's size but from its global sanction and support. Any attack on the force would be taken as the belligerent's intransigence and defiance of the collective will to maintain peace. In this way the security and therefore effectiveness of the peacekeeping force was further enhanced. This in turn gave the peacekeeping option further appeal as a viable response to conflicts. But, not only did peacekeeping offer member states a more attractive option, it also offered the parties to conflict an attractive solution to the fighting. As Malitza notes,

peacekeeping operations intervene at the end of a conflict, as a technique of its termination. They come into being as soon as the parties reach the conclusion that the battleground no longer promises victory, or resources are exhausted, or when they feel the condemnation of international opinion. How to end a war? This is a question whose answer is far from simple. The presence of a third party, which is not required when a war starts, seems to be necessary at its end. Face saving, securing a cease-fire, maintaining it, restoring peace, all presuppose the intervention of an objective third party, accepted by both sides to the conflict.<sup>26</sup>

Peacekeeping as a tool of good-will and confidence building went a long way toward providing the world community a means of response to threats to international peace and security. It soon became the primary instrument of United Nations response to threats and conflicts.

### Peacekeeping as Developed During the Cold War

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<sup>26</sup>Malitza, p. 237.

In the years since the initiation of UNEF I, peacekeeping operations were initiated on twelve other occasions during the Cold War.<sup>27</sup> The types of conflicts faced by the missions varied, ranging from decolonization issues to border confrontations between two or more states. The tasks given to the forces varied, too; increasingly, the United Nations peacekeeping force was asked to perform more tasks as part of its role as a monitor of a cease-fire. The Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian), a force where the effective administration of the country was turned over to the United Nations, demonstrates the extent to which new tasks were performed by peacekeeping forces. Another task that became part of the peacekeeper's repertoire was the oversight of free elections. With the rise of decolonization, the need for uncontested and fair elections rose. On several different occasions United Nations peacekeepers had to perform election monitoring, ensuring fairness and dissuading coercion. Other new tasks included the provision of humanitarian assistance to the monitored regions, performing police duties in disputed areas, and monitoring the disarming and disbanding of armed forces pursuant to the cease-fire agreements.<sup>28</sup> All of these tasks became an integral part of the central peacekeeping role as a force put in place to secure and monitor a cease-fire. As the workload for peacekeeping increased, so too did the scale of operations: forces ranged from the 18-member United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) in 1948 to the massive 20,000-strong United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, the most extensive peacekeeping operation mandated during the Cold-War period.<sup>29</sup>

While the work load that peacekeeping took on in assuming its role as a cease-fire monitor, the role of peacekeeping itself remained largely the same throughout the Cold War years. The accepted role that peacekeeping played was still as an ad-hoc, non-partisan force used to secure, observe, and maintain a cessation of hostilities between two or more parties to a given conflict. To achieve this end, observer missions would be used, as well as

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<sup>27</sup> Haas, p. 30.

<sup>28</sup> Russet, Bruce, and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, V. 59, #2, Spring, 1991, p. 70.

<sup>29</sup> Wiseman, p. 277.

designated "buffer zones" between the two disputing parties,<sup>30</sup> in which the peacekeeping force would essentially serve as a physical barrier between the belligerents. As an ad-hoc force, it could be molded to fit the demands of the situation; its lack of institutionalization freed the force from possible limitations that could strangle flexibility. As non-partisan, the force was not a collective security force, intent upon the removal of a recognized aggressor. Instead, the force relied upon the consent and cooperation of all parties.<sup>31</sup> Peace was not enforced; it was consented to. Financing, equipping, and staffing of the force was on a voluntary basis by the members; like the peacekeeping force itself, participation was voluntary.<sup>32</sup> In addition to its primary role as a monitor of the peace, there was also a secondary role that peacekeeping played: the creation of conditions of stability and trust in order to facilitate the permanent settlement of a dispute.<sup>33</sup> Thus, peacekeeping was not a complete response to a crisis in and of itself; it was instead intended to serve as part of an overall response to an international crisis. Once the peace was secured (ie. the lack of hostilities was maintained), a permanent settlement to the dispute was to be reached.

There was one notable exception during the Cold War, however, where peacekeeping went outside its traditional role. It was in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960-63) where the critical point between a peacekeeping force and a military enforcement action was surpassed. The crisis arose as the Belgian Congo prepared for its independence from Belgium in 1960. In the turmoil to establish a new national government and Constitution, the Katanga province attempted to secede and form its own country.<sup>34</sup> The situation degenerated when Belgian troops attempted to intervene to restore order; fearing a renege by the Belgians on the move toward independence, Patrice Lumumba, Congolese Prime

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<sup>30</sup> Diehl, Paul, "Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace," Political Science Quarterly, V. 103, fall 1988, p. 487.

<sup>31</sup> Malitza, p. 243.

<sup>32</sup> Wiseman, p. 303.

<sup>33</sup> Haas, p. 29.

<sup>34</sup> Jit Rikhye, p. 80.

Minister, sought help from the United Nations. The Secretary-General quickly acted, calling upon the disputants to refrain from disrupting law and order, and establishing a peacekeeping force tasked to secure the removal of Belgian troops from the Congo.<sup>35</sup> At this stage, the force was purely peacekeeping in nature; the Security Council affirmed that ONUC would not intervene in any way into the internal affairs of the Congo.<sup>36</sup> However, as the crisis worsened and civil war sparked by the Katanga secession threatened, the Security Council authorized a stronger ONUC role, including the use of offensive force, to ensure against the outbreak of civil war.<sup>37</sup> From this point on, the Congo force assumed a role that went outside the traditional peacekeeping mold; ONUC now became a partisan force tasked to prevent the Katangan secession and to pressure all parties to conflict to form a viable national government.<sup>38</sup> Through a number of difficulties in the field as well as debate in United Nations itself, ONUC finally completed its mission, restoring the authority of the central government, removing the Belgian forces from Congolese territory, and preventing the Katangan province from seceding.<sup>39</sup> In retrospect, ONUC represented an aberration from the traditional role that peacekeeping forces played. In all other situations during the Cold War, the anomalous ONUC operation would remain unsurpassed both in its complexity and in its power as an enforcement operation.

### Essentials to Peacekeeping

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<sup>35</sup>Wainhouse, David W., International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast, Baltimore; Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.

<sup>36</sup> United Nations, Security Council Resolution S/4426, 9 Aug. 1960, quoted in Jit Rikhye, p. 82.

<sup>37</sup> NOTE: The Security Council Resolution (S/4741, September 21, 1961) authorized ONUC to take "appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort." United Nations Quoted in Wainhouse, p. 408.

<sup>38</sup>Wiseman, p. 276.

<sup>39</sup> Jit Rikhye, p. 86. NOTE: The complexity and scope of the ONUC mission prohibits detailed analysis here. The Congo crisis illustrates several aspects of peacekeeping during the Cold War; I have attempted to illustrate it as situation in which a U.N. force went beyond the fundamental peacekeeping role. For further detail on ONUC, see Wainhouse, pp. 405-413, or Jit Rikhye, pp. 81-89.

To achieve its goals and adequately fulfill its role, the peacekeeping mission has come to require several things. First and most basic is the necessity of consent by all parties to the conflict. In its essence, "peacekeeping requires that all sides be willing to desist from battle."<sup>40</sup> Parties to conflict could include the primary disputants as well as any third parties that are in some way involved in the situation, and whose consent is considered necessary to halt hostilities.<sup>41</sup> For example, in the United Nations effort to secure a cease-fire in Lebanon between the Israelis and the Lebanese (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL), a third party who was also part of the cease-fire agreement was Syria, because of its extensive presence in Lebanon. Other groups which deserve attention are so-called "sub-national groups"--organized factions existing in the troubled region who are also in some way involved in the conflict. Again, UNIFIL serves as a good example because of difficulty with which it has met due to the myriad "sub-national" factions involved in the conflict, but who were not part of the cease-fire agreement.<sup>42</sup> In short, it is essential that all relevant parties to a conflict give consent, both to a cease-fire, and the peacekeeping force that monitors it.

Such consent may not always be easy to attain. Wiseman writes, "history. . . shows that the situations to which peacekeeping have been applied are becoming increasingly more complex and intractable, that the operations have accordingly become more elaborate and more difficult to execute."<sup>43</sup> The complex ONUC mission, for example, demonstrates how an intractable situation actually led a peacekeeping mission into a fundamentally different operation. Indeed, to avoid the difficulties that the United Nations faced in the Congo, many point out another essential: the need for a tenable political situation, where consent by all relevant parties can be reached so that

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<sup>40</sup> James, p. 231.

<sup>41</sup> Diehl, p. 490.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 488.

<sup>43</sup> Wiseman, p. 264.

peacekeeping could be initiated. For, without a manageable situation where consent is given, peacekeeping cannot happen.<sup>44</sup>

In instances during the Cold War where a party did not provide freely-given consent, superpower leadership and pressure on one or more sides to agree to a cease-fire and peacekeeping force became necessary as well. This was due to the singular position that the superpowers occupied during the Cold War. At a time when international politics revolved around the dynamic between East and West, countries arrayed on either side of the ideological wall usually looked to the two superpower blocs in the Security Council as a beacon to decide international policies. The United States and the Soviet Union held considerable economic, military, as well as symbolic influence over their respective spheres of influence in the world community, giving them a leadership role. In a situation where one side refused a peacekeeping operation because it held the tactical advantage, the superpower could exercise pressure on that side to accept. Haas writes, "clearly, in the large majority of the cases, the consent of the stronger side seems to be a prerequisite for United Nations success, and obtaining consent usually depends on the diplomatic and even military pressure of a superpower."<sup>45</sup> UNEF is a good example of such a need; without the pressure by the United States under the Eisenhower Administration on its allies France, Israel, and Britain, the cease-fire would not have been possible.

However, while superpower support has been essential, that support has traditionally been limited to activities outside actual participation in the peacekeeping force itself. This may seem ironic, given the importance of the superpowers to peacekeeping. But, barring a few exceptions during the Cold War, physical superpower presence in missions has been minimal. Some have seen this as a necessity, symbolizing the absolute non-partisan nature of the force for the benefit of parties to conflict, who may see the presence of one superpower as an attempt to meddle in their affairs. But others point out the usefulness in superpower participation. Superpower presence can show to the parties to conflict that the United States or the Soviet Union is actively

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<sup>44</sup> Urquhart, Brian, "United Nations Peacekeeping and How Their Role Might Be Enhanced", The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p. 258.

<sup>45</sup> Haas, p. 32.



seized of the matter, and that they desire peace for the ongoing crisis. A state or group involved in a crisis might also be more circumspect before violating a cease-fire if it knew that they would be firing upon troops from a nation who not only is committed to stopping the hostilities, but who also possesses several times the military power than they do.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, throughout the Cold War, peacekeeping missions remained largely free from superpower presence.

Another essential that has been identified includes the need for a clear, viable mandate which enjoys broad support by United Nations members.<sup>47</sup> Equivocal directives (such as those in ONUC, where the mandate had to be revised and clarified five times) would lead to protest by the parties to conflicts, as well as the member states.<sup>48</sup> A clear and acceptable mandate, however, would clear any controversy arising from the force operations. Also, for the sake of the force itself, a clear mandate would be needed for the force to competently carry out its mission. Another essential is a strong and competent force command that can execute its tasks with skill and sensitivity to all parties involved.<sup>49</sup> This may seem self evident, but it is necessary to remember the peculiar nature of peacekeeping: since forces are usually multinational, several different languages and military doctrines are unified under one aegis. Without good command and control capability, problems affecting the success of the mission could result.

Once the "prerequisites" for the peacekeeping force are taken care of--such as party consent, a tenable political situation, and a clear, accepted mandate--the next requirement is the contribution of personnel, materiel, and financial support provided by the membership. Countries who are considered neutral enough to the conflict are either asked for or volunteer personnel and materials, while the provision of funds has traditionally been expected of all members. Usually, however, the countries who contribute the

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<sup>46</sup> Renner, p. 29.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p.258

<sup>48</sup> Diehl, p. 496.

<sup>49</sup> Urquhart, p. 458.

personnel and materiels also provide the financing for the operation.<sup>50</sup> This usually sparks debate over financing practices, and brings up questions concerning the financial responsibilities of the member states to peacekeeping, a subject which will be discussed later.

### **Cold War Peacekeeping Evaluation: Successes and Limits**

Peacekeeping fared well in its tasks during the Cold War. In his evaluation of the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping between 1946 and 1986, Ernst Haas credits peacekeeping with moderate to great success on all but three of the 16 military operations initiated during the first 40 years of the United Nations.<sup>51</sup> While not all peacekeeping operations met with total success--ie. some aspect of the mandate was not successfully carried out or fighting sporadically broke out--many of the forces did indeed manage to hold the cease-fire. Haas attributes the reason for such high success to the limited role that the United Nations that the peacekeeping forces played in the various conflicts. Their role in each instance was limited to dealing with the "proximate causes of conflict," specifically halting the fighting, isolating the combatants, and abating the conflict.<sup>52</sup> As a limited response to the proximate causes, the force did not have permanent settlement of the dispute as its mandate. That was not its role. All peacekeeping does is cease hostilities and create an environment for the settlement of the dispute, not settle the dispute itself. In this role, peacekeeping proved to be fairly effective.

### Problems and Shortcomings to Peacekeeping

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<sup>50</sup> Renner, p. 29.

<sup>51</sup> Haas, p. 29. NOTE: Haas considers four proto-peacekeeping operations that took place before the 1956 UNEF operation: the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), the U.N. Committee for Indonesia (UNCI), the U.N. Truce Observer Force (UNTSO), and the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNGOMIP). These operations, while observing a cease-fire, were unlike the contemporary conception of peacekeeping in that they did not include the deployment of troops in the field. A fifth force that Haas considers is the Korea Truce, and is not considered peacekeeping, but rather part of the collective security actions of the U.N.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p. 28.

The limited nature of peacekeeping highlights a problem that many see in the wider context of conflict management by the United Nations. In this context, peacekeeping is a temporary, "band-aid" solution to a problem that stops the immediate violence. However, most conflicts usually deal with more complex problems which peacekeeping alone cannot solve. To extend the band-aid analogy a bit further, a quick fix to stop the bleeding is necessary, but to truly heal the wound requires more extensive attention. During the Cold War, United Nations efforts to resolve conflicts needed to respond to the underlying causes of the conflict as well as the immediate crisis in order to achieve a lasting peace to the stricken region. In short, a comprehensive response to international conflicts, which included peacekeeping as well as treatment of the underlying causes, needed to be developed. But in many instances during the Cold War where peacekeeping was utilized as the United Nations response to conflicts, a corresponding effort to address the underlying causes was noticeably lacking. In these cases, United Nations presence became limited to a mere military presence without a corresponding diplomatic and political mission to resolve the dispute. In missions such as the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which has been in place since 1964, the resolution to the conflict has not yet been achieved, and peacekeeping forces are still required to remain in place to prevent violence.<sup>53</sup>

The reason why there is little motivation in the world community to settle the conflict is that, once peacekeeping is sent to secure the cease of violence, the immediate crisis is gone, and the need for a lasting peace becomes less urgent. The initiative for a permanent settlement loses its momentum, and the Organization membership becomes lulled into a false sense of security. This scenario has been replicated so many times that Haas asks, "is it hopeless to expect the United Nations to deal with the underlying causes of international conflict? . . . Can the United Nations only influence the proximate causes of war and make no basic contribution to the construction of a fundamentally more peaceful world?"<sup>54</sup> Indeed, the case can be made that some instances of United Nations intervention may have actually exacerbated the conflict, allowing the seizure of territory by one nation to

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid. p. 29.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. p. 47.

stand for the sake of ceasing hostilities and then doing nothing to settle the dispute other than leaving a peacekeeping force in the middle to keep unsatisfied and hostile forces from killing each other. Indefinitely postponing the settlement of a dispute leads to an uneasy status quo somewhere between war and peace, where normal life and peaceful relations are difficult to maintain. Moreover, postponing settlement would also tend to solidify the views of the antagonists, leaving them the benefit of time to establish their positions--both physically and/or politically--until no leeway will be given in negotiation, should negotiation ever take place. Some parties to conflict no doubt actually find comfort in the presence of a peacekeeping force that establishes an uneasy status quo, for it offers them an advantage that might be lost should a permanent settlement be sought. Analyst Paul Diehl asks, "if peacekeeping can halt fighting and stop bloodshed, even for a short time, is this enough to justify a peacekeeping operation?"<sup>55</sup> If the necessary tradeoff to peacekeeping is a lasting settlement, the question merits attention.

Many cite the underdevelopment of other aspects of conflict treatment, such as peacemaking (the active pursuit of a lasting settlement between the parties to conflict), and preventive diplomacy (the effort to settle a dispute before it escalates into violence). During the Cold war, these facets to the overall response to conflict suffered because of the difficulty that the United Nations had in settling international conflict. Because of the ideological rift that existed between the countries allied to the East and those to the West, any dispute that pitted two countries of opposing orientation became Cold War issues, a battle over the balance of power. Peacekeeping in this context was able to work because it was a half-measure intended to halt the violence and prevent a widening crisis--something that both superpowers agreed upon for mutual benefit.<sup>56</sup> After all, an unstable, escalating international crisis where the threat of nuclear devastation threatens was not desirable to either side. But when it came to developing the capability to settle disputes permanently, the divided membership balked, each side fearing that any plans proposed by the other would inherently be loaded in their opponent's favor. For several

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<sup>55</sup>Diehl, p. 507.

<sup>56</sup> Wiseman, p. 309.

crises, then, peacekeeping was as good as the United Nations could do. Despite many attempts by the Organization to improve peacemaking and preventive diplomacy capabilities, such as the proposed Commission for Good Offices and the General Assembly's 1982 Declaration of Peaceful Settlements to Disputes, lack of member enthusiasm and commitment rendered these efforts ineffective and powerless.<sup>57</sup>

Not only was peacekeeping limited in its role to stopping conflict, it was also a reactive approach. Most conflicts do not spring up overnight; animosities usually manifest themselves long before a crisis turns violent. Nonetheless, peacekeeping came into play only after the fighting started. Indeed, the methods for dealing with a conflict that were established in the Charter were, for the most part, reactive themselves, enumerating plans of action after the shooting started.<sup>58</sup> Brian Urquhart, former Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs, has attributed the last-minute mindset of the Organization to the indifference of the membership to the task of maintaining peace and security. He states,

the Secretary-General, to whom responsibility is often delegated when other measures have failed, often finds himself virtually alone with antagonists who threaten the peace of the international community. This often leaves the Organization and its Secretary-General in the most unfavorable position: public responsibility without power or support, commitments without means to discharge them, and the dilemma of 'damned if you do, damned if you don't'.<sup>59</sup>

Urquhart envisions a more pro-active approach to conflict resolution, backed by strong support by the Organization membership. More emphasis on other forms of conflict response, particularly preventive diplomacy, would go a long way toward improving United Nations crisis response. However, during the Cold War, such emphasis was unforthcoming.

Another problem attributed to peacekeeping arises from the fact that superpower support was essential to peacekeeping success. This is so for two reasons. First, the existence of the Cold War meant that many conflicts were Cold War-related disputes, and therefore superpower interest in the dispute

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<sup>57</sup> Malitza, p. 247-248.

<sup>58</sup> Urquhart, p. 253.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p. 254.

was high. If a superpower did not support a peacekeeping initiative because such a force would be contrary to its interests in the dispute, than a peacekeeping force--no matter if it was not as drastic as a collective security measure--did not go forward. As Henry Wiseman states, "it is futile to suggest a United Nations role where the superpowers are directly engaged."<sup>60</sup> The Soviet crackdown in Hungary in 1956 and again in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the American presence in Vietnam War in 1965-1975 both serve as examples where a conflict went without a cease-fire or a peacekeeping force because of superpower involvement. Second and conversely, in conflicts which held no saliency for either the United States or the Soviet Union, no action was taken, for no foreign policy significance was seen for them. This is the same for all members and their support. What is notable in viewing the Cold War era is how many conflicts occurred which could have warranted peacekeeping operations, but did not receive it. The Cambodian conflict, for example, went on for over 14 years, and was responsible for over one million deaths before a peacekeeping force was initiated. Reasons for this include the lack of the conflict's saliency for the superpowers, as well as superpower resistance to getting involved in a difficult crisis. Thus, in many conflicts, United Nations peacekeeping went unused because the conflicts were either too salient or not important enough to the superpowers to initiate a force. The small number of missions--13 in all, compared to the hundreds of conflicts that occurred over the same period--attest to this.

Financing problems were at issue throughout the Cold War, and often threatened the lives of many missions. Part of the financing problem had to do with its ad-hoc nature; since peacekeeping was ad-hoc, it was funded as though it were a rare emergency.<sup>61</sup> This created difficulties in trying to initiate a force quickly, for it was only after a peacekeeping force had been agreed to, and then only after a budget has been submitted, agreed to, and sources found that peacekeeping was finally deployed.<sup>62</sup> Second, as noted earlier, most peacekeeping missions were funded solely by the contributing nations themselves, and on a voluntary basis. If a country objected to

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<sup>60</sup> Wiseman, p. 288.

<sup>61</sup> Renner, p. 29.

<sup>62</sup> "Piece Rate for Peacekeeping" *Economist*, v. 327, 25 Jan. 1992, p. 38.

peacekeeping, it simply would not pay. While the Secretariat, the body responsible for designing and finding the resources for peacekeeping missions, pressed for mandatory payments, too often the membership failed to pay their dues. As a result, debts and shortfalls continued to plague peacekeeping missions. Arrears for peacekeeping grew from \$178 million in 1981 to \$447 million by the end of the Cold War in 1989-90; by 1991, only 28 of the 159 countries in the membership had paid their full peacekeeping assessments.<sup>63</sup> The United States and the Soviet Union together owed 75 percent of the balance due. But the Secretariat could do little to force payment, for it did not possess the means to do so. Although the Charter provided the option to expel any country who does not pay its assessed dues, it remained unused--both the Secretariat and the membership know that such action could never be enforced. Meanwhile, the existing measures were barely adequate to ensure a steady source of financing for peacekeeping during the Cold War.

### Conclusion

Throughout the Cold War years, peacekeeping developed into an essential instrument of the United Nations. Created as a sort of "jury-rigged" invention which would permit United Nations action when collective security was not possible, peacekeeping became the principal tool in response to international conflicts. Throughout its usage, peacekeeping has developed its basic and fundamental role: it is an ad-hoc, non-partisan force deployed with the consent to the parties to conflict in order to secure and maintain an agreed-upon cease-fire. As part of this role, peacekeeping has taken on a number of tasks that contribute to the maintenance of a cease-fire. To carry out its tasks and fulfill its role, peacekeeping has come to rely upon several things, such as member support and party consent. In addition to the advantages that peacekeeping offers, however, it also has its inherent limitations, such as its limited role as a "band-aid" solution, and it has some problems that limit its effectiveness, such as lack of political and financial support. It is this form of peacekeeping that the world community faces as it

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<sup>63</sup> Renner, p. 31

passes from the Cold War into a new geopolitical era. What peacekeeping in this new world order will be relies in no small degree on how it has developed over history. It is the task of the world community, then, to fashion a role for peacekeeping that acknowledges the strengths, limitations, and essentials of peacekeeping as developed, while developing its capability to meet the demands of a new world.



## THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

### The End of the Cold War

For more than forty years Cold War geopolitics reigned supreme, affecting international relations of virtually every nation on Earth, and providing the rules of conduct for international relations. As a result, during that time, the United Nations remained restrained by the geopolitical reality, hobbled in its chartered task of maintaining international peace and security. Toward the end of the 1980's, however, the icy relations frozen in East-West antagonisms began to thaw. The succession to Soviet leadership of a young, reform-minded Premier--Mikhail Gorbachev--not only began to alter Soviet perspective in the East-West confrontation but also served to ease suspicions and tensions in the West. The new era of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* initiated by Gorbachev moved the Soviet Union away from the hard-line foreign and domestic policies of his predecessors. As a result, Western leaders cautiously began to drop their guard and extend hands of peace, as well as diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties. More significantly, the bitter nuclear standoff that had held the world hostage to the precarious peace that was the Cold War began to crumble away. The dangers of Mutual Assured Destruction and of First Strike Capability began to wither with the rise of new strategic nuclear treaties and accords that sought to stop the escalation of nuclear weapons and begin the reduction of the deadly nuclear stockpiles. By the end of the decade, *Glasnost* was in full effect in the Soviet Union, attempting to save the struggling command-economy with heavy doses of Capitalism and free-market economic techniques, while *Perestroika* attempted to revitalize the Soviets' diplomatic relations with the world, as well as the political relations with its own people. The constellation of Soviet satellites began to spin off one by one, beginning the explosion of democracy in Eastern Europe that finally made the Iron Curtain tumble. And, finally, the Cold War was declared over.

But as many students of Cold War relations point out, the programs of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* were not Soviet initiatives motivated solely by the desire for peace, for a reduction of tensions. After seventy years of a command economy rife with inefficiency and corruption, added to fifty-plus years of a war-time economics bent on military buildup, the Soviet economy

was in dire trouble. Its desire to keep military parity with the United States, coupled with the desire to fulfill the Leninist philosophy of "Revolutionary Internationalism" finally resulted in what Paul Kennedy terms "imperial overstretch:" the inability of the Soviet economy to support all of its policies and programs, both foreign and domestic.<sup>1</sup> Gorbachev's *Glasnost* reforms were an attempt to save the Soviet economy from outright collapse; *Perestroika* was the diplomatic policy that attempted to ease international tensions so that the Soviet Union could devote more of its revenue to repairing the domestic economy, and less defending itself. By 1991, the crisis in the Soviet Union had grown serious; the satellites in Eastern Europe were gone, and the Soviet republics themselves began to call for independence, desperate to abandon the sinking ship. Tensions in the Soviet leadership reached a crisis when hard-line Communists, attempting to thwart the progressive programs by Gorbachev and his supporters, unsuccessfully tried to seize control in a coup d'etat, August of 1991. By November of that same year, the Soviet Union was on its last legs; by the end of 1991, the 15 Soviet republics finally decided to go their own way. The beginning of 1992 saw a world without a Cold War, without a Soviet Union.

### Significance of the End of the Cold War to the United Nations

The fall of the deadlock between East and West has been crucial to the new life that the United Nations now enjoys. Secretary-General for the present term in the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali gives testament:

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The U.N. was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes--279 of them--cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period. With the end of the Cold War there have been no such vetoes since 31 May 1991 and demands on the U.N. have surged.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> As cited Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "The Cold War and its Aftermath," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 71, fall, 1992, p.31

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, Security Council, "An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping (report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992)" S/24111, 21 June, 1992, p. 4.

Reliance upon the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security has expanded to an extent not seen before. Free of deep divisions, of bickering and unilateral countermeasures against its resolutions by its members, the Security Council has succeeded in establishing to date fourteen new peacekeeping operations since 1990, surpassing the number of missions initiated during the entire 45-year history of the United Nations during the Cold War.<sup>3</sup> And, in 1990, precedent was set when the United Nations unanimously adopted and enforced collective security measures against Iraqi aggression, expelling Iraq from its violated neighbor state, Kuwait. As never before, the United Nations is being turned to for matters relating to international peace and security. Perhaps members see that things can now actually be accomplished in the liberated United Nations, and are thus using its resources to its full potential. Perhaps also the membership is coming to accept the importance of the United Nations, peacekeeping in particular, in this post-Cold War world. But the membership must understand that, with the fundamental change occurring in geopolitics, the United Nations must also change in response to the end of the Cold War, and must establish a communal world-view to replace the old status quo. For, the exact role of the United Nations and peacekeeping will inevitably be dependent upon the world community's understanding of what the "new world order" is.

With the demise of the old Cold War status quo, the world community stands momentarily at a crossroads, a point where it has lost the old conception of geopolitics and stands on the verge of a new era. John Lewis Gaddis describes the situation of the world community in analogy:

finding one's way through unfamiliar terrain generally requires a map of some sort. Cartography, like cognition itself, is a necessary simplification that allows us to see where we are, and where we may be going. . . . The end of the Cold War was too sweeping a defeat for totalitarianism--and too sweeping a victory for democracy--for this old geopolitical map to be of use any longer.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Renner, p. 29.

<sup>4</sup> Gaddis, John Lewis, "Toward the Post-Cold war World," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 69, #2, Spring 1991, p. 103.

What will the new map look like? That is a question that the world is currently asking itself. In many ways, the world community is in the same position that it found itself after the end of the two previous world conflicts. This time, it is asking itself how it can best prepare itself against the "scourge of war," be it hot or cold, a small border conflict or a full-scale war. In the past, peace and security was maintained because neither superpower desired an unstable situation to escalate into nuclear conflict, and therefore exerted pressure on the disputing parties in their respective spheres of influence to discontinue fighting. Now that nation-states are no longer influenced by one superpower or the other, the United Nations must foster a new way of bringing them to peace, should they become entangled in dispute.

### **Defining the New World Order: "Pax Americana?"**

The fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of the Cold War has left the United States in a singular position, one not attained, some have argued, since the Roman Empire and its era of "Pax Romana."<sup>5</sup> Indeed, it is evident that the United States, as the sole remaining superpower, has the potential to become the leading figure in the world for crisis response and maintaining international peace and security. United States action in the Persian Gulf War, for example was essential to combat the aggressive action taken by Iraq against Kuwait. But many cite problems to such a role for the United States in the new era, including many in the United States itself.

### The Pentagon Paper: One-Superpower World

In March of 1992, a report was leaked to the New York Times from a source in the defense Department, working in the Pentagon.<sup>6</sup> The document, known as the "Defense Planning Guidance" report, is the broad policy statement of the Defense Department, which is composed once every two

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<sup>5</sup> Tyler, Patrick, "Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics," New York Times, 10 March 1992, p.A12.

<sup>6</sup> Tyler, Patrick, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals develop," New York Times, 8 March 1992, p. A 1.

years and distributed to all military leaders and civilian Defense Department heads for use in determining military budgets, force size, and strategy. In the statement, planners argued for a "one-superpower world," where the United States policy makers would seek to perpetuate the United States' role as the sole Superpower, and make as their primary objective the task to "prevent the re-emergence of a new rival."<sup>7</sup> The intent of the planners, reports Times journalist Patrick Tyler, was to avoid a similar rivalry as that which arose between the United States and the Soviet Union a rivalry which resulted in the deadlock of the Cold War.<sup>8</sup>

To ensure that such a rivalry would be avoided, the policy statement called for a series of regional defense strategies that would ensure the primacy of United States military power. One such regional arrangement called for a substantial role in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, which "is home to the world's greatest concentration of traditional Communist states, with fundamental values, governance, and policies decidedly at variance with our own."<sup>9</sup> The report stated further, "we must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the area. This will enable the U.S. to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon."<sup>10</sup> In short, the policy promoted United States military dominance over the area. Another arrangement that would be adopted for Western Europe would call for the continued involvement in the security arrangements for the region, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In so doing, the planners claimed that the United States would ensure that the nations of Europe "need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture" by providing assurance that their interests would be protected by "United States leadership."<sup>11</sup> In other words,

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<sup>7</sup> (No Author), "Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival'", New York Times, 8 March, 1992, p. A 14.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid. p. A 14.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid, p. A 14.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p. A 14.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid. p. A 14.

the report attempted to preempt the ascendancy of other industrialized nations, particularly the resurgent Germany and Japan, to superpower status, by providing them with "assurance" that their interests would be protected by the United States.

What is notable about the report with regard to the United Nations is that there is no mention anywhere of collective action through the Organization. Tyler writes, "with its focus on this concept of benevolent domination by one power, the Pentagon document articulates the clearest rejection to date of collective internationalism, the strategy that emerged from World War Two when the five victorious powers sought to form a United Nations that could mediate disputes and police outbreaks of violence."<sup>12</sup> Instead of collective action through such bodies as the United Nations, the report opts instead for a practice whereby ad-hoc arrangements--usually not lasting beyond the crisis--would be used. This would place authority over the execution of a peacekeeping or collective enforcement mission in the hands of United States planners, and not a collective body; this way, the idea of a "new world order that is ultimately backed by the U.S." would be enforced.<sup>13</sup> Although the policy statement does reject the notion that the United States should become a global "policeman," it leaves the exact instances where it would intervene on behalf of its "interests" open to broad interpretation.<sup>14</sup> This poses a problem in two ways: first, such a broad interpretation of United States interest could conceivably mean that, in any situation, the United States would have the responsibility to intervene; second, by denying its role as world policeman, responsible for addressing all conflict, the United States would only address those conflicts it wanted to, thereby ignoring many other crises. Without a commitment to a strong collective body, whose responsibility is for the treatment of all conflict, these

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<sup>12</sup>Tyler, p. A 1.

<sup>13</sup> "Excerpts" article, p. A 14.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. A14. NOTE: Full text on this point reads as follows: "While the U.S. cannot become the world's 'policeman' by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations."

disputes would go untreated. The "one-superpower" world order would, in short, undermine the notion of international collectivism.

### Reaction to the Pentagon Plan

The Defense Department's policy statement was roundly criticized, not only by members of the international community who took exception to the report, but also by many officials in the United States who considered the document to be a "dumb plan."<sup>15</sup> Domestically, the report gained condemnation from all quarters, both in the Democratic and the Republican Parties. Democratic Senator Robert Byrd called the document "myopic, shallow, and disappointing," while an official for the Bush Administration stated that the report "in no way or shape represent[ed] U.S. policy."<sup>16</sup> Democratic Senator Joseph Biden, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, rejected the notion of a "Pax Americana," where global security would be based upon United States hegemony. The international response was also critical. One western diplomat pointed out that the policy draft ran "counter to the kind of multilateralism and commitment to the United Nations that we had expected to emerge after the Cold War."<sup>17</sup> Many diplomats expressed concern that such collectivity would be destroyed were the draft statement implemented. Other nations, such as India, took exception to the policy statement, which claimed that India had "hegemonic intentions" in South Asia. Many nations felt insulted by the presumption of United States world dominance made by the document, and also felt alarmed at such a United States-hegemonic view of the new world order that the document posited. As the Western official noted, the document caused many countries to ask of United States planners, "where do the rest of us fit into the game plan?"

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<sup>15</sup> Tyler, Patrick, "Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics," New York Times, 10 March 1992 p.A12.

<sup>16</sup> -----, "Senior U.S. Officials Assail Lone-Superpower Policy," New York Times, 11 March 1992, p. A 6.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p. A 6.

The harsh criticism that the Pentagon document elicited exemplifies the direction that many officials, both in the United States and abroad, would instead prefer to pursue. In lieu of a lone-superpower hegemonic security arrangement, the principle of collective internationalism--espoused by the United Nations--should be enhanced. According to Senator Biden, United States participation in developing "collective power through the United Nations" should remain the proper goal for policy planners, rather than unilateral aspirations to lone-superpower status. Paul Tsongas, former Democratic candidate for the 1992 presidential election, advocated a sort of "Pax Mundi" instead of a Pax Americana, where the burden of maintaining peace and security would fall equitably on the shoulders of all nations, who would see that such participation would be in their economic and security interests. Tsongas writes, "efforts are going to have to be made to provide a United Nations Security Force with real teeth. Pax Americana must give way to Heal Thyself. This is not isolationism. It is participation in a new internationalism truly based on the principle of collective security."<sup>18</sup>

### The Revised Plan

In the end, the Defense Department policy planners rejected their earlier draft statement, and constructed a new policy statement that centered on collective security arrangements and collective action instead of United States hegemony. Their revised statement abandoned the old objective of preventing the rise of a rival superpower, and called instead for increased participation in collective bodies such as the United Nations. The new policy stated, "our preference for a collective response to preclude threats or, if necessary, to deal with them is a key feature of our regional defense strategy."<sup>19</sup> While it maintained that the United States should reserve the right to respond to threats it sees to its interests, the report also stated, "in this more secure international environment, there will be enhanced opportunities for political, economic, social and security issues to be resolved

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. p. A 6.

<sup>19</sup> Tyler, Patrick, "Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers," New York Times, 24 May, 1992, p. A 1.



through new or revitalized international organizations, including the United Nations, of regional arrangements."<sup>20</sup> By adopting this new plan, the United States has accepted the role of the world community in shaping the new world order. And, although the United States wants to maintain a leadership role, it has accepted that such a determination will be a collaborative process.

### **The Collective Vision of the New World Order: Striking a Balance**

So if the new world order is not based on one-power hegemony, and is instead to be decided by the world community, what will the new "map" look like? With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations is no longer seen suspiciously as a tool by one superpower to achieve their interests at the expense of the other. As a result, there is an increased amount of trust in its capacity as a world body whose role is to maintain international peace and security. This has in turn translated into a drive to make the United Nations a more powerful organization of collective action. As Javier Perez de Cuellar notes "as rarely before, nations are recognizing that they must address international problems multilaterally, through consultation and compromise."<sup>21</sup> Therefore, to create a more capable collective organization, the membership must redefine a fundamental balance that serves as the foundation of the United Nations: it is the balance between the nation-state's inviolable right to sovereignty and self determination on one hand, and its responsibility to uphold the principle of collective internationalism on the other. By balancing these two principles, the membership will provide the United Nations a stronger capability to deal with international conflict.

### Balancing Problems in the Past: The Cold War

After the Second World War, the founding members of the United Nations attempted to strike a balance between sovereignty and collective action that would best allow for the maintenance of peace and security.

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid. p. A 14.

<sup>21</sup>Javier Perez de Cuellar, p. 3 (see Introduction, footnote 1).

However, due to the existence of the Cold War, the world community was unable to strike a workable balance. The Cold War created animosities and distrust among the membership; efforts to try to maintain peace and security by members on either side in the Cold War were considered attempts by the other side to take advantage of a given conflict. Indeed, too often decisions to comply with international law and the principles of the Organization were made not because of the sense of responsibility to the world community, but instead because it was advantageous for one side or the other in the East-West balance of power. The existence of such a dynamic in the United Nations made the possibility for a strong collective body extremely remote. With the Cold War a thing of the past, it is hoped that the Organization will now be able to strike a balance that grants the greatest amount of national freedom while at the same time ensuring that international peace and security--and trust--can be maintained.

### Contemporary Need For a Rebalancing

The need for a rebalancing has become evident to the world community. As all nations agree, the maintenance of international peace and security in the contemporary world goes far beyond the Organization's ability to halt and reverse physical aggression. Achieving a lasting peace involves addressing not only the proximate causes of conflict, but the underlying ones as well.<sup>22</sup> These include a wide variety of things, notably economic conflicts, religious disputes, ethnic and cultural animosities, linguistic differences, racial and gender issues, socioeconomic divisions, clan, tribal, or factional rivalries, and many others.<sup>23</sup> In the past, the United Nations tried without too much success to tackle these issues when dealing with a crisis. The problem (in addition to the existence of the Cold War) was that the balance was weighted too much toward the side of sovereignty; the United Nations was given no power or authority to address underlying causes of conflict because to do so would violate the principle of sovereignty, at least the way the membership understood it. Today, the extent to which nations affect one

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<sup>22</sup> Haas, p. 6.

<sup>23</sup> Gaddis, p. 106-108.

another politically, economically, and socially, demonstrates that the traditional conception of sovereignty can no longer hold. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali states, "nations are too interdependent, national frontiers are too porous, and transnational realities--in the spheres of technology and investment on the one side, and poverty and misery on the other--too dangerous to permit egocentric isolationism."<sup>24</sup> To respond adequately to international crises in the future, the membership will have to make a fundamental re-assessment of the concept of sovereignty, one which will best allow the United Nations to address the underlying causes to conflict while still respecting a state's right to self-determination.

### Redefining the Balance

The United Nations understands its responsibility to strike a workable balance. In his report to the Security Council on ways to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations in dealing with international dispute, The Secretary-General states,

the foundation stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of states today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an even more interdependent world.<sup>25</sup>

There exist global economic, social, ecological, human rights, and other issues that respect no national boundary, and events that occur in one nation inescapably have effects on others. The commitment of the United Nations, then, is to respect the sovereign rights of its membership, while at the same time calling them to take on the responsibility to comply with international agreements concerning such globally- affecting matters as those mentioned above. The call represents the understanding by the United Nations that, to adequately maintain peace and security, the United Nations must address

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<sup>24</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3046th Meeting, S/PV. 3046, p. 9.

<sup>25</sup> S/24111, p. 5.

these underlying causes of conflict. To provide the Organization the capability to do so, areas which were previously free from consideration by the United Nations, and considered instead to be purely internal matters, must now be open to international scrutiny. In short, the notion of sovereignty must be redefined.

But, while many acknowledge that there must be a rebalancing, there is much dispute amongst the membership over how exactly such a rebalancing should be made. The argument sets the view that United Nations intervention on behalf of the individuals in a nation-state is needed against the argument that such intervention would undermine the sovereignty and authority of the nation-state. On one hand is the view of sovereignty that is established in Article 2(7) of the Charter, which states,

nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter. . .<sup>26</sup>

Under such a definition, how a state authority treats its citizens would be purely internal and not open to outside scrutiny. To allow such intervention would render state authority powerless, subject appeal by their citizens to an outside authority. Not many states would be willing to relinquish such sovereignty. On the other hand, as the Secretary General states, if international peace and security is to be maintained, then certain issues which serve as underlying causes to conflict—even if they traditionally have been considered purely domestic—would need to be addressed. Otherwise, the organization will not be able to function adequately as a maintainer of peace and security.

One such issue where the debate has focused has been in the area of human rights. Respect for human rights has long been a concern for the United Nations, for the Organization understands the link between the oppression of individuals' rights in countries and the outbreak of violent conflict. However, the issue of human rights has remained the sole province of the individual nation-state. Despite this, the United Nations has repeatedly tried to secure the rights and liberties of all human beings, urging

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<sup>26</sup> United Nations Charter, Article 2, Section 7.

all of its members to pledge commitment to the protection of human rights under international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, represents the attempts by the membership to secure commitment by the world community to the notion that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."<sup>27</sup> But, while committing themselves to upholding human rights, many nations take the declarations as statements of an ideal which should serve as a beacon, not as a legal obligation that must be followed.<sup>28</sup> Violations of individuals' rights remain internal matters which no country would seem anxious to open up to outside scrutiny. As Brian Urquhart points out, most nations have human rights "skeletons in the closet" which could be gotten to if the United Nations were given authority to intervene for human rights issues.<sup>29</sup> However, if it were accepted that human rights issues serve as a fundamental cause for conflict which affects international peace and security, then the commitment that the community makes to uphold human rights will have to be more binding. For, as Samuel Kim writes, such enhanced commitment would be necessary to the new world order: "the human rights problematique cannot be overcome to any significant degree without transforming the existing world order system."<sup>30</sup>

Another issue in the argument is that of humanitarian aid missions that the United Nations initiates in order to relieve regions and populations stricken by disaster. In the past, these relief missions were for areas of the world stricken by natural catastrophes. But too often, humanitarian crises are man-made sufferings, brought about by war and conflict within the

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<sup>27</sup> Universal declaration of Human Rights, Article I; quoted from The United Nations and a Just World Order, Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., Studies on A Just World Order, number 3 (Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p. 351.

<sup>28</sup> NOTE: In the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the text reads to the effect that nations should keep the Declaration as a standard to which each one should strive for. As such, the declaration could not be considered a binding legal commitment made, the transgression of which would sanction United Nations action.

<sup>29</sup> (No Author), "The Limits to Sovereignty (Interview with Brian Urquhart, Former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations from 1974-1986)," New Perspectives Quarterly, V. 8, #4, Fall 1991, p. 26.

<sup>30</sup> Kim, Samuel, "Global Human Rights and World Order," in The United Nations and a Just World Order, Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., Studies on a Just World Order, Number 3 (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p. 373.

boundaries of one nation.<sup>31</sup> Populations of non-combatants are used as pawns or bargaining chips in the conflict between factions, and often undergo suffering, displacement, and starvation for the tactical and strategic benefit of either side. In these instances, United Nations assistance is not asked for by a government or a sub-national faction, for intervention would then help one or the other side in the conflict. Thus, the United Nations can presently do nothing for the beleaguered people within the country. However, if the United Nations recognized the necessity to intervene for the sake of the well-being of the people of a state, then the problems and conflict that would arise from the humanitarian crisis would be avoided. Ernst Haas suggests such reform, stating,

The Secretary-General would have the power to intervene without the right of the political organs to block action, provided that the main task is the establishment of order and the protection of basic human rights without the United Nations taking any position, or aiding any one party in a civil war, with respect to the political issues at stake.<sup>32</sup>

Such power would indeed redefine the balance between the sovereign authority of a nation-state and the authority of the United Nations. This concerns many states, who would be loath to surrender such power to an international organization. But, if the pledge to maintain peace and security for all peoples is earnest, then all nations will have to decide that intervention for the sake of a stricken people takes precedence over jealous claims to absolute self-determination.

A third area which is related to the rebalancing dilemma has to do with a phenomenon which, caused in part by the End of the Cold War, is presently occurring in many parts of the world. With the end of the Cold War and the fall of Communist hegemony in certain regions of the world, nations which once remained unified under the strong rule of a Communist state authority are now being split apart by emerging separatist movements. Free from the authority which would have previously suppressed their separatist claims, sub-national groups who desire self-determination on

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<sup>31</sup>NOTE: In sections three and four, contemporary examples of man-made humanitarian crisis--in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia--will be presented.

<sup>32</sup>Haas, p. 43.

ethnic, religious, economic, or other grounds are now beginning to actively press for independence. In several of these instances, the effort has turned violent, and prompted the United Nations to become seized of the matter. But, just like human rights, separatist movements have always been considered internal matters, subject to a nation-state's control, and outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations. However, with indications that much conflict in the post-Cold War world will be dispute based upon separatist movement, many feel that, in order to adequately maintain peace and security, the United Nations will have to be able to deal with separatist conflicts, serving as a mediator between the sub-national group and the state authority.<sup>33</sup>

The classic dilemma is when and when not to allow and support separatist movements. In trying to determine this, the United Nations faces a two-pronged problem. On one hand is the dilemma found in recognizing sub-national claims to self determination. The Secretary-General points out the problem in recognizing all peoples' claims to self determination:

the explosion of nationalities, which is pushing countries with many ethnic groups towards division, is a new challenge to peace and security. Could the United Nations discharge its responsibilities if, instead of being composed of 166 States, it had double that number of Members? Nationalist fervor will increase ad infinitum the number of communities claiming sovereignty, for there will always be dissatisfied minorities within those minorities that achieve independence.<sup>34</sup>

To sanction all separatist movements and allow them to succeed would result in absolute fragmentation and lead to a geopolitic "so shattering [to] state authority as to render it impotent."<sup>35</sup> By intervening in separatist conflicts regardless of the state authority's claims of sovereignty and recognizing all claims to self determinism, the United Nations will have actually sanctioned the increase of conflicts within states. On the other hand, to ignore or deny nationalistic claims outright could also threaten not only the security of a given region, but it would also undermine the legitimacy of the United

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<sup>33</sup>Gati, Charles, "From Sarajevo to Sarajevo," Foreign Affairs, v. 71, Fall 1992, p. 76.

<sup>34</sup> S/PV. 3046, p.11.

<sup>35</sup> Gaddis, p. 114.

Nations as an arbiter of peace. For example, the decolonization movement of the 1960's illustrates the importance for the United Nations to consider nationalistic movements.<sup>36</sup> In those instances, long, drawn out conflicts were avoided by United Nations efforts to broker a peaceful separation between the colonies and their colonists. If the United Nations were to reject other movements out of hand, then sub-national groups, seeing that the United Nations was inherently biased, would continue their separatist efforts along other, non-peaceful, routes like war and terrorism.

As these issues indicate, the imperative for the Organization when it decides the new world order is to redefine the balance between sovereignty and collectivity. Precedence during the Cold War dictates that states will never willingly allow United Nations intervention unless asked for. This puts the United Nations in the awkward position where it must decide between its duty to respect the sovereignty of its member state and intervening for the sake of preserving international peace. To choose one would upset the the member state, while the other would put the Organization's credibility as a maintainer of peace in question. What the membership must do is establish the new precedence, and create a balance that works to the benefit of all members, both as independent states and part of a community.

### **Creating the New World Order: An Equitable Global Consensus**

As the foregoing discussion indicates, the redefining process will certainly be a difficult period of readjustment for all the member states. It is therefore essential that such a process will inevitably have to include the equal participation of all nations, so that a world order that is fair for all countries--and accepted by all countries--can be created. As the reaction by the world community toward the "Pentagon Paper" shows, geopolitical structures which leave out the essential ingredient of world consensus can never be successful structures of a world order. Moreover, countries who feel that the

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<sup>36</sup>NOTE: instances where the United Nations intervention was called in to deal with decolonization issues include Togoland, British Cameroon, Kuwait, West Irian, Angola, and others. See Haas, p. 25.



new balance is not representative of their views, they will simply reject it, and a rift will develop between those who have adopted the new balance and those who have not. A new rivalry could then develop between these two groups of nations in the Organization, and action taken by the United Nations would be blocked once again. All nations will have to be given a voice in saying what the new collective worldview will be. As Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali states, "democratization at the national level dictates a corresponding process at the global level. . . .For a global society, it means the democratization of international relations and the participation of all States in developing new norms of international life."<sup>37</sup>

There are concerns that such democratization may be unforthcoming from the United Nations. Many members express concern that the new rivalry between members over differing world order perspectives may actually come to pass. The fear is that the East-West tensions that paralyzed the United Nations may have a successor rivalry developing between the nations of the North and those of the South. Briefly stated, the so-called "North-South" dispute is the result of the disparity between the more "advanced" and economically strong nations of the world (the "Northern" countries) and the less economically strong and less developed nations of the world (the "Southern" Countries). The disparity between these two "worlds" results in conflict when it is charged by the South that existing international political, economic, and social relations are unfairly biased toward the interests of the North. In terms of the United Nations, the dispute is over the decision-making power of the Organization, contained in the Security Council. The claim that could be made by the Southern countries is that the Security Council is structured to give the Northern countries an unfair amount of power in determining policies and actions that the United Nations takes.<sup>38</sup> Acting in accord with its own policies and interests, the North would

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<sup>37</sup> S/PV.3046, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> NOTE: Recall that the Security Council was created by the five major allied powers at the end of World War Two, and was so constructed to give them final authority when acting for the sake of maintaining peace and security. All decisions were ultimately dependant upon the consent of all five of the Allied powers.

use the structure of the Security Council to promote United Nations policies and actions in accord with its own policies and interests.<sup>39</sup>

While such an argument in abstract may not exactly be representative of the current realities, there is agreement among many in the membership that the Security Council as presently constructed ignores the current demographic realities of the membership. As Zimbabwean Prime Minister Shamuyarira pointed out in the January 31 summit meeting between the heads of state of the Security Council members,

The Security Council takes decisions of major importance on behalf of the entire membership of the United Nations. Those decisions should be made representative of the will of the general membership. [Due to increased membership,] clearly the Council has become less representative than it was before, and the question of equitable geographical representation also has to be addressed. One region is clearly overrepresented in the Security Council while Africa and Latin America are not represented at all among the Permanent Members. . . . Zimbabwe believes that the decisions of an expanded and more representative Council would carry more weight.<sup>40</sup>

In order to improve the level of democratic participation and insure that all nations get an equitable say in forming United Nations policies, A number of reforms have been considered. Such possible reforms could include widening permanent membership to include major countries from each geographical location; one seat each for Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.<sup>41</sup> Another reform suggested by William Falk, Professor of International Law at Princeton University, is a rotating permanent member seat--with the

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<sup>39</sup> NOTE: The notion of the Security Council as a monolithic Northern force is not exactly representative of the actual character of the Security Council. While the United States, Britain and France, all three Northern (and Western) countries, enjoy permanent member status, the other two permanent members, Russia and China, are not considered "Northern" countries. Moreover, while the permanent member chairs hold a great degree of power, all votes on substantive matters require a majority of nine, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. However, there is the fear that, given the economic and political power that the North possesses, particularly the United States, the North can utilize this power to pressure Southern countries into complying with their policies. In sum, the North, particularly the United States, possesses the "carrots and sticks" enough to ensure compliance with its policy. See Falk Richard, "Democratizing World Order: A Positive Vision of Global Governance," Speech delivered at St. John's University, September 28, 1992.

<sup>40</sup> S/PV. 3046, p. 129.

<sup>41</sup> Renner interview, p. 26.

benefit of the veto--voted on by the Nobel Academy, and given to a country that has demonstrated outstanding commitment to peace and international law.<sup>42</sup> Another--albeit extreme--reform is the creation of an Economic and Environmental Security Council to deal exclusively with crises and concerns in those areas.<sup>43</sup> This Security Council would be constituted so that overrepresentation by the North would be avoided, and a more democratic and equitable Council could be made. While such a reform is a substantial change for the United Nations, the feeling remains strong that Charter reform is needed in order to improve the representativeness and democracy of the United Nations Security Council. In addition to securing the active participation of all states in designing a new world order to ensure equality in the programs, the enforcement of the strategies should also be non-biased; uniformity of enforcement is also key to the success of any international order.<sup>44</sup> Peacekeeping, collective security, and other missions should be initiated, not according to what the national interests of the few powers dictate, but instead pursuant to the dictates of international law and the binding declarations and decisions of the Organization.<sup>45</sup> The obligation to do so rests squarely on the shoulders of the members of the Organization, particularly the major powers.

### Conclusion

The end of the Cold War has indeed liberated the United Nations in its mandated task to preserve and maintain international peace and security. This freedom has in turn given the world community the opportunity to craft for itself a new world order. The desire that most nations seem to have is that they want to create this order through strengthening the United Nations. Thus, in order to fashion the new order, the world community will have to redefine the balance between state sovereignty and collective

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<sup>42</sup> Falk Speech.

<sup>43</sup>Lewis, Stephen, "A promise Betrayed (interview with Stephen Lewis, former Canadian Ambassador)," World Policy Journal. 8, #3, summer 1991, p. 347.

<sup>44</sup> Renner, p. 29.

<sup>45</sup> S/ PV. 3046 p. 126.

responsibility. To do this, the membership will have to decide for itself whether the benefits to be gained from pledging more of a commitment to collective responsibilities outweighs giving up a certain measure of their sovereignty. Moreover, such a decision must be made freely by each member; world orders cannot be coerced upon the nations of the world. There needs to be participation by all nations and their peoples, so that consensus within the world community on the new balance can be reached. Otherwise, the United Nations in the new era will be doomed to repeat history.

Unfortunately, however, it seems as though the world community is having trouble trying to reach consensus on that new world order. In the section that follows, two post-Cold War crises (ie. problems that have erupted in the post-Cold War period, that are inherently post-Cold War conflicts in nature, and are not related to conflicts before the end of the Cold War) will be examined, crises which embrace the foregoing discussion of the new world order, and prompt the United Nations to formulate definite answers to nagging questions concerning how the United Nations is to develop to meet the challenges in the post-Cold War. The conflicts highlight the difficulties that the United Nations is having in trying to adjust to the new world order, both in formulating a unified vision, and in reinvigorating its apparatus to work towards achieving that vision. In many ways, the United Nations is like an old machine asked to do several new tasks. The old mechanisms must be improved, and old bugs must be worked out, while new mechanisms must be added in order to perform the job. The United Nations must be earnest in its desire to improve itself for the sake of maintaining peace and security, if it is to truly fashion a new world order.

## THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

In their annual report on the issues before the United Nations, John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson state, "no United Nations initiative to resolve a conflict has highlighted as many problems of the new world order as has the situation in the former Yugoslavia."<sup>1</sup> Their observation holds much validity. For it is in the Balkans that the toughest test of the United Nations' ability to address threats to international peace and security, and its use of peacekeeping forces, has come. The Security Council recognizes this as well; some of its members have said that "the question of the present situation in Yugoslavia has acquired special significance, because, in the context of the major changes now taking place in the international scene, it provides... an example of the new type of problems that will face the United Nations in the last decade of the 20th Century and thereafter."<sup>2</sup> The Yugoslav crisis is important because most all of the aspects concerning visions of a new world order and new peacekeeping roles are at issue in the crisis. The central concern of sovereignty is present, seen in early Security Council debate over whether or not the United Nations has authority to intervene in a conflict that began as a civil war, and is also seen in the debate over whether or not to send armed escorts for humanitarian aid convoys to the region. The crisis demonstrates the exact limitations of peacekeeping, showing also the problems and tragedies that can occur if peacekeeping is made to do more than it is capable of. The complexity of the conflict and the absence of any simple solution exposes both the need for the world community to improve its response apparatus for dealing with conflicts between conflicting parties, as well as a clear and defined role in the conflict, be it as a mediator, or as an enforcer, of peace. And, the fact that the crisis remains as yet unsettled demonstrates the need for more political will and collective resolution on the part of the membership to settle the conflict, no matter how difficult.

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations Association of the United States of America, A Global Agenda: issues Before the General Assembly of the United Nations, John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson, eds.. (Lanham, New York, and London: University Press of America, 1992), p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3009th Meeting, S/PV/3009, p.33.

## Background to Conflict

The Balkan crisis represents the epitome of the "new era" of conflict envisioned in the post-Cold War era: the rise and spread of separatist-nationalist movements that fragment existing states, pitting region against region in a struggle for self-determination and sovereignty. In the former Yugoslav republics, the fervor of ethnic identity serves as the primary fuel for the separatist urge, and also explains the extreme violence that characterizes the conflict. For, in the contested regions, there exist ethnic tensions and animosities whose history is long, bitter, and exceedingly complex. The end of the Cold War and the decline of Communist hegemony in the region have served to awaken these ethnic tensions, for so long suppressed under the strong Yugoslav leadership.

The history of the region is one that tracks ethnic rivalries and disputes that have lasted for hundreds of years. These historical disputes in turn are used by the ethnic groups in the region as precedent, justifying each new round of violence. Thus, although the roots of conflict between the diverse ethnic populations go back hundreds of years, the background to the present crisis begins with the end of the First World War. The Federation of Yugoslavia was the creation of the 1918 Armistice and Paris Peace Treaty, which placed an arbitrary border around an amalgamation of several ethnic populations, who were still reeling from the rapid shifts of rulership that came about with the end of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>3</sup> In the interim years between world wars, an uneasy peace was kept, but tension was still present. In the Second World War, these tensions rose again as ethnic groups squared off against one another, allying themselves with either side in an attempt to gain dominance over the other groups in the region. The Croat Yugoslavs aligned themselves with the Nazi occupation forces, while Serbian Partisan guerrillas were aligned with the allies, particularly the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> In the War, the fighting between the two groups was bloody and fierce; atrocities committed by both sides against one another created a fanatical enmity

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<sup>3</sup> Gati, Charles, "From Sarajevo to Sarajevo," Foreign Affairs, v.71, Fall 1992, p. 689.

<sup>4</sup> Gagnon, V.P. Jr., "Yugoslavia: Prospects for Stability" Foreign Affairs v. 70, no.3, Summer 1991, p. 20.

between them.<sup>5</sup> With the end of the War and defeat of the Nazis came the victory of the Russian-backed Serbians and the subsequent rule of Communism, subjugating any separatist claims by the ethnic groups under the rule of one man, Marshall Tito. Throughout the Cold War, strong rule by Tito and his Communist party ensured peace and stability; by decentralizing the governmental structure and allowing the republics a measure of autonomy while keeping a firm hold of power, the Communist party was able to maintain control.<sup>6</sup>

The passing of Marshall Tito in 1980, however, portended the coming of problems. The importance of a strong ruler for the governing of Yugoslavia became apparent after Tito's death when the Communist party government began to lose control of power, particularly in the outer republics.<sup>7</sup> The weak Yugoslav economy demanded reform, but half-hearted measures and balking by regional governments hobbled these efforts. Serbia, the strongest and largest republic in the federation and headed by Slobodon Milosevic, moved to dominate the central federal government and use the central authority to restore order. However, Milosevic's strong Serbian nationalist policies and disdain for the other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia were widely unpopular outside Serbia, and his moves to dominate the central government were further resisted by the other republics. The unraveling of the Republic became openly evident when the 14th League of Communists in Yugoslavia (LCY) was convened in 1988. At the Congress, a showdown arose between regions demanding reform and the hard-line Communist party members. Failing an agreement, the Slovenian delegation walked out, as did the delegation from Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>8</sup> By mid-1988, the tensions began to build between the republics for more reform, and those pressing for hard-line policies. The line was drawn between the republics of Slovenia, Croatia,

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<sup>5</sup> NOTE: Such acts of hatred committed during the war would become justification in the current crisis for renewed acts of atrocity against one another. This follows the pattern followed by the ethnic groups throughout the history of the region, a pattern where the ethnic groups use past injustices against them to justify their present acts of violence. See Gati, p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> Gagnon, p. 20.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 20

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 22.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia on one hand, and Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro on the other.<sup>9</sup> Serbia, using the power that came with being the largest of the republics as well as the seat of Federal government, attempted to keep a unified republic through the use of fear inspired by the Serb-dominated Yugoslavian National Army (JNA).<sup>10</sup>

The situation soon became explosive. The republics of Croatia and Slovenia became more reform-minded, and began to ignore the decrees of the Serb-dominated federal government, moving more and more toward a break from federal rule. The republics of Bosnia and Macedonia, who initially were for keeping the republic unified, stated that they too would break away if Croatia and Slovenia did so. Their hesitancy was due to the fact that, if separation did come, they would have a harder time of it than Croatia or Slovenia would; the tiny Macedonia would certainly face an unstoppable annexation by Serbia if it tried to separate, and Bosnia had a much larger percentage of Serbians in its region--roughly one-third.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, in May 1991, Slovenia declared free elections and independence from the republic of Yugoslavia. Croatia followed suit shortly thereafter, and in February of 1992, Bosnia did the same.

### **Croatia and Slovenia**

With the first two republics declaring their independence, the crisis soon turned violent toward the late summer of 1991. Serbian enclaves in the breakaway republics rose up against the new governments, fearing that the new governments would mean oppression for them, a Serbian minority. They aligned themselves with the Serbian republic, heeding Slobodon Milosevic and his call for Serbian unity and a Yugoslav Federation dominated by Serbia. Milosevic aided the revolting enclaves, providing them with arms and materiel for their fight, and dispatching the JNA to assist directly in the fighting. Units in Slovenia and Croatia engaged the Serb enclaves, attempting to halt their attempt to take back the republic territory

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 29.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 26.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 28.



and turn it into an independent Serb state within the republics. Slovenia, the republic furthest away from Serbia and the most homogeneous of the republics (composed of almost 90 percent ethnic Slovenians), had the least difficulty in consolidating its independence. the battleground instead became Croatia. The Serb enclaves in Croatia, aided by the JNA, moved to consolidate their own breakaway republics and seize as much of the breakaway territory as possible before an agreement and cease-fire could be reached.<sup>12</sup> Fighting in Croatia continued throughout the rest of 1991.

### United Nations Action

Initially, the response by the world community was stalled by debate over the issue of United Nations authority in the region, which brought in the issue of sovereignty. According to the Charter's definition of what a threat to international peace and security embodies, the Yugoslav crisis was not officially an international crisis; it was still an internal civil war. Those who claimed that the crisis was internal and therefore outside the purview of United Nations intervention cited Article 2 Paragraph 7 of the Charter: "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state."<sup>13</sup> In addition, there were warnings by some member states to avoid unwarranted and unwanted intervention by the United Nations; the delegate from Romania, Representative Nastase, stated,

history teaches us that imposed solutions cannot last, irrespective of the intentions of their sponsors. . . .The only wise stand consonant both with the interests of all the Yugoslav peoples and with the objectives and common interests of the whole of Europe is a stand that takes fully into account the vital interests of Yugoslavia. Such a simple truth must not be ignored within the United Nations.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> "Wreckognition," Economist, V. 322, 18 Jan. 1992, p. 44.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Charter, Article II, Par. 7.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3009th meeting, S/PV/ 3009, p. 42.

For the United Nations to interfere in a civil war without the consent of the recognized government would not only be in violation of the Charter, it would be potentially detrimental to the peace process for the region. Any solution that the United Nations came up with without the express invitation to do so by the state would be an imposed solution, which would not work. But other members, particularly the European members, claimed that it did indeed pose a threat to peace and security in the region, and that the war was affecting stability in the region. In particular, the European Community cited the refugee problem that the region faced due to the fighting.<sup>15</sup>

It was under this cloud of controversy that the United Nations began to respond to the crisis. The first step by the Security Council was to pass a resolution voicing active concern for the crisis and calling for an arms embargo for the disputing areas.<sup>16</sup> The United Nations also set up a working relationship with the European Community, the regional organization that was also involved in trying to settle the conflict. The Europeans would handle the diplomatic effort to settle the conflict, while the United Nations would provide any peacekeeping or monitoring personnel--if a mission were called for.<sup>17</sup> Efforts to restore the peace continued throughout the rest of 1991 and into 1992. Meanwhile, the fighting continued between the Croats and the Serbs, killing hundreds and displacing as many as 600,000 persons by some estimates.<sup>18</sup> While the European Community representative Lord Carrington sought a peaceful settlement, the Security Council prepared a peacekeeping force, asking the Secretary-General to submit plans for a mission in the contested regions of Croatia.<sup>19</sup> The plans were soon developed; all that remained for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was an agreement by both sides to a cease-fire. After agreement by both sides had

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<sup>15</sup> Tessitore and Woolfson, p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 713 (1991) S/RES/713 (1991).

<sup>17</sup> Tessitore and Woolfson, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Economist, 18 Jan. 1992, p. 44.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 721 (1991), S/RES/721, (1991).

been met, the Security Council officially passed, Resolution 743, which officially deployed UNPROFOR.<sup>20</sup>

UNPROFOR's mandate was a substantial one. It called for the deployment of 13,340 military personnel, 530 police personnel, and 519 civilian specialists into the three principal disputed regions: the Krajina, Eastern Slavonia, and Western Slavonia.<sup>21</sup> The force was to be an "interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement."<sup>22</sup> To achieve this, the force was to do the following: 1) establish United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the three disputed areas and monitor access to these regions, 2) supervise the disarming of the Serb enclaves and in turn ensure against attacks from Croatian units, 3) monitor and verify the withdrawal of all JNA regular troops from Croatian territory, 4) provide temporary police forces while assisting in the reformation of the existing police assets to achieve an equitable ethnic balance, 5) return displaced persons to their homes.<sup>23</sup> The cost for the mission totaled \$624 million for the first six months, \$41.2 million in maintenance fees for each month thereafter.<sup>24</sup> On January 8, 1992, the Council voted to begin deployment of the first units; by May it was fully deployed.

#### UNPROFOR Performance

The United Nations has run into difficulties that are inhibiting its ability to fulfill the mandate. Cease-fires have occasionally been broken by Croat and Serb units alike. Serb units have been slow to comply with the disarmament; Serb leaders, particularly Milan Babic, Serbian leader of the Krajina region, initially refused to disarm, fearing reprisals by Croat units attempting to retrieve some of their land lost in the battle.<sup>25</sup> But more

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<sup>20</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 743 (1992), S/RES/743, (1992).

<sup>21</sup> United Nations, Security Council, S/23592/add. 1, p.1.

<sup>22</sup> S/RES/743 (1992).

<sup>23</sup> United Nations, Secretariat, [ST/] DP 1/1257, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup> S/23592/add. 1, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> Economist, 18 Jan. 1992, p. 44.

disturbing are the attacks taking place on the peacekeepers themselves, as the January 7, 1992 downing of the United Nations Observer Team helicopter illustrates.<sup>26</sup> The thinking is that the attack was an attempt by rogue officers--it is unclear as to which side--to torpedo the peacekeeping mission and allow for the fight to continue.<sup>27</sup> But the peacekeepers have also found themselves victim to attacks because they were thought to be aiding the other side in the conflict. Such attacks on peacekeeping forces highlights the difficulty with which the peacekeeping force has met in trying to project a neutral image. This is difficult to do, for, as noted earlier, the maintenance of a cease fire might sometimes be inherently beneficial for one side or another. In this instance, the Croats, who did not want the cease-fire because it would only legitimize the land lost to the Serbs, would be angry with the peacekeepers and try to dissuade them from achieving their objectives. As for the Serbs, they would be angry because they would see the cease-fire as a legitimization of the unlawful annexation of Croatia from the central Yugoslav state.

However, there is the more fundamental question of whether or not the United Nations is actually neutral at all. In the crisis, neutrality has been hard to maintain due to some of the actions taken both by the units from the Serb enclaves and Milosevic's JNA, which have polarized world opinion against the Serbians. Reports of "ethnic cleansing" in the Serb-held regions, where the Serbs clear out any non-Serb populations from the region, have made several members of the world Organization point the finger at Serbia and the Serbs as the principal antagonists in the conflict.<sup>28</sup> Serbia is also blamed for continuing the hostilities in its "land grab," claiming as much of the Croatian republic as possible and consolidate it. While the Security Council resolutions have called for both sides to end the conflict, they have been increasingly termed against the Serbs, condemning them for not complying with the Council resolutions. In its most substantive resolution on the crisis, the Council endorsed provisions for economic and diplomatic sanctions against the government in Belgrade. With the stronger stance

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<sup>26</sup> "Brave Peacekeepers" Economist, 11 Jan. 1992, p. 12.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* p. 12.

<sup>28</sup> Economist, 18 Jan, 1992, p.42.

against one side in the conflict, the exact role of the United Nations has become blurred; it is no longer clear whether the Organization is involved as a non-partisan mediator or instead as a partisan enforcer of peace, aligned against Serbian aggression.<sup>29</sup>

Other actions by the Security Council have contributed to the confusion on this point. In May of 1992, the Council followed the European Community's lead and officially recognized the republics of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, accepting them as sovereign members into the United Nations.<sup>30</sup> While the recognition effectively ended the issue regarding whether the conflict was merely an internal affair, it caused confusion over what the exact role of the United Nations was in the situation. The recognition was a political act meant to demonstrate United Nations support for the republics of Croatia, Bosnia, and Slovenia, and also to warn Serbia against further aggression. But in doing so the Organization shifted its stance toward a more adversarial role with Serbia. There is even doubt that all three countries actually met the requirements for admittance. Robert Bodinter, president of the French Constitutional Court, pointed out that, of the three, only Slovenia actually qualified for admission.<sup>31</sup> The Zimbabwean delegation also expressed its annoyance with the Council's acceptance, believing that the official recognition of the countries would come only as part of an overall peace settlement, and that the Council's vote forced the Organization into a premature acceptance.<sup>32</sup> It could be asked whether the Organization was still acting as a neutral mediator or more as a collective

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<sup>29</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 757 (1992), S/RES/757 (1992). NOTE: Resolution 757 also condemns the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro (the rump Yugoslav republic) for not complying with the statements in Resolution 752, which demands an end to all fighting in the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While these resolutions concern Bosnia and Herzegovina, the point remains that the United Nations is beginning to view Serbia and the ethnic Serbians as principal aggressors, thus losing their non-partisan role.

<sup>30</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolutions 736-738 (1992), S/RES/736-738 (1992).

<sup>31</sup> Economist, 11 Jan. 1992, p.49. NOTE: Requirements that Mr. Bodinter cite include compliance with international standards for human rights, the requirement for a single, bordered territory, and a definite population under undivided control of one government.

<sup>32</sup>NOTE: although a cease-fire had been reached in Croatia and Slovenia, a permanent peace plan was yet to be decided; the recognition was unilateral by the U.N. and the E.C., without consent by the federal government in Belgrade and was therefore forced upon the Serbian dominated republic. As for Bosnia, there was not even a cease-fire.

group against Serbian aggression. If the former, the recognition was indeed premature; Serbia would see the United Nations as pro-Croatian and Slovenian, and the diplomatic process would suffer because of Serbian loss of confidence in the United Nations as mediator. More importantly, the peacekeepers would become targets instead of observers for Serbians who now see the world community as an enemy pitted against them.

Despite this, UNPROFOR has remained in Croatia. Its efforts have kept an uneasy peace, but attacks still occur. Recently, fighting has erupted, this time due to aggression by Croatian units attempting to regain lost land from the Serbs.<sup>33</sup> The Secretary General has sometimes noted that, because of the continued violence and the resulting danger to peacekeeping, it may be necessary to withdraw the troops. But many feel that the United Nations must not lose the achievement that it has made.

### **Bosnia-Herzegovina**

While there have been some problems with United Nations action in Croatia, they pale in comparison to the nightmare in the republic to its east, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Just as the agreements for a cease-fire and the implementation of a peacekeeping mission were being made, Bosnia declared its independence from the Yugoslav Federation in February of 1992.<sup>34</sup> Serb militias in Bosnia, backed by Milosevic's JNA, responded by staging attacks on the breakaway region. Most notably, Serbian units began an offensive on April 1, breaking a cease-fire agreed to by the disputing parties in the region.<sup>35</sup> The attack came just days before the official recognition by the EC of Bosnia, and was launched by Serb militias in an attempt to gain as much land as possible before the recognition came. Since April, an intense war between the JNA-backed militias of 1.5 million Serbians and the 1.9 million Muslim Slav majority has raged in Bosnia, forcing the flight of hundreds of thousand Bosnian people, destroying entire towns, and laying

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<sup>33</sup> Cable News Network, 2 January, 1993.

<sup>34</sup> Sudatec, Chuck, "Serbs Attack Muslim Slavs and Croats in Bosnia," New York Times, 4 April 1992, A1.

<sup>35</sup> -----"Breaking Ceasefire, Serbs Launch Attacks into Bosnia," New York Times, 15 April 1992, A6.

siege to the Bosnian capitol of Sarajevo.<sup>36</sup> In addition, the 750,000 Croatian Bosnians have joined the fray, and are attempting to claim as their own the remaining 15 percent of the Bosnian territory not claimed or held by the Serbian Bosnians.<sup>37</sup>

The reports of devastation are grim. In their move to annex as much of Bosnia as possible, the Serbian units have destroyed numerous villages and cities, killing an estimated 100,000 people<sup>38</sup> and displacing internally and externally as many as 1.5 million.<sup>39</sup> In addition, numerous acts of atrocity have repeatedly been reported from both Bosnian government officials, as well as the several news services. Reports of ethnic cleansing are surfacing daily. Charges of summary executions of Muslim Slavs by Serbian units are also surfacing, including one report of an execution of 47 Muslim Slav refugees in a bus from the town of Ahatovici.<sup>40</sup> Reports in July and August of Serbian-run "concentration camps" containing undisclosed numbers of starving, beaten Bosnians further polarized world opinion and prompted the dispatch of Red Cross inspection teams to survey the suspect camps.<sup>41</sup> There have also been reports of as many as 50,000 women and children raped, several hundreds killed shortly thereafter.<sup>42</sup> For the most part, it seems as though the Bosnian military can do nothing about these atrocities. Unlike the conflict in Croatia, where the odds were more even on the battlefield,

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Lane, Charles "Now, A Second Front," *Newsweek*, 2 November, 1992, pp. 60-61.

<sup>38</sup> Whitney, Craig, "Bosnian Official Says Serbs Have Killed 100,000" *New York Times*, 14 November, 1992, p. I5.

<sup>39</sup> Lewis, Flora, "Save Lives in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 9 November, 1992, p. A 17.

<sup>40</sup> Burns, John, "Bosnian Survivors Recount Brutality and Mass Slayings," *New York Times*, 21 June, 1992, p. I 6.

<sup>41</sup> Engelberg, Stephen, "Red Cross Seeking Speedy Access to Serbian Concentration Camps," *New York Times*, 3 August, 1992, p.A 6.

<sup>42</sup> Post, Tom, "A Pattern of Rape," *Newsweek*, 4 January, 1993, pp. 32-36. NOTE: These figures are from the Bosnian Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, while there has been no explicit public statement of policy by either the Serbian leadership or the Ethnic Serbians in Bosnia, there is strong reason to believe that the unofficial policy propagated in the Serbian ranks is to carry out a campaign of rape, where Serb soldiers are ordered by their commanding officers to commit rape against the Muslim Bosnians.

Bosnia does not have the military resources to repel the Serb offensive, or even to defend itself adequately. The daily drama in the Bosnian capitol of Sarajevo, where the citizenry is shot at daily and has to do without food, electricity, water, or sufficient medical care, symbolizes Bosnian helplessness. As was reported in The New York Times on May 12, 1992, the fighting will not end until the parties have exhausted themselves.<sup>43</sup> The only salvation, many agree, will have to come from outside intervention. Repeatedly, the Bosnian government has turned to the United Nations and the other international international organizations for intervention that will halt the Serbian aggression. But, the intervention that they seek has remained unforthcoming.

### United Nations Action

The position that the United Nations finds itself in is to say the least, difficult. The Headquarters for UNPROFOR, located in Sarajevo, had to withdraw when it became evident that the city--indeed the whole republic--was too dangerous.<sup>44</sup> Since then, the possibility for a peacekeeping force for Bosnia has been ruled out. In the meantime, the United Nations has attempted half-measures to try to aid the stricken nation. On June 9, the Security Council voted to expand the UNPROFOR mission and send an additional 1,100 troops into Sarajevo in an attempt to secure a cease-fire around the airport, so that relief shipments could land.<sup>45</sup> Shortly after, a 750-man Canadian mechanized infantry unit was deployed at the airport, and did initially secure it. However, the airport has been forced closed numerous times since then due to shelling, sniper fire, and fighting occurring around the airport. The United Nations has also attempted humanitarian aid relief convoys to deliver supplies to the outlying regions but have repeatedly been denied access. Meanwhile, the peacekeeping forces have been attacked by

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<sup>43</sup>Burns, John, "Pessimism is Overshadowing Hope in Effort to End Yugoslav Fighting," New York Times, 12 May, 1992, p. A 1.

<sup>44</sup> -----"After Bosnia Peacekeepers Weigh Their Purpose," New York Times, 19 May, 1992, p. A 1.

<sup>45</sup> Prial, Frank, "U.N. Council acts on Bosnian Airport," New York Times, 10 June, 1992, p. A 11.



both sides. On one side are the Serbs, who do not want the relief shipments to get through because they want to force the Slavs out, by starvation if necessary; they also think that the United Nations is secretly providing military aid to the Bosnian units. On the other side are the Bosnians, who think that the United Nations is being soft on the Serbs, and actually aiding their side by doing nothing to stop the shelling, the ethnic cleansing, or any of the other atrocities committed against the Bosnians. That leaves the tenuous peacekeeping role in Sarajevo in a difficult position, trying in vain to appear neutral when anything it does is condemned by both sides.<sup>46</sup>

The situation highlights the limit to what peacekeeping can do. Without a lasting cease-fire agreement by all parties to conflict and a corresponding acceptance of a peacekeeping operation, a force cannot be effectively implemented. A United Nations presence that is agreed to, as well as a clear and supported mandate, is essential for peacekeeping. Such agreement has not been possible because no middle ground can be reached. On one side, the Serbians would object to a force because, being the stronger side in the war, they could achieve their objectives without a peacekeeping force. If they were to agree to one at all, it would be as a weak force, without the power to stop Serbian advances. On the other side, the Bosnians would object to a peacekeeping force that the Serbians would agree to, wanting instead a strong force to stop Serbian aggression, or ideally, an collective security force tasked to expel the Serbians from their advances. Without such a middle ground, the requisite support and consent for a peacekeeping force will not be given. Diplomats have also pointed out other reasons: the mandate and deployment would be prohibitively complex, and the size and cost would be too high for the present capability of the United Nations resources. As it is, the United Nations is alarmingly short of funds for the peacekeeping missions requested of it. Also, given the advances that the Serbian enclaves have made in carving out pieces of Bosnia, many point out that reaching an agreement now could in effect let most of the gains stand, sanctified by a treaty.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Burns, John, "In the Middle, Under Attack," New York Times, 3 July 1992, p. A 8.

<sup>47</sup> Sudetec, Chuck, "A U.N. Aid escort in Bosnia is Urged," New York Times, 11 May, 1992, p. A 2.

On the diplomatic front, such agreement is unforthcoming. Several rounds of negotiation have passed, without any lasting cease-fire to show for it. The current plan for settlement, where Bosnia would be divided up into ten autonomous regions, was rejected by the parties in Geneva in January of 1993.<sup>48</sup> Some, such as Lord Carrington, head of the European Community diplomatic mission to reach an agreement, have given up in frustration. Indeed, some diplomats state, "some persisting disputes are simply not amenable to resolution by the United Nations because the parties involved do not want to settle their differences and stop fighting."<sup>49</sup> The role of the United States and the European Community has often reflected the frustration it feels about the crisis; at one point the United States gave up their role at finding a solution "in anger and frustration."<sup>50</sup> Under the Clinton Administration, however, the United States policy is warming back up to the diplomatic effort; in his foreign policy statement on Yugoslavia, made February 12, 1993, Clinton pledged commitment to searching for a diplomatic peace to the conflict, and endorsed the European Community/United Nations plan to divide Bosnia up into ten autonomous regions.<sup>51</sup> But, for now, there seems to be no breakthrough for the peace plan.

While a lasting settlement seems stalled, the United Nations has attempted other efforts to initiate a limited peacekeeping force. One such effort that the United Nations has made consists of a United Nations Monitoring Force, assigned as part of a cease-fire effort to monitor all heavy guns and artillery units involved in the combat.<sup>52</sup> The force caused controversy in the Organization; Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali objected to it on procedural grounds, claiming that it was a regional

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<sup>48</sup> Cable News Network, Broadcast January 12, 1993. NOTE: More recent talks between the Muslims, Croats, and Bosnians have brought hope that the Vance-Owen Plan, the plan dividing Bosnia into the ten provinces. Presently, however, final agreement has not yet been reached, due to ethnic Serbian complaints over the plan.

<sup>49</sup> Sudetec, Chuck, "U.N. Chief Rules Out Role for Peace Force in Bosnia," New York Times, 14 May, p. A 12.

<sup>50</sup> New York Times, 5 May, 1992, p. A 10.

<sup>51</sup> Cable News Network, 12 February, 1993.

<sup>52</sup> United Nations, Security Council, S/24333, p.1.

organization initiative that circumvented the Secretariat and left him "out of the loop."<sup>53</sup> But the Secretary-General also objected for reasons that reiterate the difficulty in establishing peacekeeping for the crisis:

... it is well established that certain conditions have to exist before a successful peacekeeping operation can be established. These include the consent and cooperation of the parties and a practicable mandate. Neither exists in the present case. . . .Fourthly, the additional function which UNPROFOR is asked to assume is simply beyond the present operational and logistical capability of the United Nations. UNPROFOR is already stretched to the breaking point, with severe shortages of civilian personnel and of almost all categories of equipment. . . .In spite of repeated requests to the General Assembly, the Secretary General has not been authorized to establish a reserve stock of basic peace-keeping equipment which would enable me to respond quickly to requirements of this kind. . . .I am advised that in these circumstances it would take at least three months to deploy all the personnel and equipment required to implement the Force Commander's concept. There is reason to doubt whether the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina would respect the cease-fire for so long a period without their heavy weapons being supervised.<sup>54</sup>

Nonetheless, the force was initiated (with EC financial assistance to back-stop the United Nations shortfall), and on June 26 the warring parties were given 48 hours to relinquish their heavy guns. However, the Serbs balked at doing so and continued the shelling of Sarajevo.<sup>55</sup> It was only after intense pressure and tightening sanctions that brought the Serbs to compliance.<sup>56</sup> Still, the force has not been effective; not all the guns have been collected (as the continued shelling in Sarajevo attests to) and oftentimes, the collection depots are looted, the guns stolen.

The humanitarian crisis in Bosnia has prompted more serious action by the Security Council--action which again brings up the difficulty that the Organization has had in defining its exact role in the Bosnian crisis. Responding to the many reports of starvation compounded by the effects of winter, European Community and United States leaders pushed in the

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<sup>53</sup> Faison, Seth, "U.N. Chief Mired In Dispute with Security Council," *New York Times*, 24 July, 1992, p. A1.

<sup>54</sup> S/24333, p. 3-4.

<sup>55</sup> Burns, John, "Serbs Defy Ultimatum From U.N. and Persist in Shelling Sarajevo," 28 June, 1992, p. 11.

<sup>56</sup> Whitney, Craig, "Factions in Bosnia Accept U.N. Custody of Weapons," *New York Times*, 18 July, 1992, p. A 4.

Security Council for a humanitarian aid escort force to combat the seizure of the United Nations relief convoys.<sup>57</sup> The resolution, acting under Chapter VII, Article 43 provisions (the provisions which sanction a collective security force), sanctions the use of "all necessary measures" to preserve the safe delivery of the humanitarian aid to the stricken regions in Bosnia.<sup>58</sup> On September 11, the addition of 5,000 troops contributed by the NATO Alliance was formally announced, tasked with the protection of the relief convoys.<sup>59</sup> The force represents the strongest action to date by the United Nations, and may signal a possible future arrangement between the United Nations and the regional organizations for the supply and financing of peacekeeping operations. But this measure, too, has its limitations. The mandate of the force is limited strictly to the safe delivery of supplies, and does nothing to keep the peace. Notes Mohammed Sacirbey, Bosnian representative to the United Nations, it is "at best only an attempt to deal marginally with the symptoms of this illness, and only with the symptoms."<sup>60</sup> Without a more permanent solution, the force could have to perform its duty for an indefinite period of time in a constantly hostile environment, most probably at great expense. This is because of the fact that protection inevitably means having to defend against attempts at seizure, which then means violence. The United Nations at this point then becomes not a mediator, but a party to conflict. Evidently this is not a scenario that the Organization wishes; the convoys continue to be blocked and interfered with, while the United Nations is left to do nothing but accept it.

### Collective Security instead of Peacekeeping?

The World Community's failures to bring about peace or even relief to Bosnia seems to beg the basic question of what exactly the role of the United

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<sup>57</sup>Lewis, Paul, "U.N. Council Votes to Support Force in Assisting Bosnia," 14 August 1992, p. A1.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Burns, John, "U.N. Will Add NATO Troops To Bosnia Force," New York Times, September 11, 1992, p. A 10.

<sup>60</sup>New York Times, 14 August, 1992, p.A 6.

Nations is in the crisis, whether it be as a neutral mediator or as an enforcer of peace against an identified aggressor. The call for collective security action in Bosnia has been made throughout the past year, most desperately by the Bosnians themselves. The Secretary-General himself has noted that all observers in the crisis have identified the ethnic Serbs in Bosnia as the principal aggressors.<sup>61</sup> But the Belgrade government is also blamed; as one report puts it, "there is no doubt that the principal responsibility lies with the civil and military authorities in Belgrade. Multiple rocket launchers are not found in Serbian peasants' barns. Somebody puts them there."<sup>62</sup> As former Prime Minister of Britain Margaret Thatcher has stated, "Serbia will not listen until forced to listen. Only the prospect of resistance and defeat will lead to the rise of a more democratic and peaceful leadership."<sup>63</sup> The resulting action by the United Nations has reflected the condemnation of Serbia; the sanctions against Serbia, the humanitarian aid convoys, and the new "no fly zone" over Bosnia to prohibit Serbian air strikes against Bosnian targets reflect a bent more towards a collective security solution.<sup>64</sup> Further condemning actions include the expulsion of the Yugoslav seat in the United Nations, previously occupied by a representative from the rump Yugoslav government in Belgrade.<sup>65</sup> But these actions, while of a more harsh flavor, are only half measures, caught somewhere between neutrality and collective condemnation, leaving the exact role of the United Nations blurred and confused.

So what if the role of the United Nations were defined in terms of a collective security response against Serbian aggression in the sovereign

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<sup>61</sup> Tessitore and Woolfson, p. 9.

<sup>62</sup> Lewis, Paul, "U.N. Votes 13-0 for Embargo on Trade With Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 31 May, 1992.

<sup>63</sup> Thatcher, Margaret, "Stop the Excuses. Help Bosnia Now," *New York Times*, op ed article, 6 August 1992, p. A 23.

<sup>64</sup> Rosenthal, Andrew, "U.S. May Be Ready to Discuss Ban on Warplanes Over Bosnia," *New York Times*, 23 September, 1992, p. A 14. NOTE: While the "no fly zone" was voted for, there still remains no will to enforce it; talks continue between Western states over the question of enforcement, but to date there has been no official agreement to enforce.

<sup>65</sup> Burns, John "U.N. Assembly Expels Belgrade Over Its Role in Bosnia Fighting," *New York Times*, 23 September, 1992, p. A 1.

nation of Bosnia? The next logical step for the United Nations would be to demand withdrawal of Bosnian-Serbian militia forces from all territories they seized before the official declaration of independence by the government of Bosnia. The United Nations would also require the return of any Serbian advances into the territory of Bosnia. Demands would also include cessation of support of the Bosnian Serbs by the Serbian government in Belgrade, guarantees of safe passage of relief convoys and the return of all displaced Muslim Slavs due to ethnic cleansing to their homelands, and the demilitarization of Bosnia.<sup>66</sup> Failure to comply, and continued violence, would immediately activate the Article 43 provisions sanctioning the use any means available to ensure the compliance by Serbia and Bosnian Serbs with the resolutions laying out Council demands.<sup>67</sup> Through either a multinational United Nations force or a United Nations-sanctioned coalition force, the Serbians and Bosnian Serbs would be forcibly ejected from the taken territory.

Such a response seems attractive in many ways. Provided that the force is successful, the resolutions would have indeed been met; the Bosnian land would be reclaimed, the assault on the Bosnian population would be halted, relief to the region would finally come, and the displaced would be able to return home. Moreover, the threat of a widening crisis, which would have threatened had world intervention not put a stop to the Serbian aggression, would then be avoided. Symbolically, the United Nations would have sent a strong signal to other regions that threaten a similar situation that such aggression would not be tolerated.<sup>68</sup>

But there are many problems and difficulties which would make it difficult for the Organization to opt for the collective security option. Any force designed to repel and expel the Serbs from Bosnian land will inevitably have to be large and expensive. The task would not only be costly in terms of money, but in lives as well--perhaps unacceptably so. It would also face a

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<sup>66</sup> Thatcher, op ed article, p. A 23.

<sup>67</sup> NOTE: The same action would conceivable hold true for the Croat forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina who are attempting, just as the Serbs have done, to annex as much of the Bosnian Territory as possible.

<sup>68</sup> NOTE: other regions include the Nagorno-Karabakh region in the Azerbaijan region of the Former Soviet Union, as well as Moldavia, and Ossetia, also in the former Soviet regions.

highly complex campaign; since the force cannot expel all ethnic Serbs from the region, it would have to fight on a difficult and patchy battlefield, pushing the Serbs back along unconventional fronts and into complex pre-war positions, inevitably forcing some Serbs out of areas that were originally theirs. There is the fear by many nations that the offensive would quickly become mired while trying to fight a difficult battle, resulting in a "Vietnam-type" scenario. In addition, even if the Serbs were stopped, there would be a long, drawn out post war period of re-integration, where the ethnic groups returned to their homes. During this period, rage on both sides could result in further violence, prompting the need for an extended, substantial United Nations presence to try to enforce the peace. Presently, these problems are keeping the World Community from taking such action. Moreover, the United Nations is simply not equipped to handle such an operation. The mechanisms for a United Nations force are unused and underdeveloped. Because of this, the burden of creating such a force would fall to the United States and Europe, in the same way it did in the Gulf War. But the prospects of a long, drawn out conflict costing billions of dollars and thousands of lives has checked US or EC enthusiasm for a collective security force.<sup>69</sup>

But there may be a more fundamental reason that prevents an extensive outside involvement. It could be argued that the situation is inherently intractable, completely hostile to the possibility of a peaceful and lasting settlement initiated from outside, whether it be by mediation or by force. The ferocity of ethnic animosities in the region is alarming to all mediators involved. The animosities between the ethnic groups seem to come from a deep-seated drive to seek revenge for past injustices committed, injustices which will never be forgotten. As Daniel Nelson, Professor of Russian Studies at Georgetown University, has noted, "in Yugoslavia we have 12,000 dead people as martyrs for the next generation."<sup>70</sup> Moreover, Mark Kramer, a Fellow at Harvard University's Russian Research Center, states,

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<sup>69</sup> Rosenthal, Andrew, "Bush and the U.N. Fail to Fix Accord on Balkans," New York Times 9 August, 1992, p. A 1.

<sup>70</sup> Crosette, Barb, "Failure of New Order: Painful Questions on Yugoslavia," New York Times, 15 May, 1992, p. A 1.

Many people and organizations hoped to get involved and settle things promptly. What they found was all their best efforts were for naught. It is a classic case of conflict between ethnic groups whose main desire is to kill one another. It is not amenable to outside mediation. A military solution would have required substantial commitment and the willingness to endure casualties. People aren't willing to pay that price.<sup>71</sup>

The idea of a strong military presence becomes even more unpalatable when considering the possibility that, in sum, that presence will not have solved anything except to forestall all-out fighting until it leaves--and suffer casualties from the cross-fire until it does.

So if an all-out, collective security force is out of the question, there also remains the option of lesser offensive measures used to deter further Serb aggression. The convoy escorts are such an example; the "no fly zone" is another.<sup>72</sup> Other suggestions include the establishment of "humanitarian safe zones," demilitarized regions where fighting would be prohibited.<sup>73</sup> Another idea is the establishment of a campaign of limited strikes against Serb units, thereby "levelling the playing field" for the Bosnians.<sup>74</sup> But the limited collective security option, too, has problems. Colin Powell, United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, points out the flaws to such a response. Powell expresses doubt about actions such as the "no fly zone" and the use of limited air strikes to try to force Serb compliance. Specifically, Powell questions the effectiveness of using limited military means to achieve ambiguous political objectives. Powell argues, "you must begin with a clear understanding of what political objective is being achieved. Once the political objective is clear, the next step is to determine the proper military means, whether the objective is to win or do something else."<sup>75</sup> The military action

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Rosenthal, Andrew, "U.S. May Be Ready to Discuss Ban on Warplanes Over Bosnia" New York Times, 23 September, 1992, p. A 14. NOTE: The most recent action to date by the Security Council has been the April 6 authorization the use of force to enforce the "no fly zone" it created in September.

<sup>73</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 787 (1992), S/RES/787 (1992).

<sup>74</sup> Gorden, Michael, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in Bosnia," New York Times, 28 September, 1992, p. A 1.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.



must bring about the desired political objective; if not, the soundness of the decision to use military force is put into question. If the political goal is to deter Serb aggression, that goal may be ambiguous enough to put the use of limited measures in question. For it is not clear that such measures would indeed deter Serb aggression. The no fly zone, if successful, would deter Serb air strikes, but would do nothing to stop the ground offensive. The air strikes might stop some units, but others would surely remain untouched, capable of retaliatory strikes against the Bosnians, and even the peacekeeping forces--since the international community would then be seen by the Serbs as enemies. The limited action would then serve only as a presage for further military involvement.

### **Conclusion**

It is precisely this dilemma over United Nations involvement--between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, or between mediator and enforcer roles--that makes the Yugoslav crisis such an important test for how, when, and where exactly peacekeeping belongs in the conflicts of the new world order. Such an evaluation requires first an understanding of the balance between sovereignty and international responsibility. Then, when that balance is decided, there needs to be an evaluation of what the exact role of the United Nations is to be in a given conflict. If peacekeeping is to be used, it must be used with a clear understanding of its capabilities and limitations--it cannot be sent to fulfill a role that it is not meant to play. And, peacekeeping must be supported and improved so it can perform its role adequately. Like nothing else, the crisis points out the inherent limitations of peacekeeping, as well as the lack of attention given to improving the peacekeeping capability. But the crisis also shows the need for a greatly improved integrated response system to international crises; as the Secretary-General has noted, peacekeeping alone is not sufficient for the problem; in Bosnia it is not even possible. For peacekeeping to truly be successful, its role must be as part of the comprehensive response plan of action for the United Nations. Had there existed an integral response that dealt with the crisis quickly in its early stages, and had there existed the international will to deal with the conflict then and there, many argue, the current nightmare might have been avoided.

## THE CRISIS IN SOMALIA

Just as conflict in the North has made the world community realize the pressing need for an improved United Nations capability, so too has there been a desperate situation in the South, a crisis that threatens the African nation of Somalia. The crisis in Somalia, like the one in Bosnia, represents another post-Cold War crisis, caused in part by its end, and threatens the vision of a more peaceful world order. Somalia, too, is in many ways a test for the Organization, posing questions relevant to the fashioning of a new world order, as well as the role of the United Nations--and of United Nations peacekeeping--in it. Specifically, Somalia poses the question that asks where the new balance is to be struck between the respect for sovereignty and the obligation to intervene in a situation for the sake of peace and security. Specifically, the Somalia crisis demands an answer to the question of whether or not it is within the bounds of the Organization to intervene, not on behalf of the state, but rather on behalf of its citizens. For, one of the difficulties faced in Somalia--one that makes it somewhat of a novel and more perplexing threat--lies in outright lack of any established state authority. How the Organization deals with this crisis depends upon how determined it is to fashion a just and peaceful world order.

### Background to Conflict

The roots of the present conflict go back to the deepest days of the Cold War. With the decolonization movement taking firm hold in Africa, and the subsequent rise in the number of newly independent states there, it was not long before the geopolitical balance-of-power contest between East and West quickly made the new African nations the new battle-ground. United States attempts to bring the fledgling nations into the Western political and strategic fold were matched by Soviet attempts to win them over and incorporate them into the Eastern sphere of influence. Somalia, having gained its independence in 1960, was still getting used to the idea of sovereignty and the intricacies of multi-party democracy when Mohammed Said Barre seized control in 1962, tying Somalia to the ideology and foreign aid offered by the

Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> Somalia under the Barre regime was a strange combination of dictator rule coated with a sheen of socialism, an unsatisfying mixture that resulted in the stirring of discontent and civil unrest. The opposition to the Barre regime consisted largely of an amalgamation of tribes and clans who, previously at odds over territory, water, and land rights, joined together to oppose rule by the totalitarian Barre. Without the adequate resources or organization, however, the opposition remained unable to depose the strong rule by Barre.

The years of 1977 and 1978 meant change for Somalia. When neighboring Ethiopia underwent a civil war that switched the government to Socialism, it pulled the Soviets, who saw a more advantageous strategic opportunity in the newly Socialist Ethiopian state, away from Somalia. Left without the patronage support of the Soviet Union that was critical to its existence, the Barre regime flip-flopped, allying itself with the United States, and in turn receiving five billion dollars in U.S. technical and military aid over the 1980's.<sup>2</sup> But the problem for Somalia, in the context of foreign assistance, was that it was not a strategic asset;<sup>3</sup> the Soviets changed to Ethiopia in part for this very reason, and the United States increasingly questioned the pragmatism of its support of the oppressive Barre regime if Somalia was not essential for United States foreign policy in Africa. Moreover, as the internal and international opposition to the Barre Regime grew during the mid 1980's, the United States began to see withdrawal as the most pragmatic political option left to them. As a result, the United States pulled out of Somalia during the last half of the 1980's, leaving behind not only a troubled and unstable country that was ruled by an unpopular and oppressive strong-man, but also an arsenal of weaponry provided by almost

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<sup>1</sup> MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, "Somalia: Could It Have Been Avoided?" broadcast 2 December 1992.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> NOTE: Somalia was never of essential strategic importance for either side during the Cold War; the U.S. already had military bases in and around the critical Persian Gulf region, and the Soviets, seeing the better strategic vantage point in Ethiopia, opted instead to support it instead of Somalia when the revolution came. With these more strategically important sites in hand, it was hard for both sides to justify supporting Somalia.

30 years of Cold war stockpiling both by the Soviets and the Americans. The United States, in short, left behind a powder-keg.

The loss of Superpower support proved fatal to the Barre regime. Without such a strong resource with which it could quell its opponents, the regime faltered, and, in 1991, finally fell to the coalition of tribes and clans loosely united against it. However, once the Barre administration fell, there was no clear and uncontested victor to claim ascendancy and national power. Instead, fighting broke out between the clans over claims to the remains of the now-headless nation. In the capitol city of Mogadishu, a conflict between two rival leaders of the dominant Hawaie Clan has occurred, each trying to win control of the city.<sup>4</sup> On one side is Ali Mahdi Mohammed, who is officially the interim President of Somalia (but who holds no such power); facing him is Mohammed Farah Aidid, the other principal power in Somalia.<sup>5</sup> In addition to the fighting in Mogadishu, the fighting has also been between the regional clans and sub-clans in the outlying regions of Somalia. Around main cities such as Bardera, Baidoa, and Kismayu, local tribes vie for power and control of the immediate area. There is also the attempt by the Barre legacy, taken form in Barre's son in law, Mohammed Said Herse-Morgan; the loyalist Barre forces are involved in the fighting around Mogadishu.<sup>6</sup> In essence, there exists no national government responsible for the state of the nation.

With the combined fighting of these several groups, organized into clans and sub-clans, not only has juridical administrative rule effectively been destroyed, the country's administrative capacity and infrastructure has been wiped out. As Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali stated in his report on the region, "Somalia is today a country without central, regional, or local administration."<sup>7</sup> The Somali National Congress has not met since the ouster of Barre in January 1991; most of the state services have been

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<sup>4</sup> "(Untitled)" Economist, v. 322 11 January 1992, p. 40.

<sup>5</sup> MacNeil/Lehrer Report.

<sup>6</sup> Perlez, Jane, "U.N. Envoy Says His Ouster is Official," New York Times, 30 October 1992, p. A7.

<sup>7</sup> -----"U.N. Head Proposes Expanded Efforts for Somali Relief," New York Times, 25 July 1992, p. A1.

inoperative since that time as well. Moreover, the Barre forces, upon leaving Mogadishu, destroyed much of the city utilities, leaving the capitol without running water, electricity, sewage, or other support services.<sup>8</sup> As for the rest of the country, lack of central control has left the regions to fend for themselves. The emphasis is not on trying to maintain infrastructure, however; the clans and tribes instead are more concerned about trying to fight to maintain what control they possess over the territory. As a result, infrastructure had been demolished. In his report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated,

Four years of civil war, against a backdrop of years of neglect and lack of investment in human development, basic services and infrastructure, have left much of Somalia in ruins. Major cities in northern Somalia have been reduced to rubble; houses, public buildings, communications and water systems have been destroyed and an already inadequate health sector has been rendered incapable of providing even the most rudimentary services. Agricultural production and Somalia's vital livestock trade have been crippled and an entire generation of Somali children is growing up without access to education.<sup>9</sup>

Roads, pipelines, and what electricity lines that originally existed are now destroyed. More critically, the delivery of food has been halted to many of the contested regions, and the farmland has been demolished and abandoned due to the fighting. Moreover, re-establishment of these services has been halted by clan members as part of a strategy against whichever opponent they face: the hope in this strategy is to starve the enemy into surrender, rather than risk defeat at battle.

The result of this complete breakdown has been, in a word, appalling. Without the infrastructure needed to support a civil level of life, Somalia has been forced back into subsistence living and below. Without the delivery of food to the several warring regions, those living there are left without food. Starvation of mass proportion, a humanitarian crisis exceeding comprehension, has resulted. By October of 1992, it was estimated that 300,000 people had died in Somalia due to either starvation or to the fighting.<sup>10</sup> It has

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<sup>8</sup> -----"Hungry Somalis Still Die, But Crops Grow, Too," New York Times, 23 October, 1992, p. A1.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, Security Council, "Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia," S/23829 Add.. 1, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup>-----" U.N. Envoy Says His Ouster is Official," New York Times, 30 October, 1992, p. A7.

been estimated that a full one-third of the estimated six million living in Somalia faces starvation in the next year alone.<sup>11</sup> To add to the tragedy, Somalia is coming off of a four-year drought, and does not yet have the capability in and of itself to feed its starving, even assuming that the food could be gathered and transported. In some areas to the south, drought is still a problem, denying access to all sources of water. In addition, the lack of clean water, coupled with the spread of death has resulted in the spread of disease, as well.<sup>12</sup> The lack of any decent medical care due to the destruction of all but 15 hospitals (themselves left without utilities or supplies) augments the problem.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the fighting has forced the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, causing problems not only for Somalia, but for the surrounding nations as well. In short, the humanitarian crisis brought on by the collapse of the Somali government is profoundly acute, and is demanding the efforts and resources of the world community to help stave off mass starvation.

### **United Nations and World Efforts**

#### Humanitarian Assistance

The response by the United Nations and world community has been earnest, but it also has been mired in difficulty, not only arising from the difficult situation in Somalia, but also in disputes taking place within the Organization, and disagreements over how best to help the Somali people while still trying to maintain respect for the sovereignty of Somalia, such as it is without a central government. The first response was the mobilization of the humanitarian assistance organizations, to coordinate the shipment and delivery of food to the starving regions. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Food Programme, and Operation CARE, among many others, all began shipments and airlifts of food, supplies, and other necessities to the affected regions. By the end of 1992, more than 213,000

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<sup>11</sup>Perlez, NYT, 25 July, p. A1.

<sup>12</sup> "100-Day relief Plan for Somalia Launched," U.N. Chronicle, v. 29 n.4, December 1992, p. 5.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 5.

metric tonnes of food and supplies were ready for distribution.<sup>14</sup> Also, individual nations such as the United States contributed to the effort; As of June 1992 the United States had contributed \$62 million to emergency food-distribution operations such as Operation Care, UNICEF, and others; \$28 million was contributed to the African Red Cross, and \$30 million was given to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), to deal with the estimated 800,000 refugees caused by the conflict.<sup>15</sup> Throughout the world, non-governmental organizations and governments alike have responded to the call for food by Somalia.

But the violence and warfare between clans and gangs remains the chief impediment to the delivery of the contributed food. For the most part, the shipments have not been able to reach those areas most desperately hit by the famine, because the clans have prevented their safe passage, and have even looted the shipments for their own use or to sell.<sup>16</sup> The informal business of stealing food and selling it has become a lucrative business in Mogadishu, offering a necessity that everyone needs and will pay anything to get. But the attacks on the distribution centers also mean danger to the volunteers' lives; countless times, airlifts or shipments have had to be cancelled due to attacks on the airport, or mortar attacks on the port in Mogadishu. In their defense, Somali warlords state that they are not allowing the shipments to proceed because the shipments are allegedly supporting rival clans in the fight. They defend their position by citing an incident in June where a United Nations plane "was allegedly used for an illegal flight to Mogadishu to deliver newly-printed Somali currency and military equipment to one of the factions."<sup>17</sup> All observers, however, note that this justification is merely an attempt to justify their actions in hampering the and looting the relief process. Thus, shortly after the crisis received the humanitarian

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<sup>14</sup>UN Chronicle, Dec. 1992, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Congressional Testimony By Assistant Secretary of State Herman J. Cohen 23 June 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin, v. 3 n. 1, July/Ag 1992, p. 53.

<sup>16</sup> Perlez, Jane, "U.S. Move Might Save Somali Relief," New York Times, 29 November 1992, p. A5.

<sup>17</sup> U.N. Chronicle, v.29, Dec. 1992, p. 5.

attention, thoughts turned to security matters, namely the protection of the humanitarian aid.

### Preliminary Peacekeeping Efforts and Dilemmas

The response by the Security Council and the Secretariat was quick. The Secretary General in April laid out a "Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-Day Plan" which took the humanitarian aid actions already undertaken by the NGO's and other parties and integrated them into a United Nations peacekeeping force.<sup>18</sup> The plan first called for the establishment of a cease-fire between all the warring disputants, most significantly between Aidid and Mahdi, the two chief warlords in Somalia. Once the cease-fire was agreed to and consent for the presence of a monitoring force was given, the United Nations would establish a progressive plan that would include the humanitarian work by the several aid agencies, with the protection by United Nations military personnel, working from key sites within Somalia to reach all affected regions.<sup>19</sup> The hope for the security force was that they would deter attacks and lootings by the armed gangs that roam uncontrolled around the embattled regions of Somalia. Designated United Nations Operation in Somalia, (UNOSOM), its first operational units, a group of 50 observers, were sent to Mogadishu in July to secure the cease-fire between the rival factions.<sup>20</sup> Preparations were being made for an expanded force of 500 military personnel; with the agreement finally given by both clan leaders, UNOSOM

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<sup>18</sup> NOTE: The Secretary General sees the immediate crisis as a "vicious circle," where lack of security for the people of Somalia prevents the delivery of food, while the food shortages serve as a cause for the violence and insecurity. To respond to this circle, the integrated 90-day plan incorporates the humanitarian relief to address the lack of food side, while the security force addresses the lack of security. See United Nations, Security Council, "The Situation in Somalia, Report of the Secretary-General," S/24480, 24 August, 1992, p. 7.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations, Security Council, "The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary General," S/ 23829, 21 April 1992, p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> U.N. Chronicle, v. 29, Dec. 1992, p. 5.



was deployed.<sup>21</sup> The \$23.1 million price-tag was partially covered by pledges made to the organization.<sup>22</sup>

The 500-member UNOSOM force ran into trouble, however, because of problems which are in part due to the inherent limitations to peacekeeping itself. Although the UNOSOM force was accepted by the two factions in Mogadishu, there quickly arose problems which impeded their ability to execute the mandate to observe the cease-fire and protect the food shipments and convoys. Despite the agreement made, the Aidid forces would not allow the force to act in pursuance of its mandate and protect the relief convoys. Without the sanction to force Aideed to accept the armed convoys, the peacekeepers could do nothing. Relief convoys went unprotected, and were therefore stopped and looted. Needing the compliance by all forces, and not given the mandate to enforce protection, the peacekeeping mission was left useless. When the Secretary-General proposed an expansion of UNOSOM with a stronger force, Aidid rejected it out of hand.<sup>23</sup> Without consent by all parties, the United Nations could do nothing but try to convince Aidid to accept. There was, however, no such acceptance by Aidid. UNOSOM was left in limbo while the humanitarian aid effort continued, hampered by looting and attack.

The lack of stronger United Nations action, here and at other points, was criticized by many who look upon the situation in Somalia as a disaster that could--and should--have been avoided. For example, Mohammed Sanhoun, the United Nations envoy to Somalia and the former UNOSOM commander, himself was a harsh critic, condemning the Organization's temerity in the face of gang-lord posturing, while thousands were dying daily without the essential United Nations assistance. Many also share these sentiments, blaming the world community as a whole for indecision and even cowardice. The Secretary-General also chastised the membership, claiming that lack of initiative for Somalia demonstrates the Northern bias toward resolving conflicts of particular salience to Northern countries; he

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<sup>21</sup>U.N. Chronicle, v. 29, dec 1992, p. 5.

<sup>22</sup>United Nations, Security Council, "(Addendum to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, made 21 April 1992)," S/23829/Add. 2, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Perlez, Jane, "???????" New York Times, 30 August 1992, p. I 12.

points out the attention given to Bosnia as an example.<sup>24</sup> The criticisms signal a harsh decision that has to be made by the organization regarding the balance between respect for sovereignty and intervention. Granted that peacekeeping requires consent, the United Nations could instead have been more forceful than the traditional peacekeeping role guidelines. A stronger, better equipped force could easily have suppressed the looting by the roving gangs, many of whom were no more than teen-aged boys hired by clan leaders to steal the food. With a stronger force, the United Nations could then be able to protect the convoys and even enforce a cease-fire, if it was mandated to do so.

But the problems that this option poses to the United Nations made choosing it hard to do. First, there was the question of the balance between sovereignty and the right to intervene. The right to intervene in a "classical" internal dispute (that is to say, internal under the old world order) for the sake of human rights was not yet an agreed right by the Organization. In short, the balance had yet to be decided upon. Second, if it were to do so, that would mean that the United Nations would no longer be an arbiter and non-partisan mediator, but instead a partisan force going against the will of a regional authority-power. There would inevitably be conflict between the United Nations forces and the local forces, conflict which could become protracted. Any solutions that the United Nations made would therefore be imposed upon the regions that did not accept the United Nations role there, and instead of a United Nations working with the regional authorities to rebuild Somalia, United Nations presence would be reduced to a chronic "Vietnam-like" scenario--unless the United Nations decided to push Aidid and the others out, in effect conquering the nation for the sake of saving it. While this may be an extreme abstraction from the situation, it shows where the United Nations might be headed if it decided on a more military response. A third reason that the United Nations balked initially at the stronger military force was due to logistics: as the Secretary General repeatedly

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<sup>24</sup>NOTE: This was also part of the reason why the Secretary-General protested Security Council action in Bosnia concerning the gun-monitoring measures taken by the Security Council. The Secretary-General expressed anger at the Organization, claiming that it was devoting too much time to Yugoslavia (a Northern crisis) and not enough time for Somalia (a southern crisis). For further details see Faison, Seth, "U.N. Chief Mired In Dispute With Security Council," New York Times, 24 July, 1992, p. A6.

pointed out, the United Nations does not have the resources for such a stronger action; its membership still has not given the Organization sufficient funds, equipment, or personnel.

### United States Sponsored Intervention and Future Dilemmas

But, whatever the hesitations that kept a stronger United Nations response from happening, they disappeared with the Security Council vote on December 3, 1992. It was a move sponsored by the United States and other Permanent Members to take a more "pro-active" role in Somali crisis.<sup>25</sup> The vote, Resolution 794, sanctioned the deployment of a larger force to "establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible."<sup>26</sup> The force, based on Chapter VII Article 43 provisions, was to guarantee the safety of all relief shipments, flights, convoys, and workers in the execution of their job, without the need for consent by the parties involved in the conflict. The force was mainly comprised of United States troops, 28,000 in all, with the addition of 3,500 United Nations personnel to supplement the 500 already in UNOSOM.<sup>27</sup> The mission that the force was tasked to do was limited strictly to ensuring the safety of the humanitarian effort, by opening the port of Mogadishu as well as moving forces inland to ensure safe corridors to the distribution points in the stricken towns and regions, many of which had not seen relief for months.<sup>28</sup> Within a month, all objectives had been reached. Presently, the forces are maintaining the secure environment for the continuation of the humanitarian effort.

The initiative by the United States is heartening in terms of upholding the new commitment to security, not only of states but for peoples as well.

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<sup>25</sup>Lewis, Paul, "4 U.N. Members Back Force In Somalia Crisis," New York Times, 2 December, 1992, p. A1.

<sup>26</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 794 (1992), S/RES/794 (1992), p. 3.

<sup>27</sup> Gordon, Michael R., "U.N. Backs A Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; Pentagon Sees a Longer Stay," New York Times, 3 December, 1992, p. A1.

<sup>28</sup> Wines, Michael, "Bush Declares Goal in Somalia is to 'Save Thousands'" New York Times, 5 December, 1992, p. A1.

The deployment is indeed the recognition by the Organization of the need for a "rebalancing," where the United Nations would intervene on the part of a nation's people. But, now that the immediate crisis is finally being treated, attention is turning to the fate of the Organization's presence after the immediate crisis has gone. In committing the American troops to action, President Bush stressed that they were there only for a very limited time. Bush said, "once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular United Nations peacekeeping force. Our mission has a limited objective, to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary."<sup>29</sup> By stressing the limited deployment of the force, the Bush Administration (whose policies concerning the United States' role in Somalia have largely been followed by the Clinton Administration) apparently desires to avoid a long, drawn-out, and potentially costly presence. The refusal by the United States to expand their mission to include the huge task of confiscating all firearms in Somalia demonstrates this desire.<sup>30</sup>

Once the daunting military presence of the United States forces is gone, however, there leaves serious questions concerning what the future United Nations presence will be. As everyone agrees, the crisis demands a lot more than the limited role that the present contingent is playing. The immediate crisis is presently being taken care of by the security forces and the humanitarian aid agencies. However, beyond this immediate crisis, there is the huge task of rebuilding Somalia which faces the Organization. For example, there will need to be a national reconciliation and a re-establishment of a national authority, followed by the re-establishment of a police force, domestic administration, which will in turn necessitate the restructure of all social services. This will require the reconstruction of

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<sup>29</sup>(No Author), Transcript of President's Address on Somalia, New York Times, 5 December, 1992, p. A4.

<sup>30</sup> NOTE: The extensive presence of arms in the country would make confiscation a huge, time-consuming and potentially deadly; as the Secretary General points out, "arms are ubiquitous, and are used "as a means not only of personal security but also of personal survival. See S/24480, p. 8.

Mogadishu and all other cities destroyed by the war, as well as the repair of the destroyed infrastructure. The repair of the infrastructure would then allow for the revival of the agriculture and food producing regions, so that Somalia can once again produce its own food. And, beyond all this lies the huge task of fixing the years of neglect suffered under the Barre regime. Somalia will not only have to get back to square one, but it will also have to begin its progress toward modernization and self sufficiency. The role of the United Nations and the world community will be essential throughout the process, acting as midwife for the transition from anarchy and destitution to order and prosperity.

The scope of the job which lies before them has made many members in the organization as equally hesitant as the United States is in becoming part of a protracted presence. The amount of time, money, and effort needed from the world community to repair Somalia, whose tangible importance to the world community is not great, has many nations asking if the cost is worth the effort. Even if the cost to each member of the organization were minimal, there would still exist the temptation to revert back to the time-honored practice whereby, once a peacekeeping force is put in place, member motivation to settle the problems in the region dies, leaving the security force to deal with a chronic conflict. In Somalia, this will be even more difficult; since the security force is not the traditional peacekeeping force, accepted by the parties to conflict, party opposition will threaten to undermine the efforts of the United Nations once the daunting United States military presence is gone. This would be so unless the Organization decided to maintain the strong military presence in order to deter violence. But, without a corresponding reconstruction effort, such a presence would become nothing more than a police force tasked to maintain order in a state of anarchy. The United States led force has indeed brought a moment's respite for Somalia. But the questions posed by Somalia, and the complex and long-term difficulties they present to international assistance and intervention, remain unanswered.

## Conclusion

Like Yugoslavia, Somalia contains numerous obstacles which the United Nations Organization must negotiate in order to bring international peace and security to the world community. Questions of respect for sovereignty versus intervention present themselves, taking shape in problems and shortcomings to the efforts they have already attempted. In terms of peacekeeping, it is becoming clearer that there exist some fundamental limitations that hinder peacekeeping, making it unsuited to deal with the problems presented it in situations such as the Former Yugoslav republic and Somalia. Just as peacekeeping is having trouble in Croatia, and is not possible in Bosnia, it has been ineffective in Somalia. The problem is that the basic requirement upon which peacekeeping relies--the consent of all parties involved--has not fully been met. The urge in the Organization at such an eventuality has been to move toward more aggressive, collective security solutions. But in doing so it risks losing the intermediary role that it must play in settling conflicts. And, as Somalia demonstrates, imposed solutions by the United Nations will not solve the crisis; it will merely complicate it by unwanted outside intervention.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, Somalia demonstrates as nothing else can the need for a much more developed response to conflict in the post-Cold War era. This in turn must spring from a determination by the world community of what exactly the shape of the new world order is, and what the role of the United Nations is to be in it. And, the crucial ingredient for the success of this new collective vision will be the determination of every member nation of the United Nations to act, to participate, and to contribute to the implementation of the vision. In sum, the United Nations must develop itself in order to deal with these questions adequately. For, if Yugoslavia and Somalia are simply indications of the future of conflict, the Organization must develop the skill, and the will, to deal with them.

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<sup>31</sup> NOTE: in the case of disputes in the South, that intervention could develop into N-S tensions, further straining relations amongst the whole of the membership.

## THE ROLE OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The foregoing discussion indicates that the new world order demands a renovated peacekeeping capability. Both Yugoslavia and Somalia demonstrate the limitations of peacekeeping, both the inherent ones and the limitations due to lack of adequate support requisite for its success. The need for a stronger United Nations in the new era, one in which situations such as Yugoslavia and Somalia menace, therefore necessitates the need for improved peacekeeping role, as well as an improved overall response to threats to international peace and security. So what is the role and capability of United Nations peacekeeping in the new world order? The answer seems to be twofold. First, peacekeeping in itself must be treated, and second, an overall, comprehensive plan of crisis response, to which peacekeeping plays a part, must be developed.

### Peacekeeping

#### Peacekeeping Clearly Defined

First, peacekeeping itself must be clarified in its role as a response to threats to international peace and security: it is the physical United Nations presence in a crisis put in place to secure and observe a cease-fire agreed to by all relevant parties to a dispute. That is the essence of its role and the limit of its capability in conflict resolution. As part of that role, peacekeeping performs several supporting tasks, such as the establishment of buffer zones, monitoring of troop activities, assistance to local administration and police services, monitoring of elections, monitoring the disbanding of combatants, repatriating refugees, and other services linked to securing and maintaining a cease-fire. But in all cases, the peacekeeping force is acting with the consent of the parties involved. That is the fundamental role that peacekeeping plays--a non-partisan, third-party, confidence building measure, accepted by all sides to facilitate trust between them in order to stop the violence. It is a tool to perform a specific task, and cannot be made to do jobs it is not designed to handle. The crisis in the former Yugoslav republics and the Somali crisis both demonstrate this fact. In Bosnia, it is clear that peacekeeping for the

present time cannot work, for there is no tenable cease-fire agreement to secure. In Somalia, the multi-factional fighting, and the lack of authority control over much of the combatants have made a cease-fire an impossibility. In Croatia, on the other hand, there was the possibility for a mission, since the two antagonists agreed to a cease-fire.

However, in the former-Yugoslavia and Somali crises, there seems to be indication that peacekeeping is expanding into a new role--one that does not require the consent of all parties involved. In the both the former-Yugoslavian republics and the Somali situation, this has taken the form of armed escorts for humanitarian aid and relief supplies convoys. In these missions, consent is not sought for the deployment of forces to protect the relief convoys. It could be argued that armed escorting is a new task added to the list of peacekeeping tasks, alongside with troop and election monitoring--the difference being that there is no consent by the parties. But the claimed new role must be compared to what a peacekeeping force in essence does, which is to secure and maintain a cease-fire--and perform all attendant tasks to that role--that is agreed to by all sides. If there is no agreement, then it is not-and cannot be--essentially peacekeeping. Instead, it is a limited form of collective security, enacted by the international community in the interests of the people of the region, instead of one or the other side. Instead of a new peacekeeping task, it is instead a new manifestation of a collective security response (this will be covered later). Moreover, the aid escorts represent a new balance between sovereignty and international responsibility established by the United Nations, which holds that massive human suffering within a region--no matter whose control that region is in--is reachable by the world Organization, reachable by collective security.

The actual fate of the escort missions illustrate this point. In Bosnia, the mission was treated more or less as a peacekeeping operation; UNPROFOR was expanded to include the new escort forces, expanded, and their mandate was worded along the same lines as other peacekeeping missions, ie. the force was lightly armored and armed, was to fire only in self defense, etc.. As a result, they have not been taken seriously, and convoys still fail to reach their destinations. The problem is that the force is an extension of a peacekeeping force; as such, if it were to fire on Serb or Croat forces intent on stopping them, the peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslav republics in general would no longer be considered non-partisan,



and would become just another party to conflict, just another target. Thus the escorts can do nothing about the seizures and blockades of the convoys. In Somalia, on the other hand, the armed escort is instead a 28,000-strong, highly trained, and heavily armed contingent whose military doctrine is centered around the use of overwhelming force to secure its objective. There is no appeal for consent, just as traditional collective security makes no such appeal. The provision of human aid is instead enforced. Consent has only been given by the parties retroactively, when they had no other choice save for attempting resistance, which it has not done. From these examples it seems evident that aid escort is instead the province of collective security measures instead of peacekeeping.

Although peacekeeping may remain the same in essence, there are new ways to use it which are being considered. Peacekeeping has always been called upon to end a conflict that already has been going on--where lives have already been lost, territory has already been fought over, and where animosity and hatred has already polarized the combatants. To prevent this from happening, Brian Urquhart offers a suggestion that is gaining support in the world community: the use of peacekeeping as a pro-active force that is put into place before the fighting actually starts.<sup>1</sup> If there is an emerging crisis somewhere in the world, the Security Council or Secretary-General can broker an arrangement between the parties before the shooting starts. The peacekeeping force could then be positioned in relevant areas as a confidence builder for the parties to conflict, ensuring that a strike will not occur.

### Improved Support for Peacekeeping

But in order to allow peacekeeping forces to carry out their mandates and to be used to their full potential, they must be supplied with enough political, logistical, and financial support by the Organization. This has been a problem that has haunted peacekeeping throughout its history. But it is becoming more acute because, with the end of the Cold War, the sharp rise in the demand for peacekeeping demands a corresponding rise in cost and logistical requirements. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali has warned

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<sup>1</sup> Lewis, p. 546.

that, without adequate material support, he will no longer be able to establish operations--the missions already in place are themselves facing serious lack of support, to such an extent that their very existence is put into question. The debate in the Bosnian crisis over the gun-monitoring forces demonstrates this. In this case, the credibility of an international organization that envisions a new world order of peace and security but doesn't provide for it would seriously be put into question.

The ideas for strengthening peacekeeping are not new. Each successive Secretary-General has proposed means to provide funding, material, and personnel for peacekeeping operation. But, while not new, perhaps they are suggestions whose time has come. First, the forces must be made available. The old practise of "rounding up a posse," where each mission is established only after the Security Council votes on a crisis already well underway, must be abandoned.<sup>2</sup> Instead, one solution could be found in the existence of a standing peacekeeping force. This way, in the event of some emerging crisis, forces could be on hand, ready to go at a moment's notice when called for. In the case of pro-active peacekeeping, such a force would be essential; there simply would be no time to scrape together a force quickly enough to defuse the situation before it turns violent.<sup>3</sup> Along with a standing army would be the need for a standing cache of equipment. The Secretary-General states,

not all governments can provide their battalions with the equipment they need for service abroad. While some equipment is provided by troop contributing nations, a great deal has to come from the United Nations. . . .The United Nations has no standing stock of such equipment. Orders must be placed with manufacturers, which creates a number of difficulties. A pre-positioned stock of basic peacekeeping equipment should be established.<sup>4</sup>

Another option that the Secretariat has suggested would have the member states create and maintain a standing force of troops earmarked for peacekeeping service. Similar to the idea of a standing force, the difference

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<sup>2</sup> "Round Up a Posse," *Economist*, V. 322, 27 June, 1992, p. 48.

<sup>3</sup> Renner, p. 30.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations, Security Council, "An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January, 1992)," S/24111, p. 15.

would be that the members themselves are responsible for the force, and not the United Nations, thereby taking some of the burden of equipping, training and financing off the Organization. The earmarked units would be trained in peacekeeping tactics, and would be made available to the Secretariat and the Security Council when necessary.<sup>5</sup> These ideas have only received lukewarm attention by the membership, and have been supported only by a few dedicated states (such as Scandinavia and Canada). But the world organization will have to do better than that. As Yugoslavia and Somalia point out, the need for improvement is too important.

The question of financing has been the most debated issue regarding peacekeeping in the United Nations. Shortly before leaving office, former Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar commented, "it is a great irony that the United Nations is on the brink of insolvency at the very time that the world community has entrusted the organization with new and unprecedented responsibilities."<sup>6</sup> In the face of an expanding peacekeeping agenda, lack of funds has been a problem that threatens the lives of many peacekeeping missions. The Secretary General reports that arrears through 1992 were expected to exceed \$800 million, with the threat of a rising deficit expected through 1993.<sup>7</sup> The problem is not lack of money, however; it is instead a problem of prioritization among the member states. Boutros Boutros Ghali compares the expected three billion dollar price-tag for peacekeeping in 1993 to the one trillion cumulative annual military outlay of the member states, of which peacekeeping would be roughly 0.3 percent.<sup>8</sup> Members still continue to see the need for large military forces to ensure security from threat, rather than placing the responsibility in the hands of the Organization. In short, the money is there; the member states just do not trust the United Nations to be the instrument of global security, so they instead opt to spend it on a military.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Renner, p. 31.

<sup>7</sup>S/24111 p. 14.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

There are several suggestions to improve financing.<sup>9</sup> One proposal is to establish a peacekeeping fund stocked and replenished by annual contribution. This would be effective for two reasons. First, having a ready source of funds to finance peacekeeping would avoid the headache of having to go through the time-consuming process of finding nations to contribute on an ad hoc basis. Second, one reason behind the difficulty countries face in contributing funds is procedural: since peacekeeping fund raising is ad hoc and dependent upon whenever there is a crisis, many countries do not have the funds to spare because their national fiscal and budgetary cycles have already allocated all funds, leaving none when the crisis arises. Having a peacekeeping slush fund of one billion dollars, for example, contributed to whenever countries are able, might go a long way to alleviate the headache due to lack of funds. Another suggestion offered by Boutros Boutros Ghali is to have members allocate peacekeeping contributions from their military budgets instead of their foreign affairs budgets.<sup>10</sup> In this sense, peacekeeping would then become an aspect of a nation's defensive capability. To compare the costs of peacekeeping to the cost of military upkeep while keeping in mind that both national militaries and United Nations forces perform the similar tasks (ie. protect against threats to international peace and security), one could argue that peacekeeping is the best defense that money can buy.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, having peacekeeping funded by military budgeting would assure that any unexpected cost spikes in peacekeeping operations would be covered.<sup>12</sup> A third innovative suggestion would have non-governmental organizations and corporations with a stake in ending a crisis contribute funds for the operation.<sup>13</sup> Another proposal, this one submitted by Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1990, would be to borrow in commercial markets.<sup>14</sup> But

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<sup>9</sup> NOTE: The Secretary General lays out a more comprehensive list of financing suggestions in his report. See S/24111, p. 14.

<sup>10</sup> S/24111, p. 14.

<sup>11</sup> Renner p. 31.

<sup>12</sup> S/24111, p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> "Piece Rate for Peacekeeping," *Economist*, V. 322, 25 January, 1992, p. 38.

<sup>14</sup> Renner, p. 32.

this suggestion has not been adopted. As for the other suggestions for improving peacekeeping in general, no real financing reform has taken place. In short, while the membership looks forward to a brighter future with the help of a stronger Organization that rests upon a strong financial base, they are not taking the time or making the effort to build that base up.

### **Peacekeeping as Part of Integrated Response**

A renovated peacekeeping role for the new world order is not the only improvement that the Organization needs to make. The reality made clear in both Yugoslavia and Somalia is that peacekeeping is a limited response to international conflict that cannot be the only one. For conflict is multifaceted, and needs to be treated so: if peacekeeping is to have a new role in the new world order, it therefore can be said that the new role of peacekeeping will be as part of a comprehensive, integrated response to crises that threaten international peace and security. In his June 21 report to the Security Council on ways peacekeeping could be improved, the Secretary-General stated, "the efforts of the Organization to build peace, stability, and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterized the past."<sup>15</sup> In short, peacekeeping is not enough. A response to threats must include all possible avenues for dispute treatment, working from a comprehensive, synthetic structure. Specifically, the Secretary-General in his report mentions four main topics to the comprehensive plan: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building. Those topics to which peacekeeping plays a complementary role will be discussed below.

### Preventive Diplomacy

One aspect to the Secretary-General's proposed integrated plan is one that attempts to deal with a conflict before it turns violent. Preventive diplomacy involves four measures: confidence building, fact finding and

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<sup>15</sup> S/24111, p. 4.

early warning assets, preventive deployment, and pre-conflict demilitarized zones. First, confidence building involves attempts by the United Nations to establish ties of good faith and trust between disputing parties.<sup>16</sup> Through diplomatic observer and military missions, risk reduction centers, and various other channels of communication, the emphasis would be to keep dialogue going between the parties to dispute. The Secretary-General would provide mediators, special envoys, and crisis prevention teams to a troubled region to facilitate dialogue between the antagonists in the hope to sooth tensions and ensure the commitment to communication instead recourse to violence.

The successful mediation of a crisis requires facts and knowledge of activities and events in the situation, however. Therefore, there have been numerous calls for the development of early warning assets to warn of emerging "hot spots" around the globe, as well as improved fact finding capability to assist the diplomatic efforts. Ways to improve early warning capability would be the establishment of standing conflict resolution centers for each region of the world.<sup>17</sup> A United Nations committee dedicated exclusively to the security of a specific region would increase the possibility of detecting problems early enough to stop an escalating conflict. In 1988, the Soviets suggested setting up United Nations Observation points in places of chronic tension to provide up-to-the-minute information on developments in the region.<sup>18</sup> Though shot down when it was first suggested, the time may be right for the proposal to gain acceptance by the members. Another proposal, made by the Secretary-General, calls for an invigorated use of Article 99, which gives the Secretariat the ability to investigate any potential areas of conflict and dispute at any time it chooses. Under Article 99, the membership must provide the Secretariat any information concerning situations that may become threats to international peace and security. A similar, more extreme proposal gives authority to a United Nations team to survey any border or region at any time to assess the threat to international

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p. 7.

<sup>17</sup> Renner, p. 30.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. p. 30.

peace and security.<sup>19</sup> This would be another way in which the sovereignty/international responsibility balance would be shifted in the new world order. Another improvement that could be made to the Organization's fact-finding capability would request the superpowers to provide information on hot spots gathered by their respective satellite monitoring technologies.<sup>20</sup> Another suggestion made by the Secretary-General is to reinvigorate the Economic and Social Council, and have it provide "reports. . .on those economic and social developments that may, unless mitigated, threaten international peace and security."<sup>21</sup> For, with the ongoing tension between North and South, economic issues will be increasingly important to dispute resolution.

The idea of preventive deployment goes back to the new situation in which peacekeeping would be deployed. The Secretary-General describes the situation in his report:

For example, in conditions of national crisis there could be preventive deployment at the request of the government or all parties concerned, or with their consent; in inter-State disputes such deployment could take place when two countries feel that a United Nations presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities; furthermore, preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border alone. In each situation, the mandate and composition of the United Nations presence would need to be carefully devised and be clear to all.<sup>22</sup>

The Secretary-General notes that preventive deployment could take form in a variety of ways; 1) an interstate deployment, where each side or party consents to a United Nations presence, 2) fear of attack by one country by another,

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid. p. 30.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid. p. 30. NOTE: presently, the superpowers (ie. the United States and Russia) are loath to give up such information, fearing that divulging such information would compromise the secrecy of these assets. One way to get around this would be to have the organs which monitor satellite operations provide information instead of merely giving access to the United Nations. However, it could be criticized that those organs would be selective in their sharing of information, perhaps with the intent to use such information to their own advantage. But such discussion is academic; neither superpower has shown an indication toward agreement to such cooperation with the United Nations.

<sup>21</sup>S/24111, p. 8.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 8.

where the fearful government can request a force between it and its neighbor, 3) an intra-state deployment consented to by the sovereign government and the sub-national group(s) that request it. And, as part of pre-conflict preventive deployment, the use of demilitarized "buffer" zones to strengthen goodwill and provide both sides with assurances that no attack or hostile action takes place.

### Peacemaking

The active process of settling dispute must also be developed. It has been noted earlier that, too often, peacekeeping is left without a corresponding diplomatic initiative and therefore is left as a temporary solution trying to work as a permanent one.<sup>23</sup> However, in his report, the Secretary-General notes the several commitments to peacemaking made by the General Assembly and the Security Council, demonstrating the strides made in the realm of peacemaking. The problem, he points out, lies not with the United Nations but instead in the lack of will on the part of the parties in conflict, and the lack of leverage at the disposal of the United Nations in situations where will breaks down. Both Yugoslavia and Somalia demonstrate this problem. But there is also the lack of commitment by the Organization to settle disputes permanently; the thinking by the members still seems to be that, once peacekeeping is in place, the problem goes away. More commitment to settling the dispute permanently, after the peacekeeping force is in place, must be mustered.

### Pacific Responses to Assist in Settlement

To improve the response by the United Nations, the membership can do many things to contribute to the settlement of a dispute. First, diplomatic assays for peace can be supported. On this matter, the United Nations has been active in addressing the new conflicts. The partnership with the European Community, using such distinguished negotiators as Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen in Bosnia, and the partnership in Somalia with the

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<sup>23</sup>Malitza, p. 247.



various regional organizations, demonstrate this. The Organization should also make efforts in other ways to promote a lasting settlement, such as providing any material or service assistance needed that would promote peace. Boutros Ghali states,

If, for instance, assistance to displaced persons within a society is essential to a solution, then the United Nations should be able to draw upon the resources of all agencies and programmes concerned. At present, there is no adequate mechanism in the United Nations through which the Security Council, the General Assembly, or the Secretary-General can mobilize the resources needed for such positive leverage and engage the collective efforts of the United Nations system for the peaceful resolution of a conflict.<sup>24</sup>

Whatever provides for the facilitation of relaxed tensions and more reciprocal attitudes should be pursued by the United Nations. In this, peacekeeping operations can (and indeed have done so in the past) serve as an instrument of this assistance.

### Collective Security Measures

In instances where the parties themselves are intransigent, and will not cooperate fully with the peace process, the Chapter VII collective security arrangements should be supported and developed so that the organization can effectively deal with those involved who do not support peace. In cases where there is an identified aggressor, such arrangements would include diplomatic and economic sanctions, naval, air, and land quarantines, and in the last resort, military action by United Nations forces to enforce compliance with Security Council resolutions against acts of aggression. While the War in the Gulf demonstrates the way in which such a capability can be handled for the future, others argue that a United Nations collective security capability--and not just a United Nations-sponsored force--should be developed. This way, the force would be a true United Nations force, not subject to the policy of the one or the few nations who institute the force. To improve collective security would require essentially the same improvements as peacekeeping--the adequate supply of material, funds, and personnel, albeit on a larger scale. But, for collective security, much attention

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<sup>24</sup> S/24111, p. 12.

would have to be paid to training, improvement of command, control, communications, and intelligence abilities; in short, the United Nations force would have to learn how to fight as a cohesive unit. To do this, the Secretary-General appeals to member states under the stipulations of Article 43, which calls on states to make forces available to the Security Council, "not only on an ad-hoc basis but on a permanent basis."<sup>25</sup> Also, the Secretary-General advocates the development of the Military Staff Committee, the body established by the Charter with the task of commanding the collective security force. As the Gulf war has shown, the Cold War impediment to collective security is gone, there is new opportunity to develop it to its fullest potential as defined in the Charter.

A new idea that some offer could be defined along the lines of "pro-active collective security." Called a "trip-wire" security force, it would basically consist of a nominal and small United Nations force that is deployed at the request of one state that fears attack by another.<sup>26</sup> It would be situated in the state requesting the assistance, along the border with the menacing neighbor, and ideally serve as a deterrent to attack. Any attack against the country on whose soil the United Nations force is stationed would "trip" off a collective security action response by the Organization against the recognized aggressor. While such a plan essentially requires United Nations troops to act as "sitting ducks" awaiting attack, it is hoped that a sufficient collective security capability will be developed to back the deterrent role that the force would play. That way, such attack would never come; United Nations resolution would have achieved a credible deterrent.

### Peace Enforcement Units

The difficulties that the United Nations has faced in Bosnia and Somalia when it has tried to establish and maintain the peace often results in frustration that the Organization feels because it lacks the leverage to maintain a cease-fire even when the parties to conflict lack the will. What happens when one or all parties to conflict fails to keep the peace? Normal

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid. p. 13.

<sup>26</sup> "Brave Peacekeepers," Economist, V. 322, 11 January 1992, p. 12.

peacekeeping, since it relies upon consent, is frustrated. As Bosnia shows, the inability to guarantee a cease-fire confounds traditional peacekeeping. But, to ask a peacekeeping mission to enforce an agreed to cease-fire would essentially change the role and mission of peacekeeping. On the other hand, as both Bosnia and Somalia demonstrate, in certain situations, recourse to collective security would not be appropriate or feasible. To resolve this problem, the Secretary-General posits a novel idea:

Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peacekeeping forces and the expectations of peacekeeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilization of peace enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces.<sup>27</sup>

These units would fall somewhere between collective security and peacekeeping. They would essentially be collective security units, but tasked to perform a task that peacekeepers have traditionally done--monitoring a cease-fire. In addition, they would be similar to peacekeeping and different from collective security because they would be non-partisan--they would enforce a cease-fire against any side in a conflict that attempted to renege on it by attacking their enemy. Conversely, they would be different from peacekeeping because they would have sanction to enforce the cease-fire, irrespective of consent. To use an apt analogy, they would act more or less as neighborhood police officers sent in to settle a domestic dispute, there to force two bickering neighbors apart from one another. Together with peacekeeping and collective security, the peace enforcement units would cover the spectrum of disputes: collective security would cover outright attacks by belligerents against a neighbor, peacekeeping would serve as a goodwill tool to consummate an agreed-upon cease-fire, and peace enforcement would ensure the maintenance of peace by enforcing a cease-fire on bickering parties. The specifics of the particular conflict would determine which response would be used.

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid. p. 13.

### Peace-building

The third area of improvement in the overall response to international crises, that of peace-building, should also be pursued vigorously.<sup>28</sup> Boutros Boutros Ghali writes, "peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people."<sup>29</sup> The United Nations would participate in establishing cooperative projects between previously disputing parties once a peace has been settled. In essence, peace-building would be an attempt to consummate the peace by establishing stronger bonds between the disputing parties. Also, peace-building would be another way that seeks to address the underlying causes of dispute between people; by putting both sides to work in ameliorating a problem, the United Nations would also be eliminating that problem as a cause for future conflict. The future of the United Nations presence in Somalia serves as the best present example of the need for a developed peace-building capability.

The preliminary stage of peace-building actually involves the tasks traditionally performed by peacekeeping units in fulfilling their role of securing the peace. Activities that peacekeeping provides, such as disarming and disbanding the previously disputing sides, repatriating refugees and displaced persons, monitoring troop withdrawals, all would be considered the first stage in building the peace, and restoring the confidence of both sides. Once tensions have been reduced and a lasting settlement has been agreed to, advanced peace-building projects could then begin. These cooperative projects would link the parties in a single, mutual interest, one that provides benefit to all parties concerned. Examples of peace-building include

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<sup>28</sup> NOTE: Preventive diplomacy and peace-building serve as peace-time efforts in the United Nation's response Plan, whereas peacekeeping and peacemaking are the contingencies that to attempt to establish peace once conflict has broken out. In terms of the comprehensive plan envisioned by the Secretary-General in his Report, peace-building would therefore serve as the counterpart to preventive diplomacy. See the Secretary-General's report, S/ 24111, p. 16.

<sup>29</sup> S/24111, p. 16.

cooperative agricultural or resource developments, educational, scientific, and cultural exchanges, and looser travel restrictions, to name but a few. Peace-building would therefore be an attempt to solve some of the underlying causes to conflict: disputes over shared resources, for example, would be solved by joint projects for resource development. Boutros Boutros Ghali also points to the development of democratic institutions as an essential peace-building facet, one that demonstrates "the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic of political peace."<sup>30</sup>

### Other Improvements: Regional Organizations

In addition to strengthening its own house, the United Nations should begin improving cooperation with the regional organizations. Chapter VIII of the Charter spells out the general principles and guidelines for this relationship. Throughout the Cold War, bi-polar animosities often worked to subvert the relationship, putting the United Nations and the regional organizations of the world at odds with one another. In many instances, the regionals would view United Nations policies as biased in favor of their chief opponent. Also, nations would often "forum shop," that is, search for whatever international organization would be most sympathetic to its views in a conflict.<sup>31</sup> Now that the Cold War is over, there is also the hope to improve relations between the United Nations and the regional bodies.

The Secretary-General envisions a strong liaison and working relationship between the United Nations and the regional organizations. He states,

regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p. 17.

<sup>31</sup> Haas, p. 47.

contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.<sup>32</sup>

In this sense, the regional organizations would act as the regional link and resource in a conflict. The spirit of cooperation would be governed by the relationship established in Chapter VIII, and would acknowledge United Nations primacy in maintaining international peace and security. The regional organizations would provide their services when needed, and would even be relied upon by the Organization if it is decided that the regional organization is better suited to take the lead in conflict resolution. Examples of this cooperation exist right now. The arrangement between the United Nations, the European Community, and NATO in the Yugoslav crisis demonstrates such unity, as does the relationship between the Organization and the three regional organizations involved in Somalia.<sup>33</sup> With the cooperation of those countries involved in the United Nations and the regional organizations of the world, a working, collegial relationship would go very far in maintaining international peace and security.

## CONCLUSION

The threat of a proliferation of such conflicts as those in Bosnia and Somalia makes the need for improvement in United Nations crisis response pressing. The tricky situations that they present, and the difficult choices that they demand, must be taken by the world community as problem-solving tests in which the United Nations must develop itself in order to successfully resolve them. Such development, however painful it is now for the world community, will ultimately prepare the United Nations for similar difficult problems in this new era. Developing a new balance between collectivity and sovereignty will be essential in founding the new basis on which to act as a collective international body. By defining this new balance, one which enjoys the support and approval of all its constituents, the

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<sup>32</sup>S/ 24111, p.18.

<sup>33</sup> NOTE: These organizations are the following: The Organization for African Unity, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

membership will therefore provide itself with the means for determining what the exact role for the United Nations in a given crisis, be it as a mediator or an enforcer. The shift in the balance on the issue of humanitarian aid, for example, is a positive step for the United Nations. Further such shifts are important, for they will provide the membership a framework when deciding on an appropriate United Nations response, be it a peacekeeping mission, a peace-enforcement mission, or a collective security force, that will be most effective in dealing with the crisis at hand. Bosnia and Somalia serve as effective indications of how such determinations should be made.

To provide itself with these capabilities, as well as all the other aspects attendant to a United Nations response plan, there are many improvements and new ideas which will be essential to implement. The suggestions mentioned above are, in my opinion, the key improvements which need to be made. Peacekeeping must be clearly defined, so that will not in the future be tasked to do a job that it fundamentally is not meant to do. It also must be supported financially and politically; in short, all of the attendant essentials to peacekeeping must be met fully for peacekeeping to work. But it must not remain the only response to crisis; for too long during the Cold War, peacekeeping was left without the support that a holistic crisis response plan would have provided. A comprehensive plan, incorporating peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, peace-building, cooperation with regional organizations, simply must be developed as well. Having such a holistic response capability will ensure that crises in the future will be fully treated. Peacekeeping in the new world order will be as an integral part of a whole United Nations response.

But in the end, the responsibility for all of this improvement will inevitably rest on the shoulders of the member-states themselves. In essence, that in turn will depend on the people of the world in general. In a recent interview on the subject of the future of United Nations power in the post-Cold War world, Brian Urquhart noted, "the question really comes down to whether governments can get enough support from their own people to lift their sights from short-term concerns to the long-term project of safeguarding the future."<sup>34</sup> In this context, then, the answer to the question, "what is the

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<sup>34</sup>Urquhart, Brian "The Limits to Sovereignty (Interview With Brian Urquhart, Former Undersecretary General of the United Nations, 1974-1986)," New Perspectives Quarterly v. 8, no. 4 Fall 1991, pp. 24-28.

role of peacekeeping in the new world order" would be "whatever the world decides it to be." For peacekeeping, or any other collective response for that matter, is ultimately dependent upon the will of the membership, which are in turn dependent upon the will of their people and their leaders. The crises in the world demand such determination. The new era has afforded the United Nations--the world--an unprecedented opportunity. The world must find the will and the determination to grasp it.

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