The Requirements of Citizenship in a Modern Democracy

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The Requirements of Citizenship
in a Modern Democracy

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by
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The Requirements of Citizenship
in a Modern Democracy

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The Requirements of Citizenship in a Modern Democracy

Thesis: Our current understanding of citizenship is grounded in our culture of individualism and results in a flawed conception of the good citizen in our liberal democratic state.

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The Requirements of Citizenship in a Modern Democracy

Does our current understanding of citizenship lack substance? What is required, if anything, of a citizen in a modern democracy? What obligations do we have to each other?

Ours seems to be a culture based on individualism. This individualism is far from completely negative. To a great extent this individualism supports, and is an essential justification for, democracy. For as Robert Bellah states, in his book Habits of the Heart, our belief in individualism fosters the fundamentally democratic notion that that "Anything that would violate our right to think for ourselves, judge for ourselves, make our own decisions, live our lives as we see fit, is not only morally wrong, it is sacreligious" (142). Positive individualism supports what Robert Dahl calls, in his book Democracy and Its Critics, the presumption of personal autonomy. Dahl defines this presumption by saying, "In the absence of a compelling showing to the contrary, everyone should be assumed to be the best judge of his or her own good or interests" (100). This presumption of autonomy is essential to our democratic society—for there seems to be no other justification for espousing the ideal of self-government. Therefore, to the
extent our sense of individualism supports a recognition of the autonomy of all individuals it is a requirement of democratic citizenship.

The Problem

Unfortunately, this individualism so important to democracy may also be a democracy's greatest enemy. Returning to Bellah, we find that while individualism can be positive, it is also true that "some of our deepest problems both as individuals and as a society are also closely linked to our individualism" (142). Taken to extremes, individualism encourages the unlimited pursuit of personal fulfillment at the expense of the rest of society. As Fr. Virgil Michel states, in his book *The Social Question*, excessive individualism "glorifies the individual to the neglect of the social aspect of man's being" (10). Indeed, this criticism of individualism lies at the heart of the problems with our current definition of citizenship—a legalistic vision which requires little more of the citizen than that he/she respect another's individual rights.

Much criticism of the dominance of individualism focuses on this neglect of the "social aspect of man's being". Some critics believe that individualism presents a flawed notion of personal identity. Edward B. Portis has argued that strictly individual notions of citizenship are "psychologically untenable" (458). He claims that
individuals necessarily define themselves in social terms and a failure to recognize this makes political processes inherently unstable. William M. Sullivan similarly finds that much contemporary criticism of liberalism, often recognized—though perhaps unfairly in terms of contemporary liberal thought—as the philosophy behind excessive individualism, "concurs in the idea that human beings are intrinsically social, meaning that language, consciousness, and personal identity all develop within, and only within, a context of interaction" (39).

Periodically throughout this paper it will be useful to look at some anecdotal evidence of the notions of citizenship espoused or condemned. This effort will be made in the attempt to clarify an inherently slippery subject, a subject rooted in habits and attitudes more than facts and figures. In this spirit, we see the character of Margaret Oldham in Bellah’s book as one who fails to recognize the social aspect of an individual’s being. She is a therapist who preaches personal responsibility above all else. Unfortunately, Margaret’s "clear-sighted vision of each individual’s ultimate self-reliance turns out to leave very little place for interdependence and to correspond to a fairly grim view of the individual’s place in the social world", Bellah states (15). While Margaret is very self-aware, her vision of self rejects a connection with others, rejects the social aspect of her being. She
therefore has difficulty connecting with her own family, much less the larger society around her, as she describes her responsibilities to her children in strictly legal terms (82). Margaret's excessive individualism leaves her alienated from others, the inevitable result of a view of personal identity which recognizes no social connections. As Bellah states, "Self-reliance is a virtue that implies being alone" (15).

While perhaps the most fundamental complaint, the view that a culture based on individualism presents a flawed view of personal identity is far from the only source of criticism of individualism. Individualism also blinds us to our interconnections as members of community, encourages an overly adversarial notion of politics, alters the nature of our democratic processes, and finally, fails to allow us to recognize the potentials of public action. Each of these criticisms of our culture of individualism, expanded on below, exposes a flaw in our current conception of citizenship.

Let us now continue our exploration of the inadequacies of individualism as a guiding vision for citizenship. Individualism fails to recognize our interconnections in a complex modern society. Dewey states that, "The forces, springing from combination and institutional organization which controlled below the surface the acts which formerly issued from individuals, went unnoticed" (101). A focus on
individualism, by placing undue emphasis on supposedly isolated actors and actions, blurs our vision. When we fail to recognize the extent and the importance of our interactions, we fail to recognize our common problems and the ways in which they might be solved. For Dewey, the public is "eclipsed" by this failure—unable to come together to solve problems.

Brian Palmer, another character in Bellah's book, is "eclipsed" by his failure to recognize our interconnections. Brian is a successful businessman who is proud of his ability to rise quickly up the corporate ladder. His good is rooted in himself, only slightly attenuated by the legal rights of others. As Bellah states, "Even the deepest ethical virtues are justified as matters of personal preference. Indeed, the ultimate ethical rule is simply that individuals should be able to pursue whatever they find rewarding, constrained only by the requirement that they not interfere with the 'value systems' of others." (6). Brian and those like him fail to see the connections between individual goods and those of the rest of society. This blindness not only "eclipses" the ability of individuals to identify common problems brought on by our often hidden connections, but also prevents the collective search for answers to common problems.

Continuing our critique, individualism also fosters an adversarial notion of democracy. Adversarial democracy is
predicated on the belief that individuals with fundamentally different interests come to the government to compete for resources. While this system is often effective, to the extent that resources are divided efficiently, it hardly promotes cohesion and cooperation among citizens. Your fellow citizen in this conception is an enemy for whom you have no concern beyond the fact that he/she may want what you want, and you have no desire to share. Furthermore, the adversarial system fails to recognize interests that are unable to establish their voice (Mathews 275). One looks with particular concern at the position of the disadvantaged in our society. With little money and often little connection with the "system" or even other individuals, it is unlikely they will have a powerful interest group with which to compete for resources, and thus it is likely they will be forgotten. Perhaps worse, as Peg Michels states, "If you have a very privatized concept of public action, when you encounter somebody who is not like you, you want to pull out. You get hurt" (261). This fear of difference is a pariah in a pluralistic democracy— conducive to conflict, not compromise. Finally, and particularly salient considering our present state of affairs, while adversarial competition may provide for all during times of plenty, slow economic growth will leave increasing numbers, again we fear for the disadvantaged, out in the cold.
Excessive individualism also seems to have altered the nature of our democracy and changed the underpinnings of its legitimacy. While our democracy is based upon government by the people, a focus on distinct individual interests rather than common interests depends upon advocacy groups and lobbyists—and government for the people (Boyte 11). Citizens here are expected to do no more than sit back and watch these groups govern for them. Surely the complexity of our modern society necessitates the existence of mediating structures, but in government by the people these curbs on direct participation should be seen as necessary evils, not established ideals.

Similarly, citizens have come to be seen as more political consumers than activists, being further removed from the process of government and thus further removing the legitimacy of government by the people (Buchanan 283). The citizen simply consumes what the government provides rather than actively participating in the processes which determine that provision, rather than actively practicing self-government. Finally, the very stability of our government is brought into question by individualism because "our political parties and associations rest less on habits and affections and more on words and doctrines" (Wilson, Landy 209). The viability of public life is sustained by habits and affections which have meaning to the individual, and shaken by words and doctrines imposed on the individual. The
lack of substance in a political commitment based upon solely individual interests leaves little room for social bonds and much room for doctrinal, or even coercive, bonds.

Last in our criticisms of individualistic culture is its failure to recognize the potentials of government and community action. In speaking of the current state of cities, Norton E. Long notes that, "The dominant ethos is that of Locke, with its focus on property, individual rights, and a conception of government as a necessary convenience for limited purposes..." (6). These limited purposes of individualistic government fail to recognize the potentials for common action on the basis of common purposes. Individualism subsequently encourages passivity in public life. David Flacks analyzes the present state of mass movements as catalysts for social change in an article entitled "The Revolution of Citizenship". He discovers that:

The dominant culture encourages Americans to place their hopes for fulfillment not on collective action in the public sphere, but on the results of their individual efforts within the spheres of work, education and family. Accordingly, rather than endorsing ideological appeals to overthrow the powers that be, Americans in the majority have preferred to live within what amounts to a contract with them—a contract that allows elites to rule in return for continuing provision of the material basis for a "normal" life. (41)

This presents a disturbing view of citizen activity—or lack thereof—and acceptance based on wholey individual satisfaction, leaving the general public to fend for itself.
Bellah presents Mike Conley as the typical self-described "concerned citizen". In this type of citizen we see the lack of potential for public action brought on by individualism. As Bellah states:

Implicit in this designation is the idea that one can be a good citizen simply by being passively law abiding, and that one need become actively involved in public issues only when one becomes concerned about threats to the interests of one's self and one's community. (181)

Mike participates only when his interests are threatened. When the Department of Housing and Urban Development introduced plans that would have created some low-income housing in his community, Mike was motivated to work with his fellow citizens to stop the project (182). The community which he sought to preserve was not one in which people work together to solve common problems, but one in which otherwise distinct individuals come together only for the purpose of preserving their homogeneous enclave. Surely there is more to public action, community, and citizenship than the limited notion of participation espoused by Mike Conley and other "concerned citizens"—a notion which revolves solely around individual rights and security.

Ruth Sidel, in her book entitled On Her Own, also speaks of the failure of individuals to recognize the potentials of public action, a failure wound up in our culture of individualism. We can praise our modern emphasis on individualism for its contributions to allowing women to
participate in the labor force. By stressing individual responsibility, our society encourages young women to educate themselves and participate in the work force so that they can become financially independent of men. Yet while individualism in this respect has enhanced the personal autonomy of many women, it also seems to have discouraged their recognition of the potential for public action. Sidel uncovers the difficulty women have in balancing work and family life, and the subsequent artificial boundaries their individualism places on them. As she states of the women she spoke to, "Despite their concern, virtually none of the young women raised issues such as day care, parental leave, or the need to encourage the wider society to provide services for them and their children" (214). This failure to recognize the potential for public action stems from our by now familiar nemesis:

These young women have accepted an almost completely individualistic view of their future: that they as individuals will need to work out their conflicting pressures and demands, in some cases without the sustenance and support of the fathers of their children, and in virtually all cases without the support of their extended family, their community, or of the broader society. (214)

The individualism of our culture has limited the discussion of potential collective solutions to their, and our, problem. These women, and the society as a whole, need something more from their conception of citizenship than individualism can provide.
These flaws in our culture of individualism give rise to an obviously flawed view of citizenship in a modern democracy. While the flaws in individualism cataloged here are many: a flawed view of the person, a failure to recognize interconnections, an overly adversarial notion of politics, a alteration of the democratic system with increased consumerism, and a failure to recognize the potential of public action—the end result of the processes of each of them is alienation.

Our society is alienated from itself. We see ourselves as an aggregate of individuals, not a community of heterogenous, but fundamentally interdependent peoples who strive toward common goals or are willing to cooperate and deliberate where interests diverge. The culture of individualism, while at its base essential (again the presumption of personal autonomy), has gone too far and created a profoundly alienated society. A society in which individuals fail to recognize their need for others. A society in which individuals fail to recognize their interconnections, their common problems. A society in which individuals see conflict with other individuals as the only means of goal attainment. A society in which individuals are consumers of their government, not the controllers of it. A society in which individuals fail to recognize the potential of collective action. Our society is alienated from itself,
from its connections, and the potentials of those connections.

The elimination of this alienation, and the subsequent realization of a more meaningful vision of democratic citizenship, can be seen as the pursuit of a common good. A pursuit not of differentiation, but of unity in the pursuit of collective ends which might benefit us all. A common good which refers not to collectively defined ends forced upon individuals, for as argued below that would violate our first requirement of citizenship, but to the collective effort to secure and enhance the means necessary to allow all individuals to determine their own ends. This common good in democracy aims at distributing the opportunities for an ultimately self-defined though collectively influenced satisfying life equally among citizens, in turn enabling all individuals to practice their citizenship effectively. This common good is necessarily vague and relies on its citizens for deliberation and definition, as the meaning of securing and enhancing opportunities for all will vary. Nonetheless, we do know this common good cannot be pursued effectively in a culture of individualism which seems unable to recognize the potential extent of our collective problems and goals.

We now see that, for a variety of reasons, our modern culture of individualism leaves us alienated—and wanting—wanting a more satisfying conception of citizenship. The problems for democratic government inherent in the culture
of individualism have been hinting at the requirements of citizenship in a modern democracy. It is perhaps time to make those requirements explicit.

The Requirements of Citizenship in a Modern Democracy

A belief in the liberal essentials

Our modern democracy is based upon liberal principles. We believe all individuals must be considered the best judges of their own best interests—the presumption of personal autonomy. We believe in the basic equality of all individuals, and while this is far from absolute, the burden of proof is with the individual arguing for inequality. These essentials are to guide both the distribution of authority and the application of justice among citizens.

While these liberal essentials should not seem terribly controversial, it is from this point that our departure from common understanding about citizenship grows. It is from this point that we attack the failings of an individualistic conception of citizenship consistent with liberal thought, but inconsistent with a reduction in alienation or a pursuit of the common good. The liberal essentials are not enough to establish whom in our modern democracy would qualify as a good citizen. Our common understanding of citizenship is focused on individualism and a very limited subsequent requirement to respect individual rights. This notion is
fundamentally based upon the liberal essentials, and it is incomplete. However, It is important to note that the search for a broader and more complete conception of citizenship is not a search for compromise between the liberal essentials and some other notion--they are too important to risk compromise. Rather, we seek to add to the current understanding of citizenship, to build on the solid base provided by the liberal essentials, not to supplant them.

In short, while a belief in the liberal essentials is a fundamental requirement of modern democratic citizenship--it is not the only requirement. It cannot be the only requirement if we are to successfully move beyond the current culture of individualism which has left us alienated, and if we are to successfully pursue democracy with a vision of the common good.

A respect for community relationships

All of the problems we see with our current understanding of citizenship stem from our culture of individualism and the subsequent alienation it creates. The solution suggested by many thinkers in the area is an increased attention to community. We must be willing to explore the extent of our commonalities, meaning our shared problems, goals and solutions, rather than focus on our differences. Again, this is taken to be explicitly secondary to the liberal essentials--we seek cohesion and unity where
possible, not coercion, exclusion or separation where it is not.

A fundamental aspect of our respect for the possibilities of community is the need to put this respect into action—we must participate. We do not require leadership, but simple involvement within or outside of government that reflects a commitment to one's national, but most importantly one's local community. Money alone does not satisfy this requirement, it is both shallow and a probable violation of basic equality unless one can argue that one should rightly be able to buy inequality of participation. Volunteerism, rightly understood to be action with others, for others and not as the means to strictly individual ends, is a key to this participation.

Communication also of necessity flows from a respect for community relationships. Already covered in the liberal essentials is the necessity of respecting the opinions of others, but, as is consistent with the theme of expanding our vision of citizenship, we must go further. We cannot simply respect those with the loudest voices, we must pursue and communicate with all voices.

Knowledge

The third requirement of citizenship in a modern democracy stems directly from the first two. If we are to adequately understand the meaning of the liberal essentials,
or argue about them when their meaning is not clear, we must have knowledge. If we are to adequately respect and participate in our community, and communicate with our fellow citizens, we must have knowledge.

The knowledge required is both technical and deliberative. Technical knowledge refers to information about societal problems, the possible solutions to those problems, and the feasibility of those solutions. However, this technical knowledge is of value not only in and of itself, but also as it provides the context for deliberative knowledge. Deliberative knowledge refers to the ability to make judgements on the technical knowledge. One must be able to form judgements and defend those judgements to others, to deliberate with them. Similarly, one must also be able understand and evaluate the judgements of others. Both these judgements must account for both the liberal essentials and a respect for community relationships.

Here it becomes necessary to point out that the citizen who meets the requirements of citizenship in a modern democracy as presented here must be able to use both aspects of the necessary knowledge to question. Good reasons and arguments must be made for judgements, and good questioners must assure that this is the case. Therefore, it follows that while the liberal essentials must be respected by each citizen in a democracy, this is contingent on there being good reasons to want democracy in the first place.
Furthermore, what is required by the liberal essentials is often open to question. Indeed, the very espousal of these requirements is in itself open to question. It can thus be ironically stated that the citizen under the vision presented here must be willing to question this same vision. There exists here a dual process. The setting forth of requirements of citizenship here meets the need for deliberative knowledge, as it is an argument in favor of a particular judgement that can be defended to others. At the same time these judgements must be open to questioning, and hence, deliberation. The deliberating citizen must be able to both formulate and question good arguments, both build and tear down judgements.

Obviously, for practical reasons, the requirement of knowledge is seen to in turn require the communication and participation mentioned above. Yet it is knowledge which gives the necessary body to the other requirements even as it requires them. The reciprocal influences among each of the requirements must not be forgotten.

A Belief in the Liberal Essentials

The requirements of citizenship in a modern democracy have now been briefly set forth. To begin the complete exposition of the three requirements it is helpful to start with the philosophical underpinnings of the liberal essentials. This will not only aid in revealing exactly what
the liberal essentials are, it will also provide us with clues as to the inadequacies of these liberal essentials when taken alone to be the requirements of citizenship. Indeed, as the previous discussion of our alienating culture of individualism indicates, our current understanding of the requirements of citizenship is focused solely on these liberal essentials as they are embodied in our system of individual rights. As this current notion has alienated us and subsequently led to a failure to recognize the common good, the purpose of the following exposition is twofold: to argue that the liberal essential are still indeed essential, and to argue that we must build on them to prevent alienation and build on a common good—and emerge with a complete vision of citizenship.

To begin, let us first sketch the meaning of the liberal essentials. Strict definition of the liberal essentials is a profoundly difficult task. A belief in the liberal essentials does, however, rest fundamentally on two liberal and democratic ideals: a belief in the presumption of personal autonomy and a belief in basic equality. Yet the individual rights which spring from these ideals—to liberty, property, free speech, etc.—are many and must be defined and applied through a process of deliberation. The necessity of this deliberation stems from the fact that, as Charles W. Anderson states, "The great problem of liberal thought is that starting from essentially the same premises,
it is possible to construct very different kinds of political theory" (8). While our liberal essentials are strongly grounded in democracy, the difficulty still remains in defining what exactly the essentials or standards require, and which essential or standard should be prominent in a particular situation in which they conflict.

Anderson states that, "The first problem of practical liberal reason then is that formal liberal political theory cannot tell us which principle to apply to particular kinds of cases and controversies. This requires and act of judgement" (9). This search for the particular meanings and applications of the liberal essentials is then a matter of profound public concern, and hence the requirement of a belief in the liberal essentials spills into the requirement of a respect for community relationships—and its call for participation—and into the requirement of knowledge—with its focus on being able to form judgements. Again the reciprocal nature of the requirements of citizenship espoused here is seen.

The Liberal versus Communitarian Debate

Let us now take a look at our current philosophical understandings of societal interaction in a democracy to better understand our current conception of citizenship under the essentials, and how it might be improved. Currently we use the language of liberalism and individual
rights to describe our societal obligations. In this language we are given freedom from others, with little subsequent obligation to them other than a pledge not to infringe upon them. This liberalism so much a part of our society seems to counteract a discussion of the requirements of citizenship beyond a respect for individual rights. Yet before we rashly abandon liberalism, let us first examine its strengths and limitations for describing citizenship requirements in a democracy.

John Rawls contends that one of the fundamental tasks of political philosophy in a democratic society is the attempt to discover an underlying basis of agreement among citizens from which mutually acceptable standards of conflict resolution can be found (Fairness 226). It is important to note that Rawls' conception of liberalism is rooted in our democratic society. Therefore, when he speaks of "justice as fairness", the fundamental idea is that "of a society as a system of fair social cooperation among free and equal persons" (229). Accepting that democracy must in essence be a system of fair social cooperation among free and equal persons, Rawls finds his justice principles—our individual rights. These principles or standards must be agreed to by all citizens in a democratic society. The standards form not concrete answers to questions, but simply provide the base (in our language a base of liberal
essentials) under which no argument is allowed to fall in a democracy.

In other words, liberal theory gives us standards through which we can judge competing arguments in a democratic society. Those arguments or decisions which violate individual rights are cast off, those that pose no violation are not necessarily correct, only acceptable for further discussion. Therefore, the standards of liberal theory and individual rights do not present, as Rawls states, "a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons" (Fairness 229). Basic liberal theory of justice requires no more of the citizen than a recognition of individual rights, so that justice will be served in social cooperation.

The application of the Rawlsian principles of justice and liberal theory in general describes the system of individual rights so prevalent in our society. The standards by which we judge arguments and go about making collective decisions revolve around how those arguments and decisions effect individual rights. The importance of basic liberal rights should not be underestimated, for they are essential to the survival of democracy—they are the liberal essentials mentioned above—and a belief in them constitutes the first requirement of citizenship in a modern democracy.
The notions behind the liberal essentials provide the fundamental justification for democratic government. Because liberal ideas only prescribe the necessary means of deliberation (that they do not violate rights), and not the ends of that deliberation, the anti-democratic notion that society can be ruled by a group of experts who know how to find the "correct" end can be easily discarded. A majority that attempts to define a minority's ends would violate that minority's right to determine its own ends. In addition, in terms of the requirements of citizenship, liberal theory suggests--though crucially it does not require--that individuals need to participate in the discovery of answers to collective problems. As Rawls states, "we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a fully cooperating member of society over a complete life" (Fairness 231). Therefore, liberal theory, as a base level of standards which prescribe the acceptable means of social cooperation and not its ends, preserves democracy as it discards theories which violate individual rights and suggests participation.

Unfortunately, talk of individual rights brings to mind a society of self-interest in which all individuals are out for themselves, caring for no one but themselves and participating in collective action only to serve narrow personal goals. Individual rights are seen to divide, not unite. This vision seems far from Rawls' and contemporary
liberalism's own, yet the ideological notion persists. This notion seems to persist not only in the libertarian strain of liberal argument, but in common usage. Rawls believed that part of what was necessary for an individual to be a fully cooperating member of society, in addition to the capacity to recognize the fair terms of social cooperation encased in individual rights, was the ability to form a conception of the good (Fairness 233). This conception of the good was not to be interpreted only as those things pursued for the sake of the individual's benefit, but as also composed of those things pursued because of our connections to others. As Rawls states, "attachments and loyalties give rise to affections and devotions, and therefore the flourishing of the persons and associations who are the objects of these sentiments is also a part of our conception of the good" (233). This conception reduces alienation and fosters a notion of the common good in citizenship within the liberal essentials.

Rawls seems to suggest that what individuals pursue with the individual rights they possess will not revolve only around self-interest narrowly understood, but also around our connections to community and our societal sentiments and attachments which include others. Therefore, liberal theory in the ideal not only suggests that individuals should participate in democratic society, but also that this participation will not be only narrowly self-interested.
Unfortunately, while participation in a society or community on a level beyond one's own direct interest may be perfectly consistent with liberal theory—it is certainly not required. It is from what may therefore be called a failed (or perhaps unrecognized) emphasis on that which is beyond the individual's narrow interests, which subsequently lends focus to a concern for purely individual rights, that leaves us wanting more for a democratic conception of citizenship than liberalism alone can provide.

The inadequacy of liberal theory and individual rights centers around the fact that while a society in this vision may have citizens who participate in collective action and are more than narrowly self-interested, a far different vision is also perfectly consistent. Indeed, common thought on liberalism today (while seemingly at odds with the current philosophical thought) seems to encourage a vision of individualism; an individualism found above to be so consistent with societal alienation and so antithetical to the requirements of modern democratic citizenship. If society revolved only around the liberal essentials in terms of individual rights there would seem little direct reason to engage in any community activities, it simply would not be seen as necessary, so we would do our own thing.

In this light, Amy Gutmann, as she examines the communitarian critics of liberalism, recognizes that while a society that requires no more than that citizens recognize
the liberal rights of others may be perfectly liberal, "...it is certainly not the best society to which we can aspire" (Critics 320). Nor is this a perfect vision of what should be required of citizens in a democratic state. Therefore, because all that liberal theory requires of citizens is a recognition of the individual rights of others, it is severely lacking as basis for discussing the requirements of citizenship beyond the legalistic sense. The lack of further liberal requirements, as opposed to suggestions, seems to have led to a lack of recognition that there is more to a society and more to a citizen than the protection and recognition of individual rights.

The communitarians are the most contemporary critics of liberal theory. They generally argue that liberal theory is inadequate because it is not closely connected to the particulars or to the context of a given situation. While Rawlsian liberalism is abstracted from the context of an individual’s wealth, prestige, etc., it is not abstracted from society, from our democracy. Yet communitarians go beyond the abstract rights of liberals to contend that theories of justice must be found by interpreting traditions and shared understandings of the good in a society (Okin 42). The communitarian vision of individuals being fundamentally rooted in their communities and their traditions is a direct attack on the individualism of our modern society. As Alasdair MacIntyre states, "That
particular actions derive their character as parts of larger wholes is a point of view alien to our dominant ways of thinking and yet one which it is necessary at least to consider if we are to begin to understand how a life may be more than a sequence of individual actions and episodes" (Sandel 126).

Unfortunately, the communitarian focus on traditions and shared understandings is unable to provide us with standards of judgement. What is just may simply be what a majority or an elite group feels is intimated by tradition. It is then potentially acceptable for a minority to be used at the will of a majority if that is what tradition or the shared meanings of a community imply—as interpreted by the majority or the "experts". The minority may protest that this is undemocratic, as it certainly is, but so long as the dominant group defines what is democratic, as they interpret tradition, they are unlikely to have any luck. In this vision there are simply no objective standards to which the minority can appeal. Susan Moller Okin therefore rejects communitarian arguments because they necessarily rely on the subjective evaluations of those in the position to define the society's traditions and shared understandings—and domination often results (61).

Communitarians will argue that our traditions and shared understandings may change over time, presumably allowing for the rejection of things such as slavery which
were previously traditional and part of our shared understanding, but which we now reject. Indeed, MacIntyre states that, "A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition" (Sandel 144). When a society becomes incoherent with its traditions and understandings it will change in the interests of justice. However, yet again there are no objective standards to appeal to in order to judge the current society. Because individuals in the communitarian vision are so bound up in their community, they cannot step outside of it in order to judge and criticize. Therefore, for the white slave owner whose tradition and shared community understandings recognize slavery’s legitimacy there is no way to judge. The end result of this flaw is that, as Gutmann states, "A great deal of intolerance has come from societies of selves so ‘confidently situated’ that they were sure repression would serve a higher cause" (Critics 319).

The liberal essentials give us standards with which to judge the current functioning of our democratic society. The dangers inherent in failing to recognize the personal autonomy of individuals, for example, and the wide degree of inclusiveness that this autonomy implies can be seen throughout history. In the past both women and blacks (to name just a few) were seen as incapable of making the
decisions that would promote their own best interests. Because of this their true interests were often ignored.
Robert Dahl recognizes these historical injustices when he states, "the record of human experience argues decisively, so it seems to me, against the view that, as a general matter, the protection and advancement of the good or interests of any significant proportion of adults can safely be entrusted to others" (103).

While our primary concern here is with the essential requirements of citizenship assuming one is already a citizen in the legal sense, a look at the interaction of liberal and communitarian arguments regarding immigration is revealing. Rogers Smith contends that both liberal and communitarian ideals have been used to justify policies of immigration throughout U.S. history. While communitarians have been accused of glorifying the past as a model for the present, Smith criticizes communitarians not for glorifying, but for ignoring the results of communitarian ideals when formerly put to use in particular states' immigration policies. He states:

Generally...these writers have not paid detailed attention to the role the ideals they invoke actually played in the nation's past political and legal debates. This failing is a crucial one, for the actions that America's Governors have justified via these non-liberal ideals have frequently been disturbing. Community has often been pursued only through harsh exclusions and inequalities. (228)
Again, the communitarian ideal, taken alone without the liberal essentials, fails us.

Steve Johnson, as described in Bellah's book, subscribes to the exclusionary notion that Smith saw put forth by communitarians. He lives in a southern Californian lifestyle enclave of like-minded individuals and hopes to keep his community as homogeneous as possible (180). Bellah refuses to call Steve's place a "community", preferring to use the term "enclave" because it celebrates similarity, not diversity. The lifestyle enclave to which Steve aspires is socially segmented in that it includes only those with a common lifestyle. Bellah further states, "The different, those with other lifestyles, are not necessarily despised. They may be willingly tolerated. But they are irrelevant or even invisible in terms of one's own lifestyle enclave" (72). While Steve lives in a community only in the broadest sense of the word, we still see the danger created by a focus solely on community without a belief in the autonomy and equality of others in society—without a belief in the liberal essentials.

The political philosopher Christian Thomasius also recognized the potential dangers of a communitarian vision without what we are calling the liberal essentials. As Frederick M. Barnard states of him:

Thomasius's reluctance to speak of political associations as communities had its foremost source
in a deeply ingrained fear that beneath the benevolent image of the communitarian vision there lurked the danger of a highly problematic kind of unity. Problematic, because in order to find expression, it may involve potentially repressive forms of political homogenization. (Fraternity 598)

Yet Thomasius, while firmly grounded in the liberal tradition, was also wary of the excesses of complete individualism (597). Therefore, his rejection of the word community stemmed not from a rejection of all that community might stand for—for individualism alone was necessarily inadequate—but from a fear that the need for intrinsic consensus in order to belong to a community necessitated coercion or exclusion.

While liberalism does not go far enough in a vision of citizenship, communitarianism goes too far. The trouble lies primarily in the communitarian vision's attempt to define the ends of an individual, while liberals merely prescribe the means acceptable for individuals to derive their own ends. Amy Gutmann states that:

Liberal justice therefore does not provide us with a comprehensive morality; it regulates our social institutions, not our entire lives. It makes claims on us 'not because it expresses our deepest self-understandings,' but because it represents the fairest possible modus vivendi for a pluralistic society. (Critique 313)

Liberal standards situated in this manner serve to reconcile competing conceptions of the good life, rather than repress them.
Liberalism provides us with the liberal essentials which give us the standards by which we can judge our societal institutions. Hence, we must be wary of attempts to discard basic liberal rights. These rights must preserve democracy, the presumption of personal autonomy, and basic equality lest communitarian justice be allowed to justify rule by elites or the oppression of minorities with appeals to traditions and shared understandings which are necessarily subjectively defined.

The value of communitarian thought on the subject of political philosophy does not then rest in its refuting of the basic liberal essentials, but in its challenge to the notion that these values alone can create a society in which we would like to live. As Amy Gutmann states:

Communitarianism has the potential for helping us discover a politics that combines community with a commitment to basic liberal values. The critics' failure to undermine liberalism suggests not that there are no communitarian values but that they are properly viewed as supplementing rather than supplanting basic liberal values. (Critics 320)

Referring back to Smith's analysis of historical immigration policies, we find that while communitarian ideals often led to unfavorable results, a reliance on only liberal ideals also had severe inadequacies. Smith recognizes that a focus only on liberal individual rights comes at the price of maintaining viable political communities (230). As he states, "The nation's frequent rejections of liberal
conceptions of citizenship, particularly in times of stress, must cause us to doubt whether traditional liberalism can provide a sense of civic identity that will prove politically feasible or morally satisfying" (247). Therefore, for Smith, Gutmann, and for us here, it is essential that while we must preserve the essentials of liberalism, we must also seek to build upon them.

The communitarian concern for community and local decision making and participation is a valuable addition to the debate over what makes a good community and what should then be required of a citizen in a democracy. As an example of the potential communitarian capability of working within liberal rights, Gutmann suggests the pornographic bookstore. While respecting the right of free speech by not allowing the store to be banned, it is possible to simultaneously respect the values of community and democratic participation through local efforts to regulate the location of and the manner in which the store displays its wares (Critics 320). We must be true to the liberal essentials, but if we are to maintain a strong democracy the requirements of citizenship demand much more—specifically a respect for those communitarian values which constitute a respect for community relationships.

Again, the values of the liberal essentials and their subsequent focus on individual rights need not be the only values we recognize either for society or for citizens. Much
constructive criticism is to be taken from the
communitarians. It is therefore the case that "The worthy
challenge posed by the communitarian critics...is not to
replace liberal justice, but to improve it" (Gutmann,
Critics 322).

Before we move on to an exposition of the requirement
of a respect for community relationships that has been
strongly alluded to in the arguments of the communitarians,
it may be helpful to provide some anecdotal evidence of the
application of the liberal essentials, or the lack thereof.

Ted Oster, again in Bellah's book, fails to recognize
the liberal essentials. Ted is a lawyer who believes rigid
moral standards interfere with one's enjoyment of life.
Indeed, he recognizes no essential values or moral premises,
all values are simply instrumental to the individual's
attainment of satisfaction. Ted, "must act so as to produce
the greatest satisfaction of his wants or to express the
fullest range of his impulses" (Bellah, et al. 77).

Liberalism has often been unjustly accused of the value-less
instrumentality exemplified by Ted Oster. Yet modern
liberalism, particularly as it interacts with democracy, is
necessarily value-laden. The liberal essentials, while they
cannot prescribe the ends of Ted's actions, do prescribe the
means through which he might achieve those ends. To meet the
requirements of citizenship, Ted must abandon those
self-defined values which, while individually instrumental,
do not meet the adequate respect for others encased in the liberal essentials.

Now for the good anecdote. In the early sixties, George Anastaplo was declared "unfit" for admission to the Illinois bar because he refused to answer, on First Amendment grounds, questions pertaining to his possible affiliation with the Communist Party. While Anastaplo's belief in the liberal essentials forced him to stand his ground in this issue, the two characters from his hometown who supported him provide an even more interesting example of a belief in the liberal essentials. As Anastaplo states, "These two men were bitter political opponents while I was growing up. This is the only issue on which I have ever known them to agree" (111). These two men shared a belief in the liberal essentials which allowed them to overcome their differences. They met the requirement of citizenship which prescribes a base of beliefs necessary to a liberal democratic society, beyond this point they are free to continue their arguments.

What Should We Add to Citizenship?

A Respect for Community Relationships

We have now seen that a belief in the liberal essentials provides the fundamental base of citizenship in our modern democracy. Yet the above debate between liberals and communitarians strongly alluded to the need for something more—provided the liberal essentials were
recognized. This something more, as previously noted, is the requirement of a respect for community relationships. While drawing heavily on communitarian visions of society, the constraint remains, as the liberal essentials must come first if the repression and exclusion so antithetical to democracy are to be avoided.

It is now time to make explicit why the requirement of a respect for community relationships is necessary, what it would specifically require of citizens, and what this would do to stem the tide of societal alienation—and ultimately further the recognition of a common good.

The necessity of community has not been lost on thinkers in American history. As Rogers Smith argues:

While in comparative perspective the United States is a predominately liberal society, its political system has never been as fully liberal as the critics...presume—in large part because American law-makers have often decided that the liberal ideals did not respond adequately to the problems of community identity their society faced. (226)

The people of this country have therefore long recognized the failure of liberal principles, taken alone, to create the kind of society in which they would like to live. If citizenship were simply a matter of recognizing the liberal essentials, it would "fail to respond to desires and, indeed, moral claims for community solidarity that have always been potent in American politics" (228). Throughout
the history of our democracy people have looked to community to recognize the shared endeavors of government and to create more meaningful public lives.

Like Smith's exploration of the historical, David Mathews recognizes a strain of dissatisfaction with the current state of public life. He believes that there are "a group of unusual, different and insightful people who have a well-informed instinct that something is missing in politics as it is usually practiced" (271). Among this group are the communitarians, who believe that the answer to public problems lies in community resolve and cooperation, not in the self-interested pursuit of divergent goals.

The calls for community having been made, it is necessary to explore what a respect for community relationships would specifically require of citizens. Marshall Dimock describes a citizen rooted in community relationships when he states that, "The good citizen is interested, active, responsible. He/she seeks consensus and national unity" (24). Dimock believes many groups are beginning to recognize the power of consensus as they attempt to realize self-determination (22). Implicit in his analysis is the assumption that self-determination is the goal in democratic society and that far from implying individualism in citizenship, it actually requires the search for consensus for realization. This search for consensus respects the potentials of community
relationships, as opposed to the individualism which ignores those potentials, and hence fulfills a citizenship requirement.

John H. Buchanan Jr., as he describes the CIVITAS framework for civic education, states that, "The concept of community has always been a tenuous one, but recently it has been eroded by an overwhelming emphasis upon individual advancement, to the detriment of the common good"—no doubt an erosion due largely to a focus on only the liberal essentials as a requirement of citizenship (280). In this context, Buchanan sees the recognition of community as an essential part of the revitalization of citizenship education toward which CIVITAS aims. He believes that despite the pluralistic nature of our society, we share many common values which the "enlightened" citizen must recognize. Some of these values, such as a commitment to the "basic ideals and values of American democracy", we have already covered in the liberal essentials. But to these essentials Buchanan adds community, or "a commitment to the public welfare", which also requires, "virtues of the democratic citizen including toleration and appreciation of diversity, compassion, civility, following the rules of the game, and an acceptance of the need to compromise" (281). The notion behind these virtues is that the phrase "we the people" implies that, "we are a people: that we recognize our kinship, our commitment to each other's well being, and
our sharing of a common destiny"—that we recognize community (281). The underlying theme, both for Buchanan and for us, is one of a respect for the potential and the value of community relationships in a democratic society.

David K. Hart also begins his speculation on what is required of the "virtuous citizen" with the stipulation that he/she must be grounded in what he calls the American regime values. His American regime values can be seen as similar to our liberal essentials, and as Hart states, these values or essentials must be believed to be true, "not just that the majority accepts them or that they are psychologically gratifying, but that they are true" (114). Hart then goes on to contend, as is being done here, that more is required. Essential to the realization of the American regime values is the notion of civility, which includes forbearance and tolerance (116). The respect for community relationships inherent in these additional values allows citizens the capacity to live together for common, as well as individual purposes.

Cecilia Dougherty, in Bellah's Habits of the Heart, is an individual with a respect for community relationships. As Bellah states, "she exemplifies a form of individualism that is fulfilled in community rather than against it" (162). Cecilia is active in her local community, working for a local attorney involved in progressive causes, and serving as an elected official of city government (159). She sees in
her commitment to community a responsibility to care for others. Far from being alienated from her community by individualism, Cecilia is driven by a concern for the public welfare that is part of her very identity. Individuals like Cecilia Dougherty lead Bellah to speculate that:

Perhaps the notion that public life and private life are at odds is incorrect. Perhaps they are so deeply involved with each other that the impoverishment of one entails the impoverishment of the other. Parker Palmer is probably right when he says that 'in a healthy society the private and the public are not mutually exclusive, not in competition with each other. They are, instead, two halves of a whole, two poles of a paradox. They work together dialectically, helping to create and nurture one another. (163)

The call for a respect for community relationships is not a new one, for the inadequacies of narrow individualism as reinforced by the a look only at the liberal essentials have long been recognized. The virtues required of the citizen who respects community relationships include: a concern for and interest in the public welfare and the community itself, toleration and an appreciation of diversity, civility and personal responsibility, a search for consensus, and a recognition of the need for cooperation and compromise where no consensus exists. These virtues revolve around the essential notion that we in a liberal democracy are bound together in more than legal ways and that the best society we can hope to achieve requires a vision of ourselves not as a collection of alienated individuals, but as a community of interrelated peoples
striving toward the common good. The alienation resultant from our current understanding of citizenship must be attacked through the requirement of a respect for community relationships.

However, before we explore the specifics of how a respect for community relationships would combat the alienation of our modern culture of individualism, it is first necessary to clarify the type of community we seek. What we need is not so much a recovery of community as the formation of it. This is not to say that fine communities have not existed which could give us models, only that too often we look at our past communities with an uncritical eye. As Marshall Dimock analyzes what he calls the "eclipse of sturdy citizenship" he speaks against the individualism of the present day. No argument there, but he goes on to describe this "philosophy of selfishness as contrasted with the ethical-altruistic view which was previously the dominant motif" (22). Certainly there is much to be said for past communities and their virtues, as de Tocqueville will tell you, yet it is misleading to say that we simply want to recover them.

History tells us quite explicitly that communities in the past, and indeed still today, have justified exclusion and discrimination in the name of unity and a particular good. The citizen in our conception does not want to recover the community of the past simply because it often violated
the first requirement of citizenship—a belief in the liberal essentials, which cannot be compromised. The kind of community we would like to form or develop or even recover is that kind of community which respects the liberal essentials at its base, from which it pursues its own virtues. Robert Bellah rejects the very term "community" when it applies to what he terms a "lifestyle enclave" of similar, like-minded individuals who segregate themselves from those who are different. In our context here, a belief in the "lifestyle enclave" can be seen as a rejection of the liberal essentials, which respect diversity and equality. Bellah therefore reserves the term community for that "which attempts to be an inclusive whole, celebrating the interdependence of public and private life and of the different callings of all..." (72). We would do well to do likewise.

Joe Gorman, in Habits of the Heart, has a profound commitment to and respect for his community. Joe's goals are defined within his community, not strictly by personal preferences. He believes that his community has deteriorated since he was a boy, and hence yearns for a recovery of its more glorious days. Yet while it seems foolish to suggest that Joe does not meet the citizenship requirement of a respect for community relationships, we must be wary of the community which he wants to recover, as it might violate the liberal essentials. As Bellah states, "The past was almost
certainly never as relaxed and innocent as Joe nostalgically remembers it", and, "a dangerously narrow conception of social justice can result from committing oneself to small town values" (12). Furthermore, a recently proposed HUD grant for Joe's community was rejected by townspeople who feared the presence of blacks and Cubans in the low-cost housing units. Bellah states the violation of the liberal essentials, "Townspeople appealed to the unity and integrity of their tradition-rooted community to justify segregationist policies" (13). While Joe disagreed with the HUD grant decision, it seems his nostalgic and uncritical look at his own community might inadvertently force him to violate the first requirement of citizenship, a belief in the liberal essentials, even as he staunchly practices the second requirement, a respect for community relationships. While we can applaud the latter, we must be wary of the former, for there can be no compromise.

With our vision of community so situated, the citizenship requirement of a respect for community relationships can now be seen to combat each of the culture of individualism's alienation-causing tendencies. Stated again, they are: a flawed view of the person, a failure to recognize interconnections, an overly adversarial notion of politics, an alteration of the of the democratic system with increased consumerism, and a failure to recognize the potential of public action.
Perhaps most obviously, a respect for the value of community relationships attacks the notion that we are all atomistic individuals without connections, attacks what many call a flawed view of the person. While Christian Thomasius, as noted above, was wary of the power of consensual communities to exclude and suppress, he did not believe in the atomistic individual. As Frederick M. Barnard states of him:

On the contrary, the autonomy that Thomasius envisages is held to be wholly compatible with the belief in human interdependence, with the conviction that humans cannot exist as humans without the help of others. And it is precisely this muted belief in individual autonomy that distinguishes the ethical individualism of Thomasius from later theories of liberalism... (Fraternity 588)

(Note that the wording "muted belief in individual autonomy" is misleading for our purposes here, as it may seem to imply a muted belief in the liberal essentials—which cannot be compromised or diluted. This is not misleading if we distinguish between individual autonomy and the personal autonomy argued for under the liberal essentials. It is possible to reject, as I believe was Thomasius' intent, the atomistic liberal notion without rejecting the liberal notion that the individual is the best judge of his/her own best interests.) Thomasius therefore believed that it was essential that we interact with others if we are to be all that we can and should be as individuals (592). In this light, he attempted to reconcile individualism with mutual
dependence. The individualism Thomasius rejected presented a flawed view of the person, a view that could only be corrected by a respect for what we call here community relationships.

Edward B. Portis concurs in the rejection of individualism as defining the individual. As he states, "...even under ideal circumstances individuals can find fulfillment, indeed can best maintain themselves as individuals, only through seeing themselves as genuine members of some sort of social entity" (472). The community provides the "social entity" of which Portis speaks. Similarly, Bellah finds community essential as he recognizes that "the individual self finds its fulfillment in relationships with others in a society organized through public dialogue" (218). A respect for community relationships and the subsequent virtues this respect implies, as described above, reflects a more pleasing, and most would say a more accurate, view of the person than does a focus only on the liberal essentials—which tend to accent our separations, not our common fulfillments.

Moving our attack of individualism along, a respect for community relationships also requires that we recognize the interconnections among us all, that we see the connection between our public and private lives. Harry Boyte laments the decline in power of citizen activism because, as he states:
In these terms, the problem as identified by C. Wright Mills as the basic dilemma of our times must be the starting point: "People in a mass society are gripped by personal troubles which they are not able to turn into social issues. They do not understand the interplay of these personal troubles of their milieu with problems of social structure." Activity to renew and repair the ties dissolved by "mass society" is the most elemental remedy. (330)

A respect for community relationships can be the "elemental remedy" to the problem of alienation which makes us incapable of recognizing the problems which plague us all and how those problems might be best addressed.

John Dewey also stresses the need for a recognition of our interconnections as the means to discovering and then resolving our common problems. He defines the public as those people affected indirectly by the consequences of other individual's actions. It is therefore essential that individuals recognize the impact of their actions on others so that we can collectively, "secure consequences which are liked and eliminate those which are found obnoxious" (34). For Dewey, the recognition of our interconnections then revolves around the need for community. Dewey calls the "Great Community" "a society in which the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences of associated activities shall be known in the full sense of the word, so that an organized, articulate Public comes into being" (184). Community so situated removes our alienating failure to recognize our interconnections. And as this community removes our alienation, it fosters our democracy, "for
democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion", Dewey states (184). In these terms it is apparent that a respect for community relationships is an essential requirement of democratic citizenship.

The notion of adversarial democracy perpetuated by our culture of individualism has also alienated many. Louis C. Gauthrop decries the focus which it seems adversarial democracy puts on the principle of majority rule. He speaks of the focus this in turn creates not on the quality of our relationships, but on their quantity. The quantifiable vote has alienated those who want a higher quality of participation. As Gauthrop states, "What should have been learned over the past 200 years of experience with a mechanistically applied doctrine of the public interest [majority rule] is how it has contributed to the denigration and atrophy of the notions of citizen, citizenship, and the art of government" (105). While the quantity of relationships is also a concern to the requirement of a respect for community relationships (discussed later in terms of participation), the quality of those relationships is essential to their efficacy, the defeat of alienation, and hence the practice of citizenship. In community, individuals come together as mutually interdependent individuals to search for common solutions to common problems, not as adversaries concerned with only their own well-being. The quality of public relationships, which are
inhibited by adversarial processes, can be fostered through a respect for community relationships.

F. Stevens Redburn states that, "Community development—in its literal, not its current official sense—requires that people seek a synthesis of interests with others who share the same environment" (159). The message is that if we are to grow and achieve our collective ends we must do more than compete as adversaries for limited resources. We must attempt to seek consensus, and compromise where consensus is not available, so that we can all benefit in times of scarcity. In an adversarial system many lose, many are alienated. The requirement of a respect for community relationships moves beyond this to a search for unity of purpose and gain, toward cohesion—not conflict.

Further cataloging the need for a respect of community relationships, we note that the culture of individualism has altered the purposes of our democracy from a system of self-government to a system of government to be consumed. As Harry Boyte states:

In America—perhaps the preeminent case of uprootedness from historical wisdom, communal ties, and cultural identities—our very understanding of politics has consequently become degraded. "Politics" as normally understood focuses narrowly on personalities, various forms of advocacy for the people instead of by the people, and the activities of government rather than the people themselves. (11)

If we are to recover the notion of self-government from the alienating hands of consumerism we must turn to, in Boyte's
words, "the renewal, empowerment, and interconnection of communities of many sorts..." (11).

Terry L. Cooper notes our altering system from the perspective of a public administrator. He believes that a focus on technical expertise will "reinforce the role of the politically passive citizen who views government as a provider of public services, on the one hand, and the role of the professional administrator who views the citizen as a consumer, on the other" (147). This consumer notion is fostered by the conception of the citizen as a self-interested individual interested only in what he/she can get from the system. Therefore, individualism encourages government by experts, for individuals—instead of government by the people, for the people. A requirement of citizenship which stipulates a respect for community relationships has the potential to restore the focus of government into the hands of the people, simultaneously removing our alienation and protecting us from the experts Tocqueville so long ago referred to as "benevolent schoolmasters".

Finally, we address the lost vision of the potentials of government and collective action under individualism. Perhaps we should shiver as Wilson Carey McWilliams contends that, "The American citizenry is an audience. Active citizens attend, but they do not perform; they are listeners rather than speakers, and their political role consists, for
the most part, in judging rather than proposing" (206). While judgement is certainly an important aspect of citizenship (as will be discussed later under the knowledge requirement), McWilliams' fundamentally passive notion not only alienates as it alters the democratic system, as stated above, it also alienates as it fails to recognize the potential of popular government and community action. This is the final problem our culture of individualism has created which the requirement of a respect for community relationships is intended to resolve.

The potential of community and popular government has often been downplayed by liberal thinkers who have argued that the government must stay out of the individual's life lest oppression result. It is this very fear that has kept the requirements of modern democratic citizenship advocated here so firmly grounded in the liberal essentials. Yet, as Harry Boyte states, "at times the advocates of the new community movement have perceptively pointed out that liberal or left-wing approaches, which slight or marginalize communal bonds as hopelessly parochial impediments to justice, ignore its foundations" (12). Therefore, while the liberal essentials must come first, we would do well to recognize, as the requirement of a respect for community relationships attempts, the potentials of community foundations—which emphasize unity, defining common
purposes, building common ground, and searching for consensual answers to common problems whenever possible.

Much can be done in community and in public action once the potential is recognized. As David Mathews states, "What makes people willing to act is seeing the possibilities they did not see before" (277). The culture of individualism alienates us from the potentials of public action, the requirement of a respect for community relationships fosters the recognition of this potential. Our citizenship requirement fosters the search for consensus and the concern for public welfare that are conducive to potential public efficacy and productivity. We must see ourselves as actors in public life, not simply an audience to or consumers of it. Once we recognize this potential we have gone a long way toward effective community and public action that can benefit all toward the common good.

We have now exposed how the citizenship requirement of a respect for community relationships would specifically attack the alienating culture of individualism's notion of citizenship. We have, in turn, exposed an alternative and more satisfying vision of citizenship in democracy. This vision strives not only to combat alienation, but also to realize the common good—which recognizes that we have commitments and connections to each other which are essential to the security and enhancement of each of our lives. It is now necessary to bring to light two key
elements which allow for the practice of the requirement of
a respect for community relationships and its vision.

Participation

What has been alluded to, and what will now be made
explicit, is the central citizenship requirement necessary
if a respect for community relationships is to be put into
action—participation. Participation is the action which
returns the nature of our democratic system to a focus on
self-government, and allows the recognition of the
potentials of community and public action to be realized.
Participation may be the evidence of alienation lost, and
hence we can never see enough of it.

David Mathews analyzes three modern groups whom he
feels see something missing in our modern politics, and for
each of these groups participation is key. They all seek
something more than a conception of citizenship based solely
upon the liberal essentials can give them. Something more
than the legalistic requirements of respect for other
individuals. As Mathews states of those individuals he calls
"seekers", they "are looking for is the kind of politics
that engages them personally. They want to do it with their
own hands. They want to feel it in a personal way that
strikes more to the center of their being than writing a
letter, making a contribution, or even voting in an
election" (272). Another group, the "Publicers", are
individuals who know how to get things done and attempt to
do so in communal, grass-roots oriented style. Finally, and
perhaps most interestingly, we see the communitarians (an
interesting name in light of our previous discussions).
Mathews draws their picture:

Their sense is that the problem [any problem] is not
well understood as an isolatable kind of bad virus.
They see "their problem" as resulting from behaviors:
Things people do or fail to do. The support structures
for people are not present, so Communitarians view the
community as the network capable of providing the
support, caring, and nurturing necessary to do the
things that cannot be done—or are not being done—
because of some other social dysfunction. (273)

The communitarians put the responsibility of action on
common problems squarely on their own shoulders, and the
shoulders of those in the community around them. Individuals
must participate in their community if problems are to be
solved. Each of these groups, out of dissatisfaction with,
and we might speculate alienation from, the current
understanding of public life, goes beyond the first
requirement of citizenship in a modern democracy to
actualize, through participation, the second--a respect for
community relationships.

In an interview with Harry Boyte, Peg Michels speaks of
the same notion of citizen responsibility and obligation to
participate that were reflected in Mathews' three groups,
particularly the communitarians. As she states, "When people
identify their self-interest, you can frame it in terms of
accountability. What are you going to do about these things? I've found it's not difficult to call people on blaming tactics. People know that the responsibility lies partly with them" (261). If the "self-interest" spoken of here can account for public and communal responsibility, in other words if it is "rightly understood" in terms of our requirement of respect for community relationships, then we again see a call for our citizenship actualized as an obligation. Indeed, this notion of citizen accountability turns the notion of elected official accountability so essential to consumer citizenship on its head. While we must not derogate the necessity of official accountability, we can criticize the liberal notion that in a democracy this accountability is not necessarily a two-way street. The citizen must participate in the search for the solutions to common problems, and help to implement those solutions once found. Such is the nature of the requirement of a respect for community relationships.

The citizen's responsibility to participate is not without historical roots. William Sullivan notes that the civic republican tradition in our society has long rejected the historically liberal idea that individuals exist outside of their social bonds. As Sullivan states:

Instead, the republican tradition has taught that there is an ineluctably participatory aspect to political understanding that develops only through the moral maturation of mutual responsibility. Genuine political
understanding, while it can be heightened by conscious reflection, is thus tied to specific experiences of political practice. (21)

Participation here is recognized as an essential form of learning about society, as well as aiding in the realization of its collective goals. The citizenship requirement of a respect for community relationships is fostered in either instance.

Yet despite these historical roots, the obligation to participate is far from easily recognized, as our familiar nemesis, the culture of individualism, arises once more. An over-reliance on individualism undermines the participation of individuals in public life, as we are taught to believe we need be concerned with only our own individual lives. Therefore, most Americans today find a desire to participate in public affairs and community only when they freely choose to do so, which is only when they see their most direct interests involved (Bellah, et al. 198).

Yet participation is an essential aspect of democracy as it enables us to solve problems together, seemingly a must under the presumption of personal autonomy put forth by the liberal essentials. The presumption of personal autonomy, far from requiring that everyone leave everyone else alone, dictates participation. If one cannot be the best judge of another's interests, the latter individual must participate in order to assure that his/her interests are recognized. Therefore, despite its contradiction with
the present thought of our time, participation is an
obligation of modern democratic citizenship both because it
actualizes the respect for community relationships as stated
above, and because it is essential to the life of personal
autonomy as put forth in the liberal essentials.

Volunteerism is an essential aspect of the
participation spoken of here. Brian O'Connell argues that
volunteerism is currently not given the respect it deserves
in academic literature, and that we must begin to fully
recognize its potentials. O'Connell is the president of the
Independent Sector, which has as its mission the empowerment
of citizens and investment in the labor-intensive voluntary
sector in order to "better serve people, community, and
causes" (311). A current campaign to increase volunteerism
is entitled "Daring Goals for a Caring Society", which
includes a standard of personal participation. This
standard, known as "Give Five"—five percent of your income
and five hours of your time each week to a chosen
cause—gives individuals a goal toward which to strive
(312-313). The establishment of such a standard may prove a
catalyst toward volunteerism, though there is much work to
be done, as a 1981 Gallup pole found that 70 percent of the
population had spent one or less hours during a three-month
period in volunteer activities of any kind (McGregor 132).
Yet the effort must be made, for as O'Connell states, "Among
the crucial factors that preserve that democracy [of the
United States] and those freedoms are active citizenship and personal community service" (314). In this light we see participation through volunteerism as an essential way in which the requirements of citizenship in a modern democracy can be met.

However, it must be pointed out that the requirement is realized only if the volunteerism is rightly understood for our purposes here. The volunteerism must be done with others, for others. The whole idea behind a respect for community relationships is that we are connected in important ways and that because of this we must strive to act together in the pursuit of common goals and the common good. If we are to be consistent with this vision, as citizens we must make the attempt to work with other citizens toward other than narrowly self-interested goals. Volunteerism designed to relieve our guilt after we have pursued narrow interests which have harmed others in the business world does not count. Volunteerism aimed at increasing one's job opportunities does not count. What counts is volunteerism which aims at the common good, not just the good of the self. These two types of good will often overlap, as the line between self and other-motivated actions is a fuzzy one. Nevertheless, the line can be drawn. A respect for community relationships is realized only when volunteerism is rightly understood to be the realization of
a commitment to work with and work for the community and others.

Ed Schwartz, in Bellah's Habits of the Heart, actualizes a respect for community relationships through participation. Ed has worked as a leader of the Institute for the Study of Civic Values, and is an advocate of citizen education (214). Through his participation, Ed attempts to refute the notion of citizenship which requires only that one's particular interests be advanced. He encourages a notion which respects community relationships, which attempts to see the individual in terms of a larger whole, with the obligations that follow. His participation therefore revolves around a need to work in the community to empower those who do not now participate, and a concern for the public welfare which leads him to stimulate cooperative efforts among local institutions of self-help (216). While one need not devote one's entire life to the practice of a respect for community relationships, Ed Schwartz provides a model for doing so which makes him a good democratic citizen, even as he works to make others the same in his pursuit of the common good.

Similarly, Marra James, also in Bellah's book, recognizes the need for participation in the practice of citizenship within community. She speaks of the alienation which results from the failure to realize community when she states that "Lonliness is a national feeling", yet she does
not despair—she participates (158). She is extremely active in her attempts to establish community for both herself and others, even in the face of failure. As Bellah quotes her, "I sometimes describe myself as a rubber ball, I've been pushed down sometimes to where I've almost been pressed flat, but I've always been able to bounce back" (158). Her perseverance in the face of defeat in the public sphere is admirable, showing a true commitment to and respect for community relationships and the practice of citizenship.

It should be noted that the participation spoken of here does not necessarily mean participation within government. In fact, it may often argue against participation within government. The groups discussed above as explicated by Mathews' all found government limited for their terms of participation—so they turned to community. For them, no government could ever create its own legitimate purposes, build common ground, generate political will, or transform private into public citizens. It is henceforth the self-appointed obligation of these groups to realize these goals (276). Yet, as Mathews states, "Neither are they in the group that says, 'look, the government has really messed up. It can't do anything right. We have to give this all to the private sector.' They don't belong in either camp (273). These participators recognize the potential of public and community action, both within and without government,
whichever way the respect for community relationships can be best achieved.

It should also be noted that participation is not valued as a good in itself, but only as it recognizes and realizes both the liberal essentials and the respect for community relationships. The danger of participation taken alone can often be seen in the modern day interest group. As Terry L. Cooper states, "The emergence and growth of the very interest groups which demand and generally receive greater participation in the political process has not always been accompanied by a broad sense of obligation for the common good" (147). To recognize and realize the citizenship and the common good as presented here, participation must show concern for more than the individual's narrow interests, the needs of others must be recognized and pursued. If the larger communal and societal needs are not recognized by interest groups, participation in them merely perpetuates the culture of individualism, and the alienation of those who have no advocacy group. The interest group would merely symbolize the notion of adversarial democracy and the promotion of solely individual interests, leaving the rest of society to fend for itself. The participation required here must be conducive to the respect for community relationships of which it is but a part. It must be remembered that participation, while essential, is only one aspect of our citizenship
requirements. As Wilson Carey McWilliams states, "while political participation may encourage or develop citizenship, the two things are not identical: citizenship is participation with at least some regard for the whole" (204).

Communication

Communication, while akin to the notion of participation, should also be noted as an essential aspect of a respect for community relationships. It is a specific form of participation which requires that we get out, talk to, and interact with our fellow citizens. We cannot simply listen to advocacy groups for particular interests, we must listen to those who may not want, at first, to talk because they are alienated from their government, their community, and worst of all their neighbors. It does not have to be this way; we must strive to remove the alienation and discover the voice. As Peg Michels reflects on her activity as a campaign field director she states, "I discovered that even in a small space of time, people can form judgements and learn about issues, if they are posed in a particular way. People are hungry for conversation" (260). The "particular way" to engage communication is through a respect and concern for the individual's point of view, interests, and concerns—through a respect for the liberal essentials. The result of this communication is the
recognition of and increased respect for the value of community relationships, a fundamental notion in a modern democracy and hence a requirement of democratic citizenship.

Communication is conducive to the integration of individual viewpoints which is essential to binding individuals together in a common purpose. The aggregation of individual preferences so prevalent in a society which stresses individualism is conducive not to a search for common purpose, but to the alienation of those who lose in the percentages. As David Mathews reflects upon our search for common ground he states that, "We aggregate it. But actually, aggregation is not democracy's best resort, it is our last resort. The way we really get together is by integration, not aggregation. Why? Because integration transforms. It creates things that were not there before" (277). The power of direct communication lies within its potential ability to unify and integrate, not divide and alienate. The search for an integrated consensus and the need to respect the concerns of all are facilitated only through meaningful communications among citizens who therefore share a respect for community relationships.

Communication may also be seen as a protector of the boundaries of community relationships. The liberal essentials set the standard boundaries or means by which community relationships can pursue commonly desired ends. We
must be wary of violations and communicate discrepancies when necessary. David K. Hart gets at this notion:

The matter is unequivocal: whenever any situation compromises the regime values [the liberal essentials in our conception], the virtuous citizen is required to act immediately in defense of those values. Thus, when one encounters racism, sexism, the invasion of privacy, or some such, one must instantaneously oppose them. The responsibility can never be shifted. (115)

Communication is therefore not only an essential aspect of a respect for community relationships, but also a preserver of that citizenship requirement's legitimacy within democracy.

We return to the character of George Anastaplo, the one declared "unfit" for admission to the Illinois bar because he refused to answer questions about his potential affiliation with the Communist Party, as an example of the preservative powers of communication. Anastaplo suffered from a violation of the liberal essentials, as the equality and autonomy of his judgements were not respected. The Illinois bar presumed to know better than he what his affiliations should be. Anastaplo rejected their pleas for information and now speaks of the trials of his time. He communicates the injustice and thus performs a vital service for the preservation of democracy. He has respected the boundaries of a respect for community relationships, as imposed by the liberal essentials, and in so doing has strengthened the ground upon which community relationships necessarily rest in a democracy.
Finally, and importantly, the necessity of communication to citizenship can give us insight into the viability of local versus centralized participation. It would seem inherently easier to recognize community, and the need to participate and communicate within it, on the local level. One’s connections to others are made all the more obvious by proximity. It is easier to find common purposes and common problems on the local level, and it is generally easier to communicate those purposes and problems to neighbors, than it is to strangers. It is in this context that the requirement of a respect for community relationships and the participation and communication it subsequently requires are seen to be primarily localized notions.

The power of the national focus to alienate citizens from participation, communication and a feeling of efficacy should not be underestimated. Norton E. Long laments the idea that the vertical institutions of the nation have eroded the horizontal institutions of local communities which necessarily preserve and foster our common bonds and objectives. As he states, "The region and the state, unlike the city, lack the cultural memories of a functional and personally interactive citizenship" (9). Long then agrees with Dewey that the power of the local community must be restored if the public is to find itself and reinvigorate democracy. It would seem that the local level of community
meshes far easier with the recognition of those common bonds
and responsibilities which foster individual participation
and communication, than do the immense and impersonal forces
of the state. There must be a return to the local if the
requirement of a respect for community relationships is to
be fully realized.

Peg Michels sees the alienation of the elderly in
nursing homes where extensive centralized government
regulation has deprived them of any autonomy, participation
or communication in their own lives. The culture of
individualism with its focus on individual rights alone as
constituting citizenship is again to blame. As Michels
states, "Government's role has been to protect the rights of
the residents, which leaves them not in charge of their own
lives" (263). The solution comes with localization of
control—putting the power into the hands of the residents
and staff.

This decentralization results in the formation of
community, with participation and communication soon to
follow. Michels speaks of the communication at a meeting in
the home as she states that, "the point there was to give
permission to talk about their experiences. It was a public
setting, not a private conversation, so differences of
opinion had to be allowed. They had to find out that not
everybody was happy and content" (264). Communication and
participation at the level of local community was able to
facilitate the identification of common purposes, common problems, and eventually, common solutions. Through a local emphasis which enabled communication and participation, the requirement of a respect for community relationships had been restored. The elderly Michels speaks of now can be full citizens, both respecting the value of their new-found community relationships and practicing the liberal essentials to which they are entitled.

The potential of localities to foster the kind of citizenship required in a modern democracy is not a new concept. Nancy L. Schwartz speaks of Max Weber's conception of the city as follows:

...what is most distinctive about the city is its form of association, the quality of the relationships among its citizens. The city is "beyond all this also a sworn confraternity" in which the members bind themselves one to another in a collective body. Through a series of institutional practices, a diverse collection of people who had previously been strangers, immigrants to this new and alien place, now become known to each other. There is a ritual joining of people as symbolic brothers, implicated in the fate of others. (546)

The ability of the local association to foster community through a recognition of common bonds, purposes, and a commitment to the public welfare must be recognized if we are to successfully respect community relationships. Proximity and interaction bear the fruit of participation and communication, not the alienation which often springs from the distant state. It is in this light that we nod in agreement with Schwartz's statement that, "While the nation
as a political society remains crucial for certain kinds of military and administrative action, it may well be that the nation-state is no longer the appropriate locus for the range of activities we call citizenship" (532).

Yet our agreement with the previous statement is somewhat hesitant, as the necessity of a respect for community relationships is not lost in the larger state. In our modern democracy, we are still citizens of both the United States and each of our individual communities. The practice of citizenship is simply more feasible and direct in the local community. It is more difficult to recognize the community in an entire state, and to an extent it is less essential—for we do not associate with those across the country on a regular basis. However, this said, we must still respect community relationships in regard to the entire country, not just our own locality. In the country as a whole we are still bound together by ever-more complex common purposes and problems, and we must still care for the welfare of those geographically distant. Communication and participation, as the actualizing agents of a respect for community relationships, are still essential if we are to be good citizens in both our modern democratic country and community. Robert Bellah recognizes this and states, "The fullest conception of civic politics that emerges from the citizens' movement proposes to link local participation to a national dialogue" (218).
Still, community relationships are primarily a local affair. So what of the nation? Dick Flacks feels that we must overcome the disintegration of the nation-state through the empowerment of individuals in communities. Yet he does not reject the role of the nation, he revises it. As he states, "We need to think of the national state not as the source of initiative and control, not as the vehicle for solutions of problems, but principally as the potential source of capital and law that would enable people to solve their problems at the level of the community" (49). This is an appealing conception. The nation as a source of capital is essential to communities, for localization of control and participation in the resolution of problems does not require a parallel localization of funds. Similarly, the nation can provide the source of legal enforcement of the liberal essentials--for as discussed earlier, small communities have far from a perfect record of remaining true to our first requirement of citizenship.

The Homeless

Perhaps we can better understand the limits of the liberal essentials, and the potential of the additional requirement of a respect for community relationships to expand our notion of what democracy requires of citizens, by observing the plight of the homeless in our society. It seems a worthy endeavor to examine the requirements we have
of citizens in terms of how these requirements would affect the society's most disadvantaged. Indeed, perhaps more than any other group, the homeless are alienated from our society and unable to partake of the common good—and subsequently are also unable to practice citizenship.

Again we see the culture of individualism, with its focus for citizenship on only those liberal essentials which give protective rights from others, lurking in the shadows. The language of individual rights even spills into the manner in which our society attempts to aid disadvantaged individuals. The welfare state grants entitlement rights. While this welfare state is then able to dole out some of the money for the provision of basic needs, it tends to overshadow the need to help disadvantaged individuals beyond their basic survival needs. The welfare state, by transferring money through a bureaucracy, avoids what Michael Ignatieff calls "the enslavement of gift relations."

Yet while this is necessarily a positive in terms of our liberal essentials, he goes on to state that, "if the welfare state does serve the needs of freedom [one of our liberal essentials], it does not serve the needs of solidarity. We remain a society of strangers" (18).

It would seem that it is this solidarity or community (or, in our terms, this respect for community relationships) which is avoided by the welfare state that must be refurbished if groups like the homeless are to be helped
beyond their basic survival needs. Individualism simply does not allow us to solve the problem. William Sullivan notes that:

The twentieth-century welfare state is expected to take care of issues of justice while relying on the "me-too" motivation of self-interest. This is consistent with modern liberalism's notion that politics is an extension of the pursuit of private interests through political bargaining. (33)

Unfortunately, this notion, while consistent with that of the liberal essentials taken alone, is inconsistent with the respect for community relationships essential to aiding the homeless beyond survival—and into citizenship.

If we are to realize the common good and enable the homeless to become good citizens, and thus be good citizens ourselves, we must look beyond the narrow self-interests encouraged by our current culture. As Frederick M. Barnard states, "There is a world of difference between seeking one's inner peace, which is a wholly intrinsic affair, and seeking means for the removal of obstacles that externally block the means of its attainment" (Fraternity 589). While certainly we must be concerned with the former, the latter is equally essential if we respect community relationships and so it is that we must participate in removing the obstacles for the homeless. The responsibility to be involved is made explicit by Mathews' Communitarians, as discussed earlier. The Communitarians focus on the necessity
of community as the network through which active individuals can give support, caring, and nurturing (Mathews 273).

Currently, the last thing on the mind of the homeless individual is how to be a good citizen. Survival is an all-consuming task. The homeless simply do not have the means to practice citizenship as presented here. They are alienated by a welfare system run rampant with absurdity. Jonathan Kozol, as he observes the plight of the homeless in New York City's welfare hotels, sites a myriad of examples. There is the "restaurant allowance" which is meant for groceries, not restaurants, and which enables the homeless to buy food which they cannot legally cook in their rooms (152). Then there are the rules which require that the homeless search for apartments they cannot possibly afford (34). Kozol refers to these and other events as the "immersion in irrationality". It again seems clear that if the homeless are to be helped, and are to have the means for citizenship, we must go beyond what their rights have so cruelly granted them to find something more.

A respect for community relationships among those who are not homeless, and therefore have the means to practice citizenship, would give the something more that is the answer. It seems that only a small community can recognize the nonmaterial needs of a disadvantaged person and respond. Similar to liberal rights which provide for the basic protection of democracy but fail to provide a complete
vision of democratic citizenship, entitlement rights provide basic care for disadvantaged individuals but fail to address their complete needs. In both cases then, there is a need to move beyond individualistic rights and to expand our vision of what citizenship requires if we are to truly help. Again, the requirement of a respect for community relationships provides such an essential expansion. This requirement would go beyond what the liberal essentials have required—a provision of, at best, survival—to require that the homeless be taken into community and allowed to become full, participating and communicating citizens. Kozol draws the distinction between shelter and home thusly: "Shelter, if it's warm and safe, may keep a family from dying. Only a home allows a family to flourish and breathe" (50). We can draw from this a parallel relationship between what the liberal essentials require—a shelter—and what a respect for community relationships as a citizenship requirement requires—a home in community.

Currently, it seems our society has chosen to provide only shelter, consistent with our dominant culture of individualism and its focus on only our first requirement. As Kathleen Hirsch reviews the history of attempts to help the homeless she notes that the welfare state emerged from a conception of poverty based solely on money. She goes on to state that, "Shattered in this conception was the broader conception of poverty as interconnected material and
nonmaterial barriers to fulfillment, and with it the belief that social and economic welfare was the province of small, private, nonprofit agencies and foundations" (95). Again, the welfare state has (to a limited extent) preserved the liberal essential of freedom for the homeless by providing for their basic material needs and not making them subject to a master's charity. Yet it has simultaneously, by focusing society's aid on entitlement rights, made the provision of the nonmaterial aid which cannot be provided by an impersonal federal government hard to come by.

So again it seems that only local community efforts by citizens who respect the value of community relationships can recognize the particular needs of the homeless as individuals, not as an impersonal aggregate group. Homelessness is a complex problem which defies an answer based solely upon rights. Yet we in community fail to respond to the need to find connections with the homeless, to recognize their problems as our problems, and to participate and communicate with them because they, under our current conception of citizenship, have no right to impose obligations on us. The focus on rights has crowded out our recognition of the necessity of community in helping the homeless. We therefore see a "disturbing breakdown of some essential glue in American society, a failure not just of large systems but of family and community to provide
security, support, and a sense of belonging to all its members" (Hirsch 202).

We must restore this "essential glue" if we are to help the disadvantaged. Consistent with the theme of citizenship requirements argued for here, it is not that we must abandon the liberal essentials, only that we must add onto them and in doing so revise our conception of what those essentials are meant to do. The liberal essentials, once we note a respect for community relationships, are not meant only to divide and protect us from one another. Rogers M. Smith argues for our cause when he states that:

"...we should reformulate the nation’s dedication to liberty into a positive, substantive goal of human empowerment. Freedom should not be understood to mean simply a lack of hindrance in doing what we will. It means valuing and exercising our capacities for reflective self-direction and choosing ways of life that preserve and enhance those capacities for all." (247)

Through a respect for community relationships we can formulate a vision of the common good which empowers all individuals to be good citizens, which both preserves and enhances everyones ability to lead a self-defined, though community situated, satisfying life. We must do more than leave others alone, we must strive to enable them to be good citizens--and hence be good citizens ourselves as we practice a respect for community relationships.

Kathleen Hirsch makes a pressing call for a respect of community relationships as the only thing that will bring
real change to the problem of homelessness. According to Hirsch, the homeless are victims of our individualistic society which only furthers their problems by isolating and alienating them. Further, as she states, "isolation and insularity increasingly lead to parochialism in public policy, a lack of political will to address issues that don't touch directly on our perceived self-interest" (403). Yet our individualism not only perpetuates the plight of the homeless, it blinds us to the solutions to their problems--relationships with others from which self-care and eventually citizenship can emerge. The complexity of problems which the homeless face cannot be addressed by a paternalistic state which dispenses cash, but only through personal contact with fellow citizens. Hirsch states that effective programs can be given only "on a meaningful scale--not through vast, impersonal, and centralized systems with revolving staffs of caseworkers, but in neighborhoods that permitted one-on-one interaction between residents and staff" (404).

In this context, Hirsch argues that a transformation in the philosophy and structure of our service agencies is needed to enable the homeless to achieve real change. In our terms, and consistent with Hirsch's approach, there is the need for similar change in our notion of citizenship. The addition of a respect for community relationships can be seen to require the concern for others and the participation
in their lives essential to Hirsch's vision, and to the emancipation of the homeless from an alienating society. Service agencies must become participatory centers of concerned, community-minded citizens. Only on this level and in this manner can we simultaneously enable the homeless to become citizens by addressing the true complexity of their problems, and actualize the citizenship of those of us who already have the means. The indirect call made by Hirsch for what we call a respect for community relationships is powerful:

...the only real change occurs when we invest ourselves in the lives of others: by alleviating the loneliness of a solitary neighborhood child like Amanda [discussed below]; sharing our skills; easing the plight of Americans who can't buy private solutions to the problems we all share, such as a lack of child care; contributing time and money to educational, housing, and work opportunities for those who haven't had our good fortune; listening with an open heart to the songs from the alley. These are the investments that will yield real change. Nothing else, nothing less. The solution to homelessness begins at home. (410)

The term for what Hirsch wants, and what we want in the participatory aspect of a respect for community relationships, is "coproduction". This refers to the provision of services for citizens, by citizens—a nifty parallel with government by the people. Contrary to the belief perpetuated by our society's current trend toward professionalization, one does not need to be an expert or a professional to provide a public service. Yet it is not only in the provision of services and hence the application of
citizenship for which we applaud coproduction, but also for its ability to foster that citizenship itself. As F. Stevens Redburn notes, "where coproduction involves cooperative actions, it helps to develop the community, in the sense of generating shared commitments and new bonds of communication and association that may take on other communal functions" (160).

Unfortunately, those with the means to practice good citizenship, who would therefore help the homeless with coproduction sprung forth from a respect for community relationships, often feel no need to do so. The culture of individualism, as it has alienated the homeless from the rest of us, concomitantly alienates the rest of us from the homeless. We recognize no connection to the homeless and so we easily attribute their difficulties to strictly personal flaws, disregarding the complexity of the situation. We have individualized homelessness so that the problem is taken out of our hands. Jonathan Kozol sees this individualization in our attempts, or lack thereof, to deal with the homeless as he speaks of how we distance ourselves from them, "She's not like us. This nightmare could not happen in our lives or to our children. There must be something wrong with her—some flaw we do not share." In this way perhaps, we find some consolation for the grief we feel and some assurance that our own lives are secure" (130). Michael B. Katz sees our alienation from the homeless in our use of the
language of "us" and "them" (of which we are admittedly guilty here). As he states:

Even in the language of social science, as well as in ordinary conversation and political rhetoric, poor people usually remain outsiders, strangers to be pitied or despised, helped or punished, ignored or studied, but rarely full citizens, members of a larger community on the same terms as the rest of us. (236)

Much of what Katz suggests should be done to change this situation revolves around a notion in the same spirit as our call for a respect of community relationships. For instance, he suggests "The substitution of human dignity, community, and the realization of democracy in place of classification, work incentives, and the obligation of the poor as the foundation of public policy" (239). We must strive to recognize our connections, have concern for the public welfare, and participate and communicate in order to realize our common goals. These attempts would remove our alienation from the homeless, and hence allow those with the means to practice citizenship to help those without the means attain them. A respect for community relationships is therefore seen as both a requirement of democratic citizenship itself, and a requirement for the enabling of others, like the homeless, to attain that citizenship. In Katz’s words, we must "Find ways to talk about poor people as "us" that expand ideas of citizenship..." (239).

Despite the culture of individualism’s dual alienation, "them" from "us" and "us" from "them", there are those who
have "expanded ideas of citizenship" both for themselves and for others. They have moved beyond the often alienating language of individual rights evinced by the liberal essentials to recognize a respect for community relationships. Mathews' Communitarians have an expanded view of citizenship which focuses on individual and communal responsibility for providing the necessary caring and nurturing structures in public life (273). David Hilfiker in an article entitled "Healed by the Poor", writes of his experience as a doctor living in community with the homeless. He notes, "As I've walked the rocky path between the different worlds of the rich and poor, I've come to see that healing for both groups will be found in the re-creation of community. Community with the poor breaks the alienation we experience so profoundly" (11).

Kathleen Hirsch, in her book Songs from the Alley, finds stark evidence of the need for a respect for community relationships to expand our notion of citizenship as she traces the experiences of two homeless women, Amanda and Wendy. At the end of Hirsch's book we find Wendy still sleeping in the streets, having just suffered a miscarriage due to excessive drinking. Amanda, on the other hand, had a new apartment, a job, and a hobby. What made the difference?--the quality of their respective relationships. While Wendy received no special attention from any caseworker or volunteer in any shelter, Amanda was able to
connect with Jackie, a good citizen who respected the value of community relationships. Jackie helped Amanda build her self-confidence and supported her when times were tough. Jackie was no expert or professional in homeless care, indeed, "The unusual thing about Jackie as a character in Amanda’s life is her normalcy. She’s been married, she has kids. She’s not dealing with any major problems in her life. She is just a very nice, normal, motherly, warm, caring woman with lots of love to give" (270). In our language, Jackie simply practiced volunteerism rightly understood. She provided the kind of one-on-one relationship, which Wendy lacked, that Hirsch found essential to enabling the homeless to restore their lives, and remove their alienations. In doing so, Jackie recognized and realized a respect for community relationships through participation and communication as she engaged in coproduction, and, most importantly, furthered the common good as she gave another the means to become a good citizen, as she was herself.

Only in close community can the true intricacies of the homeless individual’s problems be recognized and addressed, the impersonal state simply cannot do it. Yet currently it is upon that state that we rely, as "Traditional church-based groups, civic action associations, and local family organizations founder for lack of volunteers" (Hirsch 403). Our individual entitlement rights granted by the state may give us the welfare checks we need for base
survival—but they cannot give us citizenship, or dignity. For that, the means are much higher. For that, we need a respect for the value of community relationships. The requirements of modern democratic citizenship require that those with the means to practice this citizenship help those who do not, so that the common good might be realized as those without the means attain the potential to become full citizens.

The language of individual rights alone again has failed us, this time harming those who are most in need of help. Surely this is not all our society can be and all that we can require of our citizens, that they support indirectly through the welfare state. Again we hear the call for an improvement on our sole reliance on liberal values, on only the liberal essentials, this time in Ignatieff’s words. As he states, "We need justice, we need liberty, and we need as much solidarity [community] as can be reconciled with justice and liberty" (141). We need community to further help our society’s most alienated, most disadvantaged, so that they too can participate in democracy. We need to expand the requirements of citizenship in a modern democracy to include community, participation, and communication on many levels, not just regarding the homeless—though certainly this is not a bad place to start!

Knowledge
Knowledge, the third and final requirement for citizenship in a modern democracy argued for here, provides much of the substance of the first two requirements. In a sense, knowledge provides the means through which the ends of a belief in the liberal essentials and a respect for community relationships can be pursued. The knowledge required is of two types, technical and deliberative, the latter of which might also be called wisdom. Technical knowledge consists primarily of facts and figures and an understanding of the requirements of citizenship and how they apply to public life. Deliberative knowledge consists of the ability to use technical knowledge to form judgements and participate in meaningful discussions. We must be able to recognize those situations where the liberal essentials are called into question or must be applied, we need technical knowledge. Further, if we are to determine the meaning of the liberal essentials, or find which essential has priority, we must be able to argue and deliberate with each other, we need deliberative knowledge. Similarly, Our ability to respect community relationships is directly related to our ability to see them, to understand our connections and their implications, we must have technical knowledge. The quality of our participation and communication also bears influence on our respect, we must have deliberative knowledge. Finally, we must have the
capacity to use both these types of knowledge in questioning both the status quo and those who desire change.

To an extent, we acquire both types of the knowledge necessary to meet the first two requirements of citizenship presented here simply as we interact with one another. As Edward O’Neil states, "lessons are first learned and later practiced in the countless face-to-face interactions that occur in our daily lives. It is this learned connectedness to individuals--first family, then friends and neighbors--which provides us the context of sharing democratic values with members of the culture who remain unmet" (303).

However, in our efforts to enhance this knowledge of connectedness and interdependence we often confront a familiar enemy. Again in O’Neil’s words:

A rather virulent strain of independence and individualism distinguishes our culture. We often value the freedom from individual constraint more than the freedom to participate in collective action. The notion that there might be a process of civic education which is consciously constructed and a visible part of our public institutions leaves most of us trying to remember where we left our copy of the Bill of Rights. (304)

Yet if we are to be consistent with the requirements argued for here, we must necessarily move beyond our notion of individualism as strictly freedom from others and espouse education for all that will give substance to citizenship.

The technical knowledge needed refers to information about our societal problems, the possible solutions to those
problems, and the feasibility of those solutions. This is more than simply knowledge of facts and figures, though that is a large part, for we must also be able to recognize those issues where the liberal essentials are brought into question (abortion is an obvious example) if we are to have any hope of dealing with them. Similarly, we must learn to recognize our interconnections if we are to recognize our common problems and their potential solutions, a knowledge particularly crucial in our complex modern times.

Indeed, John Dewey's notion of the "eclipsed" public seems to stem largely from a lack of technical knowledge among a citizenry faced with great complexity. As Dewey states:

Indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences of conjoint and interacting behavior call a public into existence having a common interest in controlling these consequences. But the machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the scope of the indirect consequences, ...that the resultant public cannot identify and distinguish itself. (126)

For Dewey, and for us, it is essential that we have the technical knowledge to recognize our connections and the common problems that spring from them. Unfortunately, our connections are even more complex now than in Dewey's time. Further, it seems that complexity has not only blinded us, but has encouraged the narrow vision of citizenship as espoused by the culture of individualism. We become alienated from citizenship beyond the legal by our lack of
technical knowledge and the lack of understanding therein. As Edward B. Portis states, "As societies grow in population and structural complexity, meaningful involvement in public affairs declines and citizenship tends to lose its cultural content and become mere legal status, indicating the possession of certain rights" (460). We must be educated in technical knowledge if we are to overcome the blinding and alienating complexity of our age and emerge with a sound understanding of the implications of our belief in the liberal essentials and our respect for community relationships.

John H. Buchanan argues for technical knowledge as he speaks of the need to create the "informed citizen" as an aspect of citizenship education. This knowledge, he states, "includes an understanding of basic concepts such as the nature and purposes of government and law, fundamental principles of American government, political institutions, and what constitutes the office of citizen" (280). Therefore, technical knowledge is important not only as it helps us move beyond complexity to recognize and respond to our collective problems, but also as it enables us to understand those problems in relation to our current societal structures. This knowledge provides us with the means to realize the first two of our citizenship requirements. If one understands the facts and implications of an argument over a liberal essential, one can join in it.
If one understands the position or power situation of another group, one can better pursue the consensus or cooperation necessitated by a respect for community relationships. A technical understanding of the issues of and the operations within government then provides the foundation for the deliberative knowledge discussed later.

While obviously the technical knowledge required here can be attained in the classroom, it is more interestingly, and perhaps even more effectively, attained through participation in the actual processes of government and community service. The coproduction mentioned above, even as it realizes and fosters a respect for community relationships, also provides essential technical knowledge. As F. Stevens Redburn states, through this process "citizens become intimate with the production of a particular public service, which gives them information they can use as participants in policy development" (160). Similarly, Susan Schwartz states that, "Many education leaders believe that public and community service can do more than any classroom learning to make social responsibility an integral part of a student's life" (289). In this light, there has been much recent experimentation in mandatory community service in high schools and curriculum requirements of service in colleges (295-98). This type of education not only fosters the realization of a respect for community relationships, but teaches the technical knowledge necessary to understand
what our requirements entail, how we are connected to each other, and how the current system works and does not work in the provision of public services.

The role of the public administrator in dispensing the technical knowledge necessary is a potentially great one. Eugene B. McGregor defines this type of knowledge as, "an understanding of the nature of public problems, the options available to solve problems, and the alternative criteria by which public choices can be judged" (126). McGregor believes that this knowledge or "civic capital", made more difficult by modern complexity, must be fostered in the citizenry so that self-governing becomes more possible. In this light, he suggests that, "career service [of the public administrator] works best when it constantly seeks ways to devolve responsibility for service delivery and production back to the communities where the problems arise" (128). Therefore, if technical knowledge were further distributed through the citizenry, we would both better realize the capacity for democratic self-government toward which the first two requirements of citizenship aim, and concomitantly reduce the risk, long recognized, of rule by experts or elites.

However, technical knowledge, as alluded to earlier, is not only valuable in its role as dispeller of complexity, alienation and government by experts, or in its subsequent ability to give us the means to practice what the first two requirements of citizenship require. It is also important in
its capacity to give us the information necessary for deliberative knowledge, that knowledge which enables us to deliberate, to form judgements and defend those judgements to others. Deliberative knowledge also refers to the capacity to understand and evaluate the judgements of others.

John H. Buchanan Jr. espouses the necessity of deliberative knowledge as a part of citizenship education when he speaks of "the thinking citizen". As he states, "what our country desperately needs—and must have for its survival as a democracy—is people in every field who have learned to think and make judgements and responsible decisions" (282). Citizens must learn the analytical and critical thinking skills necessary to make judgements. They must learn how to think, not what to think. This judgement-forming ability inherent in deliberative knowledge is an essential part of recognizing the implications of the liberal essentials and the need to respect community relationships. While technical knowledge of information, as stated before, is also essential to this end, it will often not be enough and a judgement will have to be made. As Dennis F. Thompson states, "The connection between the principles and the policies of government is left for citizens themselves to make. Yet making that connection—exercising political judgement—is an essential
part of citizenship, and should have prominent place in the education of citizens" (193).

The ability to deliberate is at the very heart of democracy, and hence democratic citizenship. Amy Gutmann, in her book *Democratic Education*, proposes a theory of education rooted in enhancing the individual's ability to deliberate. For Gutmann, the individual in a democracy must learn to deliberate among competing conceptions of the good life and the good society. She goes so far as to equate this deliberative character with democratic character in the belief that one cannot exist without the other (52). The purpose of democratic political education, in Gutmann's words, is then "to foster the capacities for democratic deliberation essential to conscious social reproduction..." (288). Similarly, in our terms, the point of education for deliberation in terms of democratic citizenship is the respect of all individuals' viewpoints as the means toward consciously pursuing our collective ends when they exist. For Gutmann, as for us, deliberation is central to the processes of democracy. So it is that deliberative knowledge is an essential requirement of citizenship in a modern democracy.

Yet while deliberative knowledge, considered alone, is of essential value, as in the case of technical knowledge it is perhaps best seen insofar as it provides substance to the first two requirements of modern democratic citizenship.
Deliberation is actually constrained by the liberal essentials of the first requirement. These essentials run parallel to the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination which Gutmann espouses. And so it is that, as Gutmann states concerning education, issues "are to be decided within the bounds of the principles of nondiscrimination and nonrepression" (Education 288). So too with the essentials, as they set the boundaries or the means of argument below which no deliberation can fall in our democracy. Deliberative knowledge in this conception is thus far from value-less, it is value-laden with the liberal essentials.

The relationship between deliberative knowledge and the liberal essentials, however, runs still deeper. Indeed, the presumption of personal autonomy and its focus on the individual's right to be his/her own best judge, taken to its logical conclusion, seems to demand deliberation in public life. If we are to respect each individual's point of view, as we must under the essential, then certainly it follows that each individual should deliberate with others in the public realm so that each individual's point of view is known. However, we can only say "should" deliberate regarding the liberal essentials, as nonparticipation in public deliberation is also perfectly consistent (Although as noted previously, this "should" is replaced by the more forceful "must" under the requirement of a respect for
community relationships and its focus on the search for consensus, participation, and communication). But even if the liberal essentials do not demand deliberation per se, their formation does.

In other words, because the actual requirements of a belief in the liberal essentials, and/or the liberal essential which should prevail when they conflict is not always clear, there must be deliberation. Charles W. Anderson argues for what he calls pragmatic liberalism, a vision that relies heavily on deliberation among citizens. The difficulty with liberal values, or our liberal essentials, is that, in Anderson's words:

There are a variety of systems of liberal principles and no sure metatheoretical standards for deciding among them. The difficulty is that the method of liberal philosophy does not result in a unique set of principles. It is possible to order the guiding values of liberalism in a number of ways, and the meaning of such fundamental liberal concerns as right, freedom, equality and the like seems always contestable. (157)

In this light the necessity of deliberation, and hence deliberative knowledge, emerges. While the liberal essentials, consisting of a presumption of personal autonomy and equality, argued for here set forth the unique set of principles in which the modern democratic citizen must believe, the necessity of deliberation remains. What individual rights and obligations flow from these principles, and which is primary in a particular scenario, is always the subject of public deliberation. Indeed, the
liberal essentials argued for here as essential to
democratic citizenship merely constitute an argument now
open to public deliberation. Such is the happy dilemma of a
philosophy which refuses to prescribe the ends of individual
and collective action, lest oppression result.

Deliberative knowledge is also essential in its ability
to foster a respect for community relationships. The respect
of another’s viewpoint and the search for consensus when it
exists can only take place through a process of deliberation
among equal citizens. William Sullivan states that, "The
social task of a public philosophy is critical in a highly
differentiated society in which common consensus is always
in some measure the achievement of an active process of
discussion and persuasion among involved citizens" (9).
Deliberative knowledge provides much of the substance
—discussion, persuasion, argumentation— to the necessity of
participation and communication with other citizens.

Deliberative knowledge can also be seen to provide the
means through which we pursue our collective ends as
determined through public discussion. Because this knowledge
is concerned with the formation of valid judgements, it is
grounded in reason. This reason provides an essential, if
not entirely realized, level playing field on which public
discussion takes place, provided all citizens have the
requisite deliberative knowledge. Frederick M. Barnard
states, as he interprets the thinking of the political
philosopher Christian Thomasius, "reason is seen capable of acting as a political mediator, as the instrument of public discourse, anywhere and at any time" (Fraternity 586). The function of deliberative knowledge is not then to determine the ends of public discussion, but only to provide the means of rational argument through which that discussion can be pursued—thus mediating between desired ends. Again in Barnard's words, "the ends of a political society merely confront its members as possible objects of public choice. As such, they are subject to debate and intersubjective agreement, since there is nothing self-explanatory or self-justificatory about them" (598). Barnard himself finds, as we do here, rational grounding to be an essential aspect of citizenship, as he contrasts this notion with the notions of fraternity and patriotism in two separate articles on Christian Thomasius and Rousseau respectively.

The necessity of deliberative knowledge, here understood to provide the realization of democracy as it allows individuals to expose their views and as it provides the substance of the first two requirements, as a requirement of democratic citizenship imposes one further burden. The need and ability to question must be fostered. The citizen in this conception must not only form his/her own judgements, but also be able to evaluate and understand the judgements of others so that meaningful discussion over common problems can occur. Neither the status quo nor change
from it should be excepted blindly. Mary Cornelia Porter
states that, "It is when the students are asked to 'think
about' their heritage, to confront the array of differing
views of what constitutes the common good, and how it may be
attained, that teaching about coincides with educating for
citizenship" (218). The citizen must always strive to
recognize and, if necessary, combat and question good
arguments so that quality deliberation results. Furthermore,
The citizen must always question and examine whether each of
three requirements for modern democratic citizenship is
being realized, both in him/herself and in others.

Conclusion

The requirements of citizenship in a modern democracy
argued for here provide a distinct vision of what the ideal
citizen in a modern liberal democratic society would look
like. The argument given here is for an expanded
understanding of citizenship in the ethical, not the legal
sense. Ethical citizenship, as Terry L. Cooper argues,
"involves a much broader definition of the role, which
includes the social and economic aspects of life as well as
the political. Citizenship, from this perspective, has to do
with membership in community..." (144). The community of
membership here considered is our own, and hence the
requirements given here will not apply elsewhere. We follow
the Aristotelian notion of citizenship rooted in the particular regime.

An exploration of the legal implications of this ethical vision of citizenship has been avoided for purely practical reasons. Simply put, there are no direct legal implications for citizenship in this conception. The liberal essentials must constitute much of the legal system in this vision, but this is already primarily the case or the goal in our society. Any legal implications from the first requirement therefore stem from the search for a more complete realization what the essentials require, not a fundamental change in thinking. The second two citizenship requirements argued for here would constitute drastic change in our legal notion of citizenship—but this is not their purpose. The second two requirements of citizenship only propose to provide the requirements for becoming an ideal citizen, not requirements for simple membership.

In fact, if the second two requirements were legally enforced, there would almost of necessity be rampant violations of the first requirement. While the first requirement provides objective standards, the second two are open to far more subjective interpretation, hence the danger. The requirements of citizenship presented here simply provide a vision of the ideal citizen, a vision to be fostered and pursued in our society, not legally enforced. Indeed, it would be impossible for any individual to meet
all the requirements all the time. One looks with particular fright at the overwhelming amount of technical knowledge seemingly needed. We may not be able to meet all of the requirements all of the time, but we can constantly make the effort and look to the ideal.

Citizenship in the conception presented here is not any one thing, not a particular ability, nor a particular type of person. Citizenship here is a way of life that can be realized in a variety of different ways. It is a manner of behaving, thinking, acting and interacting that would best suit our liberal democratic society. Each method of realizing this citizenship must account for each of the requirements. In the end, it is believed that an individual who lives his/her life with a belief in the liberal essentials, a respect for community relationships, and a knowledge both technical and deliberative, will be a good citizen in our modern liberal democratic society.
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