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Relational Leadership and Governing: Somali Clan Cultural Leadership

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This research is focused on exploring the distinction between theories of leadership and more contemporary visions of relational leading. In order to do so, the specific case of traditional clan structure seen in the Somali state will be examined, and parallels between the two will be drawn. This paper argues that the old Somali tradition shares much in common with current writing on relational leadership (Uhl-Bien, 2006) and, therefore, can expand our understanding and support for a form of leadership that transcends traditional, individualist, hierarchical leadership. This argument will be supported by a detailed investigation into clan politics, leadership, and state formation within clan culture in Somalia as a case study. Therefore, this research will evaluate how approaches to leadership of clan culture institutions and political figures co-exist, overlap, and have intervened in the context of political competition in post-conflict Somalia. By exploring the case of Somalia and its clan structure and clan-based political leadership in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods, this research offers an expanded understanding of relational leading and its benefits for social and cultural transformation. The literature reviewed reveals that Somali traditional clan leadership has similar relationality in its style to that of relational leadership. In writing this literature review, I have utilized a qualitative approach from data collection to the development of ideas.

Keywords: Tradition, culture, clan, leadership, theory.

Introduction

Leadership is a growing field tied to many academic disciplines, and the study of leadership is continually evolving. Leadership intertwines with culture, and the concept of culture has different meanings to different societies. However, within these differences, there is a constructed reality that influences the practice of each society. Thus, the differences matter only when one compares the social beliefs and practices of one group to another, which means “our claims to truth are invariably wedded to tradition and value” (Gergen & Gergen, 2003, p. 20), and that differences become evident and these differences are of a cultural nature. The conceptual framework for this study will be developed from the literature review of academic journals, books, and archived documents. Qualitative research is used as a design strategy. This qualitative study seeks to extend the theoretical debate about leadership, particularly relational leading.

There are arguably thousands of books and articles written about leadership and management; even academic journals like The Leadership Quarterly and The Journal of Leadership are dedicated to this subject. They all examine the complexity and challenge that leadership presents and the solutions it will require. Yet, it is still a source of contention with no resolution as to what is good and effective leadership. Academic and public debates have emerged from theories of leadership by traits, skills, and style. Traits is a theory of leadership in that it was one of the first systematic and extensively researched attempts to understand what made great leaders great, with an exclusive focus on the leader (Bass & Bass, 2008; Kotze & Venter, 2011; Stogdill, 1949). Skills is an approach where individual skills of leaders are assessed in a manner to understand the “nature of
effective leadership” in a descriptive manner (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Schein, 2010; Zaccaro, 2007). Styles is an approach that is more concerned with what leaders do, i.e., a study of behavior rather than personal traits reflecting who the leaders are (Blake & Mouton, 1985; Blanchard et al., 2013). The leadership suitability or quality of leaders within a society cut across cultures, and many societies use these approaches to select their leaders, whether it's through ballot boxes or traditional cultural selection.

One school of thought that identifies leadership as inherently biological is the great man theory (Carlyle, 1888). This theory accepts a leader’s capacity for leadership is inherent and that great leaders are born, not made. Historian Thomas Carlyle (1888), who had an influence on this theory of leadership, at one point stated that “the history of the world is but the biography of great men” (p. 14). According to Carlyle, effective leaders are those gifted with divine inspiration and the right characteristics. According to the great man theory, leaders are God’s gift to humanity. While Carlyle thinks that you either possess the leadership trait or you don’t due to the notion that it is passed down through family genes, sociologist Herbert Spencer (1892) disagreed and suggested that leaders are products of the society in which they live. He argued that “you must admit that the genesis of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences that has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown” (p. 76). In other words, society makes the man, and social evolution will contradict the great man theory because a long series of complex influences shape a great personality.

The other theories shift away from the notion that leaders are such due to individual-centric traits. For example, transformational leadership theory assumes that there is a general interdependence among both leaders and followers who share mutual interests in support of their organization (Bass & Avolio, 1993; Bass, 1995, 1997; Burns, 2012). Avolio and Bass (1993) suggested that in transformational leadership, “leaders and followers share mutual interests and a sense of shared facts and interdependence” (p. 116). Still another theory, contingency theory, says no single leadership style is appropriate in all situations, and success depends upon a number of variables, including leadership style, qualities of followers and situational features (Charry, 2012).

In situational theory, however, a leader is expected to be the most knowledgeable and experienced member of a group. There are four levels of follower performance readiness that are effective in situational leadership styles: telling, selling, participating, and delegating (Blanchard et al., 2013). According to Jago and Vroom (2007), there are three distinct roles where situations have an impact on the leadership process: “organizational effectiveness, leader behavior, and how situations influence the consequences of leader behavior” (p. 17). By referring to leadership as a process, Jago and Vroom made the same admonition noted by Northouse (2013) in that leadership as process is not a trait or characteristic; rather, it is a transactional event that occurs between leaders and followers.

In behavioral theory, people can learn to become leaders through training and observation (Naylor, 1999). Participative theory suggests that the ideal leadership style is one that takes the input of others into account. Participative leaders encourage participation and contributions from group members and help group members feel relevant and committed to the decision-making process (Lamb, 2013). Transactional/management theory, which is also known as management theory, focuses on the role of supervision, organization, group performance, and the exchanges that take
place between leaders and followers. These theories base leadership on a system of rewards and punishments (Charry, 2012). Relationship/transformational theory is the process by which a person engages with others and can create a connection that results in increased motivation and morality in both followers and leaders (Lamb, 2013). Servant leadership theory moves leadership closer to a relational leading theory in that the institutional power and control of leadership are no longer assumed to be found only in a leadership hierarchy; it is now dispersed to those being led (Fields & Hale, 2007; Greenleaf, 2002; Spears, 1995).

**Relational leadership**

Relational leadership, on the other hand, while it is a relatively new concept in the study of leadership literature (Uhl-Bien, 2006), it has been historically the hallmark of many traditional cultures. Yet, ironically, in a global attempt to modernize the relational leadership styles in many traditional cultures, contemporary modern state leadership has replaced the traditional relational style. Relational leadership is a newer concept in academia, and its meaning is still being debated by scholars (Brower et al., 2000; Drath, 2001; Murrell, 1997; Uhl-Bien, 2003, 2005). However, according to Uhl-Bien (2006), “relational leading is not entity-based but a perspective that focuses on identifying attributes of individuals as they engage in interpersonal relationships” (p. 654). It is a view that sees leadership as emerging from social processes and relationships among people.

A key assumption of relational leadership is that leadership is co-constructed in the social and historical context. As Ospina and Uhl-Bien (2012b) claimed, relational leadership “serves as an umbrella term for research that studies leadership as something that is generated in social processes and relationships among people” (p. 570). Relational leading emerged from the social constructionist perspective. Social constructionism has roots in symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934; Schutz, 1970) and phenomenology, yet it was with Berger and Luckman’s (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality* that constructionism was extended and galvanized. More than four decades later, there is a considerable amount of theory and research subscribing to the basic tenet that people make their social and cultural worlds at the same time these worlds make them (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Burr, 2003; Crotty, 1998; Gergen, 1999, 2001; Hacking, 1999; Harre, 1986; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Shotter 1993, as cited in Fairhurst & Grant, 2010). Relational leading fosters a positive change that brings spirit to an organization and communities worldwide. According to Mary Uhl-Bien (2006),

Relational leadership theory is offered as an overarching framework for the study of the relational dynamics that are involved in the generation and functioning of leadership. Contrary to other studies of leadership, which have focused primarily on the study of leadership effectiveness, Relational Leadership Theory focuses on the relational processes by which leadership is produced and enabled. (p. 667).

Twenty-first-century expectations of leadership brought relational leading to the center stage and have sharply reduced the perceived value of a purely directive, top-down model of leadership. Leadership is viewed by many as a relational and ethical process of people together attempting to accomplish positive change. Relational leading invites a way to engage the world and for leaders to be morally accountable to others, where they facilitate a relational dialogue.

My research interest focuses on exploring not only the relational leading concept in the Western hemisphere but its effect and influence on Somali traditional clan leadership structure. The
Research will address whether relational leading practices may have emerged and are evident within Somali clan leadership. The origin and the culture of the Somali people have been a topic of debate within the framework of academic research. However, in studying the leadership of Somalia’s people and culture, one needs to look back on its organic cultural roots that predate the colonial era. Understanding the history, in particular, the gradual deterioration and the ultimate collapse of the state, as well as the factors supporting the society’s resilience in attempting to govern in this period, can contribute to the search for a future Somalia state. Since Somalia is a culture that has transitioned from clan leadership to state leadership to integration of clan and state leadership, we can gain insight into the contemporary understandings of leadership.

Methodology
This literature review utilizes a qualitative research methodology to collect data and to further develop the main focus on cultural values and communal leadership as leadership that transcends from one culture to another. A qualitative method is used in this project in order to gain a holistic understanding of Somali clan cultural leadership methods in pre-post-colonial, colonial times. The pre-colonial literatures retrieved were found within the books written during the colonial period and archived documents. This research utilizes a qualitative research methodology to collect literature data and further develop the main focus on understanding cultural values and leadership within the Somalia clan system. According to Czarniawska (2004), qualitative research is especially effective in obtaining culturally specific information regarding the values, opinions, behaviors, and social contexts of populations and can be described as “an account of an event/action or series of events/actions, chronologically connected” (p. 17). The principal objective of this exploratory research was to study the role clan leadership culture plays in state leadership and to support and provide recommendations on the best approach or practices to reconstitute a state leadership.

Overview of Somali history and culture
"Of all the races of Africa there cannot be one better to live among than the most difficult, the proudest, the bravest, the vainest, the most merciless, the friendliest; the Somalis." - Gerald Hanley (1971).

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is an overview of Somalia's historical background—including its clan culture, traditional institution leadership, and social structure. The final two sections examine the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial legacy in Somalia as the source of influence on the prolonged political and clan conflict. The country is bounded by the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden to the east. The Somalis occupy the bulk of the Somali peninsula, a huge mass of land projecting into the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and covering Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Eastern Ethiopia, and North-Eastern Kenya (Hess, 1966; Lewis, 1965; Toural, 1963). It is located in the easternmost corner of the African Continent (Horn of Africa). Scholars’ contributions inform us that Somali mythology links the genesis of the people by language and lifestyle, by economic mode and social institutions, by traditions and physical demeanor, and by a sense of belonging to a wide family among people from the Arabian Peninsula, and linguists associate it with Eastern Cushite’s ethnic group (Cassanelli, 1982; Issa-Salwe, 1994a; Lewis, 1965; Laitin & Samatar, 1987; Touval, 1963).
Figure 2
Somali Pre-Colonial Map

Note: Full map of Somali people before colonial split. From Somali Nationalism by Saadia Touval, 1963, Harvard University Press.

Earliest historical records relating to what is now the Somali coast were found in ancient Egyptian inscriptions describing visits to that coast in search of incense and aromatic spices which they called ‘Punt the land of Aromatic.’ Vivid evidence of this fact was the one provided by the trade expedition which Queen Hatshepsut of Egypt sent to the land of Punt (circa 1480 BCE). Greeks called the land of Barboroi (Berbera) and the land of cinnamon, and it was known by Romans as the land of milk and myrrh and the land of Somalis’ (Abdullahi, 2001; Cassanelli, 1982; Hess, 1966; Laitin & Samatar, 1987; Touval, 1963). There is evidence that the land of “Punt,” the ancient homeland of the Somalis, was not only inhabited since the 3rd millennium before the Christian era (BCE) but was also home to a sophisticated civilization with governing structures and trade relations with other nations (Touval, 1963).

African societies were of a highly varied culture: they were either stateless, state-run, or kingdoms, but most were founded in the principles of communalism in that they were self-governing, autonomous entities in which all members took part, directly or indirectly, in the daily running of the tribe (Clapham, 2017; Mamdani, 2018). In the context of Somalia, according to Hoehne (2010), “Somali descent model of citizenship is an ancestral model which stresses the blood relationship of all Somalis – exists in its purest form among nomadic clans” (p. 34). However, to understand citizenship bonds and lineage in Somalia, one must also recognize the different inferences these have for different communities. As part of Africa, Somalia has tradition and culture across
generations, particularly orality, kinship that impacts educational institutions, identity, and social relations. Somalia’s environment, particularly the pastoral area, is 70% arid, which has made a significant contribution to shaping Somali society” (Laitin & Samatar, 1987 p. 5).

Figure 3
Boy With Baby Camels


“Although the region is arid, it is not a desert but rather a savanna… rain is meagre and fluctuates considerably from year to year and is therefore not only little but unreliable” (Touval, 1963, p. 6). Further, Touval stated that Somalis are a rare case of a homogeneous ethnic group inhabiting a large territory and united by culture, religion, and tradition, and their sense of unity was not effaced even by the divisive impact of alien rule. However, this sense of unity is being challenged for today’s Somali people, who are disillusioned by the prolonged conflict resulting from the nation’s brutal colonial and military regimes.

Pre-Colonial Somali clan structure and traditional institutions
Pre-colonial Somalia was a stateless society. Stateless refers to "a political organization where no formal centralized polity exists, but which maintains the social order and stability through moral, material and social sanctions" (Mohamoud, 2006, p. 18). In this context, Somali society was comprised of independent people living with and separate from each other without a unitary government; however, they had trade dealings with the outside world, Arab administrations and other business elites, Egyptians, Turks, Omanis, and Zanzibarians before the European arrival (Hess, 1966; Lewis, 1961). These trade dealings were shipments of goods and services through Somali ports and other business landmarks, which were negotiated by sultans and other territorial clan leaders as their own independent entities (Hess, 1966). The Somalis established kingdoms and/or Sultanates in various parts of the Somali peninsula. Table 3 shows the names, geographical coverage, and duration of the most important of these kingdoms/sultanates.
Table 3

*Kingdoms and Sultanates*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Sultanates</th>
<th>Period of Existence (centuries)</th>
<th>Geographic Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adal</td>
<td>14–16th</td>
<td>Northwestern Somalia, Harar and parts of Abyssinia. Capital: Zeila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajuran</td>
<td>13–17th</td>
<td>Southern and southwestern Somalia including the entire inter-river area. Capital: Ghandershe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geledi</td>
<td>17–20th</td>
<td>The Geledi Sultanate’s rule covered the lower reaches of Shabelle River and the upper reaches of Juba River before its dissolution by the Italians. Capital: Afgoye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majerteen</td>
<td>16–20th</td>
<td>The entire eastern coast of the Somal Peninsula better known as the Horn of Africa and surrounding hinterland. Capital: Bargal/Alula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obbia (Hobyo)</td>
<td>19–20th</td>
<td>Central Somalia and southern parts of the Somali Region of Ethiopia. Capital: Obbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsangeli</td>
<td>13-20th</td>
<td>North-eastern Somali coast and the surrounding hinterlands. Capital: las Khoreh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Drawn from common sources.

The Arab traders who negotiated deals with the Somali sultans or kings to lease mainly ports were given the freedom to exercise sovereignty over the leases. As Hess (1966) described, the Arab traders and their governments were very impressed with the riches of Somalia, particularly the ports of Banaadir. In the fourteenth century, “Ibu Battuta described Mogadishu as the seat of a rich and powerful sultanate of great commercial prosperity” (Hess, 1966, p. 6). Though these foreign traders had arranged contracts with local sultans or kings and had control over their commercial lands, their trade relations did not affect local traditional affairs. European explorers initially
pursued the same pattern by either subletting ports and other businesses from Arabian leaseholders or making direct dealings with sultans themselves.

However, Somalis are profoundly aware of their identity and are attached to their tradition and Islamic heritage, and as Cassanelli (1982) points out, “it is their political division into distinct kinship groups and the formation and breaking of alliances among these groups that most influence their precolonial political history” (p. 17). The Somali clans’ identity is derived from the descendants of two brothers: Samaale and Sab. Samaale’s descendants comprise three clans: Hawiye, Darood, Dir, (including Isaq), and the Sab clan is made up of the Digil and Mirifle (Abdullahi, 2001; Lewis, 1988, 1994; Laitin & Samatar, 1987). There are also minority Somali ethnic groups called “Reer Hamar, who are mainly known to live in Muqdisho and Marka. There are also Wa-mbalazi or Wa-miini, also called Reer Barawe, which speak a very distinctive language known as Chi-mbalazi or Chi-miini. There are also Bantus or jarer-thick hair” (Issa-Salwe, 1994a, p. 2).

Traditional clan institutions and Leadership
Traditional elders and chiefs play stewardship roles in facilitating the preservation and persistence of clan social structure (Hess, 1966). Their leadership is critical for the health and the wellbeing of the community or the clan they lead. The traditional clan leaders are answerable to all the external actions among their members and are liable for communal settlement since there are ecological competitions due to the arid nature of most of the Somali clans’ land, which challenges the traditional institutions (Lewis, 1961). Hence, the traditional leaders were not authoritative but led by consensus. Therefore, to appreciate the cultural complexity of the social interaction and the leadership of traditional institutions, we must analyze kinship lineages and the compensation paying sub-clans and Heer or traditional customary laws (Salah, 2011).

Kinship lineages and Heer (Traditional customary law)
One of the pillars of the traditional institution is Heer. This customary system of governing was used by Somali society prior to the colonial rule that ended in the 1960s. The Heer institution is “a social contract democratically constructed to check the occasional conflicts between individuals and communities” (Samatar, 1992, p. 260). The system of Heer was popular among nomads, but what increased its popularity was its ability to adapt and evolve over time. As Lewis (1961) described, Heer “denotes a body of explicitly formulated obligations, rights and duties…it binds people of the same treaty (Heer) together in relation to internal dialogue and defines their collective responsibility in external relations with other groups” (p. 162). Somali loyalty to a group membership does not indicate loyalty to one leader or person, and according to Lewis (1955), the “absence of institutionalized hierarchical authority in Somali pastoral groups are not held together by attachment to the chiefs” (p.162). However, he admits that the principle of government, which is so important in so many other parts of Africa, is here replaced by binding ties of patrilineal kinship. The role of the traditional leaders during community conflict or meetings was to attempt to form some consensus among the diverse opinions of their members (Cassanelli, 1982; Issa-Salwa, 1994a; Lewis, 1961). The Somali traditional custom/law or Heer is the embodiment of common-wisdom and constitutes an unwritten but loosely accepted pan-Somali code of conduct. Heer emphasizes the values of interdependence and inclusiveness and thus forms the basis for a social order. Heer did not eliminate strife but provided accepted and workable ways of dealing with disputes and conflicts (Lyons & Samatar, 1995, p. 10).
This customary law is considered a form of democratic system.

**Kinship lineages and dia-paying or blood compensation**

In pre-colonial Somalia, the base of a kinship lineage system was comprised of a political stand of compensation paid to a victim or dia-paying groups. According to Lewis (1961), "the dia-paying group is essentially a corporate agnatic group whose members are united in joint responsibility towards outsiders… Dia (originating from Arabic), or Mag (Somali word), means compensation payment to a victim" (p. 6). Dia paying is a culturally shared concept; however, at the individual level, membership in a dia-paying group delineates two important factors in Somalia's social governance structure. First, it provides personal identity for individual members, which means the dia paying member usually keep their livestock within a roughly defined territory and share maintained wells, grazing land, and other communal resources. Second, economic cooperation and political solidarity, sanctioned by the force of kinship, are most pronounced in the corporate dia-paying unit (Lewis, 1961; PDRC, 2002; Salah, 2011). What distinguishes a clan-based structure from a Western European political structure, such as a party, is the cohesive power of membership. A party or a political formation in the West has its cohesive power centered on an idea, a programme, and a social class, while a clan is an expression of strong kinship ties (Tripodi, 1999).

In the context of leadership structure, traditional chiefs of communities consult with other respected community members such as Nabadoono or peace-seekers, religious groups, and warriors (Lewis, 1960). Traditional institutions govern their members by a form of leadership (Sultan, Garaad, Ugaas, Malla, Imaam, Islaan, Beeldaage, etc.) who facilitate and execute communal decisions reached by their clan members (Lewis, 1960). Elders make judgments after members of the clan present their cases before assemblies with certain and recognized characteristics. In this case, “all adult males have the right to speak, and to assemble to promulgate a common treaty by whose terms they bind themselves to abide” (Lewis, 1961, p. 176). These leaders claim no rights as rulers over their people in spite of being responsible for all affairs concerning the clan and its relations with other clans (Issa-Salwe, 1994a).

Despite these positive aspects of these customary laws ("Heer/Dia laws"), certain shortcomings must also be addressed. They conflict with individual rights. As noted by Gundel (2006), "the collective responsibility imposed on dia-paying groups by Heer is seen as removing responsibility from individual perpetrators of crimes" (p. iii). There are gender and minority rights limitations with this customary law as well. Women are not allowed to participate in public assemblies, and often, the decisions of the elders’ favour men over women (Lewis, 1960). While young men are denied participation in assemblies due to their age, women are denied due to their gender and minorities due to their social status under these laws, which become a common practice within the clan system (Salah, 2011). Somali clans are mostly nomadic, and though they did not establish central political and structural social development, they functioned coherently in separate spaces and groups in pre-colonial era.

**Colonial legacy and its influence on Somali culture**

The colonial legacy had the most lasting effect on the nation’s culture and society. In many areas of the world, including Africa, colonialism brought multiple changes to the colonized societies, including government structure and organization, political practices, and even economics. Lacking a unitary government, the Somali “territory” was partitioned by the European colonial powers
during the late 19th century (Cassanelli, 1982; Hess, 1966; Lewis, 1961; Touval, 1963). Parts of
the north of Somaliland were administered by the British, while much of the South became Italian
Somaliland. Issa-Salwe (1994a) noted the first European explorers who reached the shores of Somalia:

Among the first European to reach the Somaliland coast were the Englishman William Christopher, who reached the Geledi Sultanate in 1843 and Captain Charles J. Cruttenden, who penetrated the interior land in the northeast. During the same period the French Commodore Charles Guillain explored the southern coast, Richard F. Burton reached Zeyla (Zeila) and Berbera in the 1850, John Speke, a protégé of Burton, started out from Las Qorey (Laskhorai) in north-eastern part of Somaliland, and reached up to Nugaal in central Somaliland. German Carl von der Decken, traveled to East Africa from 1859 until his death near Barbera in 1861. (p. 13).

Like so many other African states, the colonial competition had a devastating effect on the centuries-old independence of the Somalis. For Somalis, it is the political and social unit in the traditional system that is most important. Clan lineage, perhaps, becomes associated with notions of common ancestry and a sense of order (Issa-Salwe, 1994a; Lewis, 1960). But the colonial practice interrupted that system by corrupting the leadership. For example, colonial administrations started giving salaries to clan leaders or chiefs to institutionalize what was a minimal association system into a more administered and structured one (Abdullahi, 2001). According to Robert L. Hess (1966), “Italian tribal interference (i.e., the Italian colonizers seeking obedience in the form of force or the threat of force) reduced tribal warfare and restricted nomadism which disenchanched the traditional pastoral society” (p. 187). Somalia particularly inherited three noticeable hindrances from their colonial rule: (a) hastily made decisions in 1884 that divided the Somali nation into five regions, (b) the introduction of a centralized state, which eliminated the role of elders and traditional institutions; and (c) poorly developed social programs, which paved the way for chronic and wide-spread poverty, leading to total dependence on former colonial foreign aids (Issa-Salwe, 1994a; Salah, 2011). However, “the establishment of governmental authority and administration throughout the territory was not well received by the tribes. Independence, even with anarchy and insecurity, was preferable to subjection to Christian government and its imposed peace” (British & Foreign State Papers, as cited in. Touval, 1963, p.71).

In this context, the flag bearer for resistance to Christian education on Somali soil and was the mullah-Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hassan and his movement known as Darwish. “A Darwish is a Muslim believer who takes vows of poverty to lead a life of austerity in the service of Allah and of his community” (Issa-Salwe, 2020.p.76).

Sayyid Mohammed was born in the Sa’madeeqa valley, a small watering hole between Wud-Wud and Buhodle in 1856. Two influences left an impression on the life of the Sayyid. The first influence was Islamic study, the other was the pastoralism. He travelled to many Islamic seats of learning, including Mogadishu, Nairobi, Harar and Khartoum (Sudan), where he sought out the most learned sheikhs in each place (Issa-Salwe 2020. p.76).
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After encountering schools run by missionaries, particularly, “a Roman Catholic English school at Berbera that was more popular, much to the annoyance of the Mullah” (Irons, 2013, p. 49), the Mullah, also known by colonial literature as Mad Mullah, rallied the Somalis to resist the Christian invaders and their attempts to Christianise their children; “Mohammed declared himself to be the expected Mahdi and proclaimed a holy war against the infidels” (Jardine, 1932, p.42). The Somalis were not welcoming and did not particularly want the colonial administration on their land; they were very suspicious of Christian schools and their system of educating their children. This tendency might have been triggered by the Euro-Christian colonization of Muslim lands in Africa and Asia, creating a widespread reaction culminating in a resurgence of a revivalist movement against the Euro-Christian hegemony…the resistance led by Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah was motivated by religious and cultural principles (Issa-Salwe, 2020.p.76).

The Mullah Sayyid mounted a powerful army that garnished the support of the Somali people and went to war with the British colonials who occupied the north of the Somaliland. His focus was to resist the intruders and consolidate power. He was not only brutal to the colonial administration but also to those who did not agree with his vision or goal; “The reason that Mohammed Abdulle Hassan was such a controversial figure was that his indiscriminate raiding, seizing, and plundering of the property of the Somali clans he suspected were not favorable to his cause” (Issa-Salwe, 1994b, p. 551). Other critics described him as brutally cruel, particularly to those who doubted him being the messiah or “savior of Islam and the Somalis alike” (Irons, 2013. p.39). The war between the Mullah and the British army continued for more than two decades, and most of the lives lost were Somalis, which ultimately ended with the defeat of the Mullah in 1920 “by the aeroplane, a newly invented lethal weapon, with which they started to attack all Darwish bases in Taleh and Mirashi simultaneously on 21 January 1920 and completed captured on 3 February” (Issa-Salwe, 2020, p. 91). He succumbed to an attack of influenza on 21 December 1920, where he died on the land of his paternal clansmen in Ethiopia. “Long years of adversity gave vitality to Sayyid Mohammed’s personality,” but “his tyranny was directed towards a noble end” (Issa-Salwe, 2020, p. 86; Lewis 2002, p. 82).

Darwish nationalism endured in a period when Somali society was widely dispersed and lacked the necessary organization to form a single political unit and at a time when colonial powers such as Britain, Italy, and France were expanding their hegemony over the country (Issa-Salwe, 2020). Although he was seen as very tyrannical to some Somalis, to others, he was a hero and the founding father of the Somali national movement. Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hassan left an indelible legacy in the minds and psyche of the Somali people and the notion of nationalism. After World War II, the European grip on Africa was loosening, but not fast enough. In Somalia, however, Italy maintained control of Italian Somaliland as part of its African colony until they were defeated by the British in 1941 (Hess, 1966). The Somali territories, both north and south, came under British military protection until 1949, at which time the newly formed United Nations granted Italy, 10 years of trusteeship over most of present-day Somalia until its independence in 1960 (Mohamoud, 2006).

**Post-colonial Somali governments: The formation of political systems**

During colonial rule, Somalia was made up of two distinct entities, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, which received their independence in 1960 and joined, as noted before, to form the
Somali Republic. This was an exhilarating moment for all Somalis, whether they were in or out of the country and, as Mohamed Trunji (2015) describes,

They watched the hoisting of the Somalia flag at “midnight on June 30, 1960 on the National Assembly building, and the provisional head of state, where his Excellence newly elected president of Somalia Aden Abdulla, appeared on the balcony of the Assembly and was greeted by a very large crowd of happy and cheering Somalis” (p. 372).

The new president nominated Abdirashid Ali Sharmara as his first Prime Minister of Somalia. Although the country was administratively divided into eight regions and 37 districts, each headed by a regional governor or district commissioner appointed by the Minister of the Interior (Vogt, 1994, as cited in Isse-Salwe, 1994a). Somali people created political parties and participated in a democratic process of electoral systems on their own and created a country they alone could govern. In contrast, according to Abdi Samatar (2016),

most African liberation leaders, whether Nkrumah, Nyerere, or Kenyatta established the Liberation parties that led countries to independence, and most of those parties’ become instruments for the founding leaders’ tenacious attachment to political power, thereby losing much of whatever democratic qualities they had (p. 39).

Somalia became a unitary republic with a representative democratic form of government.

According to Laitin & Samatar (1987), “Somalia has a history of a good start after its independence, a political history in sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 154), and participated in a democratic election and legislation. The authors further pointed out that Somalia started “a vigorous participatory democracy and elected a National Assembly to which government was answerable, an independent judiciary, and an active set of Newspapers that were once hailed as the model of free press in sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 154). Several factors may help to explain this—though one could not disagree with the explanation offered by a British intelligence report, according to which, “the intensely parochial tribal spirit always militated against any leader rising above it... these qualities abound among the Somalis who have aptly been described as belonging to an egalitarian society” (Somali intelligence report, 1947, p.39, as cited in Trunji, 2015, p.382). According to Lewis (1965), the nationalism mixed with the government policy was “tailor-made, and their problem was not that of nation-building, but of extending statehood outside the frontiers of the Somali Republic to embrace the remaining portion of the nation” (p. 1). In this context, the new government focused not on building policy but on planning to regain those missing regions. Somalia was divided into five regions by the European colonials, and the people did not respect the borders demarcated by the departing colonial powers, which in effect, placed their kinsmen under foreign jurisdictions like Ethiopia and Kenya (Lewis, 1965). However, the government neglected its responsibility to focus on domestic social policy reform.

In response to the public’s dissatisfaction and his own disappointment with the Prime Minister’s lack of focus on their agenda, President Adan Abdullahi Osman fired Abdirashid Ali Sharmara and nominated a new Prime Minister, Abdirisaq Haji Hussein, who was a “politician of considerable personal charisma and courage, to institute a number of administrative reforms” (Lewis, 1965, p. 202). Although the new Prime Minister and his government faced tough opposition within the parliament, they eventually were approved, and the new Prime Minister
formed his government. The Prime Minister focused on domestic matters and government institutions. According to Samatar (2016),

Osman-Hussein team led the best government the country ever had… Hussein become the first African leader to enact far-reaching civil service reform, unprecedented in African history, and establish(ed) a system of administration whose hallmark was merit, efficiency, and professional autonomy (p. 185).

Nevertheless, in 1967 President Adan Abdullah Osman’s time in office came to an end when his previous Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Sharmaarke, ran against him and won. This period of Somali history marked “the first time in modern African political history in which a democratically elected president was defeated in an election, gave up power with dignity, and walked away freely as an adored citizen” (Samatar, 2016, p. 184). The Somali public had an expectation from their own government of what their nation should look like. However, the democratic parliamentary process that blended well and was expected to go well with the traditional political institutions had turned distinctly sour. Emphasis was on party politics and personal power rather than on mobilization for national development. It was not limited to the members of the Westernized elites, but “the country’s Assembly was no longer the symbol of free speech and fair play for all citizens” (Lewis, 1965; Muzrui & Tidy, 1985). Corruption had become rife, and deputies traded their votes for personal gain. “Sixty-four parties totaling 1000 persons took part in the March, 1969 election” (Laitin & Samatar, 1987, p. 76). Unfortunately, after almost a decade of parliamentary democracy, the ever-increasing tension between antagonistic political elites, which undermined national solidarity, seemingly debilitated state institutions, allowing corruption to fester and the negative use of clan lineage to resurface.

As Abdi Samatar explained, “This incredible record has yet to be digested by Somalis, Africans, and Africanist social sciences…two democratic changes of government took place, one at its beginning and one at the end of the first republic” (Samatar, 2016, p. 185). However, this incredible run was cut short by the assassination of President Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmaarke on 15 October 1969 by his own bodyguard. This tragedy left a political vacuum, and the military commander (Mohamed Siyad Barre) took advantage of the situation and seized power on 21 October 1969. According to David Laitin (1976), “Aside from the assassination of the president, the political chaos of late, increased public demand for change and gave the military an opportunity to seize power” (p. 451). This was a bloodless coup d’état led by the head of the military, Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre, who became the longest ruler of Somalia until his forced departure in 1991. The impact of Siyad Barre’s tyrannical rule and self-serving policies further significantly altered the Somali clan structural leadership and affected different aspects of the culture. The military regime pursued a divide and conquer methods, particularly on clans, which is a legacy inherited from the colonial administration. In this context, clan leadership shifted from organized traditional elders who were respected by their masses to the battle-tested warlords inscribed with the quest for political power (Perlez, 1992).

The civil strife, the revival of the state, and the Clan impact on leadership
In 1991, when Somalia descended into anarchy and clan fiefdom caused by a brutal authoritarian regime, neither the state authorities, politicians, elites, intellectuals, traditional leaders, nor the international community was able to prevent or rescue the country from the ensuing catastrophic situation (Salah, 2011). The civil war tapped into the worst impulse of clan feud. The clans got
access to weapons and were increasingly composed of heavily armed young, unemployed combat veterans of insurgent forces (Perlez, 1992). For Perlez, the objective of the clans was transformed into one with a desire for hegemony, which changed the demographics and capabilities of the clan militias. Today, an estimated millions of Somalis live in poverty, a situation that is exacerbated by frequent droughts and famine as a result of climate change. According to the United Nations Development Programme (Human Development Report 2015), more than 60% of Somalia’s population lives in severe poverty, and 69% of youth are unemployed (UNDP-HDR, 2015). Although a human development index (HDI) has not yet been calculated for Somalia because of an absence of quality data, there is every reason to believe that Somalia would be comparable, if not at the bottom, to some of the worst-performing nations on the African continent. It is a difficult time ahead for Somalia’s state revival since there is a lack of social cohesion and strong clan identity. Justin L. Smith (2007) pointed out, once the legitimacy crisis is well underway, regimes that begin or have been practicing identity politics increase incentives...this conflict, regardless of proximal cause, is what leads the state into collapse rendering resurrection difficult, if not impossible once the regime has been removed from power. (p. 13).

**Figure 4**

*Legitimacy Crisis*

![Diagram of Legitimacy Crisis](https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/dissertations/AAI1451690/)

Due to the civil conflict, Somalis have lost not only their institutions but their social and cultural identity. They are, as it stands, close to three decades of being without a strong legitimate Somali state, which is considered the longest world record for a society living without an adequately functioning central government (Salah, 2011). Somalia currently has a government, but it is a fragile one that is riddled with conflict and barely coherent, mainly because of corruption and clan divisions. While Somalia’s cultural history of stateless pastoralism was managed coherently, today, the dysfunctional political culture of the country prevails among many of the country’s elite (Menkhaus, 2007). Overcoming such obstacles will require inclusive strategies that integrate traditional clan structures into conceptions of Somali national identity (Johnson, 2011; Issa-Salwe, 2002).

**Discussion**

The literature reviewed in this research originated in academic and non-academic books, journal articles, and archives about Somali culture, clans, and leadership. The qualitative data collected from the academic literature was synthesized to examine the extent to which relational leading practices may have emerged and are evident within Somali clan leadership and state governing. The literature showed that the Somali people are predominantly nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists for whom clan lineage is part of their social identity, unity, and relations. Most early
and modern scholars of varying disciplines, including linguistics, ethnography, historians, and archaeologists, had similar but different versions of Somali ethnicity. The origin of Somalia, as far as the literature available is concerned, was in the Horn of Africa, and the earliest known records go back for at least a few centuries (Cassanelli, 1982; Hess, 1966; Lewis, 1961; Touval, 1963). However, because the population was mostly nomadic, there are few material artifacts and almost no permanent settlements to be investigated by archaeologists.

However, the literature also shows that Somali society in pre-colonial times had a clan leadership structure that was decentralized and ruled by consensus. It showed clan leaders, like the sultans, boqor, ugaas, chiefs, etc., were elders who were selected by their clansmen and respected. The literature revealed that pre-colonial Somali society was governed by clan leaders who functioned as governing bodies similar to what is known today as democracy. It also shows they achieved this without a centralized modern governing system. While pre-colonial Somali society appeared to have its own internal cohesion (though not centralized), its social structure was interrupted by European colonizers who installed their own system and dislodged the Somali traditional way of life. When European colonizers took control of the Somalilands, they focused on clan leadership in order to manage them. The colonial administrations started giving salaries to clan leaders or chiefs to institutionalize them and minimize their capacity to freely associate with their members. The result undermined the authority of the clan leaders and created rivalries within clans.

Somali traditional clan leadership has been diminished from the colonial to post-colonial periods and was completely altered negatively during the civil war. As Lewis (1988) pointed out, like many African states, the decolonization of Africa had an effect on how society formed with the exception of the Somali Democratic Republic, Botswana and Lesotho, sub-Saharan Africa’s traditional nations and tribes are not autonomous, but encapsulated in multi-national states formed haphazardly and without regard to ethnic boundaries in the European part of the continent (p. ix).

However, in some parts of Somalia, clan leaders are recognized as the legitimate leadership and resumed their roles resolving conflicts and building communities, particularly in the North regions of Somalia. According to Gundel (2006), the status and legitimacy of the elders underwent a renaissance during and after the civil war, and with that a renewed respect derived from their successes in solving conflicts and managing clan affairs…the elders’ efforts in Somaliland and Puntland to come together and lift crisis resolution to the higher level of regional and national peace was successful (p. iii).

In addition, Florence Ssereo (2003) stated that “clan-democracy in Somalia is reappraised, as a concept and framework for conflict resolution and achieving political stability in the 21st century” (p. 25). Nevertheless, the literature reviewed reveals that Somali traditional clan leadership has similar relationality in its style to that of relational leadership. What the literature shows is that Somalia’s clan leadership structure is built on participation, dialogue, and collaborative goals to achieve changes. Relational leading means that individuals interact with others and that leaders and other participants work together to achieve change; our collective experience today determines what our tomorrow will look like (Stavros & Torres, 2006). This was more palpable during the pre-colonial era, but as society engaged with the European colonizers that cohesion was disrupted
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and has not fully recovered. Somali clan paternal lineage is largely accepted as part of the social identity, relationships, and sense of belonging. However, culture, within society or organization, forms “values and patterns of influence and from the very simple process of coordinating we develop local-culture norms and values which in turn, serve as common sense justification for future coordination” (McNamee & Hosking, 2012, p. 40). Somalia is a complex community made up of different clan groups that established a common polity. Therefore, re-evaluating clan relational leadership and identity is a way to resolve the Somali society’s conundrum of state revival if it is to be successful.

Conclusion
This literature review focused on the overview of the distinctions between different theories of leadership and more contemporary visions of relational leading. In parallel, it explored Somalia's historical background in the context of clan culture, traditional institutions, social structure, and the impact of pre- and post-colonial and colonial legacy. It further explained the colonial influence on culture, as well as the collapse of the modern state in Somalia and the causes of state failure. The Somali people have a positive relationship with their clan lineages, and this relationship is built on the trust of their clan leaders. However, while Somalia’s pre-colonial history tells a different leadership pattern than its post-colonial one, the principle of the clan system and its loyalty remain the same. This pre-colonial history was an African experience and not only Somalis, which did not get a lot of attention, and as Abdi Samatar (2016) pointed out, many scholars and practitioners have assumed that post-colonial Africa lacked a democratic culture and governance experience that was “worthy of emulation.” Nevertheless, Somalia’s institutions have endured through colonialism and independence and have remained relevant in the modern world. The country’s history tells a different leadership style than the one it struggles with today, such as major internal and external obstacles, including leadership power struggles, regional secession, clan hegemony, and religious extremism. In addition, further research will be needed to expand on the concept of Somali clan leadership in relation to state institutions that would provide strong support for the relations between state and clan leadership. Finally, it also would be helpful to know how cultural identity develops for today’s Somali leaders, who may not have had an opportunity to experience a functional state apparatus and positive traditional clan leadership. This research does not include the current situation in Somalia. The principal objective of this research is to study the role and the relational approach of traditional clan leadership and institutions during the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods. Finally, this research will also aid policymakers in developing awareness of the country’s social structure and its influence on state reconstruction.

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