“Solidarity: A Catholic Perspective” Chapter 10 from A Vision of Justice: Engaging Catholic Social Teaching on the College Campus

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In memory of Fr. Peter Ignatius Gichure, we reprint this essay co-authored by Fr. Gichure and Ron Pagnucco, co-editor of the JSE. Fr. Gichure was working on an essay on Fratelli Tutti for the JSE when he died.


Chapter 10
“Solidarity: A Catholic Perspective”
Chapter 10 from A Vision of Justice:
Engaging Catholic Social Teaching on the College Campus

Ron Pagnucco and Peter Gichure

We come across many uses of the word “solidarity” today -- ethnic solidarity, worker solidarity, solidarity with the poor, global solidarity – the list goes on. Some analysts discuss solidarity in a descriptive way, as the degree of unity in a group. Others focus on solidarity as a moral duty of support for those in need. As used in much of the scholarly literature, the concept of solidarity includes both a descriptive (empirical) dimension and moral (normative) dimension.

In this chapter we will explore the concept of solidarity in Catholic Social Teaching (CST) and locate that understanding in the broader discussion of solidarity by philosophers, political theorists, and social scientists. We will close the chapter with a concrete example of global solidarity between the University of Notre Dame and The Catholic University of Eastern Africa in Nairobi, Kenya.

The definition of solidarity we use in this chapter includes both empirical and moral dimensions. Drawing from the scholarly literature, we define solidarity as a certain type of relationship that has the following components: the relationship is seen by its participants as being one of interdependence and unity; in which there is shared identity, interests, feelings of belonging (a “we feeling”) and mutual moral obligations.1 One way to determine with whom we see ourselves in solidarity is to answer the questions: “Should we support them? Should we support us?”2 The “us” is our solidary group, or “in-group.” The “them” is an “out-group” with which we do not share solidarity. Exactly who and what “them” is, and what, if any, moral obligations we have to “them” is often a topic of much debate within solidary groups. As we will see, how exclusive or inclusive a solidary group is can also be a topic of debate among scholars who study solidarity.

The philosopher Sally Scholz notes that solidarity “is neither individualism nor communalism but blends elements of both… [W]hile not losing the individual in the community, [solidarity] emphasizes the bonds with others or interdependence… The good of the community is tied up with the good of the individual and vice versa in solidarity.”3 Catholic Social Teaching shares this view. Scholz also points out the unique nature of solidarity’s moral obligations, noting that “perhaps the most distinguishing [characteristic of solidarity], is that solidarity entails positive moral obligations. Political philosophy has historically been preoccupied with articulating rights and
privileges of citizens or describing negative duties.” Rights and negative duties usually entail “freedom from” something, non-interference, such as in the duty not to block free speech or assembly. The concept of solidarity incudes respect for such rights and negative duties. However, the positive duties of solidarity require action to improve a situation, such as action to feed the hungry or to otherwise actively contribute to the community’s well-being. Respect for the individual’s freedom and autonomy is combined with a recognition of interdependence and its responsibilities. This understanding of the positive moral obligations of solidarity is shared by CST.

As indicated earlier, scholars debate whether or not we are psychologically capable of solidarity with individuals and groups beyond the boundaries of our solidary or in-groups. Scholars also debate the ethical issues involved – do we have the same moral obligations to people in distant lands as we have to people in own families, groups or countries? We will explore the two basic schools of thought, what we are calling the “Bounded Solidarity” and the “Cosmopolitan Solidarity” schools, on the descriptive/empirical and moral/normative issues, and show where CST fits in.

**Theories of Solidarity: Bounded Solidarity and Cosmopolitan Solidarity Schools**

Influenced by the work of philosopher Nigel Dower, we identify two basic schools of thought on solidarity and call them the “Bounded Solidarity” school and the “Cosmopolitan Solidarity” school. Scholars in these two schools differ on various issues, most notably on the capabilities of humans for broad and far-reaching solidarity, and on whether or not there is one moral community with moral obligations of all to all. We begin with a look at the “Bounded Solidarity” school, which holds that humans are not capable of a broad-reaching solidarity, and that there are no universal moral obligations or standards such as universal human rights – all solidary relationships and moral obligations are local and limited or “bounded.” Conversely, the “Cosmopolitan Solidarity” school holds that humans are capable of global solidarity, and that humans are one moral community with obligations to each other, including distant, unknown others. In the Cosmopolitan Solidarity school there are two different models of how local and national groups fit (or don’t fit) into global solidarity. Drawing from the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, we call these the “Impartial” solidarity model, and the “Partial” (or “Rooted”) solidarity model. Catholic Social Teaching falls into the Cosmopolitan Solidarity school, and uses a Partial solidarity model.

**Bounded Solidarity.** Philosopher Kurt Bayertz discusses the views of the Bounded Solidarity school, which includes historically well-known scholars. Bayertz cites the work of the prominent eighteenth-century philosopher, David Hume, who “emphasized that sympathy and benevolence do not usually extend beyond the intimate sphere: we evince them undividedly for the members of our family and our friends, less for our neighbors and acquaintances, hardly at all for the inhabitants of our town or our compatriots, and towards the inhabitants of distant continents we are ultimately indifferent.” Solidarity and moral obligations are limited because of human capabilities. The philosopher Simon Derpmann observed that some scholars consider transnational solidarity “a desirable, but nonetheless unrealistic vision overestimating... the capacities for human affiliation with the distant [other].” Bayertz provides a good summary of what he and other scholars in the Bounded Solidarity school see as the empirical reality: ‘One is not ‘solidary’ with just anybody, but only with the other members of the particular community to which one believes
oneself to belong. A differentiation between those belonging to 'us' and everybody else is thus prerequisite; in most cases, one is only solidary with the former."9

Moral obligations follow the (supposed) empirical reality that people have solidarity with some groups and no solidarity with other groups and that moral obligations are based on the degree of solidarity, or lack thereof. Solidary or in-group relationships usually have their own norms, customs, and mutual obligations. Bayertz makes an argument typical of the Bounded Solidarity school: the existence of attachments to particular relationships and groups leads him to reject any universalistic ethic or obligation that proposes that "each individual is morally obliged to help all other individuals without differentiation"10 since, he claims, humans do not have a sense of solidarity with the human race as a whole, and morality "cannot be reduced to universal [and impartial] principles since [morality] includes particular reasons and obligations to act."11 Bayertz does argue for the universal ethical obligation of refraining from doing harm,12 but he does not see a universal obligation to prevent harm. One philosopher in this school made the notable claim that if one does not have a relationship with starving children in Africa, one does not have a moral obligation to help them.13

Nigel Dower summarizes the theories in what we call the Bounded Solidarity school by saying that generally these theories reject ethical universalism and limit "the domain of one's duty (or at least primary duty) to those to whom one stands in some meaningful relation, the relation being meaningful if it is informed by such diverse factors as sentiment, affection, shared traditions, convention, reciprocity or contract... These theories may be called 'bounded' or 'closed' theories of ethics... [They] have a tendency either to deny the existence of global obligations or, in terms of what the theory says, regard obligations at that level as marginal and relatively unimportant."14 In our terminology, bounded solidarity includes bounded ethics.

**Cosmopolitan Solidarity.** The empirical and ethical claims of the school of thought we are calling “Cosmopolitan Solidarity” are quite different from those of the Bounded Solidarity school. Proponents of Cosmopolitan Solidarity contend that humans are capable of broad, far-reaching solidarity, identifying with and caring for distant, unknown others and humanity as a whole. In other words, humans are capable of expanding their in-group boundaries. There is significant empirical evidence to support this claim. Political scientist Lawrence Wilde reports that in a 2005 World Values Survey conducted in 57 countries, 77 percent of people replying either agreed or strongly agreed that they saw themselves as world citizens.15 The respondents combined the world citizen identity with national and/or local identities. Research on political altruism and prosocial behavior has found that people have been willing to help people they don’t know, near and far geographically, and can have very inclusive definitions of who is a member of their group.16 In their review of studies on in-group and out-group helping, psychologists Stefan Sturmer and Mark Snyder note "the amazing potential of common group membership to foster the expansion of empathy and helping to people one has never seen before or who are geographically distant but to whom one feels psychologically connected through perceptions of similarities on the basis of a common 'we'."17

The Cosmopolitan Solidarity school includes CST and other theories that "advocate some kind of world ethic for individuals, as belonging to one global moral community – where community is defined in terms of the claimed moral relations, not in terms of established traditions, felt relations
and shared values in practice.” Unlike the Bounded Solidarity school, the Cosmopolitan Solidarity school contends that humans are psychologically capable of global solidarity and identifying as world citizens or members of the global human community. The Cosmopolitan Solidarity school holds that all human beings are of equal value and it espouses universal ethical standards and rights for all. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a good example of a universal standard of rights.

Since the Cosmopolitan Solidarity school claims there is one human moral community that transcends all local, bounded communities, what does this mean for relationships and moral obligations in local communities and the nation-state? What moral obligations, if any, do we have to them? There are two different models of Cosmopolitan Solidarity addressing these and related questions: the impartial solidarity model and the partial solidarity model.

**Impartial Cosmopolitan Solidarity.** For the most part, advocates of the impartial model of cosmopolitan solidarity, writes sociologist Craig Calhoun, “offer no new account of solidarity save the obligations of each human being to all others, they give little weight to ‘belonging,’ to the notion that social relationships might be as basic as individuals…” In fact, the impartial model is based largely on liberal individualism; advocates of the impartial model place emphasis on “justice among individuals. They tend to denigrate or at least marginalize national and more local loyalties, to ignore religious belonging, and in general to treat individuals as essentially discrete and equivalent.” For example, philosopher Peter Singer states: “The interests of all persons ought to count equally, and geographic location and citizenship make no intrinsic difference to the rights and obligations of individuals.” Singer does write that partial behaviors can have impartial justifications; for example, he would agree with other advocates of impartial solidarity that “it is right for parents to care most for their own children, but only because this will ensure the best possible global childcare arrangements.” Drawing from Calhoun’s work, we can see that the impartial model, “minimizes attention to social solidarity in favor of analysis framed in terms of individuals and the universal…”

**Partial Cosmopolitan Solidarity.** The partial solidarity model has a positive view of local belonging and sees it as compatible with global solidarity. Simon Derpmann observed that being a member of the local community “may enable the satisfaction of morally legitimate desires. It may be important… to belong to such a community in order to lead a fulfilling life. If this is true… one needs good reasons to negate the communal obligations that go along with it…” Like we would find in the Bounded Solidarity school, this is a positive recognition of the importance of local belonging for human well-being. However, Derpmann goes on to argue that humans are capable of “mutually non-exclusive solidarities…” and that “cosmopolitanism can be understood to be compatible with the evolution of multiple loyalties. Those loyalties are neither exclusively universal, nor only national or local, but represent different layers of identification of a person… A cosmopolitan community with cosmopolitan obligations allows for communal obligations within it.”

The preceding view expressed by Derpmann summarizes well the Cosmopolitan Solidarity school’s partial solidarity model, the model used in CST. Indeed, what he wrote could have come from a CST text.
Catholic Social Teaching on Solidarity
We begin our discussion of CST on solidarity with a look at how CST combines local and national belonging with global solidarity. In CST, human beings are social beings that naturally form groups ranging from the family to the nation-state, and that are capable of solidarity with the global human community. Local and national relationships can actually help people develop global solidarity. As Craig Calhoun observed, “thinking in terms of the abstract equivalence of human beings is helpful – in theories of justice and human rights, for example… Cosmopolitanism becomes richer and stronger if approached in terms of connections rather than (or in addition to) equivalence.”27 Calhoun then points to the Catholic Church as an example of the successful combination of global identity and solidarity with local parish and national church identities and solidarities. Calhoun claims that the Catholic Church “offers a reminder of more general importance: the organizations, networks, and pathways by which we transcend locality are still particular, specific – to people, dimensions of human life, ways of bringing some human beings closer rather than others.”28 In the same line of thought, theologian Dorian Llywelyn observed that the Church respects ethnic and national belonging: “since grace does not efface nature, Christianity does not wipe out ethnicity or nationality. It does, however, relativize it.”29

Among the “organizations, networks and pathways by which we transcend locality” we find various church programs specifically designed to foster global solidarity, such as parish partnerships between parishes in the United States and in developing countries, and the Catholic Relief Services Global Solidarity Partnership program, through which dioceses in the United States and developing countries establish partnerships.30 All of these programs celebrate, rather than downplay, ethnic and national belonging and cultures even as they transcend them.

A discussion of the nation-state shows us key differences between the impartial and partial models. Pope John Paul II wrote: “The term ‘nation’ designates a community based in a given territory and distinguished from other nations by its culture. Catholic social doctrine holds that the family and the nation are both natural societies, not the product of mere convention… [T]he nation cannot be replaced by the State, even though the nation tends naturally to establish itself as a State.”31 Citizens have a duty to work for the common good of their nation-state while avoiding an unhealthy, exclusive nationalism.32 Noting growing interdependence through globalization, John Paul called for a global solidarity that respected but looked beyond local and national loyalties and obligations: “New ethical choices are necessary; a new world conscience must be created; each of us, without denying his origin and the roots of his family, his people and his nation, or the obligations arising therefrom, must regard himself as a member of this great family, the world community… This means that the worldwide common good requires a new solidarity without frontiers…”33

The differences between CST’s view and the impartial solidarity model are illustrated by comparing Pope John Paul’s and Peter Singer’s views of the nation-state. Singer, taking the impartial view, wrote, “the modern idea that we owe special loyalty to our national community is not based on a community that exists independently of the way we think about ourselves. If… the modern idea of the nation rests on a community we imagine ourselves to be part of, rather than one that we really are part of, then it is also possible for us to imagine ourselves to be part of a different community. That fits well with the suggestion that the complex set of developments we refer to as globalization should lead us to reconsider the moral significance we currently place on
national boundaries.” Singer then asks if it would be better if “we begin to consider ourselves as members of the world” instead of the nation-state. The nation-state is socially constructed, not a “real” community, and individuals can re-imagine themselves as members of the global community; obligations are based on the needs of others, and national boundaries are morally irrelevant, imagined fictions. In his excellent discussion of Singer’s work and impartial universal standards, theologian Charles Camosy notes that CST contends that we have real, not imagined, interdependent relations and moral obligations in the groups and nation-state of which we are members, and that global interdependence is real as well and globalization “simply highlights this already existing relationship.” Camosy continues: “The Church hardly needs to “imagine” the concept of a transnational community, because the Church is such a community.” One can experience this transnational reality in the local parish.

Interdependence, Moral Virtue, and Solidarity
We have discussed the basic ideas of the Cosmopolitan Solidarity school and of its two models, the impartial solidarity model and the partial solidarity model, which CST holds. We have seen how CST integrates local and national solidarities into global solidarity, and how the Church itself is a concrete example of this integration. Now we look at other important aspects of CST on solidarity. We begin by recognizing the broad-reaching importance of the concept of solidarity in CST. As the Compendium notes: “Solidarity is one of the basic principles of the entire social teaching of the Church.” This principle has consistently appeared in modern CST under one guise or another since 1891. Echoing the current understanding of solidarity noted by Scholz earlier in this chapter, Matthew Lamb writes that beginning in the late nineteenth century, the term “solidarity” was adopted from labor-union movements by Catholic social theorists… They used ‘solidarity’ to differentiate Catholic social theory from the modern theories of liberalism [liberal individualism] and communism.” The importance and broad applicability of the concept of solidarity in CST is illustrated by its use in many of the other chapters of our book.

In CST, solidarity includes an empirical dimension and a moral dimension. Empirically, the human is a social being that is born into interdependent relationships and needs others to be fully human, and globalization is increasing interdependence among peoples. Solidarity is also a moral principle to guide the conduct of our relationships with others. While all the components of solidarity we noted at the beginning of this chapter are included in the CST concept of solidarity, CST gives the greatest emphasis to the moral aspect — in particular, to solidarity as a virtue. John Paul II saw the empirical reality of growing interdependence through globalization as a key component of global solidarity, but his — and the CST — definition of solidarity emphasized its moral aspect: “a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good… to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all.” The “common good” is defined in CST as “the sum of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and easily.” A concrete example of global solidarity can be found in the Catholic Relief Services’ Parish Partnership Manual. The guidelines for solidarity-based partnerships between parishes in the developed and developing world are:(1) Emphasize relationships over resources; (2) Practice mutuality and equality; (3) Seek to give and receive, learn and teach; (4) Work to change unjust systems and structures; (5) Deepen our faith by experiencing the universal Catholic Church. Global solidarity is based on relationship-building, equality and mutuality – we are to become friends, and each of us has gifts we can share.
with others for the good of all, whatever those gifts may be. Hopefully, such concrete transnational connections will help participants more clearly see themselves as members of the human family.

The principle that each of us belong to the global human family and that we have moral obligations to one another has been a part of CST for many centuries. However, today’s increasing interdependence through globalization creates an urgent need for solidarity. As the Compendium notes, this growing interdependence “is the determining factor for relations in the modern world in the economic, cultural, political and religious sense” and provides an opportunity for negative moral acts such as exploitation and for the positive moral responses of solidarity. Solidarity is both a personal virtue that shapes an individual’s actions, and a social virtue that shapes the actions of groups and nations; it includes the commitment to genuinely seek the good of the other, whomever and wherever they may be, to the point of being willing to sacrifice for the good of the other. As a social virtue, solidarity leads us to transform structures of sin, such as unjust trade policies favoring wealthy nations, into “structures of solidarity through the creation or appropriate modification of laws, market regulations, and juridical systems.”

While CST advocates solidarity with the entire human family, and affirms local and national belonging as legitimate and valuable in that broader context, it gives special attention to the poor and the oppressed. We have seen how CST justifies partial local and national solidarities in the context of a universal, global solidarity. How does it justify its partial preferential option for the poor and oppressed? Solidarity with the poor and oppressed is especially important in order to bring them into full community with everyone else. As theologian Marie Vianney Bilgrien writes: “Solidarity… searches out the poorest and the most oppressed because they are the clearest manifestation of where justice is lacking.” Indeed, poverty and oppression are manifestations of a lack of solidarity. However, Bilgrien goes on to remind us of solidarity’s broader meaning: “Solidarity also forces the virtuous person to see the victim and the executioner, the oppressed and the oppressor, the poorer and the one who causes the unjust poverty and to accept both as equal members of the same human family, worthy of dignity.” Solidarity always means love of everyone, including oppressors and enemies.

Similarly, everyone needs to collaborate in order for problems such as poverty to be resolved. The Cathechism notes:

Socio-economic problems can be resolved only with the help of all the forms of solidarity: solidarity of the poor among themselves, between rich and poor, of workers among themselves, between employers and employees in a business, solidarity among nations and peoples. International solidarity is a requirement of the moral order; world peace depends in part on this.

In some ways the above statement seems quite utopian: certainly we know of many cases in which the rich do not collaborate with the poor, and employers do not collaborate with employees, to achieve justice. However, CST does not have a particularly naïve or utopian view of human nature. As the Compendium states, the “social nature of humans does not automatically lead to communion among persons, to the gift of self. Because of pride and selfishness, man discovers in himself the seeds of asocial behavior, impulses leading him to close himself within his own individuality and to dominate his neighbor.” Also, we noted earlier that CST discusses structures
of sin; these unjust social, political and economic arrangements emerge from pride and selfishness, and need to be replaced with structures of solidarity, including just laws, market regulations, and juridical systems, among other things. Similarly, CST does recognize in its support for just war and humanitarian military intervention (Responsibility to Protect) that violence can legitimately be used for the sake of justice in certain kinds of conflicts, though CST has difficulty accepting the concept of “just revolution.” Nevertheless, in CST conflict is played down in favor of collaboration, dialogue, negotiation and unity. Lamb notes that this is part of the general orientation of CST: “Where modern liberalism and collectivism viewed social reality as ultimately competitive and conflictive, [CST] emphasized society and economy as ontologically and ethically oriented toward cooperation and harmony.” We see a good example of this when Pope John Paul II wrote that a labor union should not be engaged in a “struggle ‘against’ others” or “to eliminate the opponent” but in a struggle “‘for’ the just good.” Pope John Paul II asserts the importance of unity saying that in “the final analysis, both those who work and those who manage the means of production or who own them must in some way be united in… community.” Solidarity is never to be used against anyone, as in, for example, mobilizing a group to fight against another group. Rather solidarity is to encompass everyone and to be used for justice, the common good, and the betterment of the community as a whole. The end result of the struggle should be unity and reconciliation. As theologian Kristin Heyer has noted, “[l]iberation theologians and social ethicists have likewise noted magisterial Catholicism’s tendency to prioritize unity, harmony and synthesis in ways that circumvent necessary conflict… Without confronting issues of economic and political power and engaging grassroots mobilization, work toward and implementation of changes to the status quo will remain stunted… However, those who take a peacebuilding perspective look at a range of possible stances for the church to take towards conflict, with a goal of promoting justice and peace, two goods that may be difficult to realize simultaneously.

Whatever may be the limitations of the ways in which CST addresses conflict, undoubtedly many would agree with the well-known statement by Pope John Paul II that “peace is the fruit of solidarity.” Catholic Social Teaching’s emphasis on solidarity has encouraged individuals and institutions to engage in relationship-building and collaboration for social justice and integral human development. One example of institutional involvement in a global solidarity project is the collaboration between the University of Notre Dame and the Nairobi-based Catholic University of Eastern Africa on the Dandora project in Kenya. This case study provides an example not only of global solidarity, but of local solidarity as well.

**Universities and Solidarity: The Dandora Project**

Dandora is located on the eastern side of Nairobi, in the Embakasi Division. It has a population of about 500,000 people. Part of Dandora is occupied by the Dandora Municipal Waste Dumping Site managed by the City Council of Nairobi. The Dandora Municipal Waste Dumping Site was established by the City Council of Nairobi in the 1970s as a land fill over an unused quarry. It remains the only main site for disposal of solid waste from the entire Nairobi area, with an estimated 2000 tons of unsorted waste deposited there daily. The dumpsite is located on about 30 acres of land.

The site is an overfilled garbage heap surrounded by residential homes, businesses, schools and churches. The dumpsite is a key livelihood-generating income for over 600 people. It provides economic opportunities for the youth groups involved in garbage collection and recycling and a
community of residents that work and live in the dumpsite area has emerged. They have built houses in the periphery of the dumpsite. The dumpsite continues to attract young children eager to make easy money at a very early age, contributing to school drop-out rates in the area. It is estimated that more than 2000 children work in the dumpsite. The dumpsite has also been associated with numerous health issues: air quality is negatively impacted by the constant burning of waste and spontaneous methane fires that erupt at the dumpsite resulting in noxious smoke and fumes.

The establishment of local gangs pitted against each other for control of the dumpsite has led to general insecurity in the area. These gangs extort money from those who would like to scavenge the dumpsite. This has made it very hard to address the issue of relocating the dumpsite. However, as the Integral Human Development Report for Dandura notes: “The actual beneficiaries of the dumpsite…, are the influential and politically connected individuals and private companies that are involved in the transportation and deposit of solid waste in the city.”

In 2011, the University of Notre Dame, the Catholic University of Eastern Africa, located in Nairobi, and the Holy Cross Catholic Parish - Dandora came together and formed the Dandura Law and Human Development Project (DLHDP) to try to solve this very critical problem in Dandora. The parish is served by Holy Cross priests, members of the religious order at the University of Notre Dame. Faced with the problem of the dumpsite, it was obvious that something had to be done. The priests approached the University of Notre Dame, who agreed to see whether they could do something. It was determined that the Ford Family Foundation at the University of Notre Dame could contribute resources and sue the Kenyan government but that this should not be done without the involvement of a local university in Nairobi.

They approached the Catholic University of Eastern Africa for partnership. At first everything seemed obvious: with Kenya’s new Constitution in place, it was possible to sue the government and other actors for this abuse of human rights.

Initially the problem was viewed as how to remove a dumpsite that was affecting the health of the people of Dandora, as it seemed clear that the people’s health was being adversely affected. The Holy Cross parishioners of Dandora had always inquired how this dumpsite could be removed from Dandora, which would not be easy given the non-cooperation of the government. With the new Constitution, those in power could be taken to court and possibly compelled to remove the dumpsite. This task was to be undertaken by the law schools of both universities in collaboration with Dandora Parish.

Though it looked like a straightforward case, the reality was that this approach was misguided. There were more people who were affected by the dumpsite than was imagined. There were many people who were beneficiaries of the dumpsite, including the many poor residents who scavenged the dumpsite for their livelihood. This was a hard-hitting finding for people who wanted to address the issue of health and human rights. But human rights must address all human beings in an integral way. Those who literally lived on the dumpsite needed to be protected and those who suffered because of the dumpsite also had to be protected.
The proposed relocation of the Dandora Dumpsite clearly generated two different views on what to do. One was that “the dumpsite must be relocated and closed for health, human rights, and developmental and environmental reasons.” The other was that “the dumpsite is an important source of livelihood and a coping strategy for extreme poverty and without proper alternatives, such as the extension of social security and protection or the employment of those dependent on the dumpsite for their livelihoods, the dumpsite cannot be closed or relocated, but perhaps better managed.”

Listening and learning was undertaken through a variety of activities with the main objective of collecting the information necessary to understand the needs of Dandora residents and the complexities of urban poverty. There was no choice but to listen to all and develop solutions.

The Way Forward: Solidarity. The two universities and Dandora Parish saw that the only way out was to map the area under investigation and then do research to see the needs of the area and look for ways of addressing those needs. Through their project, the DLHDP, they commissioned research that resulted in the Integral Human Development Report for Dandura, which revealed how complex the issues were. The report demonstrated that one cannot solve problems partially. This will infringe on others’ rights, thus defeating the purpose of the whole effort.

Lessons Learned. The lesson learned from this case is that solidarity with the marginalized must take into consideration many challenges that may not be obvious. Working together in solidarity, the University of Notre Dame, the Catholic University of Eastern Africa, and Dandora parish came to learn that there were many underlying issues not immediately apparent. Although the dumpsite was affecting the health of Dandora, it was also clear that Dandora was a beneficiary of the dumpsite. The Integral Human Development Report for Dandura found that it was not a simple matter of saying that the dumpsite should be removed. It was no longer a simple issue of human rights being abused by the government, but instead an issue of urban poverty entangled with many factors that cannot be solved by one approach. The report ultimately recommended more dialogue with all the stakeholders and a continued search for a common solution, an exercise in inclusive solidarity.

Conclusion
We discussed various theories of solidarity, and located CST on solidarity in the Cosmopolitan Solidarity school. Like other theories in this school that hold a partial solidarity model, CST affirms multiple group memberships with their moral obligations, from the local to the global. The Catholic Church exemplifies the integration of these levels of belonging in its own structure and has advocated for centuries the view that we are all members of one human family and all children of God. The church’s spirituality, rituals, ethical teaching and concrete social relations make a unique contribution to enacting Cosmopolitan Solidarity. Theory alone is not enough; we always must ask: what are the concrete ways solidarity can be learned, enacted and sustained. In CST we can see that the beliefs, ethics and practices of a particular religious community need not be exclusivist but in fact may lead its members to a global inclusiveness. The partial and particular can lead to the embrace of the universal. We close with a quote from Pope John Paul II that illustrates this important point by his application of an ancient Christian parable to a globalizing world:

*God himself has created our basic interdependence and called us to solidarity with all. This teaching is formulated in an incomparably effective manner in the parable of the Good*
Samaritan, who took care of the man who was left half dead along the road from Jerusalem to Jericho. We all travel that road and are tempted to pass by on the other side. Referring to the Samaritan who was moved by compassion, Jesus told his listeners: ‘Go and do the same.’ Today, Jesus repeats to all of us when we travel the road of our common humanity: ‘Go and do the same’ [cf, Luke 10, 37].

**Questions for Discussion**

1. How are individualism and collectivism different from solidarity?
2. Do you think people are capable of global solidarity, of seeing themselves as part of one human family and acting accordingly?
3. Give an example of what you think is a “structure of sin” and an example of a “structure of solidarity.”
4. If we know that nongovernmental organizations have projects that succeed in saving lives, do we have a moral obligation to donate money to them? If so, how do we choose which ones, and how much? What does the parable of the Good Samaritan mean for us in this era of globalization?

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4 Ibid., 19.

5 Nigel Dower, *World Ethics. Second edition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 25. We are using the label of “Bounded Solidarity” school for the theories Dower labels “communitarian.” Since CST is sometimes called “communitarian” and does not fit Dower’s description of communitarian, we decided to use a different term to avoid confusion. For a discussion of the theories Dower calls communitarian, see Dower, 25. We are using the term “Cosmopolitan Solidarity” school for the theories that Dower labels “cosmopolitan.” While Dower does not include CST by name under his cosmopolitan label, he does include Natural Law, and Thomas Aquinas. Several CST scholars have noted that CST has much in common with cosmopolitan theory; see for example, Kenneth R. Himes, *Christianity and the Political Order: Conflict, Coopetition and Cooperation* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2013). Drew Christiansen, “Commentary on *Pacem in Terris (Peace on Earth)*”, in Kenneth R. Himes, Lisa Sowle Cahill, Charles E. Curran, and Thomas Shannon, editors, *Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries & Interpretations* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005); and the chapter in this volume by Gerard Powers. We put CST in the Cosmopolitan Solidarity School.
10 Bayertz, 8-9.
11 Ibid., 5 See also the essays in Dobrzanski, editor, *The Idea of Solidarity*.
12 Ibid., 9.
25 Ibid., 110.
26 Ibid., 111. See also Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, xviii; and Calhoun, *Cosmopolitan Liberalism*, 118-122.
27 Calhoun, “Cosmopolitanism in the modern social imaginary,” 113.
28 Ibid., 113.
32 Ibid., 67.
35 Ibid., 171.
37 Ibid., 167.
39 *Compendium*, para 194, fn. 421.
41 *The Catechism of the Catholic Church* defines “virtue” in the following way: “The human virtues are suitable dispositions of the intellect and will that govern our acts, order our passions, and guide our conduct in accordance with reason and faith.” *Catechism*, 869.
42 *Compendium*, para. 193.
43 Ibid., para 164.
45 *Compendium*, para 443.
46 Ibid., para 193.
48 Ibid., 254.
49 Catechism, para 1941.
50 *Compendium*, para 150.
51 See the essay by Gerard Powers in this volume.
54 Ibid., para 20, 380-381.
57 *Compendium*, John Paul II, quoted in para 102.
59 Ibid., 12.
60 Ibid., 12.
61 Ibid., 13.
62 Ibid., 13.
63 Ibid., 3.
64 John Paul II, *John Paul II in America*, 94.