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Chapter 11

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PERSONALITY

AUBREY IMMELMAN

The study of personality in politics has a long past, but a short history as a distinct specialty within an organized academic discipline. Niccolò Machiavelli's political treatise, *The Prince* (1505/1908), an early precursor of personality-in-politics inquiry, has modern-day echoes in Richard Christie and Florence Geis's *Studies in Machiavellianism* (1970). The formal establishment of political psychology as a scholarly discipline, marked by the founding of the International Society of Political Psychology in 1978, was anticipated by notable precursors in the twentieth century with a focus on personality—Graham Wallas's *Human Nature in Politics* (1908), Harold Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930) and *Power and Personality* (1948), Hans Eysenck's *The Psychology of Politics* (1954), and Fred Greenstein's *Personality and Politics* (1969).

I entered the fledgling field of political psychology in the late 1980s in search of methodologies for assessing personality in politics as a vehicle for predicting the behavior of political leaders. Having been professionally trained as a clinician, I was baffled to discover that extant approaches to the assessment of political personality bore little resemblance to the tools and techniques of my trade. Increasingly, I became convinced that, both conceptually and methodologically, much of the work ongoing in political personality was psychodiagnostically peripheral, if not irrelevant. That is not to say that these studies were entirely worthless; indeed, their political-psychological formulations were frequently insightful and compelling. However, it seemed to me that some of these assessment models, particularly those relying on content analysis, did not exactly measure what they purported to measure—personality—raising troubling questions of construct validity. What could possibly account for the perplexing schism between conventional clinical practice and political personality assessment? Why, for example, would anyone want to infer personality indirectly from content analysis of speeches and published interviews when a wealth of direct observations from multiple sources—commonly referred to as *collateral information* in the parlance of psychodiagnostics—already existed in the public record, ready to be mined, extracted, and processed? And why would anyone construct, de novo, political

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Portions of this chapter draw from the paper "A Research Agenda for Political Personality and Leadership Studies: An Evolutionary Proposal" (submitted for publication), coauthored by the present author and Theodore Millon, which integrates aspects of their respective contributions (Immelman, 2003; Millon, 2003) to the *Handbook of Psychology.*

personality taxonomies—as though politicians comprised a subspecies of Homo sapiens—when classification systems already existed with reference to the general population?

First—on a conceptual level—it was evident that the study of political "personality" had traditionally been more *political* than psychological or personological. For example, Lasswell's (1930) early formulation essentially identified three *leadership* (as opposed to personality) types: the agitator, the administrator, and the theorist. Lasswell formulated this typology before the modern systematization of major personality typologies, whose clinical variants would later come to be catalogued in classification systems such as the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.* But the same orientation to political personality was reflected in James David Barber's (1965) categorization, 35 years later, of four legislative types: the lawmaker, the advertiser, the spectator, and the reluctant. Barber (1972/1992) later reformulated his earlier typology, constructing a 2 × 2 model of presidential character by crossing a positive-negative affective dimension with an active-passive temperamental dimension. Barber's typology was rather well received in the nascent political psychology community. James Davies, for example, in the first *Handbook of Political Psychology* (1973), observed that analysis and description of leadership style had become increasingly sophisticated, pointing to the work of Barber, which he described as "the boldest step yet in establishing a typology applicable to all American presidents" (p. 25). Barber's four presidential character patterns are essentially temperamental dispositions rather than fully developed personality types. Though clearly relevant to personality, temperament in isolation from other personological attributes provides an insufficient basis for constructing a comprehensive taxonomy of personality patterns.

Second—on a methodological level—a degree of consensus began to emerge in the 1970s, converging around the notion that the proper route to political personality assessment was content analysis of verbal material rather than psychodiagnostic analysis of biographical data. For example, Margaret Hermann's (1974, 1978, 1980, 1984) influential conceptual scheme employed content analysis to assess four kinds of personal characteristics hypothesized to affect the content and style of political decision making: motives, beliefs, decision style, and interpersonal style. Hermann successfully applied her framework in illuminating studies of numerous world leaders. Hermann's landmark work was informed by social psychology (especially leadership studies), cognitive psychology (e.g., belief systems), and personality psychology (e.g., motives); however, it was at best only peripherally related to parallel personological and psychodiagnostic formulations. The same can be said of David Winter's (e.g., 1980, 1987) insightful content-analytic studies of the achievement, power, and affiliation motives of political leaders, inspired by the work of Henry Murray and David McClelland. Contemporaneously, Stephen Walker (1977, 1983, 1990) developed content-analytic scoring systems for the operational code construct introduced by Alexander George (1969) and Ole Holsti (1970) to political psychology. The operational code refers to an individual's beliefs about the fundamental nature of politics, narrowly conceived as "embedded in personality" or more broadly as "originating from the cultural matrix of society" (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003, p. 216). The construct is founded on the assumption that these political beliefs are instrumental in shaping a person's worldview and, hence, his or her choice of political objectives.

As organized political psychology approached the quarter-century mark, George Marcus (2002), pointing to recent advances in neuroscience, issued a call for "entirely new theories, new concepts, and new data" capable of rehabilitating political psychology from the limited, though currently dominant, social-psychological and cognitive conceptual frameworks (pp. 100–102). "Conventional wisdom," he noted:

whether as to substantive conclusions, methodologies, or typologies, is, by definition, well entrenched. As such, the "state of the field" often becomes resistant to self-examination due to our comfort with prevailing accounts. . . . Still, however circumspect we must be in advancing our current understandings, we should not shy away from the obligation to do an even better job of self-examination, for how else can political psychology become that scientific enterprise? (p. 104)

For political personality inquiry to remain a thriving scholarly endeavor, it will need to account, at a minimum, for the patterning of personality variables "across the entire matrix of the person" (Millon & Davis, 2000, pp. 2, 65). Moreover, it will be incumbent on political personology to advance an integrative theory of personality and political leadership performance, eventually to abandon its well-worn "patchwork quilt of concepts and data domains" (Millon, 1990b, p. 11). In the course of his long and illustrious career, Theodore Millon has both built the foundations and pointed the way for political psychology to proceed.

From a Millonian perspective, conceptual systems for the study of political personality and leadership performance should constitute a comprehensive, generative, theoretically coherent framework consonant with established principles in the adjacent sciences (particularly the more mature natural sciences; see Millon, 2003, pp. 3–8), congenial with respect to accommodating a broad array of politically relevant personal characteristics, and capable of reliably predicting meaningful political outcomes. In this regard, political psychologist Stanley Renshon (1996b) has been critical of unitary trait theories (such as those relying primarily on isolated personality traits, motives, or cognitive variables) that have dominated the study of personality in politics, noting that "it is a long causal way from an individual trait of presidential personality to a specific performance outcome" and that unitary trait theories fail to contribute to the development of an integrated psychological theory of leadership performance. In Renshon's view, "more clinically based theories . . . might form the basis of a more comprehensive psychological model of presidential performance" (p. 11).

Greenstein (1987), while acknowledging substantial progress since the publication of his seminal *Personality and Politics* (1969) "in grounding complex psychological typologies empirically," pessimistically proclaimed that "complex typologies are not easily constructed and documented" (Greenstein, 1987, p. xiv). However, as Millon has shown, recent advances in evolutionary theory, buttressed by flourishing neuroscientific understanding of the biological substrates of affect, behavior, and cognition at the molecular level, afford a timely resolution of this dilemma. Fundamentally, it offers the promise of "carving nature at the joints" by suggesting a generative framework for a model of political personality and leadership founded on latent phylogenetic-evolutionary principles rather than on observable characteristics and surface features.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF PERSONALITY-IN-POLITICS INQUIRY

Ironically, despite major advances in behavioral neuroscience, evolutionary ecology, personality research, and clinical science in the past two decades (see Millon, 2003), personality-in-politics inquiry appears to have stagnated, with little cross-pollination from these adjacent disciplines. At this juncture, all of the dominant trends in political personality assessment date back to the establishment of organized political psychology in

the 1970s, and earlier. In addition, most are also at variance with conventional psycho-diagnostic frameworks and procedures—a difficulty alluded to in the previous section.

Jerrold Post's authoritative edited volume *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders* (2003c) covers seven methodologies for assessing leader personalities: two "integrated" methods, namely, psychobiographic/psychodynamic political personality profiling (Post, 2003a) and the closely related psychoanalytically oriented assessment of character and performance (Renshon, 2003); three trait/motivational approaches, namely, verbal behavior analysis (Weintraub, 2003), motivational analysis (Winter, 2003a), and trait analysis of leadership style (Hermann, 2003); and two cognitive methodologies, namely, operational code analysis (Walker et al., 2003) and the assessment of integrative complexity (Suedfeld, Guttieri, & Tetlock, 2003).

Integrated Psychodynamic Approaches

Post's (2003a) psychobiographically rendered psychodynamic profiling approach draws from an eclectic array of psychodynamically oriented approaches, including the theoretical frameworks of Erik Erikson (1950/1963) and Otto Kernberg (1984); however, it also references Axis II of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,* fourth edition (*DSM-IV;* American Psychiatric Association, 1994), focusing primarily on the narcissistic, obsessive-compulsive, and paranoid personality patterns. The origins of Post's approach can be traced back at least as far as psychoanalyst Walter Langer's (1943/1972) study of Adolf Hitler, commissioned by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Post, a psychiatrist, founded and led the CIA's Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior for 21 years, during which he used his integrated psychodynamic approach to develop the "Personality Profiles in Support of the Camp David Summit" (Post, 1979), which President Jimmy Carter commended for its instrumental role in his successful mediation of the peace accord between Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel (see Post, 2003b).

Renshon's (2003) psychoanalytic assessment of character and performance is firmly anchored to Kohut's (1971, 1977) psychoanalytic self theory, though it is also indebted to Erik Erikson's (1980) ego psychology and the social and interpersonal formulations of Karen Horney (1937), Harry Stack Sullivan (1953), and others (see Renshon, 1996b).

Trait/Motivational Approaches

Weintraub's application of language-based personality analysis, which focuses on syntax and paralinguistic variables, dates back to the 1960s (e.g., Weintraub & Aronson, 1964). This approach to psychological assessment is more rooted in psycholinguistics than in personality theory and references Chomsky (1957), who noted that syntactic structures are independent of meaning, easily recognized, and amenable to scoring (Weintraub, 2003, pp. 137–138).

Winter's motivational analysis of political behavior, organized in terms of three dimensions of motivated behavior—achievement, power, and affiliation (Winter, 2003b, p. 121)—was inspired by the work of Murray (1938) and McClelland (e.g., 1961). Winter (2003a, pp. 174–175) offers a cogent rebuttal of several validity issues that have been raised (e.g., Renshon, 2001, p. 235) about the logic of scoring speeches and other verbal material for motive imagery.

Hermann's (2003) trait analysis of leadership style, arguably the most prominent approach to political personality at the inception of political psychology as an organized

discipline, remains influential. Hermann's (1980) elaborate scheme accommodates four kinds of personal characteristics: *beliefs* and *motives,* which shape a leader's view of the world; and *decision style* and *interpersonal style,* which shape the leader's personal political style. Conceptually, Hermann's notion of *beliefs* is anchored to the philosophical beliefs component of the operational code construct (George, 1969). The *motives* component is indebted to the work of Lasswell (1948) and Winter (1973). Hermann's construal of *decision style* overlaps with the instrumental beliefs component of George's (1969) operational code construct and aspects of Barber's (1972/1992) formulation of presidential character, focusing particularly on conceptual complexity (see Dille & Young, 2000). Finally, Hermann's *interpersonal style* domain encompasses a number of politically relevant personality traits such as suspiciousness, Machiavellianism, and task- versus relationship orientation in leadership (see Hermann, 1980, pp. 8–10), which—though informative—are much too restrictive for assessing personality in politics across the entire matrix of the person.

Cognitive Approaches

Walker et al.'s (2003) operational code analysis (now available in computer-enhanced automated form; Dille & Young, 2000) is the latest development in a World War II-era construct, revived by Holsti (1970) and George (1969), who asserted that perception and beliefs are more easily inferred than personality, given "the kinds of data, observational opportunities, and methods generally available to political scientists" (p. 195).

Suedfeld et al.'s (2003) integrative complexity approach to political personality assessment originated in the 1970s (e.g., Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977) and in some respects relates as closely to cognitive psychology and social cognition as to personality psychology.

As I show in the balance of this chapter, personality-in-politics inquiry is currently poised on the threshold of a new personology, due in no small part to the work of Theodore Millon.

MILLON'S DIMENSIONAL POLARITIES AS AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL PERSONOLOGY

Over the past decade and more, Millon (1990b, 1996, 2003) has endeavored to build a clinical science of personology founded on universal evolutionary and ecological foundations and informed by parallel developments in the more mature adjacent sciences, most notably evolutionary ecology and neuroscience. Contemporaneously—and deeply indebted to Millon's uncommon insights and formulations—I (Immelman, 1993a, 1998, 2002, 2003), have endeavored to transpose these contemporary insights from the source disciplines of personology and clinical science to the target discipline of political personality and leadership, drawing liberally from the Millonian wellspring of knowledge.

To provide a conceptual background and furnish a rudimentary, though generative, model of personality and personality-based leadership styles, I must briefly recapitulate Millon's three interacting domains or spheres of evolutionary and ecological principles (detailed more extensively elsewhere in this volume). The three evolutionary domains are labeled *existence, adaptation,* and *replication.* The first domain, *existence* (the pain-pleasure polarity), relates to the serendipitous transformation of random or less organized states into those possessing distinct structures of greater organization. The second, *adaptation* (the passive-active polarity), refers to homeostatic processes employed to sustain survival

in open ecosystems. The third sphere, *replication* (the other-self polarity), pertains to reproductive styles that maximize the diversification and selection of ecologically effective attributes. It is remarkable that these dimensions appear to reflect essentially the same evolutionary adaptations that Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) uncovered half a century ago with respect to person perception and object appraisal, namely, the three semantic differential dimensions of *evaluation* (good-bad; i.e., pleasure-pain), *potency* (strong-weak; i.e., self-other), and *activity* (active-passive)—dimensions that were later found to possess a high degree of cross-cultural universality (Osgood, 1977; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975). Table 11.1 presents my taxonomy of politically relevant personality patterns derived from these principles, congruent with Millon's dimensional polarities and Axis II of *DSM-IV* (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

Aims of Existence: The Pain-Pleasure Polarity

The two-dimensional (i.e., two linearly independent vectors) pain-pleasure polarity (Millon, 1990b, pp. 51–64, 2003, pp. 9–14) is conceptualized in terms of, respectively, life preservation (pain avoidance) and life enhancement (pleasure seeking): "behaviors oriented to repel events experientially characterized as painful (negative reinforcers)" versus "acts that are attracted to what we experientially record as pleasurable events (positive reinforcers)" (Millon, 2003, p. 10).

Personality Implications of the Pain-Pleasure Polarity

Although the tendency to minimize pain and maximize pleasure is undoubtedly an inherent part of human nature, individual differences in ontogenetic development of adaptive strategies—the shaping of latent potentials into manifest styles of perceiving, thinking, feeling, acting, and relating to others, engendered by the interaction of biological endowment and sociocultural experience—are overtly reflected in distinctive personality styles. (See Table 11.1 for all personality patterns described in this section.) *Reticent* (e.g., avoidant; Millon, 1996, p. 260) personalities display an excessive, pain-avoidant preoccupation with threats to their psychic security—a hyperalertness to signs of potential rejection—that leads these persons pessimistically to disengage from everyday relationships and pleasures. At the other extreme of the pain-pleasure polarity, we find pleasure seeking, *dauntless* (e.g., antisocial; Millon, 1996, p. 444) personalities with a risk-taking attitude and little countervailing caution and prudence to avoid danger and threat. Somewhat less sensation seeking—though still distinctly pleasure seeking—but more risk averse (i.e., pain avoidant) are *outgoing* (e.g., histrionic; Millon, 1996, p. 366) personalities. Less likely than either dauntless or outgoing personalities to throw caution to the wind are *ambitious* (e.g., narcissistic; Millon, 1996, pp. 403–404) personalities, who are intermediate on both pain avoidance and pleasure seeking; for them, risk taking is more commonly a function of self-enhancing hubris.

Both *conscientious* (e.g., obsessive-compulsive; Millon, 1996, pp. 513) and *contentious* (e.g., negativistic; Millon, 1996, pp. 548–549) personalities are low on the pleasure-seeking valence, experiencing relatively little joy in existence; they are more driven by self-preservation, though only average on the pain-avoidant polarity, which features less prominently in their adaptive strategy. Introverted, *retiring* (e.g., schizoid; Millon, 1996, pp. 228–229) personalities are notable for weakness on both the pain-avoidant and pleasure-seeking polarities, thus displaying a distinctively impassive, anhedonic quality.

Some personality patterns evince marked polarity reversals (see Millon, 1996, pp. 496–498, 597–600). *Aggrieved* (e.g., self-defeating; Millon, 1996, p. 584) personalities, rather than avoid circumstances that may prove painful and self-endangering,

**Table 11.1   Taxonomy of Politically Relevant Personality
Patterns: Millon Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria**

Scale 1A: Dominant pattern
  a. Asserting
  b. Controlling
  c. Aggressive (Sadistic; *DSM–III–R,* Appendix A)
Scale 1B: Dauntless pattern
  a. Venturesome
  b. Dissenting
  c. Aggrandizing (Antisocial; *DSM–IV,* 301.7)
Scale 2: Ambitious pattern
  a. Confident
  b. Self-serving
  c. Exploitative (Narcissistic; *DSM–IV,* 301.81)
Scale 3: Outgoing pattern
  a. Congenial
  b. Gregarious
  c. Impulsive (Histrionic; *DSM–IV,* 301.50)
Scale 4: Accommodating pattern
  a. Cooperative
  b. Agreeable
  c. Submissive (Dependent; *DSM–IV,* 301.6)
Scale 5A: Aggrieved pattern
  a. Unpresuming
  b. Self-denying
  c. Self-defeating (*DSM–III–R,* Appendix A)
Scale 5B: Contentious pattern
  a. Resolute
  b. Oppositional
  c. Negativistic (Passive-aggressive; *DSM–III–R,* 301.84)
Scale 6: Conscientious pattern
  a. Respectful
  b. Dutiful
  c. Compulsive (Obsessive-compulsive; *DSM–IV,* 301.4)
Scale 7: Reticent pattern
  a. Circumspect
  b. Inhibited
  c. Withdrawn (Avoidant; *DSM–IV,* 301.82)
Scale 8: Retiring pattern
  a. Reserved
  b. Aloof
  c. Solitary (Schizoid; *DSM–IV,* 301.20)
Scale 9: Distrusting pattern
  d. Suspicious
  e. Paranoid (*DSM–IV,* 301.0)
Scale 0: Erratic pattern
  d. Unstable
  e. Borderline (*DSM–IV,* 301.83)

Note: Equivalent *DSM* terminology and codes are specified in parentheses.
Sources: From *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,* third
edition revised, by the American Psychiatric Association, 1987, Washing-
ton, DC: Author. Copyright © 1987 by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion; *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,* fourth edition,
by the American Psychiatric Association, 1994, Washington, DC: Author.
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ventory of Diagnostic Criteria,* second edition, by A. Immelman and B. S.
Steinberg, compilers, 1999. Copyright © 1999 by Aubrey Immelman.

masochistically tend to set in motion situations in which they will come to suffer; in transmuting pain to pleasure, and thus self-inflicting rather than avoiding pain, they display a polarity reversal. *Dominant* (e.g., aggressive; Millon, 1996, pp. 482–483) personalities exhibit a different kind of polarity reversal; they avoid pain by preemptively imposing it on others—a tendency most clearly discernable in the extreme, sadistic variant of the dominant personality pattern. For some types, such as *accommodating* (e.g., dependent; Millon, 1996, pp. 330–331) personalities—intermediate on both the life preservation and life enhancement valences—the role of pain avoidance versus pleasure seeking is of minimal consequence in personality adaptation.

The hypothesized valences of the personality patterns catalogued in Table 11.1, with reference to Millon's three universal evolutionary polarities, are summarized in Table 11.2.

Political Implications of the Pain-Pleasure Polarity

The pain-pleasure polarity can be invoked to hypothesize a partial genetic basis for individual differences in ideological (e.g., liberal-conservative) resonance. In evolutionary terms, liberalism can be construed as a primary concern with "improvement in the quality of life" and "behaviors that improve survival chances," and conservatism as an avoidance of "actions or environments that threaten to jeopardize survival" (Millon & Davis, 2000, p. 58). Thus construed, liberals are motivated to maximize survival by seeking pleasure (life enhancement, or positive reinforcement), whereas conservatives seek to maximize survival by avoiding pain (life preservation, or negative reinforcement). In the context of personality correlates of the pain-pleasure polarity (summarized in the preceding section), evolutionary theory would predict that reticent and possibly dominant, conscientious, and contentious personalities are overrepresented among conservatives, that dauntless and possibly outgoing personalities are overrepresented among liberals, and that retiring personalities are the least ideological. Furthermore, it would be expected

Table 11.2   Millon's Three Domains of Evolution and Associated Personality Valences

Personality Pattern	Aims of Existence: Pain/Pleasure Polarity		Modes of Adaptation: Passive/Active Polarity		Strategies of Replication: Other/Self Polarity	
	Pain	Pleasure	Passive	Active	Other	Self
Dominant	High[a]	Medium	Low	High	Low	Medium
Dauntless	Low	High[b]	Low	High	Low	High
Ambitious	Medium	Medium	High	Low	Low	High
Outgoing	Medium	High[b]	Low	High	High	Low
Accommodating	Medium	Medium	High	Low	High	Low
Aggrieved	High[a]	Low	High	Medium	Medium	Low
Contentious	Medium	Low	Medium	High	Low[c]	Medium
Conscientious	Medium	Low	High	Low	High[c]	Low
Reticent	High	Low	Low	High	Medium	Medium
Retiring	Low	Low	High	Low	Low	Medium

[a] Polarity reversal.
[b] Millon regards this valence as medium.
[c] Conflict between polarities.
Source: From *Disorders of Personality:* DSM–IV *and Beyond,* second edition, by T. Millon with R. D. Davis, 1996, New York: Wiley. Copyright © 1996 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

that ideological resonance in accommodating and outgoing personalities is less determined by the pain-pleasure valence than by their strong other-nurturing orientation on the other-self polarity (to be discussed), which predicts liberal resonance.

In Hermann's (1987) conceptual scheme, a core belief component shaping a leader's worldview is *nationalism,* which emphasizes "the importance of maintaining national honor and dignity" (p. 167). In evolutionary terms, the motivating aim of nationalism is, in part, a life-preserving (pain-avoidant) orientation, emphasizing traditionalism (though it likely also references the *self* valence of the other-self polarity).

The pain-pleasure dimension also provides evolutionary underpinnings for Barber's (1972/1992) fourfold (active/passive × positive/negative) categorization of presidential character, in which positivity-negativity is described in terms of enjoyment (i.e., positive affect) derived from political office. Positive leaders have a generally optimistic outlook and derive pleasure from the duties of public office, whereas negative leadership has a more pessimistic tone, being oriented toward pain aversion.

Finally, the pain-pleasure polarity suggests a possible evolutionary basis for the three management models proposed by Richard Johnson (1974) and employed by Alexander George and Eric Stern (1998) to classify the policy-making structures and advisory systems favored by recent U.S. presidents:

- *Formalistic* chief executives prefer "an orderly policymaking structure, . . . well-defined procedures, hierarchical lines of communication, and a structured staff system" (George & Stern, 1998, p. 203). In evolutionary terms, their motivating aim is to *preserve* life by minimizing pain. In addition to the high-pain/low-pleasure reticent personality, a formalistic management style is likely for contentious and conscientious personalities, both of which are average on pain avoidance, in conjunction with low pleasure seeking (see Table 11.2).

- *Competitive* chief executives encourage "more open and uninhibited expression of diverse opinions, analysis, and advice" and tolerate or encourage "organizational ambiguity, overlapping jurisdictions, and multiple channels of communication to and from the president" (George & Stern, 1998, p. 203). In evolutionary terms, their motivating aim is to *enhance* life by maximizing pleasure. In addition to the high-pleasure/low-pain dauntless personality noted earlier, a competitive management style is likely for the outgoing personality, which is relatively high on pleasure seeking, in conjunction with a moderate level of pain avoidance (see Table 11.2).

- *Collegial* chief executives attempt to benefit from the advantages of both the competitive and formalistic approaches while avoiding their pitfalls. Thus, they strive for "diversity and competition in the policymaking system," balanced by "encouraging cabinet officers and advisors to identify at least partly with the presidential perspective" and "encouraging collegial participation" (George & Stern, 1998, p. 203). In evolutionary terms, collegial executives are intermediate on both the pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidant dimensions of the pain-pleasure polarity and strongly other-oriented on the other-self polarity (to be discussed). The accommodating pattern is noted for being average on both of these dimensions, in conjunction with strong other-directedness, which is also the case for outgoing personalities (see Table 11.2).

The systematic import of a generative theory is implicit in the suggestion that Johnson's (1974) management model fails to account for at least two additional (hypothesized)

executive styles: *complex* types high on both the pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidant polarities (e.g., mixed personality types; personalities with polarity reversals, such as aggrieved or dominant types; personality types whose adaptive strategies are defined more by the passive-active and other-self polarities than by the pain-pleasure polarity) and *undifferentiated* types low on both the pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidant polarities (i.e., introverted, retiring personalities).

Modes of Adaptation: The Passive-Active Polarity

The passive-active polarity (Millon, 1990b, pp. 64–77, 2003, pp. 14–18) is conceptualized in terms of ecological modification (active) and ecological accommodation (passive); that is, "whether initiative is taken in altering and shaping life's events or whether behaviors are reactive to and accommodate those events" (Millon, 2003, p. 14).

Personality Implications of the Passive-Active Polarity

At the ecologically accommodating end of the passive-active continuum are personality adaptations that exhibit an excess of passivity. Several personality patterns demonstrate this passive style, although their passivity derives from and is expressed in appreciably different ways. (See Table 11.1 for all personality patterns explicated in this section.) *Accommodating* (e.g., dependent; Millon, 1996, pp. 330–331) personalities, because of deficits in confidence, initiative, and autonomous skills, display a tendency to wait passively for others to provide nurturance, offer protection, and assume leadership. Passivity among *conscientious* (e.g., obsessive-compulsive; Millon, 1996, p. 513) personalities stems from their aversion to acting independently because of intrapsychic resolutions they have made to quell troubling thoughts and emotions generated by their self-other ambivalence. *Ambitious* (e.g., narcissistic; Millon, 1996, pp. 403–404) personalities presumptuously assume that they are unconditionally entitled to recognition and admiration and that good things will come their way with little or no effort on their part. *Retiring* (e.g., schizoid; Millon, 1996, pp. 228–229) personalities are passive because of their relative incapacity to experience pleasure and pain. *Aggrieved* (e.g., self-defeating; Millon, 1996, p. 584) personalities passively submit to others' wishes; however, unlike the acquiescence of accommodating types, for aggrieved types submission to suffering represents a measure of personal control in that anguish is perceived as the most desirable alternative among the range of seemingly inescapable options available to them.

At the ecologically modifying end of the passive-active continuum are personality adaptations that exhibit an excess of activity. *Outgoing* (e.g., histrionic; Millon, 1996, p. 366) personalities epitomize this tendency. These individuals achieve their goals of maximizing protection, nurturance, and reproductive success by energetically engaging in a series of manipulative, seductive, and attention-getting maneuvers. Approval and affection must constantly be replenished and are sought from every interpersonal source. Susceptible to boredom and intolerant of inactivity, they evince a restless, stimulus-seeking quality as they keep stirring up things, fleetingly enthusiastic about one activity after another. Ecological modification in *dominant* (e.g., aggressive; Millon, 1996, pp. 482–483) personalities is seen in the proactive manner in which they subjugate others (i.e., impose pain). A similarly active polarity focus is seen in *reticent* (e.g., avoidant; Millon, 1996, p. 260) personalities. The distinctive feature is the reticent personality's anticipatory escape from pain, which presents as a hypervigilant awareness and active avoidance of situations that portend failure, rejection, denigration, or humiliation. Activity in *contentious* (e.g., negativistic; Millon, 1996, pp. 548–549) personalities is seen in a perpetual shifting

in thoughts, feelings, and behaviors because of conflict and ambivalence between the self-enhancing and other-nurturing polarities (to be discussed).

Major personality theorists (e.g., Kernberg, 1992) have noted strong similarities between the antisocial and narcissistic personality types. The evolutionary model, with its polarity schema, clarifies the central distinctions between the *dauntless* (e.g., antisocial; Millon, 1996, p. 444) and *ambitious* (e.g., narcissistic; Millon, 1996, pp. 403–404) personality patterns. Both patterns are below average in pain avoidance and above average in pleasure seeking, combined with high self-enhancement and low other-nurturance. The key distinction between these personality patterns appears on the passive-active dimension: Ecologically accommodating, ambitious, narcissistic personalities, with their characteristic sense of entitlement, assume that good things will come to them with minimal effort on their part; ecologically modifying, sensation-seeking, dauntless personalities assume the contrary—that they are undervalued and that little will be achieved without considerable effort on their part (including Machiavellian cunning and deception, should such means serve their aggrandizing ends).

Political Implications of the Passive-Active Polarity

The passive-active dimension provides evolutionary underpinnings for Barber's (1972/1992) fourfold (active/passive × positive/negative) categorization of presidential character, in which activity-passivity is described in terms of energy invested in political office. In evolutionary terms, a passive orientation can be construed as "a tendency to accommodate to a given ecological niche and accept what the environment offers," whereas an active orientation can be construed as "a tendency to modify or intervene in the environment, thereby adapting it to oneself" (Millon & Davis, 2000, p. 59).

The passive-active dimension also provides an evolutionary basis for Lloyd Etheredge's (1978) fourfold (high/low dominance × introversion/extraversion) classification of personality-based differences in foreign-policy operating style and role orientation. High-dominance introverts (*bloc* or *excluding* leaders such as Woodrow Wilson and Herbert Hoover) *actively* seek to reshape the world, typically by means of containment policies or by tenaciously advancing a personal vision. High-dominance extraverts (*world* or *integrating* leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson) *actively* seek to reshape the world through advocacy and pragmatic leadership on a wide range of foreign policy fronts. Low-dominance introverts (*maintainers* such as Calvin Coolidge) tend to persevere with the existing order, *passively* pursuing a foreign policy that amounts to "a holding action for the status quo" (p. 449). Low-dominance extraverts (*conciliators* such as William McKinley, William Taft, Warren Harding, Harry Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower), though revealing a preference for *passively* accommodating to existing arrangements, are more flexible and open to change, tending "to respond to circumstances with the sympathetic hope that accommodations can be negotiated" (p. 450).

Finally, in Hermann's (1980, 1987) conceptual scheme, a core belief contributing to a leader's worldview, along with nationalism, is *belief in one's own ability to control events.* In evolutionary terms, a more efficacy-oriented, internal locus of control implies an active-modifying motivating aim, in contrast to a more external locus of control, which suggests a passive-accommodating mode of adaptation. Hermann's (1987) expansionist, active-independent, and influential orientations are more actively oriented, whereas her mediator/integrator, opportunist, and developmental orientations are more passively oriented. The likely personality correlates of these leadership and policy orientations are easily inferred from the exposition of passive and active modes of adaptation in the preceding section.

Strategies of Replication: The Other-Self Polarity

Somewhat less profound but no less fundamental than the first two polarities, the two-dimensional other-self polarity (Millon, 1990b, pp. 77–98, 2003, pp. 18–24) is conceptualized in terms of, respectively, reproductive nurturance (other) and reproductive propagation (self)—a nurturing tendency to value the needs of others, versus an individuating self-orientation that seeks to realize personal potentials before attending to the needs of others (Millon, 1994, p. 6, 2003, pp. 18–19). Evolutionary biologists (e.g., Cole, 1954; Wallen & Schneider, 2000) have recorded marked differences among species in both the cycle and pattern of their reproductive behaviors. Within most animal species, an important distinction may be drawn between male and female adaptive strategies (Daly & Wilson, 1983; Mealey, 2000; Trivers, 1972); it is this latter differentiation that undergirds what has been termed the self- versus other-oriented polarity.

Males lean toward being self-oriented, because their competitive advantages maximize the replication of their genes. Conversely, females lean toward being other-oriented, because their competence in nurturing and protecting their limited progeny maximizes the replication of their genes. It bears note, however, that these conceptually derived self-other extremes do not evince themselves in sharp and distinct gender differences (Hyde, 1996; Mealey, 2000). Such proclivities are matters of degree; consequently, most individuals exhibit intermediate characteristics on this, as well as on the other polarity sets.

Personality Implications of the Other-Self Polarity

In the other-nurturing quadrant of the two-dimensional other-self polarity are personality adaptations that exhibit a distinctively interdependent orientation and an external locus of control. Several personality patterns demonstrate this other-oriented style of self-denial, where self-actualizing autonomy is relinquished in favor of gaining the approbation of others. (See Table 11.1 for all personality patterns described in this section.) *Accommodating* (e.g., dependent; Millon, 1996, pp. 330–331) and *outgoing* (e.g., histrionic; Millon, 1996, p. 366) personalities have learned that feelings associated with pleasure or the avoidance of pain—that is, their personal sense of safety and security—are provided almost exclusively as a function of their relationships with others. Behaviorally, these persons display a strong need for external support (accommodating personalities) or attention (outgoing personalities); when deprived of affection, nurturance, or approval, they experience marked discomfort, if not sadness and anxiety. A centering on the wishes of others and denial of self is also seen in *conscientious* (e.g., obsessive-compulsive; Millon, 1996, p. 513) personalities. These persons display a picture of social compliance and interpersonal respect; however, beneath their veneer of conformity, they experience an intense desire to assert themselves. Managing this pervasive ambivalence requires rigid psychological controls, which leads to physical tensions that may find periodic relief in abrupt emotional outbursts directed at subordinates. *Aggrieved* (e.g., self-defeating; Millon, 1996, p. 584) personalities, like conscientious and accommodating types, are weak on the self-enhancement polarity; the key distinction is that aggrieved types are not nearly as strong on other-nurturing, ranking only average on this polarity.

In the self-enhancing quadrant of the two-dimensional other-self polarity are personality adaptations that exhibit a distinctively individualistic orientation and an internal locus of control. In *ambitious* (e.g., narcissistic; Millon, 1996, pp. 403–404) personalities, psychogenesis reflects the acquisition of a self-image of exceptional worth. Providing self-rewards is highly gratifying for individuals who value themselves or possess either a real or inflated sense of self-worth. Beneath their manifest confidence—and, in more extreme

cases, arrogance and an exploitive egocentricity—these individuals believe they already possess what is most important—themselves; thus, they experience primary pleasure simply by passively being or attending to selfish needs, without much thought or even conscious intent, and benignly exploiting others to their own advantage. Although validation of others is both welcome and encouraged, their admirable self-concept requires little confirmation through social approval or—in more extreme cases—genuine accomplishment. *Dauntless* (e.g., antisocial; Millon, 1996, p. 444) personalities are skeptical about the motives of others, whom they judge to be unreliable, if not disloyal. To counter indifference or the expectation of pain from others, they strive for autonomy; in more extreme cases, they may actively engage in duplicitous behaviors and shamelessly exploit others for self-gain— which, from their strongly self-enhancing perspective, is simply just revenge for perceived past injustices. *Dominant* (e.g., aggressive; Millon, 1996, pp. 482–483) personalities are similar to ambitious and dauntless types in their weakness on the other-nurturing polarity; the key distinction in replication strategy is that dominant types are considerably less self-enhancing than ambitious and dauntless types, ranking only average on this polarity. Both *contentious* (e.g., negativistic; Millon, 1996, pp. 548–549) and *retiring* (e.g., schizoid; Millon, 1996, pp. 228–229) personalities are weak on the other-nurturing polarity; however, though self-involved, they are not self-enhancing, ranking only average on this polarity. Finally, for some types, such as *reticent* (e.g., avoidant; Millon, 1996, p. 260) personalities— intermediate on both the self-enhancing and other-nurturing polarities—the role of self versus other is of minimal consequence for personality adaptation.

Political Implications of the Other-Self Polarity

The other-self polarity provides one of the most clear-cut illustrations of the heuristic value of evolutionary theory in politics. Although humans can be both other-encouraging and self-enhancing, most persons will likely tend toward one side or the other. A balance that coordinates the two provides a satisfactory answer to the question of whether individuals are devoted to the support and welfare of others (in American politics, the underlying philosophy of the predominantly liberal Democratic Party) or fashion their lives in accord with their own needs and desires (in American politics, the underlying philosophy of the predominantly conservative Republican Party). More specifically, evolutionary theory predicts that in terms of party-political preference, women, in addition to accommodating and outgoing personalities generally, should disproportionately favor more liberal policy positions and the Democratic Party; in contrast, men, in addition to dauntless and ambitious personalities, should favor more conservative policies and the Republican Party.

With reference to political leadership, three social motives (which in Hermann's conceptual scheme are postulated to contribute to a leader's worldview) are considered to play a key role in leader performance: need for power, need for achievement, and need for affiliation (Winter, 1987, 1998). In evolutionary terms, the *need for power,* involving "the desire to control, influence, or have an impact on other persons or groups" (Hermann, 1987, p. 167), suggests a self-enhancing replication strategy, as does the *need for achievement,* which involves "a concern for excellence" and personal accomplishment (Winter, 1998, p. 369). Conversely, the *need for affiliation,* reflecting "concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring warm and friendly relations with other persons or groups" (Hermann, 1987, p. 167), suggests an other-nurturing replication strategy. Hermann's expansionist, active-independent, and influential leadership orientations are more self-oriented, whereas her mediator/integrator, opportunist, and developmental orientations are more other-oriented.

Hermann (1980) also posits two key elements of interpersonal style that, in conjunction with decision style, shape a leader's personal political style: distrust of others and

task orientation (see Hermann, 1987, pp. 163, 167). In evolutionary terms, the *trust-distrust* and *task-relationship* dimensions of leadership are easily reconceptualized as surface manifestations of the other-self polarity.

The two key elements of decision style in Hermann's (1980) framework are *conceptual complexity* and *self-confidence,* which she construes (following Ziller, Stone, Jackson, & Terbovic, 1977) as jointly determinative of "how ideological or pragmatic a political leader will be" (Hermann, 1987, p. 164). Stone and Baril (1979), elaborating on the findings of Ziller et al., used self-other orientation as a conceptual basis for postulating two distinctive political prototypes, each having a different motivational base. The *pragmatist*—akin to Barber's (1965) active-negative Advertiser—is motivated by power seeking to compensate for low self-esteem (as anticipated by Lasswell, 1948), being driven by self-enhancement and self-promotion. The second political personality type, the *ideologue*—akin to Barber's active-positive Lawmaker—is more other-oriented, apparently having a sincere interest in good legislation (defined as either pursuing ideological goals or as serving a constituency). Stone and Baril's construal of self- and other-oriented political personality types, in concert with Barber's (1965, 1972/1992) scheme, lends empirical and theoretical support for the utility of the other-self polarity in an overarching theory of political personality and performance.

The likely personality correlates of these leadership and policy orientations are readily inferred from the exposition of other-nurturing and self-enhancing strategies of replication in the preceding section.

OBSTACLES TO ADVANCING A MILLONIAN PERSPECTIVE IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

The advancement of a Millonian perspective in political psychology is beset by two general problems: broad objections to the relevance of studying personality in politics and specific objections to Millon's model of personality (including the empirical validity of Millon's evolutionary model and its suitability for personality inquiry in political psychology).

Scholarly Skepticism about the Relevance of Personality in Politics

Despite the conviction of personality-in-politics practitioners in the worth of their endeavor, the study of personality in politics is not without controversy (see Lyons, 1997, pp. 792–793, for a concise review of "controversies over the presidential personality approach"). Greenstein (1969, pp. 33–62) offered an incisive critique of two erroneous and three partially correct objections to the study of personality in politics, lamenting that the study of personality in politics was *not* a thriving scholarly endeavor, principally because "scholars who study politics do not feel equipped to analyze personality in ways that meet their intellectual standards . . . [thus rendering it primarily] the preserve of journalists" (p. 2). Four of the common objections noted by Greenstein (1969, p. 34) have been particularly prevalent among critics of personological analysis in politics:

1. Personality characteristics tend to be randomly distributed in institutional roles. Personality, therefore, "cancels out" and can be ignored in political analysis.
2. Personality characteristics are less important than social characteristics in influencing behavior.

3. Personality is irrelevant, because individual actors are severely limited in the impact they can have on events.

4. Personality is not an important determinant of behavior, because individuals with varying personal characteristics tend to behave similarly when placed in common situations.

Greenstein shows convincingly that the first two objections are erroneous on, respectively, empirical and conceptual grounds. The third objection is partially correct, but should be rephrased in terms of the circumstances under which the actions of individual actors are likely to exert a greater or lesser influence on the course of events (Greenstein, 1969, pp. 40–41). Greenstein offers three propositions in this regard:

- "The likelihood of personal impact increases to the degree that the environment admits of restructuring." In unstable systems, "modest interventions can produce disproportionately large results" (p. 42). Here, Greenstein (p. 44) cites the instrumental role Lenin played in bringing about the Russian Revolution. Furthermore, political systems vary in the degree of constraint they impose on the leader. In this regard, Greenstein (p. 45) points to Robert Tucker's (1965) observation that the political machinery of totalitarian systems serves as "a conduit of the dictatorial psychology." A fitting contemporary example is Iraq's former totalitarian Baathist regime and its malignantly narcissistic (Post, 1991) leader Saddam Hussein.

- "The likelihood of personal impact varies with the actor's location in the environment" (Greenstein, 1969, p. 44). In short, the higher the level of leadership, the greater the impact of personality. Thus, personality analysis is more relevant to the assessment of high-level leadership than it is with reference to regional or local politics.

- "The likelihood of personal impact varies with the personal strengths and weaknesses of the actor" (Greenstein, 1969, p. 45). For example, a highly skilled, talented leader can actively orchestrate a favorable position and a manipulable environment, thus altering the course of political events. Hitler is an exemplar of this type of leader-situation interaction.

The fourth objection, which concerns personal control versus situational power, is partially correct in that the power of the situation sometimes subdues individual differences. Nonetheless, as Greenstein (1992) has noted, "environments are always mediated by the individuals on whom they act; environments cannot shape behavior directly" (p. 109). In what may well be the most concise statement of the case for studying personality in politics, Greenstein concludes, "Political institutions and processes operate through human agency. It would be remarkable if they were *not* influenced by the properties that distinguish one individual from another" (p. 124).

In summary, skepticism concerning the pertinence of personality in politics no longer poses a significant obstacle to scholarly inquiry. More serious, however, are objections to Millon's model—both with reference to psychological assessment generally and specifically with regard to personality inquiry in political psychology.

Skepticism about the Logic and Empirical Validity of Millon's Dimensional Polarities

My purpose here is not to review critiques of Millon's theoretical model and applied measures. Rather, I address a few common oversimplifications, if not misconstruals, of Millon's

model that complicate the evaluation of conceptual objections and empirical findings that have been presented to call into question the logic and empirical validity of Millon's evolutionary model and measures. Because of space constraints, I focus on two related critiques, by Widiger (1999) and Piersma, Ohnishi, Lee, and Metcalfe (2002), of Millon's dimensional polarities.

Widiger (1999), while acknowledging that the pain-pleasure, passive-active, and other-self polarities can indeed be employed to generate the basic personality patterns posited by Millon, asserts that it is not evident that these patterns are, in fact, logical derivations from the three polarities (p. 367); instead, they are "an imbalanced or uneven mixture of the three polarities" (p. 366). More important, he notes the "conceptual ambiguities" of representing the pain-pleasure and other-self polarities on single dimensions (p. 373). However, it is clear that this is not Millon's intent. Millon (1990b) is unambiguous in noting that "the pleasure-pain distinction . . . can ultimately be placed on *two* contrasting dimensions" [my emphasis] (p. 51). Moreover, as I have suggested elsewhere (Immelman, 2003, p. 617), the pain and pleasure dimensions should be conceptualized in multidimensional space as *two linearly independent vectors*. That is, they are bipolar but not orthogonal, which further implies that these dimensions cannot be simply represented in a 2×2 contingency table or located on a circumplex model. This accounts, in part, for the difficulty with simple tabular representation of Millon's patterns, as aptly pointed out in Widiger's critique. On a related note, Millon's two-dimensional pain-pleasure polarity is consistent with Jeffrey Gray's (e.g., 1991) biologically based reinforcement sensitivity theory, which posits two independent neuropsychological systems: a behavioral activation system (BAS) responsive to cues for reward and a behavioral inhibition system (BIS) sensitive to cues for punishment. The BAS mediates approach behavior and is equivalent to Eysenck's (e.g., 1990) and the five-factor model's (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1999) introversion-extraversion dimension. The BIS mediates avoidance behavior and is equivalent to Eysenck's and the five-factor model's neuroticism-emotional stability dimension (see Pickering, Corr, & Gray, 1999).

Millon's other-self polarity also is two-dimensional and should be conceptualized as linearly independent vectors instead of a single bipolar dimension. This construal is implicit in Millon's own writing:

> The converse of other-nurturance is not self-propagation, but rather the lack of other-nurturance. . . . Although the dimension of self-other is arranged to highlight its polar extremes, it should be evident that many if not most behaviors are employed to achieve the goals of both self- and kin reproduction. Both ends are often simultaneously achieved; at other times one may predominate. (Millon, 2003, p. 22)

Piersma et al. (2002) conducted an investigation of Widiger's (1999) concerns about the logic of Millon's evolutionary model and the empirical validity of his dimensional polarities, as operationalized in the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI-III; Millon, Davis, & Millon, 1996). Like Widiger's original critique, the work of Piersma and his associates makes a worthy contribution to the advancement of clinical science, which cannot proceed solely on the strength of theoretical systematization and systematic import (see Immelman, 2003, pp. 604–605; Millon, 2003, pp. 4–5). In the simplest of terms, scientific progress requires hypothesis testing. Table 11.3 presents Millon's three polarities, the hypothesized polarity valences of the 10 basic personality patterns assessed by my inventory for assessing personality in politics (Immelman & Steinberg, 1999), and empirically established correlations among Millon Index of Personality Styles (MIPS; Millon, 1994) Motivating Aims and Interpersonal-Behaviors (reported in Millon, 1994, pp. 69–70) or MCMI-III (reported in Piersma et al., 2002, p. 155) scales. Piersma and his associates

Table 11.3 Three Domains of Evolution, Hypothesized Polarity Valences of MIDC Personality Patterns, and Correlations among MIPS Motivating Aims and MIPS Interpersonal-Behaviors or MCMI–III Scales

Personality Pattern	Aims of Existence: Pain/Pleasure Polarity		Modes of Adaptation: Passive/Active Polarity		Strategies of Replication: Other/Self Polarity	
	Pleasure	Pain	Active	Passive	Self	Other
Dominant	Medium	High[a]	High	Low	Medium	Low
Controlling (FIS)	.25	−.14	.63	−.46	.72	−.32
Controlling (NOI)	.12	.09	.39	−.14	.40	−.09
Sadistic	−.27	.39[d]	.08	.32	.36[d]	−.05
Dauntless	High[b]	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Dissenting (FIS)	−.48	.58	−.08	.35	.58	−.26
Dissenting (NOI)	−.07	.29	.11	.17	.37	−.13
Antisocial	−.12	.32	.04	.26	.32	.10
Ambitious	Medium	Medium	Low	High	High	Low
Asserting (FIS)	.63	−.51	.79	−.77	.38	−.04
Asserting (NOI)	.42	−.20	.56	−.36	.24	.08
Narcissistic	.60[d]	−.39	.40[d]	−.25	.30	.20
Outgoing	High[b]	Medium	High	Low	Low	High
Outgoing (FIS)	.57	−.43	.78	−.66	.26	.17
Outgoing (NOI)	.34	−.08	.38	−.21	.09	.25
Histrionic	.62[d]	−.45[d]	.32	−.39[d]	−.25	.64[d]
Accommodating	Medium	Medium	Low	High	Low	High
Agreeing (FIS)	−.14	.11	−.46	.43	−.72	.68
Agreeing (NOI)	−.09	.25	−.17	.44	−.10	.30
Dependent	−.53[d]	.59[d]	−.31	.56[d]	−.22	.24
Aggrieved	Low	High[a]	Medium	High	Low	Medium
Yielding (FIS)	−.70	.74	−.54	.68	−.15	.23
Yielding (NOI)	−.29	.62	−.10	.37	.18	.13
Masochistic	−.59[d]	.63[d]	−.19	.47[d]	.19	−.03
Contentious	Low	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Low[c]
Complaining (FIS)	−.61	.72	−.10	.38	.45	−.19
Complaining (NOI)	−.29	.67	−.04	.44	.25	.12
Negativistic	−.53[d]	.73[d]	−.10	.49[d]	.22	.00
Conscientious	Low	Medium	Low	High	Low	High[c]
Conforming (FIS)	.31	−.23	.49	−.30	.01	.37
Conforming (NOI)	.14	−.02	.21	.07	−.01	.32
Compulsive	.52[d]	−.60[d]	.26	−.44[d]	−.15	.01
Reticent	Low	High	High	Low	Medium	Medium
Hesitating (FIS)	−.81	.80	−.50	.64	.01	−.00
Hesitating (NOI)	−.32	.54	−.19	.47	.13	.03
Avoidant	−.66[d]	.70[d]	−.31	.49[d]	−.00	−.23
Retiring	Low	Low	Low	High	Medium	Low
Retiring (FIS)	−.56	.56	−.36	.48	.28	−.26
Retiring (NOI)	−.18	.41	−.02	.33	.34	−.06
Schizoid	−.49[d]	.51[d]	−.12	.35	.33	−.46[d]

Table 11.3   *(Continued)*

Paranoid	−.37[d]	.50[d]	−.04	.32	.34	−.11
Borderline	−.60[d]	.73[d]	−.14	.49[d]	.14	.16

Notes: FIS = MIPS full-item set; NOI = MIPS nonoverlapping (prototypal) items. Millon (1994), *N* = 1,000; Piersma et al. (2002), *N* = 50. The first two rows of correlation data under each personality pattern are from the *Millon Index of Personality Styles Manual* (pp. 69–70), by T. Millon, 1994, San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. Copyright © 1994 by Dicandrien, Inc. Adapted with permission of the author. The third row of correlation data under each personality pattern are from "An Empirical Evaluation of Millon's Dimensional Polarities," by H. L. Piersma, H. Ohnishi, D. J. Lee, and W. E. Metcalfe, 2002, *Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 24,* p. 155. Copyright © 2002 by Plenum Publishing Corporation. Adapted with permission of the authors.

[a]Polarity reversal.
[b]Millon characterizes antisocial and histrionic personalities as average (medium) rather than high on the pleasure-seeking polarity.
[c]Conflict between polarities.
[d]$p < .01$ (Significance data not available for Millon, 1994).

suggest that if a particular personality pattern is hypothesized to be low on a particular polarity dimension, we would expect a significant negative correlation; if a pattern is hypothesized to be high on a polarity, we would expect a significant positive correlation; and if a pattern is hypothesized to be medium on a polarity, we would expect a nonsignificant correlation. Piersma et al. found the majority of correlations to be inconsistent with Millon's hypothesized polarity valences. In their study, they offer several caveats and conditional hedges, to which I might add that their conclusions rest on the assumption that Millon's evolutionary polarities are adequately operationalized in the MIPS Motivating Aims scale.

Millon (1999) offers a cogent and eloquent rebuttal of Widiger's (1999) concerns—and, by extension, the findings of Piersma et al. (2002)—focusing on the inherent absurdity of harnessing factorial techniques to authenticate "the predominant polythetic structure and overlapping relations that exist among clinical conditions" (p. 448). Simply stated, the personality patterns informed by Millon's evolutionary theory are not linear, orthogonal constructs. However, there is at least one anomaly in Millon's evolutionary derivations, namely, that *no* personality pattern is hypothesized to be high on life enhancement, the pleasure-seeking polarity (see Table 11.2). Based on an emerging consensus that Gray's (e.g., 1991) BAS is associated with extraversion and sensation seeking, I consider outgoing (e.g., histrionic) and dauntless (e.g., antisocial) personality patterns to be high on pleasure seeking—both objectively and relative to other personality patterns (see Table 11.3).

Skepticism about the Adequacy of the Millonian Approach for Assessing Personality in Politics

Scrutiny of peer and editorial reviews of Millon-based political psychology manuscripts submitted for publication offer interesting insights into common reservations concerning the adequacy of Millon's model for personality inquiry in political psychology and the validity and reliability of its measures.

Validity and Reliability Concerns

As a limitation or deficiency of political-psychological studies employing the conceptual framework and methodology that I adapted from Millon's work, reviewers have pointed to

the difficulty of judging the reliability and validity of the Millon Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria (MIDC; Immelman & Steinberg, 1999), given that no reliability or validity coefficients are reported. The issue of reliability, in particular, occupies major status in the literature on indirect personality assessment in politics—to the extent, in my opinion, that it has overshadowed equally important validity concerns. The reason for this can probably be traced to the dominant status of content-analytic procedures in political psychology, which rely on the coding of verbal material by independent judges or by a single judge with demonstrable interjudge reliability. Winter, in his chapter on "Personality and Political Behavior" in the *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (2003b), wrote:

> The most widely used at-a-distance technique is probably content analysis of written text or verbatim transcripts of spoken words (e.g., speeches or interviews) from individual leaders . . . taken as reflecting the psychological characteristics or personalities. . . . Typically, content analysis measures are carefully designed with examples and training procedures to enable previously inexperienced scorers to apply them with high reliability (percent agreement and correlation ≥ .85). (p. 114)

The critical issue of validity is relegated to a footnote:

> Of course most documents and speeches that bear the name of a major political leader are actually written by one or more speechwriters, and even "spontaneous" press conference responses to questions and "informal" comments may be highly scripted. Thus, one may ask whether a content analysis of such materials produces personality estimates of the leader or of the speechwriters. Suedfeld (1994) and Winter (1995) discuss this issue, and conclude that because leaders select speechwriters and review their drafts, and speechwriters "know" their clients, personality "scores" based on content analysis (at least of major speeches) can be taken as a valid indicator of the personality and psychological state of the leader—a claim that has generally been validated by research with such scores. (Winter, 2003b, footnote 1, pp. 114, 134)

I readily admit to immense admiration for the landmark work of Peter Suedfeld, David Winter, and other eminent scholars in political psychology who rely on content analysis, such as Stephen Walker and Margaret Hermann—all of whom count among the great pioneers of personality-in-politics inquiry. However, it should be recognized that the case for the validity of content analysis constitutes, in part, an article of faith. For a brief review of validity problems concerning content-analytic assessment methodologies in political psychology, along with references to recent overviews of the current state of content-analytic at-a-distance assessment, its major conceptual and methodological issues, and future research directions, see Immelman (2003, p. 613).

Preliminary reliability and validity data are now beginning to accrue for Millonian studies conducted in the first decade since the development, in 1993, of the original version of the MIDC. As reported in the MIDC manual:

> There is strong empirical evidence for the validity and reliability of commercial personality instruments derived from Millon's theory (see, for example, Millon, 1994; Millon, Davis, & Millon, 1996). As for the present adaptation of Millon's theory, the concordance between MIDC-based findings in the present author's work and the findings of other investigators (e.g., similar findings by Immelman, 1998, and Renshon, 1996a, with reference to U.S. President Bill Clinton) using alternative conceptual frameworks and methods, provides convincing evidence for the convergent validity of the MIDC. In addition, the reliability of the MIDC has been established empirically. For example, in comparing the results

of separate studies (Immelman, 1993b, 1994) of the personalities of South African presidents F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, the present author's psychodiagnostic meta-analysis correlated highly (De Klerk, $r_s = .80$, $p < .01$; Mandela, $r_s = .64$, $p < .05$) with the mean MIDC scale scores derived from expert ratings by two South African political scientists (Geldenhuys & Kotzé, 1991; Kotzé & Geldenhuys, 1990) who had interviewed and independently studied De Klerk and Mandela. In another study (Immelman & Hagel, 1998), provisional MIDC scale scores in a trained student rater's psychodiagnostic meta-analyses of Eleanor Roosevelt ($r_s = .86$, $p < .01$) and Hillary Rodham Clinton ($r_s = .99$, $p < .01$), correlated highly with the final scale scores yielded by the supervisor's re-coding of the data collected by the student. (Immelman, 1999, pp. 11–12)

In contrast, however, to content-analytic procedures—where reliability is established by coefficients of interrater reliability—the MIDC's psychodiagnostic approach relies on *replicability*. All diagnostic criteria endorsed on the 170-item MIDC must be documented by at least two independent sources (i.e., extractions from biographical source materials in support of item endorsements). Whereas the task of coding written text in content-analytic procedures can be measured in hours or days, the Millon-based process of extracting psychodiagnostically relevant content from biographical source materials requires weeks or months of bibliographic research. In practice, duplication of this task is not a viable option. However, the cost prohibitiveness of formally establishing conventional coefficients of reliability for individual MIDC-based studies is largely offset by the explicit nature of the documentation process, which renders MIDC-based research easily replicable—a basic requirement of the scientific method. Stated differently, studies employing the MIDC easily lend themselves to replication, enabling independent investigators to validate for themselves the consistency and accuracy of the measure.

From the perspective of measurement theory, a major distinction between traditional content-analytic approaches and the current psychodiagnostic approach is that the former emphasizes interrater reliability, whereas the Millonian approach to political personality assessment places a premium on predictive validity. For example, in a study (Immelman, 1998) conducted during the 1996 presidential campaign—two years before public knowledge of the Lewinsky affair—I made the following worst-case prediction for President Clinton's second term, based on his MIDC assessment:

> [Bill Clinton] may commit errors of judgment stemming from a combination of strong ambition, a sense of entitlement, and inflated self-confidence. . . . [Narcissistic] characteristics may also predispose him to dissemble or equivocate, not only ego-defensively to protect and bolster an admirable self-image, but instrumentally to have his way with others. Concurrent Outgoing features in President Clinton's MIDC profile suggest a strong need for public recognition, approval, and validation, along with a willingness to use his social skills to influence and charm others (though lacking some fidelity in consistently fulfilling his promises). . . . Finally, there is a danger that Outgoing presidents such as Bill Clinton may be oversensitive to public opinion and neglectful of role demands relating to oversight. (p. 355)

In the article's abstract, the implications of President Clinton's personality profile for high-level political leadership were summarized as follows: "The profile . . . is consistent with a presidency troubled by ethical questions and lapses of judgment, and provides an explanatory framework for Clinton's high achievement drive and his ability to retain a following and maintain his self-confidence in the face of adversity" (Immelman, 1998, p. 335). The ensuing Lewinsky scandal, President Clinton's subsequent (albeit partisan) impeachment, consistently high public approval ratings throughout the impeachment

proceedings, and his success in averting efforts to remove him from office offer sugges-
tive evidence for the predictive validity of the MIDC.

Another case in point is a similar study (Immelman, 2002) of then-governor George W.
Bush, conducted in 1999—more than a year before his election as president of the United
States. While the verdict of history is still out on the Bush presidency, in its third year at
the time of this writing, this volume offers a fitting forum for recording that study's
broad predictions for a prospective Bush presidency, based on his MIDC assessment:

> George W. Bush's major personality-based leadership strengths are the important political
> skills of charisma and interpersonality—a personable, confident, socially responsive, out-
> going tendency that will enable him to connect with critical constituencies, mobilize popu-
> lar support, and retain a following and his self-confidence in the face of adversity. Outgoing
> leaders characteristically are confident in their social abilities, skilled in the art of social
> influence, and have a charming, engaging personal style that tends to make people like them
> and overlook their gaffes and foibles.
>
> Bush's major personality-based limitations include the propensity for a superficial
> grasp of complex issues, a predisposition to be easily bored by routine (with the attendant
> risk of failing to keep himself adequately informed), an inclination to act impulsively with-
> out fully appreciating the implications of his decisions or the long-term consequences of his
> policy initiatives, and a predilection to favor personal connections, friendship, and loyalty
> over competence in his staffing decisions and appointments—all of which could render a
> Bush administration relatively vulnerable to errors of judgment. (pp. 101–102)

The essence of validity is the determination that a measurement procedure accurately
assesses the theoretical constructs it purports to measure. As Millon (1994) has noted,
"no single number can represent the validity of a test. There are many forms of validity.
When researching the validity of an instrument, it is necessary to conduct the investiga-
tion with reference to the intended applications of the test" (p. 87). He notes that the cen-
tral consideration is whether the test achieves its purpose. Clearly, the MIDC achieves
the purpose of its design: at-a-distance personality assessment grounded in "a coherent
psychodiagnostic framework capable of capturing the critical personological determi-
nants of political performance, embedded in a broad range of attribute domains across the
entire matrix of the person—not just the individual's motives, operational code, integra-
tive complexity, or personality traits" (Immelman, 2003, p. 621).

Millon's Framework May Not Be Sufficiently Comprehensive or Relevant

This is essentially a straw man argument. The same can be said of *any* of the established
approaches to studying personality in politics: Margaret Hermann's conceptual scheme,
the Kernbergian notion of narcissistic personality organization in the work of Jerrold
Post, Kohutian self psychology in the work of Stanley Renshon, integrative complexity in
the work of Peter Suedfeld, operational code analysis in the work of Stephen Walker, and
Murray's classes of motives in the work of David Winter. The Millonian framework (e.g.,
as represented in the MIPS and MCMI-III) has gained broad acceptance in applied psy-
chology; for example, the *Journal of Personality Assessment* devoted an entire special
issue (Strack, 1999a) to the work of Millon, and, in 2003, Theodore Millon was the recip-
ient of the American Psychological Association's prestigious award for Distinguished
Professional Contributions to Applied Research, given annually to a psychologist whose
research has led to important discoveries or developments in the field of applied psychol-
ogy. Beyond the narrower confines of clinical psychology and personality assessment,
Millon (1990a) has contributed to the *Handbook of Personality* and coedited the *Personality*

and Social Psychology volume of the first comprehensive (12-volume) *Handbook of Psychology* (2003). Furthermore, studies informed by my adaptation of Millon's model have been published in the journals *Political Psychology* (Immelman, 1993a) and *Leadership Quarterly* (Immelman, 1998).

Millon's Model Perpetuates a "Pathology" Orientation in Political Psychology

One anonymous reviewer has claimed that "the origins of Millon's model in abnormal psychology tend to perpetuate the 'pathology' orientation that gave much of early psychohistory a bad name." Indeed, Millon's model evolved from an original interest in personality disorders, as witnessed by his monumental texts, *Modern Psychopathology* (1969) and *Disorders of Personality* (1996). In its preface, Millon wrote that his 1969 work was an attempt on his part:

> to gather and to render the disparate facts and theories of psychopathology into a coherent and orderly framework . . . [founded on the conviction that the time had come] for the development of a new and coherent theoretical framework, . . . that interwove both psychological and biological factors, and from which the principal clinical syndromes could be derived and coordinated. (Millon, 2002, pp. 182–183)

However, the Millonian approach transcends both the traditional concerns and syndromes of abnormal psychology and psychiatry and descriptive *DSM* diagnostic categories. In Millon's words:

> Instead of rephrasing traditional psychiatric categories in the language of modern theories, as several able psychopathologists had done, I sought [in *Modern Psychopathology,* 1969] to devise a new classification schema, one constructed from its inception by coalescing what I considered to be the basic principles of personality development and functioning. (Millon, 2002, p. 183)

The related critique from within political psychology, that the application of Millon's model to political personality assessment tends to perpetuate the "pathology" orientation that gave much of the early psychohistory a bad name, simply is not a fair assessment. As Stephen Strack (1999b) has noted:

> Millon's . . . *normal* [italics added] personality styles and dimensions emanate from his broadly based evolutionary model of personality that differentiates and links healthy and pathological character on a continuum. . . . The continuous relations between the domains of normality and pathology in Millon's model allows personologists to study the ways that healthy and disordered personalities are similar and different [and] the developmental processes that lead to various outcomes. (p. 426)

In short, the Millonian approach is a far cry from the Lasswellian *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930) orientation implied in the present critique. It is even farther removed from the specious genetic reconstructions that have most tainted psychohistory. What gave some brands of psychohistory a bad name are unfalsifiable, impressionistic, psychoanalytically oriented genetic reconstructions such as the *Psychohistory Review* article, "François Mitterand: Personality and Politics" (Guiton, 1992), which attributed the former French leader's stiffness, obstinacy, shyness, anxiety, and power orientation to toilet training and separation during the pre-Oedipal period. To paint Millon with this selfsame brush is patently unfair and a disservice to political psychology; in transplanting Millon's model to political psychology more than a decade ago (Immelman, 1993a), I have been unambiguous

in stating that the kind of developmental causal analysis caricatured in Guiton's study, cited earlier, is unsuitable for political personality assessment:

> For the majority of present-day personality-in-politics investigators, who generally favor a descriptive approach to personality assessment, developmental questions are of secondary relevance; however, an explicit set of developmental relational statements is invaluable for psychobiographically oriented analysis. Moreover, precisely because each personality pattern has characteristic developmental antecedents, in-depth knowledge of a subject's experiential history can be useful with respect to validating the results of descriptive personality assessment, or for suggesting alternative hypotheses. . . . This benefit notwithstanding, *genetic reconstruction does not constitute an optimal basis for personality assessment and description* [italics added]. (Immelman, 2003, p. 612)

In summary, common critiques of the Millonian approach to personality-in-politics inquiry, at best, are weak and misinformed; at worst, they reflect bias against the psychodiagnostically oriented approach to political personality assessment and ignorance of Millon's evolutionary model and clinical measures.

CONCLUSION

Despite major progress in personology and clinical science since the publication of Theodore Millon's landmark *Modern Psychopathology* in 1969, personality inquiry in the emerging field of political psychology remains largely divorced from these advances. In this chapter, I have attempted to expound the fruitful possibilities of Millon's evolutionary theory for advancing a generative model of personality and political leadership.

In a recent study, Camara, Nathan, and Puente (2000) reported that the MCMI-III counts among the 10 most frequently used assessment devices in forensic psychology. The demonstrated usefulness of the Millonian approach in forensic settings—arguably the area of application in clinical practice that most closely approximates the concerns of political personality assessment—strongly suggests that it should be similarly well suited to the psychological examination of political leaders.

Other psychological tests in the "forensic top 10" include the Rorschach Inkblot Test, mirroring the political-psychological concerns of psychodynamically oriented scholars such as Jerrold Post and Stanley Renshon; the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), underscoring the relevance of David Winter's inquiry into the motive profiles of political leaders; the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R), reflecting the interest of scholars such as Peter Suedfeld in the integrative complexity and related cognitive attributes of political leaders; and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2), consistent with the importance that investigators such as Post, Renshon, and I attach to the psychodiagnostic classification of political leaders as a tool for risk assessment and general understanding and prediction of political performance.

The publication of this volume coincides with an important milestone in the evolution of the Millonian era in professional psychology: the 25th anniversary of the Millon Inventories. Contemporaneously, in the adjacent field of political psychology, the seed Millon planted nearly two decades ago has taken root and begun to blossom. In addition to my published work in the United States (e.g., Immelman, 1998, 2002), the first phase (Steinberg, in press) of a major project in Canada to examine the relationship between Millon's personality patterns and the leadership styles of prominent twentieth-century

female leaders has been concluded. And in Europe, a textbook in political communication (De Landtsheer, 2004) with a distinctively Millonian perspective and personality profiles of Dutch and Belgian leaders has been published.

The mark of Millon has transcended clinical science and crossed the threshold of adjacent disciplines in ways that even Theodore Millon could not have anticipated 35 years ago when *Modern Psychopathology* burst on the scene and forever changed the landscape of modern psychology.

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