

2020

Amani Mashinani Conflict Transformation Model: Bishop Korir's Legacy on Peace and Reconciliation

Elias O. Opongo, S.J.
Hekima University College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/social_encounters

 Part of the [African Languages and Societies Commons](#), [African Studies Commons](#), [Catholic Studies Commons](#), [Christianity Commons](#), [Communication Commons](#), [Ethics in Religion Commons](#), [History of Christianity Commons](#), [Inequality and Stratification Commons](#), [International Relations Commons](#), [Other Religion Commons](#), [Peace and Conflict Studies Commons](#), [Political Theory Commons](#), [Politics and Social Change Commons](#), [Race and Ethnicity Commons](#), [Race, Ethnicity and Post-Colonial Studies Commons](#), [Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons](#), and the [Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Opongo, S.J., Elias O. (2020) "Amani Mashinani Conflict Transformation Model: Bishop Korir's Legacy on Peace and Reconciliation," *The Journal of Social Encounters*: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, 9-21.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/social_encounters/vol4/iss1/2

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Social Encounters by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@csbsju.edu.

***Amani Mashinani Conflict Transformation Model:
Bishop Korir's Legacy on Peace and Reconciliation***

Elias O. Opongo, S.J.¹

Director of the Hekima Centre for Research, Training and Publication (CRTP)
at Hekima University College

Abstract

This chapter is about the story of the late Bishop Cornelius Kipng'eno Arap Korir who stood up for peace and reconciliation in the midst of numerous interethnic conflicts. Bishop Korir, who was then the bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, lived the experience of inter-ethnic violence between the Marakwet, Pokot, Kikuyu, and the Kalenjin communities. As a person from the Kalenjin ethnic community, he had to learn to distant himself from the abrasive political rhetoric and violent actions and embrace the path of the Gospel of Jesus instead. He started what he called Amani Mashinani (Kiswahili for 'peace at the grassroots') as a strategy for bringing together warring communities. Even after his death on 30th October 2017, his legacy of Amani Mashinani continues to be a major contribution to peace in the Rift Valley region in Kenya. The Amani Mashinani model is an end-product of experiences drawn from numerous peacebuilding efforts that Bishop Korir headed throughout his leadership in the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret. This happened after many years of political tensions, mistrust, and tribal rivalry in the North Rift Valley. The model takes a conflict transformation approach that while recognizing the negative effects of conflicts, seizes the opportunity to draw different actors to find alternatives to their differences and commit themselves to working on social cohesion. This chapter details the unique aspects of the Amani Mashinani's twelve step model that helped in addressing complicated inter-ethnic conflicts and has become part of Bishop Korir's legacy.

Introduction

Standing up for prophetic leadership in times of conflict and violence is a courageous act and one that bears witness to a spirited faith that seeks to transform human life. This describes the life of the late Bishop Cornelius Kipng'eno Arap Korir who stood up for peace and reconciliation in the midst of numerous interethnic conflicts. Bishop Korir, who was then the bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, lived the experience of inter-ethnic violence between the Marakwet, Pokot, Kikuyu, and the Kalenjin communities. Himself being a Kalenjin, he had to learn to distant himself from the abrasive political rhetoric and violent actions and embrace the path of the Gospel of Jesus instead. He started what he called *Amani Mashinani* (Kiswahili for 'peace at the grassroots') as a strategy for bringing together warring communities. Even after his death on 30th October 2017, his legacy of *Amani Mashinani* continues to be a major contribution to peace in the Rift Valley region in Kenya. He was born on 6th July, 1960 and ordained as a Catholic priest on November 6, 1982 ("The Hierarchy of the Catholic Church"). He was appointed Bishop on April 2, 1990. This essay details the unique aspects of the *Amani Mashinani* model that helped in addressing complicated inter-ethnic conflicts and has become part of Bishop Korir's legacy. Such aspects include grassroots approach in peacebuilding, which is anchored on a strong foundation of an inclusive twelve-step process. The model takes a conflict transformation approach that while

¹ Elias O. Opongo, SJ, is the director of the Hekima Centre for Research, Training and Publication (CRTP) at Hekima University College (HUC). He is Jesuit priest and teaches at Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations at HUC.

*Amani Mashinani Conflict Transformation Model:
Bishop Korir's Legacy on Peace and Reconciliation*

recognizing the negative effects of conflicts, seizes the opportunity to draw different actors to find alternatives to their differences and commit themselves to working on social cohesion.

Conflict Transformation Approach

The discussion in this essay is grounded on conflict transformation framework largely advanced by John Paul Lederach. According to Lederach (2003) conflict provides an opportunity for repairing damaged relationships, addressing structures of violence and increasing people's participation in social organization of their own society. In other words, while conflicts naturally produce negative effects on human lives, it is important to seize the opportunities that conflicts provide to look back and address causes of conflicts, driving and sustaining factors, creating a dialogical link between the lower, middle and decision making levels of the society, while at the same time working with the assumption that human society can never be perfect but can always work towards realizing a positive change.

Bishop Korir worked in a region that had perennial conflicts, often occasioned by competition for natural resources especially during drought, for example between the nomadic communities of the Marakwet-Pokot, or during electioneering period, such as between Kikuyu-Kalenjin communities, as well as other ethnic groups in the Rift Valley region. Many boardroom peace meetings involving politicians were held, but there was little success in resolving the conflicts. In fact, some of those politicians who took part in these meetings were accused of fuelling the conflicts for their political gains. Others attended the meetings without full understanding of the views and opinion of the people on the ground concerning the best ways of resolving the conflict. Since the boardroom meetings did not seem to improve the situation, Bishop Korir thought: what if we "avoid the common peace training workshops and conferences held in hotels, far removed from the reality in the villages" and focus our efforts on "where conflict is, not in a rarefied, air-conditioned atmosphere" (Korir, 2009, p.49). The assumption was that if more people at the grassroots were involved in peace processes, then the success rate of resolving the ethnically-motivated conflicts would increase. This theory of change to conflict transformation, marked the beginning of Bishop Korir's lifelong journey to bringing peace through various deliberate and well-planned interventions that are largely credited for the current peaceful coexistence among four ethnic groups (Marakwet, Pokot, Kikuyu and Kalenjin) that had been in conflict.

Brief History of Conflict in the North Rift Valley Region

The North Rift Valley Region in Kenya is largely inhabited by nomadic pastoralists who embraced a deep-rooted cultural practice of cattle rustling (Ervin & Lechoe, 2018). In this case, people who successfully raid the neighbouring community and steal many cattle were adored and termed as heroes and role models. They were also protected by community members, which made it difficult for government security agents to arrest and charge them in a court of law. This archaic practice increased rivalry between communities especially among those living in the Kerio Valley where large numbers of animals that farmers kept exerted pressure on water and pasture (Huho, 2012). These natural resources were barely adequate due to the arid nature of the region. This resulted in competition that normally culminated in violent ethnic conflicts. In order to prepare to counter attacks from neighbouring communities, proliferation of firearms in the region continued to gain momentum. This increased the frequency and gravity of the attacks where many people have been killed, thousands of livestock stolen, and many houses and other property destroyed in the past (Khisia et al., 2016). Many people have also been displaced and their livelihoods destroyed. This

explains why a large part of the population in this region still live in abject poverty as demonstrated by the numerous cases of malnutrition and high levels of dependency on aid.

Following the end of the one-party system in Kenya, some politicians took advantage of these diverse challenges that people in the North Rift Valley region faced and manipulated ethnic differences to cause chaos for politicians' personal gains. It is worth noting that Bishop Korir assumed his office two years before the re-emergence of multiparty democracy in Kenya. Kenya's old constitution was amended many times since independence, but it was the *Constitutional Amendment Act No. 7 of 1982* that sparked chaos and political turmoil many years later ("Kenya National Assembly Official Record"). The introduction of section 2A in the constitution converted Kenya into a one-party state. According to the amendment, any person seeking to be elected to a political office was supposed to be a member of the Kenya African National Union (KANU). This meant that, "all political power in Kenya was vested in the ruling party" (Kamunde-Aquino, 2014, p.3). What followed after the amendment was a period of oppression that was marred with numerous extra-judicial killings and heavy state controls since there was no opposition to castigate such actions (Waris, 2015). Nine years later, the controversial section 2A was repealed through another constitutional amendment, Act No. 12 of 1991, which ended the one-party rule paving way for democratic elections under multi-party system. Since then, political violence in Kenya has been a tradition that Bishop Korir fought tirelessly to change. Hence, the *Amani Mashinani* model, while among many peace initiatives in Kenya, has become an important initiative to theorize about grassroots peacebuilding especially so, conflict transformation among groups who are hostile to each other.

The Emergence of the *Amani Mashinani* Model

The *Amani Mashinani* model is an end-product of experiences drawn from numerous peacebuilding efforts that Bishop Korir headed throughout his leadership in the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret. This happened after many years of political tensions, mistrust, and tribal rivalry in the North Rift Valley. These political occurrences are in line with Lafargue and Katumanga's view that, "the use of ethnicity in political debate and in social relations, both as inward-looking censure and a means of renegotiating social relations, brings about tensions at the height of these instances" (Lafargue & Katumanga, 2009, p.13). In this case, the combination of party confusions and tribalism was known to instigate political violence.

In 1997, Pokots were in conflict with the Marakwets due to cattle rustling at the Kerio Valley. At one point, Bishop Korir embarked on a risky mission to save some Catholic nuns. Pokot bandits spared his life because of the humanitarian aid that he provided to them during times of famine. This awakened the realization of the pivotal role that the church could play in resolving the conflict. He reached out to elders of the Pokot and Marakwet ethnic groups and asked what they wanted the church to do to bring peace in the region. Through the coordinator of Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission (DJPC), they asked Bishop Korir to help them "talk to each other" (Korir, 2009, p.2). This was followed by a series of seminars as well as trainings that the DJPC held. However, the seminars did not have any significant impact because they involved few educated elites who could not deliver the peace messages to the armed bandits and the violence victims. Bishop Korir realized that *Amani Mashinani* needed to be facilitated in the village and not in urban hotels" (Korir, 2009, p.2). Bishop Korir organized a meeting between the elders of the warring communities, opinion leaders, women, as well as the youth. The result of the meeting was a ceasefire that the diocese sought to strengthen by initiating development projects that the members

*Amani Mashinani Conflict Transformation Model:
Bishop Korir's Legacy on Peace and Reconciliation*

of the communities would share. Such projects included building of cattle dips, schools, and water projects. As a result, “these projects fostered the communities’ healthy self-interest and cooperation, building links and reducing mistrust” (Korir, 2009, p.4). These experiences laid the foundations of *Amani Mashinani*’s peacebuilding approach that was put to test during the 2007/08 post elections violence.

During the campaign period for the 2007 general elections in Kenya, the political debate became highly ‘ethnicized’. Political leaders fuelled tension between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin communities in battle for political supremacy (Bolton et al., 2017). Consequently, two major political groupings emerged with Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) on one hand and Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) on the other (Cussac, 2007). The rising ethnic hatred and subsequent dispute over the presidential election results triggered conflicts between Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. This led to the deaths of over 1,500 people and displacement of more than 400,000 others (Cussac, 2007). The intensity and magnitude of the violence had never been witnessed since Kenya got its independence. As Samuel Chirchir, a resident of Londiani in the Rift Valley who witnessed the chaos recalls:

After the results were announced, it did not take 30 minutes before war started. There were screams and houses went up in flames. It was where the Kikuyus lived. Their houses were burnt by the Kalenjin youth who were armed with arrows, pangas and petrol (Njogu, 2009, p.175).

The need to restore calm and peace between Kikuyu and the Kalenjin communities prompted Bishop Korir to apply the lessons learnt from the grassroots peacebuilding activities in the Kerio Valley (Bolton et al., 2017). His interventions resulted in the concretization of the *Amani Mashinani* peacebuilding approach, which became a *sui generis* model for conflict transformation due to its grassroots focus (Mutua & Kilonzo, 2016).

Description of the *Amani Mashinani* Model

Besides its grassroots focus, the uniqueness of the *Amani Mashinani* model is also attributed to its twelve specific steps that focus on engaging the conflict actors directly. The approach is anchored on the premise that:

Long-term change in our situation will require: an intensive focus on the grassroots led by the vibrant involvement of the church and local civil society to bring conflicting people into dialogue and build relationships of interdependence. This requires a sustained effort lasting years, even decades, beyond the rapid cycle of projects and donor timelines (Bolton et al., 2017, p.11).

In this context, Bolton *et al* (2017) emphasized the need for facilitated dialogue and not a discussion. Bolton’s argument brings about the three major differences between a discussion and dialogue that characterize the *Amani Mashinani* model (Yankelovich, 2001). Firstly, unlike in discussion, dialogue calls for equal treatment of parties where no coercive influences are permitted. Secondly, dialogue requires parties to embrace unreserved empathy when responding to issues. On the contrary, a discussion may occur in the absence of empathetic responses. Thirdly, dialogue enables those in conflict to bring forth all their deep-rooted assumptions so that the parties can

cross-examine them, which does not occur in the case of discussions (Yankelovich, 2001). These features of dialogue helped in deescalating tensions in situations of identity politics in the Rift Valley region. Bolton's argument demonstrates why Bishop Korir abandoned the initial plan to engage elites in both communities to participate in peacebuilding forums and hotel meetings. In fact, Bishop Korir realized that such forums were ineffective and misguided efforts that neglected the perpetrators of the violent crimes as well as victims. Instead of achieving lasting peace, the discussions ended up escalating emotions as demonstrated by villagers who disdainfully nicknamed the participants as "the people who go to eat rice" (Korir, 2009, p.2). In actual fact, Bishop Korir's focus on creating a peaceful and harmonious multi-ethnic community in the North Rift region remained firm especially after two lifesaving incidents involving the Bishop and the nuns. Recalling the 1992 attack led to the remark that "clergy can use the moral authority of the cassock and collar to interrupt conflict" (Korir, 2009, p.10). Admittedly, the conflict that had engulfed the community after the 2008 elections meant that the clergy could not 'find' or make peace on their own. In response, the bishop invited diverse community members to the negotiation table to find ways to prevent recurrence of conflicts. This required a systematic approach based on lessons learned from the past and the situation on the ground. That approach was a twelve-step process that distinguishes the *Amani Mashinani* peace model from the rest.

The Twelve Steps of the *Amani Mashinani* Peace Model

1) Intervention and Interruption of Warring Groups

The postelection violence in 2007/2008 occurred spontaneously and spread fast across the Rift Valley region. Police were overwhelmed and could not control the violence. During the conflict: "large groups of young men from the Kalenjin communities that supported ODM roamed the countryside, with virtual impunity, torching the homes of PNU supporters, mainly from the Kikuyu, Kisii and Kamba communities" (Okia, 2011, p.261). In response, Bishop Korir considered ways that would intervene and interrupt the warring groups "by sowing seeds of doubt about the wisdom of their actions, trying to turn their thoughts to productive rather than destructive pursuits" (Korir, 2009, p.9). One would see such a consideration as an exceptional move given the fact that unarmed and highly vulnerable leaders from the church would dare move in to quell the violence in a situation where armed police officers had already failed. On one hand, the deteriorating crisis and failure by the police to end the violence meant the church could not be a by-stander in the conflict. Its intervention meant that violence cannot always be ended by the use of violence. Unlike other models, the *Amani Mashinani* promotes inclusion of religious leaders who act as voices of reason in peacebuilding by sowing seeds of doubts among combatants in violent conflicts.

2) Offering Accommodation and Relief Services to Violence Victims

The principles of the Catholic Social Teaching (CST) guided the actions of Bishop Korir in his *Amani Mashinani* campaign to champion peacebuilding at the grassroots. According to CST, lasting peace exists when people are in good relationship with God. CST advocates for the protection of the sanctity of life and upholding human dignity. This justifies Bishop Korir's action to offer relief services to the victims regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. It shows that *Amani Mashinani* model is about preaching the word of God through acts of love. It is unimaginable how so many people could be accommodated in an institution within the territory of their tormentors. Moreover, the Cathedral was under the leadership of someone who the attackers could have thought to be easily persuaded to give in to their demands based on their shared ethnic identity. *Amani Mashinani* showed that peace can prevail within hostile ethnic environment if

*Amani Mashinani Conflict Transformation Model:
Bishop Korir's Legacy on Peace and Reconciliation*

moral authority of religious leaders is harnessed for the common good of the society. Indeed, the bishop, who the attackers could have expected to facilitate the atrocities, instead became a symbolic 'buffer zone' that protected the victims. Even when many armed police officers could not stop the violence, the church that did not have adequate security personnel became the safest place in the region.

3) Initiating Dialogue from Two People

Usually, politically motivated ethnic conflicts involve many actors due to the fear that the votes of one or several ethnic groups could sway the election results to the disadvantage of another ethnic group or groups. The *Amani Mashinani* model is a bottom up approach, often relying on the influential people at the community levels to change the mind-set of the warring ethnic groups. The approach is often low key but intended to build momentum to the higher levels of leadership. In a number of incidences Bishop Korir approached two influential individuals from two ethnic groups in conflict with the purpose to influence their support to reconcile.

The first task of the influential individuals was to help in gathering intelligence about the willingness of the communities to enter into peace talks. The expression of a willingness for dialogue resulted in an invitation to peace talks. The talks continued sessions until they agree to end the violence. This approach also worked well when there were skirmishes in Kerio Valley (Korir, 2009), especially in the conflict between the Pokot and Marakwet.

4) Organizing Small Group Meetings

The *Amani Mashinani* Model is anchored on persuasions that begin by bringing together a few willing people at grassroots and expanding the peace talks to more participants on incremental basis. The idea of group formations resemble the creation of small Christian communities that have also become vital tools in promoting the three pillars of the Second African Synod that was held in 2009. According to Orobator (2018), the synod affirmed the church as a family whose intention is to promote reconciliation, justice, as well as peace. This assertion of using family-like groups in promoting peace is supported by results of a study that showed how small Christian communities have succeeded in promoting peace due to their inclusive nature and their link with the church (Healey, 2010). In fact, the bible anticipates this as stated in the book of Hebrews 12:14 that says: "strive for peace with everyone, and for the holiness without which no one will see the Lord." Likewise, the *Amani Mashinani* approach advances peace talks "from Small Group to Small Group Meetings" (Korir, 2009, p.14). The uniqueness of these small groups is that the participants are normally members of rival groups willing to go against the ethnic hatred and create peace.

5) Sharing Food

Under the *Amani Mashinani* approach, Bishop Korir used his strong understanding of the scriptures and local culture to create a good environment for reconciling the groups, healing the people, and sealing the covenant of peaceful coexistence by sharing meals. He equated this to the sacrament of Eucharist that symbolizes unity of people in the body of Christ (Korir, 2009). He justified this move by arguing that: "We don't like to eat with people we dislike, but if we do, it forces us to be civil, at least for the length of the meal" (Korir, 2009, p.16). Sharing food was a great sign of gratitude following the Bishop's efforts to reconcile the groups. This is in line with the observation made by Jegen (2006) who recounted that: "As people share food that is a gift from God, they can more easily experience the truth that reconciliation itself is a gift of God's own

peace” Jegen (2006, p.33). This gesture of unity exhibited through sharing food shows how *Amani Mashinani* harnesses local cultural practices and religious teachings to create a reconciliatory environment in which members of rival groups can interact.

6) Organizing Intra-ethnic Meetings

Amani Mashinani advocates for organizing intra-ethnic meetings to unify the grievances of each group separately besides setting a clear agenda for the peacebuilding process. This happened at the time when prominent individuals, according to the Human rights report of March 2008, organized intra-ethnic secret meetings to plan and execute ethnic attacks. On the contrary, *Amani Mashinani* focused on finding a lasting solution, which was restoration of peace and harmony in the multi-ethnic society. This is in line with Philippians 2:3-4 that states: “Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather, in humility value others above yourselves, not looking to your own interests but each of you to the interests of the others”. These verses show how important it is to consolidate the grievances of each ethnic group in order to hold peace talks rather than carry out retaliatory attacks. It was expected that each group would accuse the other of certain infringements. However, this would occur in an environment of self-reflection where each group would also seek to find out whether its members were guilty of the same violations. As a result, the intra-ethnic meetings helped in setting a single agenda of promoting peace and harmony. Such a move is meant to counter the plans of persons bent on stirring up chaos for their self-centred ambitions. The unique thing about these intra-ethnic meetings is how they encourage people to cross-examine contentious issues without being influenced by politicians or militia groups and to strategize how to communicate their honest findings to their adversaries with mindfulness.

7) Organizing Inter-ethnic Meetings

After compilation of the lists of grievances, a joint meeting between the warring groups is held so that each group can hear what provoked its adversaries to the extent of taking up arms. This can be viewed in the context of Matthew 18:15 that states: “If your brother or sister sins, go and point out their fault, just between the two of you. If they listen to you, you have won them over.” In this case, the warring communities that once lived together in peace were like brothers and sisters fighting each other due to hatred and negative stereotypes that emerged over time. Usually, there are perpetrators and victims in any violent ethnic conflict. As a result, there is a possibility that each community has victims and perpetrators linked to the levelled accusations and counter accusations. In this case, “the key actor is the victim because the victim must forgive for reconciliation in Christian theology to be possible” (Feldman, 2012, p.2). No wonder, the message of peace and reconciliation under the *Amani Mashinani* model is emphasized through joint prayers, shaking of hands, and sharing meals (Korir, 2009, p.18). This shows the unique way in which the model manages stereotypes and misrepresentation of facts that result in hostility, rage, anger, and hatred (Miall, 2016).

8) Agenda Setting for Inter-Ethnic Discussions

Mediated process of setting the agenda for interethnic discussions is another aspect that characterizes the uniqueness of the *Amani Mashinani* model. The warring groups were aggrieved regardless of whether their grievances were valid or not. What was most important was to reconcile them, and this can only happen if there was a mediator. In this case, Bishop Korir intervened in his capacity as a church leader or what he called “the moral authority of the cassock and collar” (Korir, 2009, p.10). Through him, the church became the neutral third party that reminded the

disputants of the need for obeying the commandments especially that of love, which is the greatest of them all (Matthew 22:36-40). Even though anarchical acts of impunity were widespread, the reconciliatory voice of the church through the involvement of the bishop and his team, was loud. This was made possible by the church's supervisory role in prioritization of the emotive issues for inter-ethnic discussions. As these inter-ethnic meetings continued, the intra-ethnic meetings were also taking place in order to involve more people in the process of finding a lasting solution to the conflict. The *Amani Mashinani* model involves constant engagement of people at the grassroots level, while ensuring fair representation of all parties at every level of negotiations.

9) Reporting the Progress of the Committees

The gravity of the conflict situation and urgency to restore peace was tasked to the peace committees that the people selected to operate under the supervision of the church. Any mistake that would derail the process meant more death and destruction. Therefore, positive progress of the peace committees was a matter of life and death. As a result, the intra-ethnic as well as the inter-ethnic peace committees gave their feedbacks during general meetings in order to enhance accountability through information sharing. This was vital in ensuring that participants had full knowledge and support to do what was expected with honesty and love. Just as the Bible states in Luke 12:48, "From everyone from whom much has been given, much will be required; and from the one to whom much has been entrusted, even more will be demanded." In this case, the participants needed informational support to execute the roles that the people entrusted on them in the peace negotiations. Consequently, holding peace committees accountable through the nonpartisan church leadership became one of the exceptional features of *Amani Mashinani*.

10) Initiating Joint Projects

In order to enhance unity and solidify the peace among the warring communities, *Amani Mashinani* advocates for initiation of joint projects, activities, as well as events that promote communal sharing. Since people cannot share what they do not have, the church stepped in to address some of the community needs. Such a move can be viewed as a practical answer to the question: "If one of you says to them, "Go in peace; keep warm and well fed," but does nothing about their physical needs, what good is it?" (James 2:16). In this case, the church under the leadership of Bishop Korir did not only campaign for peace but also offered immediate and long-term solution to the physical needs of the people. This collaborative approach to problem-solving allowed *Amani Mashinani* to promote peace at the grassroots by making it easier to listen to identified grievances, assess the conflict situation, and respond to the visible needs of the people. Indeed, the model is about faith in God, and direct engagement with the different actors in conflict.

11) Signing of a Social Contract

In order to avert recurrence of conflicts and violence, *Amani Mashinani* encourages communities to prepare and sign peace agreements. Such agreements act as social contracts prepared in a consultative process with members of the community (Korir, 2009). In this case, peace contracts are like the biblical covenant relations and justice that involve "putting relationships right" (Steele, 2008, p.5). In the same breadth, the model seems to associate the role of the church with reconciliation of peoples, calling on each one to re-examine oneself and live in harmony, as we read in Ephesian 4: 31-32: "Get rid of all bitterness, rage and anger, brawling and slander, along with every form of malice. Be kind and compassionate to one another, forgiving each other, just as in Christ God forgave you." *Amani Mashinani* model ensures that the parties not only commit

to live in peace but signs an agreement to end any form of violence. In this sense, such a social contract signed in the presence of reputable church leaders like Bishop Korir has great religious significance. In addition, *Amani Mashinani* recommends that the local people, representatives from the government, and observers such as the clergy, the media, as well as members of the civil society should be invited to witness the signing of the contract.

12) Monitoring the Implementation of Social Contracts

Under the *Amani Mashinani* model, the signing of the social contracts does not invalidate the work of the peace committees because there is need to ensure that all the parties comply. In this case, the peace committees do the monitoring of peace progress (Korir, 2009). This is vital in addressing any new issues that may arise. The focus of those involved in this step should be promoting peace and harmony amongst different ethnic communities.

Outcomes of *Amani Mashinani* Model

The success of *Amani Mashinani* as a signature achievement for Bishop Korir can be measured by examining the conflict situation before and after the intervention. It is here where one sees the value of the model's uniqueness from other peacebuilding models used to manage the conflict following the 2007 elections. Some excellent examples of its accomplishments though not exhaustive include following:

Ceasefire

The *Amani Mashinani* model has succeeded in uniting ethnic groups that were once considered to be rivals. For example, members of the Pokot and Marakwet communities who were in conflict with each other for a very long time are now living in relative peace. In order to cement this friendship, a Catholic church was constructed strategically in Kapsait Hill where worshippers from both ethnic communities converge to pray (Makori, 2017). The initiative united the Kalenjins and Kikuyus in Yamumbi and Kapteldon villages. In addition, it championed the 'people-to-people tours' in the Burnt Forest that involved members of one ethnic community visiting and interacting with those of the other community for at least a day (Makori, 2017). Consequently, Rift valley and other parts of Kenya experienced peaceful atmosphere during the 2013 general elections, which can be partially attributed to Bishop Korir's *Amani Mashinani* Initiative (Dersso, 2013).

Economic Empowerment

The *Amani Mashinani* Initiative has economically empowered many people in places that are prone to ethnic clashes. Firstly, the initiative has resulted in job creation through local menial jobs and self-employment. For example, Kikuyu and Kalenjin youths from Yamumbi and Kapteldon villages were employed to offer manual labour during the construction of the road linking the two communities. In addition, the issuance of vouchers to the residents of Burnt Forest stimulated business activities in the market where the Kikuyus and Kalenjins traded with each other peacefully (Korir, 2009). Secondly, the peace initiative has improved agricultural production and enhanced food security. For example, milk storage facilities were constructed in Lelan to benefit the Pokot and Marakwet communities, which made the area to be one of the largest milk producing villages in the Rift Valley (Makori, 2017). Similarly, the Kikuyus and Kalenjins from Yamumbi and Kapteldon villages received farm inputs, encouraging further collaboration between members of the two communities. As a result, the two villages received bumper harvest that season. Thirdly, the initiative has improved access to credit across the region. For example, cooperative societies

*Amani Mashinani Conflict Transformation Model:
Bishop Korir's Legacy on Peace and Reconciliation*

with members of the Pokot and Marakwet communities have emerged to provide financial support to small-scale traders. This was believed to be an impossible mission to accomplish prior to the inception of the *Amani Mashinani* Initiative (Makori, 2017). Moreover, youths in Yamumbi and Kapteldon villages have now formed business groups that support the members by offering loans to promote each other economically.

Development of Infrastructure

Part of the *Amani Mashinani* programs entails the development of infrastructural facilities. This includes the construction of schools as well as cattle dips that the Pokot and Marakwet communities shared to promote peace (Makori, 2017). Likewise, a road of about eight kilometres was built to link residents from Yamumbi and Kapteldon villages with the aim of promoting peaceful interaction. Additionally, schools have been built in Burnt Forest where children from the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities learn together while their parents interact in frequent school meetings.

Providing Humanitarian Help

Just like in any other situation where violence erupts, the victims of the 2007/2008 postelection violence in Eldoret required humanitarian aid. As a result, the *Amani Mashinani* initiative donated food and other basic commodities and services. Through the peace initiative, farmers who benefited from the farm inputs that the diocese offered donated food to those who did not have enough. People voluntarily donated 10% of their harvest to the church following the bumper harvest. This food was then distributed to the internally displaced people who were still living in camps. For example, many victims of violence from Yamumbi and Kapteldon villages received humanitarian help (Korir, 2009). Also, the issuance of relief vouchers to the residents of Burnt Forest helped in buying food and medicine.

Promoting Peace through the Media

Amani Mashinani launched a Catholic-run radio station that broadcasts messages of peace and cohesion among other programs that benefit all communities in Eldoret (Makori, 2017). This was important given the fact that Joshua Arap Sang who was charged alongside with five other people at the International Criminal Court (ICC) was accused of using the media to fuel inter-ethnic attacks. Even though all the cases against the six suspected charged at the ICC were dropped, the possible misuse of the media in fuelling violence cannot not be ignored. In fact, Bishop Korir looked at the use of media from the positive point of view of promoting peace and cohesion.

Future Prospects of *Amani Mashinani* Model

Examples from many parts of the world indicate that most of the multi-ethnic countries have not only experienced ethnic, religious, political or sectarian conflicts but also expect that such incidences could re-occur in the future. Examples include Myanmar and Nigeria that have 135 and 250 ethnic groups respectively (Osinubi & Osinubi, 2006). While citing studies by Ryan (1990) and Instituto Del Tercer (1997), Aremu (2010) noted that “multi-ethnic states are likely to continue to be a feature of international politics and that ethnic conflict is not only a threat to the African continent but also a menace to the whole international community” (p. 552). This shows a great need of adopting the *Amani Mashinani* model across many countries that experience ethnic violence. Since the model is based on improving people's relationships at the grassroots, its potential to bring peace in conflict-prone areas is high. This observation resonates with Heisler's

statement that: “ethnic groups and relationships between them are critical elements in achieving and maintaining social peace in most parts of the world, and if we are to deal intelligently with them, it is crucial to understand their dynamics” (Heisler, 1977, p.1). This shows the importance of working closer with the local communities at the grassroots level in order to understand the communities better. Such a move would promote moral authority and legitimacy. In developing countries, this model can play a major role in bringing peace since it considers the economic and developmental factors that fuel ethnic animosity. Future research should focus on expanding knowledge about mobilizing communities to address economically motivated conflicts especially in regions with mineral potential. This can be explained by the fact that there are core economic causes of the ethnic dimension on most of conflicts witnessed today. Indeed, Bishop Korir demonstrated how best such conflicts can be addressed using the *Amani Mashinani* model.

References

- Aremu, J. O. (2010). Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, causes, impact and solution. *African Research Review*, 4(4), 549-560.
- “Bishop Cornelius Kipng’eno Arap Korir”. The Hierarchy of the Catholic Church. <http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/barap.html>
- Bolton, M. et al. “Reflections on the role of the Church in building sustainable peace in the North Rift Region of Kenya.” Eldoret, Kenya: Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, 2017. <https://disarmament.blogs.pace.edu/files/2017/05/Reconciliation-Book-Layout-7-OnlineVersion-Inc-Cover-10r0mge.pdf>
- Cussac, A. ““Kibaki Tena?” The challenges of a campaign. The General Elections in Kenya, (2007): 35.
- Dersso, S. A. “How did Kenya deliver peaceful elections on 4 March 2013, defying observers' warning of a repeat of the 2007/8 violence?” Institute for Security Studies, 20 Mar, 2013. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-kenya-delivered-its-peaceful-general-elections>.
- Ervin, G. M., & Lechoe, M. A. (2018). Warriors to peace guardians—Emergent peacebuilding design in Kenya. In *Cultural encounters and emergent practices in conflict resolution capacity-building* (pp. 153-183). London: Palgrave Macmillan
- Feldman, L. G. (2012). *Germany's foreign policy of reconciliation: from enmity to amity*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Healey, J. (2010). How Small Christian Communities promote reconciliation, justice and peace in Eastern Africa. *Journal for Peace and Justice Studies*, 20(2), 43-60.
- Heisler, M. O. Ethnic conflict in the world today: An introduction. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 433, (1977): 1-5.
- Huho, J. M. (2012). Conflict resolution among pastoral communities in West Pokot County, Kenya: a missing link. *Academic Research International*, 3(3), 458.
- Instituto Del Tercer Mundo (1977). *The world guide, 1997/98*, Oxford, New Internationalist Publications Ltd.
- Jegen, M. E. 2006. *Just peacemakers: an introduction to peace and justice*. New York: Paulist Press.
- Kamunde-Aquino, N. Kenya's constitutional history. REDD+-Law project, Briefing Paper (2014): 1-4.
- Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) Jun 8 - Jul 29, 1982
- Khisa, C. S., Were, D. E., & Amutabi, M. (2016). Trends in livestock rustling and the dynamics of socio-economic development in Samburu and Marsabit Counties. Kenya. *Strategic Journal of Business & Change Management*, 3(4).
- Korir, C. Amani Mashinani (Peace at the Grassroots): Experiences of Community Peacebuilding in the North Rift Region of Kenya. Eldoret: Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, 2009. <http://www.crs.org/sites/default/files/tools-research/amani-mashinani.pdf> (2009).
- Lafargue, J. & Katumanga, M. Kenya in turmoil: Post-election violence and precarious pacification. *The General Elections in Kenya, 2007* (2009): 13-34.
- Lederach, J. P. 2003. *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, Intercourse, PA: Good Books.
- Makori, E. Bishop Cornelius Korir leaves big gap in volatile region. *The Daily Nation*. October 31, 2017. <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Peacemaker-bishop-Korir-leaves-gap-involatile-region/1056-4162512-naksh6/index.html>

- Miall, H. *The peacemakers: Peaceful settlement of disputes since 1945*. Springer, 2016.
- Mutua, E. & Kilonzo, S. "Transforming conflict in the hands and hearts of communities in Kenya: Understanding the relevance of Amani Mashinani model." In *Impact of communication and the media on ethnic conflict*. S. Gibson. ed. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2016, 273-287.
- Njogu, K., ed. (2009) *Healing the wound. Personal narratives about the 2007 Post-Election Violence in Kenya*. Nairobi: Twaweza.
- Okia, O. (2011). The role of the police in the Post-Election Violence in Kenya 2007/08. *Journal of Third World Studies* 28(2), 259-275.
- Orobator, A. E. (2018). *Religion and faith in Africa: Confessions of an Animist*. Orbis Books.
- Osinubi, T. S., & Osinubi, O. S. (2006). Ethnic conflicts in contemporary Africa: The Nigerian experience. *Journal of Social Sciences*, 12(2), 101-114.
- Ryan, S. (1990). *Ethnic conflict and international relations*, Brookfield V.T., Goner Publishing.
- Steele, D. (2008). An introductory overview to faith-based peacebuilding. In *Pursuing just peace: An overview and case studies for faith-based peacebuilders*, M. Rogers, T. Bamat, & J Ideh, eds. pp. 5-41. Baltimore, MD: Catholic Relief Services.
- Waris, A. (2015). Kenya's fiscal accountability revisited: A review of the historical erosion of the country's fiscal Constitution from 1962 to 2010. In Ambani, J., et al. *Human rights and democratic governance in Kenya: A post-2007 appraisal*. Nairobi: PULP.